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THE PIPELINE SEGMENT OF THE DOMESTIC PETROLEUM INDUSTRY:
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT
CHAPTER I
THE PIPELINE SEGMENT OF THE DOMESTIC PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY: INTRODUCTION
The modern petroleum industry is slightly over a century old, 
a century of spectacular growth that has been accompanied by technolog­
ical and organizational innovations unrivaled in the modern era of 
multinational corporations. The industry now ranks as one of the 
world's largest (if not the largest). Its present size is incomprehen­
sible to mortals who in their lifetime rarely deal with money in excess 
of a few thousand dollars.
In 1976 eight of the world's ten largest industrial corporations 
were petroleum companies. The combined worldwide sales of the eight 
companies in 1976 was $212 billion. The world's largest industrial 
corporation, Exxon, had sales totaling $48.6 billion in 1976. The 
worldwide sales of the twenty largest companies operating in the United 
States totaled $224.2 billion and seventeen of these companies were 
ranked in the top fifty industrial corporations in the United States.^
2The petroleum industry's century of growth unleashed economic 
and political power which nations have abetted and combatted throughout 
the century. The actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) since the early seventies has demonstrated petroleum's 
influence over the non-communist world.
Since the early part of this century governments outside the 
United States have tended to participate directly in the formation and 
ownership of petroleum companies. The British Petroleum Company and the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group are the best known early examples of this par­
ticipation. In 1976 of the twenty largest petroleum companies head­
quartered outside the United States, eight were wholly owned by their 
respective governments and three were partially owned. Of the nine 
remaining companies, four were subsidiaries of Exxon and two were joint 
ventures with U.S. companies.^
Within the United States, the petroleum industry has not exper­
ienced direct government participation. Rather it has grown and devel­
oped within an environment where the government tended to react to 
industry developments. The U.S. experience has been one of investi­
gation and intervention. Since the late nineteenth century these 
activities have been like an ocean tide, rising and falling over the 
century but never discontinuing. Indeed, governmental actions and 
public policy have been marked by schizophrenia— seeking to encourage 
competition in the domestic market but by diplomatic effort and tacit 
approval encouraging cartelization outside the United States.^
The domestic petroleum industry has a controversial history. 
Since the rise of the Standard Oil empire during 1865-1878 and its
3subsequent stock transfer in 1911, the industry's history has been 
marked by charges of concentration of economic and political power in 
first the Standard Oil group and later the eight or so largest compa­
nies. By virtue of early vertical integration of the industry, compa­
nies have allegedly been able to partially distort the functioning of 
the political and economic system.
Public archives contain many documents presenting evidence of 
collusion, restraint of trade, and monopoly. They also contain counter­
evidence of competition. The current explosion of investigations, anti­
trust activity, and governmental intervention has no historical parallel 
in terms of sheer volume and public awareness. In terms of substance, 
however, there are numerous parallels. Much of what is occurring (out­
side the issue of horizontal integration into other sources of energy) 
is little more than a rerun of the past with only a change in the partic­
ipants. The allegations and the defense in recent hearings and investi­
gations are somewhat more sophisticated perhaps but the theme remains 
remarkably the same as it was in the early stages of the development of 
the industry.
Domestic petroleum transportation, primarily pipelines, has not 
escaped attention or controversy during this century. Indeed in many 
investigations and court cases, pipelines have been at the center of the 
controversy. The ownership and control of pipelines by a few companies 
has been considered a central instrument used to prevent successful 
entry and competition within any other segment of the domestic industry.
The major purpose of this study is to contribute to the litera­
ture on the pipeline segment of the domestic petroleum industry. The
4study of pipelines in the United States is also a study of vertical 
integration within the industry. For this reason the study of pipe­
lines provides an indirect means of understanding the functioning of 
other segments of the domestic industry.
Pipelines serve a variety of purposes within the modern indus­
try, many of which lie outside the scope of the present study. For 
example, the transmission of natural gas from production to distribution 
point involved nearly 263,000 miles of pipeline in 1975, and is a field 
of inquiry within itself.^ The recent growth of offshore pipelines 
systems is also another example warranting separate study.
This study examines primarily the interstate network of pipe­
lines operating in the United States. It focuses on those lines that 
carry crude oil and refined petroleum products. Only peripheral atten­
tion is given to the intrastate system, the other transport modes, and 
the other three stages of the industry (production, refining, and 
marketing).
The volume of pipeline literature is relatively large and is 
growing rapidly as a result of the renewed interest in the petroleum 
industry brought on by the "energy crisis." Serious nongovernmental 
analysis of petroleum pipelines, however, has been lacking in recent 
years. The primary literature in this regard has essentially been con­
fined to...the work of Wolbert published in~l-9i5-^  _Cookenboo published in 
1955, and Johnson published in 1967.^
The secondary literature on pipelines has largely been a 
byproduct of the study of vertical integration and is much larger. The 
work of McLean and Haign published in 1954, De Chazen and Kahn published
in 1959, and the recent work edited by Edward J. Mitchell, published in 
1976 are among the more significant examples of this literature.^
Wolbert's examination of pipelines focused on the legal aspects 
of the developments of pipelines through the year 1951. Cookenboo's 
period of inquiry was similar to that of Wolbert's. Cookenboo, however, 
examined the structure and performance of pipelines and is cited as the 
individual responsible for formulating the theory of the pipeline firm 
and the associated production and cost functions. Cookenboo was also 
the first to consider joint venture pipelines and their public policy 
potential.
The work of Arthur M. Johnson culminated in Petroleum Pipelines 
and Public Policy, published in 1967. This work, a historic industry 
study, stands out as the most comprehensive study of petroleum pipelines 
through the year 1958. The research for this work financed by petroleum 
pipeline companies, was partially based upon company records. Only 80 
of the more than 474 pages of text covered the post 1940's period.^
Because the work of the major authors did not extend beyond the 
1950's, this study's primary focus is on the period 1957-1975. The 
previous work is used to provide the framework and perspective from 
which this study takes off.
Methodology
In organizing this study an eclectic approach was adopted. This 
approach combined elements of an "industry study," transportation eco­
nomics, and industrial organization. The latter is the methodological 
approach relied upon in organizing the empirical sections.
The development of industrial organization as a discipline of
6applied economics is generally attributed to the seminal work of Edward
S. Mason and Joe S. Bain.^ Students of industrial organization have 
traditionally organized their inquiries around a specific analytical 
schema. This methodology hypothesizes a causal relationship (also a 
sequential one) where structure determines behavior which in turn deter­
mines performance.
Much of the recent analysis in this area has been of an econo­
metric nature which revolves around the testing of the structure/ 
performance hypothesis, a hypothesis first outlined in its present con­
text by Bain in 1951.^ A priori independent variables (structural 
variables— concentration, entry barriers, degree of product differentia­
tion, etc.) are tested for their explanatory (or predictive) influence 
over a dependent performance variable (usually some profit measure).
The Industrial Organization approach has enjoyed a high level of 
acceptance but is not without its detractors. Its acceptance has 
recently moved into the antitrust field. For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission has made the structure, conduct, and performance methodology a 
central part of their suit against the eight largest oil companies. The 
Senate has witnessed the introduction of several bills which also 
utilize parts of this method.
Much of the substantial criticism of industrial organization is 
to be found in the work of Demsetz and Williamson.Aside from these, 
much of the criticism has been aimed at the procedures and data used in 
the analysis. Part of the criticism has centered around the somewhat 
mechanical approach that Bain describes as ". . . specifying very few 
structural independent variables and then put the experiment in the
'computer mills' [italics his] to see what would fall o u t . C r i t i c i s m  
has been leveled at the quality of data used in testing the relation­
ship. There appears to be a serious question of whether the data used 
from readily available public sources, primarily the triennial census of 
business, has maintained a degree of quality that is still useful.
The practical problems associated with the use of four or five 
digit SIC are well known. But the problem to a larger degree lies 
beyond problems of specification of models and mechanical data collec­
tion. It rests- in the area of the corporate entity which since the 
1950's has changed dramatically. This change— by merger, acquisition, 
legal segmentation (subsidiaries)— has manifested itself in the modern 
multi-national corporation.^^
This evolution of legal entities combined with a seeming distaste 
for examining the "trees" in favor of the "forest" has often led to mis­
placed emphasis and conclusions.^'^ This seems to have been the case in 
some of the past analysis of pipeline operations.
Ifhile this study uses the industrial organization methodology it 
does depart from the traditional analysis in that it is an intra­
industry examination using both cross-sectional and times-series data.
It also provides a detailed examination of cooperation and interdepend­
ency among pipeline operations and the public policy constraints within 
which companies have operated. The extent of the examination requires 
that the "performance" part of the analytical schema be left to others.
It is the intent, however, to provide the basis from which the perform­
ance analysis can take place.
Data Sources and Organization
Four sets of primary petroleum pipeline data were initially 
required for this study. These were aggregate data on all pipelines 
operating in the United States, disaggregated data on interstate and 
intrastate pipeline companies and systems, and pipeline ownership data. 
The quality and quantity of intrastate data (beyond mileage) proved to 
be a limiting factor. The importance of these lines relative to inter­
state pipeline was such that the problems were felt to be minor.
Aggregate data on all pipelines in the United States by state 
was obtained from the Bureau of the Mines' triennial survey of petroleum 
pipelines. The most recent survey was for the year 1974. Disaggregated 
data on intrastate lines came primarily from the Directory of Pipeline 
Companies and Pipeline Contractors,15 an annual publication. Data on 
individual interstate pipeline companies was obtained from both published 
and unpublished public documents prepared by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) as a part of their regulatory function. These data 
represent the majority of this study's empirical analysis.
Ownership data, an essential part of the work, was obtained for 
the years 1956-1959 from the Oil Record. F o r  the years 1973-1976, 
data was obtained from the ICC and the Association of Oil Pipelines.
Data on the intervening years came from a range of sources, primarily 
the Oil and Gas Journal, Pipe Line News, and Moody's Industrial 
Manual(s). The differing sources were used to cross check each source 
of infc unation.
The quantity and quality of the primary data on interstate pipe­
line companies proved to be much better than that available on other
9phases of the petroleum industry. The manner in which it is published 
or made available did present problems. These largely revolved around 
the fact that while company data is published each year, no historical 
times-series are published (other than limited aggregate data). In 
addition, the volume of available annual data was extensive. For 
example, in 1975, 104 companies reported to ICC and 89 separate series 
of operating and financial data was published for each company. This 
meant that manipulation of the data by hand was impossible. Selected 
annual data on all companies reporting to the ICC over the 1957-1975 
period was thus coded from each separate publication for data processing. 
The method used was similar to a "building block" approach used in other 
areas. By this it is meant that the data on each company, including 
ownership, was identified in such a manner that any number of alterna­
tive aggregations could be accomplished. Only a limited amount of this 
data, however, is contained in this study.
As noted the identification of pipeline ownership and changes 
in ownership is an important part of the empirical work. The procedure 
followed in developing this information is as follows : (1) ownership of 
the pipeline was identified for the beginning period (1957 or date of 
entry if before 1975), if a change had occurred the date and substance 
of the change was researched and inserted into the data base; and (2) 
ownership was traced to the parent and reported as such; intermediate 
ownership forms, while notec^  were not included in the data base. For 
example, most of Exxon's interstate pipeline holdings are made and held 
through its wholly owned pipeline subsidiary, Exxon Pipeline Company. 
Rather than show these interests as being held by the pipeline company
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as do most publications, the ultimate parent, Exxon, is recorded.
Another example is that of Phillips Petroleum. Phillips, through a non­
pipeline subsidiary, Phillips Investment Company, holds an equity in a 
pipeline operation. This is, however, shown in the data base only as 
Phillips Petroleum Company. The ultimate owner or owners are obviously 
the important ones and are thus shown without reporting the intermediate 
owners.
Secondary information was obtained from a host of sources. Much 
of it was obtained as a result of a series of interviews conducted in 
the early research stage of the study. In 1974 an interview was held at 
the Tulsa office of the Oil and Gas Journal as to potential sources and 
types of pipeline material available. In the same year two trips were 
made to Washington, D.C.
During these two trips, information was obtained from contacts 
with the following:
Interviews with the staffs of the
— Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition and Bureau 
of Economics
— Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives
— Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate
— Special Subcommittee on Integrated Oil Operations, Senate
Interview with Williams John Lament, Law Offices of Lobel, 
Novins, and Lamont. Mr. Lamont was formerly a staff attorney 
with the Department of Justice.
Interview with Richard Levy, then a consultant to the Bureau of 
Competition, Federal Trade Commission.
A search of public documents. Interstate Commerce Commission.
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A follow-up trip to Washington occurred in 1975. This, combined with 
continued correspondence, proved invaluable in obtaining additional 
information. In the latter stages of this study, Joe Bohannon, formerly 
Manager of Planning and Tariffs, Williams Pipeline Company, provided 
more up-to-date industry information.
Study Outline
This study of domestic pipeline is divided into two major 
sections. The first provides an overview of petroleum pipeline's his­
toric and present role within the domestic petroleum industry. The 
second section addresses the structure and conduct of pipeline companies 
and systems.
The overview begins by examining the evolution of public policy 
between 1865-1959. This provides a perspective concerning the substance 
of the controversy surrounding the ownership of pipelines by major petro­
leum companies as well as the regulatory constraints within which compa­
nies have had to operate.
This is followed by two chapters which define the modern trans­
portation requirements of the domestic petroleum industry in terms of 
magnitude and location, the dominant modes used, and the comparative 
cost structure of the competitive modes. Pipelines, which are shown to 
be the least cost transport mode, are examined in terms of the growth by 
type and location. The relative importance of interstate vs. intrastate 
lines is also evaluated.
Chapter V examines the theory of the pipeline firm, i.e., the 
production function and cost functions, and introduces the functions of 
pipelines within the vertically integrated structure of their owners'
12
total operations. This in effect reintroduces elements of the pipeline 
controversy.
Chapter VI is the first of the chapters which specifically 
addresses the current structure and conduct of pipelines.Chapter VI 
traces ownership patterns which developed between 1957-1975 as well as 
the number of pipeline firms in the interstate market by type of service 
provided. Chapters VII-VIII examine the issue of cooperation and inter­
dependency among companies. This is accomplished by considering the 
implications of pipeline joint ventures, as well as other lesser forms 
of cooperation.
Chapter IX looks at concentration within interstate pipelines. 
This combines a cross-sectional and time-series analysis. The time 
series seeks to address long-run concentration trends. Regional concen­
tration is examined briefly as are entry/exit trends resulting from 
mergers, acquisitions, and new company entry.
Chapter X returns to the issue of public policy which is ini­
tially addressed in Chapter II. As Chapter II outlined the public- 
policy impact prior to 1959, Chapter X examines public policy since that 
time. Chapter XI offers a summary and conclusion.
CHAPTER I
^Fortune, August, 1977, pp. 225-240; "The 1977 Fortune Double 
500 Directory," Fortune, pp. 4-23.
^Fortune, August, 1977, pp. 226-235.
A recent example of this occurred in 1975 when the Justice 
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part in international cooperation aimed at reducing the importing 
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Countries (OPEC)" ("Politics. Economics, and World Oil," American 
Economic Review, Vol. LXIV (‘"ay, 1974), p. 58.).
^Gas Facts: 1975, Arlington, Virginia: American Gas Association,
p. 50.
^George S. Wolbert, Jr., American Pipelines (Norman, OK: Univer­
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lines and Competition In The Oil Industry (Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1955); Arthur M. Johnson, Petroleum Pipelines and Public 
Policy, 1906-1959 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); several 
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Doctoral Dissertations," American Economic Review, vol. 67 (December, 
1977), pp. 1022-43.
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Oil Companies (Norwood, Massachusetts: Plimpton Press, 1954); Melvin G. 
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D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976).
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ed. by J. W. Markham and G. F. Papanek (New York: Houghton, Mifflin 
Company, 1970), p. 3; Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization, 2nd ed.
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(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968).
^Richard E. Caves in the Foreward of Joe S. Bain, Essays on 
Price Theory and Industrial Organization (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1972), p. vi.
l^Harold Demsetz, The Market Concentration Doctrine (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973); Oliver E. Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York:
The Free Press, 1975).
^Ijoe S. Bain, Essays on Price Theory and Industrial Organization,
p. 171.
12U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The Quality of Data as a Factor 
in Analyses of Structure-Performance Relationships (Washington, B.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 35-36.
^%ere reference can be made to the mainstream economist growing 
awareness that orthodox microtheory has limited capacity to address 
important phenomena, e.g., the complex modern corporation and the grow­
ing utilization of joint ventures. Williamson addresses this issue in 
Markets and Hierarchies, pp. 1-5, in a chapter he calls "Toward A New 
Institutional Economics" where he acknowledges his indebtedness to John 
R. Commons. Williamson, as do most others, largely ignores that intel­
lectual heritage to be found in the work of Veblen, Ayers, and others 
labeled as "institutionalist," see William M. Dugger, "Institutional and 
Neoclassical Economics Compared," Social Science Quarterly, vol. 58 
(December, 1977), pp. 449-61.
^^See R. A. Gordon, "Rigor and Relevance in a Changing Institu­
tional Setting," American Economic Review, vol. 66 (March, 1976), pp. 1-
13.
^^Midwest Oil Register, Directory of Pipeline Companies and 
Pipeline Contractors (Tulsa: Midwest Oil Register, 1953-75).
^^Petroleum Industry Projects, The Oil Record (Washington, D.C.: 
Petroleum Industry Projects, 1957, 1958, 1959).
^^This should not be interpreted as implying that that which has 
preceded Chapter VI is only background. The opposite is the case. To 
evaluate the modern functioning of the pipeline segment of the petroleum 
industry it is necessary to evaluate the evolution of regulation, the 
spatial character of the transportation requirements, the complementary 
nature of transport modes, and the economics of the pipeline firm.
CHAPTER II
THE GOVERHIIENT'S ROLE IN THE PIPELINE SEGMENT OP THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIG 
POLICY AND REGULATION
The ownership, control, and operation of pipelines by major 
petroleum companies has a controversial history. The controversy has 
its origins in the early 19th century development of the petroleum indus­
try. Pipelines along with railways were the principal tools used to 
develop the early Standard Oil combination, a combination which at one 
time held a virtual monopoly over production, refining, and marketing.^
The denial of access to the least cost transportation mode to 
those outside the "group" is the essence of the pipeline controversy 
which persists to the present. It has been alleged that the ownership 
and control of pipelines by first, the Standard group, and later, the 
top eight petroleum companies has allowed these companies to control 
other stages of the domestic petroleum industry.
This chapter considers the controversy surrounding pipelines
between 1865 and 1959. It examines the evolution of public policy and
pipeline regulation which developed as a reaction to a continued
controversy. The ultimate purpose of the chapter is to evaluate the
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public policy developed prior to 1959 and to assess its impact on the 
structure of the pipeline segment of the industry.
The Origins of the Controversy and Public Policy: 1865-1919
Between 1865 and 1879 the Standard Oil combination was developed. 
By 1879 the combination controlled between 80 and 90 percent of the 
industry. The success of this development was largely due to the combi­
nation's rapid expansion into the field of transportation. In a ten 
year period, between 1869 and 1879, the combination bought or controlled
almost every transportation facility which existed in the oil regions of 
2
the United States.
In 1906, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the successor 
to the original combination was charged with a violation of the Sherman 
Act. It was alleged as a part of the Standard Oil case that the abso­
lute control of pipeline transportation and the preferential rates and 
rebates from railroads gave Standard Oil control over the crude oil 
market.^
Independent producers could not gain access to either pipelines 
or railroads at a cost similar to those who controlled the pipelines and 
railroads. They were thus forced to sell crude at the wellhead at a 
price offered by Standard Oil, join the group, or abandon the oil busi­
ness. The independent refiner could not move crude oil to refineries at
a rate competitive with Standard Oil. What pipelines there were, were
4
owned and operated strictly for the convenience of Standard Oil.
In 1911, five years after the case was filed. Standard Oil Com­
pany of New Jersey was broken into 34 individual companies. The relief 
ordered under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, required Standard
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to transfer its stocks in 37 subsidiaries to its stockholders. Further, 
both subsidiaries and stockholders were enjoined from combining with 
each other or with Standard Oil of New Jersey to bring about further 
Sherman Act violations.^
The dissolution achieved under the decree was aimed primarily at 
legal corporate interrelationships and left unaltered the existing 
physical relationships between Standard's various pipelines and refin­
eries. The lines laid to serve particular refineries continued doing 
so, with relatively minor short run changes in these relationships.^
The year 1906 was also significant because it represents the 
beginnings of federal intervention into the interstate pipeline segment 
of the petroleum industry. Prior to 1906, there was no federal legis­
lation applicable to pipelines. The original Interstate Commerce Act 
passed in 1887 contained no pipeline provisions.
In 1906, Congress passed the Hepburn Act.^ This act,among other 
purpose^ extended limited provisions of the original Interstate Commerce 
Act to interstate pipelines. This congressional action had the purpose 
of eliminating the abuses resulting from the behavior of Standard Oil.
The Hepburn Act stands out, not only as the beginning, but the end of 
comprehensive pipeline legislation enacted by Congress. It was not
until 1914, however, that the constitutionality of the Hepburn Act was
8upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.
One of the most controversial aspects of the extension of the 
ICC Act to pipelines was that pipelines were not covered by the commodity 
clause. The commodity clause prohibits a common carrier from owning the 
commodities being shipped by the carrier. Attempts were made during the
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debate over the bill and after the passage of the Hepburn Act to extend 
the clause to pipelines but were unsuccessful. To many, this failure 
allowed many of the early abuses to continue.^ .
The ICC's jurisdiction over pipelines as a result of the Hepburn 
Act extended primarily to the following matters: (1) the pipeline's duty 
to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request by any 
party (i.e., to function as a common carrier); (2) to establish reason­
able through routes with other common carriers and to establish just and 
reasonable rates and charges; (3) to prohibit any discrimination or dis­
advantage to any shipper, locality, or territory; (4) the requirement 
that each pipeline file with the Commission all rates and charges, clas­
sifications, regulations, and practices for the transportation between 
all points on its system; (5) not to demand nor collect any different 
compensation for transportation unless specified in its filed tariff; 
and (6) it provided the authority for the Commission to review all pipe­
line rates and if they were found to be unjust, unreasonable, discrimi­
natory, or preferential to suspend such rates and to determine and 
prescribe a just and reasonable rate.^^
The Act prohibited a pipeline from entering into any agreement 
with any other pipeline, the pooling or dividing of traffic, service, 
or earnings except those specifically approved by the Commission. The 
Act required pipelines to file an annual periodic and special report 
as required and it allowed the Commission to prescribe a uniform system 
of accounts and rates of depreciation for pipeline property. The author­
ity was given to the ICC or any other authorized agent, accountant, or 
examiner at all times to inspect the accounts, books, records, and
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correspondence of every pipeline covered by the Act and to provide a 
basic and annual evaluation of pipeline property.
The Act did not give the Commission jurisdiction over pipeline 
facilities for operation, construction or abandonment. Nor did it give 
them jurisdiction over the issuance of securities, formation of inter­
locking directorates, mergers, or consolidations with other p i p e l i n e s . 12 
The legislative and judicial action taken between the period 
1906 and 1914 was largely aimed at the Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey. This was the intent of the extension of the Hepburn Act to 
pipelines. The basic question that evolved out of this period: could 
common carrier status applied to pipelines owned by integrated oil com­
panies achieve the results of forcing these pipelines to share trans-
13portation savings with competitors and ultimately the public?
In 1907 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued a report to 
Congress which concluded that it would probably be necessary to divorce 
the function of transportation of crude oil from that of production and 
distribution. With this report, the ICC discounted the potential impor­
tance of the statute that it itself had the responsibility of enforcing. 
The Commission apparently felt that enforcement would be impossible 
without the extension of the commodity clause or the same remedy by 
divorcing pipelines from integrated oil operations. The Bureau of 
Corporations, the forerunner of the Federal Trade Commission, reached a 
different conclusion in the same year when they insisted that pipelines 
could be regulated.
Between 1906 and 1919, the petroleum industry experienced rapid 
change as a result of the discovery of major new crude oil fields.
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Production shifted from the northeastern part of the United States to 
the Midwest and Southwest (primarily Texas). It was primarily during 
this period that new companies, such as Gulf, Shell, Texaco, Phillips, 
Sun, and Cities Service successfully entered the industry. It was these 
new entries, combined with Standard Oil of New Jersey and its former 
subsidiaries that were to emerge as the dominant companies over the 
next 60 years.
As production became further removed from ultimate consumers, 
the role of transportation became more critical. The rapid change 
occurring during this period opened a new era for not only the industry, 
but also for pipeline transportation as well. Tlie emerging companies 
soon found themselves in a position of having to cope with pipeline 
regulations whose initial purposes were centered on the Standard Oil 
Companies. As a general rule, the major newcomers opposed the extension 
of common carrier status to pipelines. They maintained that their pipe­
line facilities were in-house facilities built to carry their own oil 
from producing fields to their refineries.
The owners of oil pipelines had several alternative courses of 
action available to them in regard to how to adjust their pipeline oper­
ations to the provisions of the Hepburn Act. Among these alternatives 
were: (1) they could rearrange their pipeline operations into legal 
entities that did not involve interstate commerce; (2) they could avoid 
regulation by withdrawing from pipeline operations entirely; (3) they 
could accept the formal applications of the law, but structure compliance 
in such a way that it would negate the statute's practical impact; (4) 
they could attack the statute through both court and legislative action;
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(5) the major operators could ignore the statute completely and leave 
the next move up to the government; and (5) the law could be accepted 
and complied with in terms of its obvious intent.
Over the course of the next 35 years, petroleum companies with 
major pipeline operations were to use all but one of these alternatives. 
In no instance did a major oil company withdraw from the pipeline busi­
ness. The alternative that ultimately proved successful was the accep­
tance of the formal application of the law but with compliance struc­
tured in ways that the statute's actual impact was minimized.
The initial reaction of the Standard Oil companies was to 
rearrange their corporate organization in such a way that they gave the 
appearance of operating only intrastate pipelines. The Supreme Court, 
in its pipeline decision, rejected this attempt to avoid the impact of 
the legislation by reorganization. Standard Oil's attempt to reorganize 
their pipeline interests was to prove a major innovation.Companies 
since that time have looked to reorganization into new legal entities as 
a means of coping with regulation.
As noted, the Supreme Court decision, rendered June 22, 1914, 
struck down a combination of managerial strategies, the passivity of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the complications of a legal process 
which had taken eight years in which to uphold the constitutionality of 
the Hepburn Act.^^ The Court decision was not definitive in that the 
statute's provisions should apply to any corporation engaged in the 
interstate transportation of crude oil. Part of the Court decision 
created uncertainty which resulted in further interpretation of the 
applicability of the federal regulatory statute as applied to pipeline 
operations.
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In evaluating the period between 1906 and 1914, the Interstate
Conmerce Commission was found to be relatively passive with regard to
its new responsibilities. Johnson in summarizing the period concluded:
The chief change that had been brought about in the pipeline sector 
of the oil industry as a result of public policy since 1906 was an 
increasing segregation into corporate entities of pipeline activ­
ities conducted by integrated and semi-integrated companies.
Although formally subject to either or both state and federal regu­
lations as common carriers, these pipeline companies in practice 
continue to serve the needs of their owners.19
Regulatory Activities: 1919-1931
Between the time that the Hepburn Act was upheld and 1932, the 
emerging major companies, large enough to compete with many of the for­
mer members of the Standard Oil group, followed the pattern of behavior 
established by the Standard companies as they attempted to integrate 
both upstream and- d o w n s t r e a m . ^0 it was during this period that charges 
of monopolization of the industry through the ownership and control of 
pipelines were extended from a single focus on the Standard group to 
the major companies (usually the eight largest) involved in the industry. 
As the industry grew and became more complex, so did the complexity of 
the alleged abuses. The major complaint, however, still centered on the 
independent and small producers being denied access to a major's crude 
oil pipeline.
Being denied access, the small producer was forced to sell his 
product to the gathering line in the producing field. Sale was at the 
posted price offered by the owners of the gathering line. Access was 
allegedly limited by three means. The first was by charging excessive 
rates. Tariffs were set as high as the traffic»would bear. The rate 
generally set was equal to or slightly below the tariff posted by the
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railroad companies.““
The second means of denying access was through the minimum ten­
der requirement for shipment on those common carriers. As a general 
rule, the minimum tender for the industry through 1933 was 100,000 
barrels.
The third complaint revolved around pipeline proration. % e n  
supply was greater than purchasers' requirements, buyers and pipeline 
companies could effectively discriminate by use of the common purchaser 
statute which required equitable distribution of the purchase of crude 
oil. The effect of this was that by prorating the oil between the 
shipper-owner and the outside shipper reduced to a greater degree the 
amount that the individual independent producer should ship since the 
law required transportation furnished by the carrier shall be apportioned 
among all shippers r a t a b l y . ^4
As the interstate pipeline market expanded and complaints of
abuse also increased, the ICC continued to remain passive in regard to
its role as regulator of common carrier pipelines. Although the ICC was
given its authority in 1905, its only significant action before 1919 was
to require pipeline companies to file tariffs. This was largely a formal
requirement since the ICC would not challenge tariffs unless a formal
2 Scomplaint was filed by an outside shipper.
It was not until 1920, 14 years after passage of the Act, that 
the ICC prescribed minimum reporting requirements. In addition to the 
requirement of filing tariffs, the ICC prescribed a classification of 
investments in pipelines, as well as for operating revenue and expenses. 
This action was prompted by the year-early order that all companies
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subject to ICC jurisdiction submit a report for 1918 and each year 
thereafter. This report became known as the "P" form which was designed 
to reveal information about the ownership, management, and operation of 
oil pipelines.
These reporting requirements along with the ICC legal authority 
to examine company records reinforced what was becoming standard indus­
try practice of separating interstate pipelines operations from the 
parent company (usually in the form of a wholly-owned subsidiary). This 
management strategy was to succeed in limiting the access of the ICC to 
broader company records and accounts.
In 1920 the first formal complaint against a pipeline was filed 
with the ICC. The Brundred Brothers Case was also the first adversary 
pipeline action to be heard by the ICC.28 The complaint alleged that 
the minimum tender required by the Prairie Pipeline Company was unjust 
and unreasonable. In this instance, the Company required a minimum 
shipment of 100,000 barrels. The Brundred Brothers charged that this 
was a discriminatory requirement which effectively discriminated against 
all small producers. The case was decided in 1922 after a two year 
delay and at considerable expense to the small operator. The ICC ruled 
in favor of the Brundred Brothers. The minimum tender was reduced to 
10,000 barrels. The reduction was, however, limited to this one pipe­
line .
The reporting requirements order in 1919 and 1920 and the 
Brundred Brothers case represented the majority of the ICC action 
between the time the Act was held constitutional (1914) and 1931. The 
lack of activity on the part of the ICC was in part inherent since the
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Commission adopted a practice of relying on complaints filed by shippers 
and producers. In addition and unlike some other regulatory agencies, 
the cost associated with the filing of the complaint was not absorbed 
by the ICC but by the company filing the complaint.
Between the years 1906 and 1931, the ICC failed to aggressively 
pursue its responsibility as the regulator of interstate pipelines. This 
passive role occurred during the time that interstate pipeline mileage 
increased from 24,666 miles in 1905 to 115,710 miles in 1931.^^ In 
summary, even by 1931 the impact of federal regulation on the rates and 
practices of interstate companies had been minimal. During this period, 
a number of states, particularly Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma attempted 
to regulate pipeline. Their impact was also minimal.
The lack of significant activity is attributable to three inter­
related factors: (1) the lack of complaints; (2) the long period required 
to litigate complaints; and (3) the relatively large expense the plain­
tiff was required to bear. The small producer and refiner was thus 
faced with the probability of long litigation which at best would be 
expensive and at worst, they could lose the case.
Regulatory Activities: 1931-59
The major innovation on the part of the ICC through the year
1919 was the requirement that pipeline companies file an annual report.
In terms of the final establishment of a uniform system of accounts,
this was not accomplished until January of 1935. It was only in 1936,
30 years after the passage of the Hepburn Act, that a system of depre-
33elation of accounts became effective.
In part, these delays could be explained by the fact that many
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of the sections contained in the Hepburn Act were permissive and not 
requiring action. For example, it gave the Commission the authority to 
prescribe a uniform system of accounts and to prescribe rates and 
depreciations. It gave the Commission the authority to require a basic 
and annual evaluation of each pipeline's property.
The valuation of a carrier's property was and is the key element 
of tariff rate regulation. Valuation was basic to the determination of 
whether pipeline rates were "unjust," "unreasonable," "justly discrimin­
atory," or "unduly preferential." The ICC's bureau of evaluation did 
not begin the process of evaluating pipelines until 1934. Even then, 
the basic valuation program was not completed until 1940. At that time 
some 52 companies and one lessor were valued as of December, 1934.^^
The development of valuations was a cooperative effort on the 
part of the ICC's Bureau of_Valuation and the American Petroleum Insti­
tute. In regard to this cooperation, Johnson was to comment: " . . .  the 
regulatory body had probably worked more closely with pipeline companies 
in establishing valuations than with any other transportation media sub­
ject to the ICC's jurisdiction."35
Many have attributed the six year time lag between the beginning 
of the valuation program in 1934 and its completion in 1940 to the lack 
of staff and financial resources, as well as the "press of other 
matters." Congress bears part of the responsibility for the long delay 
since a time when many members were instigating investigations concern­
ing the anticompetitive aspects of pipeline operations, the majority of 
Congress was reluctant to provide the necessary appropriations to speed 
the valuation process.
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By 1940, the Interstate Commerce Commission had valuation 
dockets on each company for only the year ending December, 1934. In 
1948, the ICC ordered the 55 companies who had submitted earlier valua­
tions and ten new companies to submit data on their valuations and 
original costs to set a new base date of December 31, 1947. This process 
was completed in approximately 1952 when the Bureau of Valuations began 
to issue annual valuation reports on all pipeline companies. In 1954,
the reports were brought up to date and have continued to be updated
37annually since that time.
Thus, by 1954, 48 years after the passage of the Hepburn Act, 
valuation dockets on pipeline companies in the United States were avail­
able for only the years 1934, 1947, and 1954. This lack of basic infor­
mation became critical as valuation was to be important in two later 
landmark cases— one determined by the Department of Justice and the 
other by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Prior to 1934, the ICC had accepted tariffs filed by pipeline 
companies as being reasonable and fair in the absence of formal com­
plaints. In 1934, however, the ICC began an investigation of pipeline 
rates and gathering charges. The ICC acting without a formal complaint 
began an investigation of the long standing charge that tariffs charged 
by shipper/owner pipelines were excessive to the point of denying access
O Q
to the pipelines.
This investigation, the Reduced Pipeline Rates and Gathering 
Charges Case, culminated in a tentative decision in 1940.^9 The decision 
gave pipeline companies 60 days to show cause as to why the order reduc­
ing minimum tenders to 10,000 barrels and adjusting rates to achieve an
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8 percent return on the Commission’s valuation of investment should 
not become effective. The case was important because it marked the 
first time that the Commission had addressed these two critical issues.
The 8 percent set by the Commission placed a maximum that could 
be charged on the entire system. This distinction is important because 
those companies operating only a single pipeline from point A to B had 
limited flexibility in establishing tariffs. The tariff would have to 
be set in such a fashion so that net income would yield a maximum of only 
8 percent return on investment. In cases where a pipeline company oper­
ated a multi-pipeline and multi-terminating system, the 8 percent was an 
overall average return. This allowed those companies considerable flex­
ibility in charging tariffs on certain segments of the system that would 
yield a higher return, as well as the corollary of being able to charge 
anything below that rate on other segments.
For reasons that are not quite clear the Reduced Pipeline Rates 
and Gathering Charge Case remained open until 1948. Two possible expla­
nations for this delay were (1) the outbreak of the war and (2) the 
valuation process previously discussed was taking such a long time. When 
a decision was initially issued (in 1940) there were valuation dockets 
for only the year 1934 and they had just become available.
Although the ICC had instituted its own investigation of exces­
sive rates, it was not until 1944 that the Commission ruled upon an out­
side complaint brought by a shipper that alleged excessive rates. In 
the Minnelusa Case, the Minnelusa Oil Company charged that the pipeline 
company was charging rates which violated the ICC provisions that rates 
could not be "unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory and unduly
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p r e j u d i c i a l . "41 i n  issuing their decision, the ICC found the rates to 
be unreasonable and reaffirmed the 8 percent maximum rate of return 
first applied in the Reduced Pipeline Rates and Gathering Charges Case 
of 1940.
That tariffs charged prior to 1940 were excessive is one area 
where students of the petroleum industry generally agree. Wolbert 
states the issue by commenting that "nominal profits derived from pipe­
line transportation, reflected by dividends paid, were generally enor­
mous prior to 1940."^^ Wolbert illustrated the point by noting statis­
tics on typical pipelines oumied by the larger oil companies during this 
period. Between January 1, 1929, and June 30, 1938, for example. Humble 
Pipeline Company (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey) had a total investment of little over $101 million. During the 
same period of time, the pipeline company paid out $138 million in divi­
dends. The Shell Pipeline Company in this same period of time had 
investments in pipelines of approximately $56 million and at the same 
time had paid out dividends in excess of $101 million.
The pipeline issues of the pre-World War II period were primarily 
concerned with crude oil transportation. The reason for the emphasis 
was the fact that product pipelines were relatively unimportant. It was 
only in the latter part of the 1930's that product pipelines began to 
expand. In 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission faced its first 
major case concerning a gasoline pipeline. In the Petroleum Rail Ship- 
pers Case, the Commission addressed a charge that an unreasonable rate 
was being charged by a gasoline pipeline c o m p a n y . 44 The final decision, 
effective June 11, 1941, drew upon the results of the Reduced Pipeline
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Rates and Gathering Charges Case tentatively decided in 1940. In the 
case, the Commission established for product pipelines a 10 percent rate 
of return on valuation. The two percent differential between this rate 
and the crude oil rate was justified on the part of the Commission as a 
result of higher risk and uncertainty in the transportation of refined 
products by pipeline.
Uncertainty Created by the Supreme Court Ruling of 1914
In the pipeline cases decided in 1914, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the pipeline provisions of the Hepburn Act and its applica­
bility to pipelines engaged in the interstate transportation of oil.
The Court supported the position that the purpose of the Hepburn Act was 
to deal with practices like those of the Standard Oil Group which 
resulted in the independent producers having to sell their oil prior to 
transportation.
In the Court's opinion it made no difference that the company 
had never carried oil for others prior to the Act, i.e., it had not held 
itself out to be a common carrier. The Court, however, made one excep­
tion in that it held that one of the defendants, the Uncle Sam Oil 
Company, was not within the scope of the Act because it carried on its 
owm line oil produced in its own field to its own refinery, i.e., it was 
a plant facility which by chance crossed an interstate boundary. This 
exception was to create uncertainty in the late 1930's and 1940's as to 
the ICC's ultimate jurisdiction. __
On the surface, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling of 1914 seemed to 
resolve the issue of the ICC's jurisdiction. The Uncle Sam exception 
opened the door to additional challenges to ICC's regulatory authority
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over pipelines. The Supreme Court was to ultimately rule on three chal­
lenges based on the Uncle Sam exception. Rather than clarify the issues, 
the decisions created additional uncertainty.
Each of the cases were appeals of ICC's orders that the pipeline 
companies in question comply with certain provisions of the Hepburn Act. 
The first case involved a crude pipeline which connected a producing 
field to a single r e f i n e r y . T h e  company argued that its operation was 
the same as in the Uncle Sam instance. The Supreme Court rejected the 
company claim and upheld the ICC. The Court noted that the company, 
unlike Uncle Sam, did not own the producing wells but purchased the oil 
in the field. In its original order the ICC had not requested full com­
pliance with the Act but only partial. After the ruling the Company did 
proceed to file tariffs.
The second and third case involved the Champlin Petroleum Company
and its product p i p e l i n e s . ^8 The Champlin cases were viewed by the ICC
as a test case of the limits of their authority concerning refined
product pipelines which were being operated as private carriers/plant 
49facilities. In 1941 the ICC ordered Champlin to file information neces­
sary to begin the valuation process. The company appealed this order 
based upon the argument that it had never operated as a common carrier, 
published tariffs, or been asked to ship for others (which was not physi­
cally possible since it connected to only its one refinery). The company 
did, however, have a pricing formula which included, explicitly, trans­
portation costs less charges borne by the purchaser between the terminal 
and the bulk plant. The Supreme Court ruled that the company must comply 
with the reporting requirements of ICC but did not rule upon whether the
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pipeline was for other purposes of the Act a common carrier. The 
decision was 5-4 with the minority seeing no difference between Champlin 
and the Uncle Sam exception. The minority also reopened the issue of a 
common carrier definition by noting that the company had never carried 
products for others.^0
After the ruling, the ICC in 1948 ordered Champlin to comply 
with other provisions of the Act. Champlin again appealed the ruling to 
the federal courts based upon essentially the same grounds as before.
The company, however, had revised its pricing formula by eliminating the 
explicit transportation charge. The Supreme Court, in 1951, ruled for 
the company and stated that the ICC had exceeded its authority in requir­
ing Champlin to file tariffs. The Court ruled that Champlin would have 
to comply with the reporting provisions. The Court had ruled that 
Congress had not intended to subject private carriers to the same provi­
sions as common carriers. In a dissenting opinion. Justice Hugo Black 
pointed out that the Court had pulled back from the 1914 ruling and the 
Valvoline ruling. Congress, in his opinion, had intended to include the 
ICC's powers to all interstate pipelines.
The Champlin rulings set the precedence that an interstate prod­
uct pipeline could operate as a private carrier but also be covered by 
some provisions of the ICC act. Only common carriers were required, 
however, to file tariffs and have the rates approved. The precedence 
in reality was to have no effect on future product lines or on crude 
pipelines. In the crude case, rarely was a pipeline built to only serve 
the owner's own wells. Refined product pipelines, built after the rul­
ing, were largely joint-venture lines or lines built by common carrier
r o
companies.
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Congressional and Executive Branch Activities through 1959^^
Between 1915 and 1951, pipelines and pipeline companies were the 
subject of a series of investigations which were conducted by both the 
Congress and the agencies of the Executive Branch. Between the years 
1931 and 1951, for example, there was a bill introduced in every Congress 
except the 80th either requiring divorcement of pipelines or seeking 
application of the commodity c l a u s e . I n  1933, President Roosevelt 
recommended emergency legislature for divorcement of pipelines. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act had a pipeline provision which required 
divorcement from their integrated o\mers. The Act was ruled unconstitu­
tional by the Supreme Court.
While members of Congress were active in terms of investigation 
and proposed legislation. Congress as a whole continued the practice of 
not providing the Interstate Commerce Commission with the appropriations 
necessary to speed the collection of necessary data for effective regu­
lation of common carrier pipelines. While the majority of Congress did 
not feel compelled to pass new legislation, Congressional and Executive 
pressures may have been the primary motivation behind actions taken by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission particularly in 1934. This also seems 
to have applied to the action taken by the Department of Justice in 
1940.56
Justice Department activities were largely motivated by the 
hearings held before the Temporary National Economic Committee of the 
Congress of the United States during the late 30's.5^ The TNEC investi­
gations provided Justice attorneys an opportunity to familiarize them­
selves with the petroleum industry and to assess the practices of the
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industry and its vulnerability to antitrust action. The Great 
Depression had accelerated the criticisms and investigations of the 
petroleum industry and pipelines in particular._ The acceleration 
reached a peak in 1940 when the Department of Justice filed a compre­
hensive antitrust action against the industry.
In September, 1940, the Justice Department filed suit against 
22 integrated oil companies, their subsidiaries, affiliates, and their 
trade association, the American Petroleum Institute. The suit charged 
violations of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act and Sections 2 and 
3 of the Clayton Act. Among other charges, these companies were charged 
with conspiring to fix prices and control transportation, distribution, 
and sales. The case became known as the Mother Hubbard Case. Among the
various remedies sought were divestiture of transportation and market- 
59ing.
Simultaneously with the filing of the Mother Hubbard Case,
Justice filed three cases against three pipeline companies.These com­
panies were considered as representative of the 59 pipeline companies 
which Justice felt were in violation of the rebates provision of the 
Elkins Act. The violation centered on the payment of pipeline dividends 
to parent companies. The Elkins Act Cases were brought to clarify the 
law with respect to instances where pipeline companies were owned by the 
major oil companies. The government sought both injunctions prohibiting 
dividends, as well as triple damages for what the government considered 
to be illegal rebates.
In the Mother Hubbard Case . the major companies' pipeline owner­
ship, both jointly and individually, allegedly represented illegal
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control over crude markets. The government contended that the major 
companies had conspired to force independent producers to sell at the 
wellhead rather than use pipelines as common carriers. This was essen­
tially the same charge that had been brought against Standard Oil of 
New Jersey in 1906.^^
The government claimed that the pipeline companies had achieved 
this result through three means. First, pipeline companies had failed 
to provide common carrier terminals; second, pipeline companies had 
charged excessive rates; and_third, excessive minimum tenders were estab­
lished and these tenders effectively prohibited the small producer from 
using these lines. The Justice staff sought several economic objectives 
in both the Mother Hubbard and the Elkins Cases. The first objective 
was to force pipelines to operate as common carriers in fact, as well as 
in form. The second objective was to force a reduction in rates which 
would allow independent producers to seek their own market via pipe­
lines.
The advent of World War II prevented a trial of the Mother 
Hubbard Case and was considered to have forced the settlement rather 
than the litigation of the Elkins Cases. T h e  Mother Hubbard Case was 
postponed until after the end of World War II. It became evident to 
some after the filing of the Mother Hubbard Case that the comprehensive 
charges and large number of defendants made it nearly impossible to 
handle as a single case. It was argued that the case should be replaced 
with individual suits. It was this line of reasoning that led to the 
case's dismissal in 1951. Justice attempted after 1951 to bring to 
trial, parts of the case in a series of antitrust suits. This series of
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suits attacked almost all the Mother Hubbard issues except pipelines.
The Mother Hubbard Case was the most ambitious undertaking of the 
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. It-was also considered one 
of its biggest failures.
The Pipeline Consent Decree
Almost immediately after the filing of the Mother Hubbard and 
Elkins Act Cases, the Justice Department made an offer to negotiate a 
settlement of the pipeline issues. The first offer was made in December, 
1940, three months after the cases were f i l e d . T h e  particular facts 
surrounding the negotiations between Justice and the defendant oil compa­
nies were never fully disclosed. As noted, the fact that the U.S. was 
shortly to enter World War II did accelerate the negotiations of a con­
sent decree. In addition, the threat of damages amounting to three 
times the dividends paid stimulated the companies' interest. Congress' 
favorable attitude towards pipeline divorcement caused the oil companies
to consider the negotiations as an opportunity to dispose a troublesome 
67issue.
In the negotiations, the Justice staff initially took the posi­
tion that dividends paid to the owners of pipelines represented illegal 
rebates. The petroleum industry united in opposition to this and pushed 
for a consent decree that would relate only to payments in excess of a 
"reasonable rate of r e t u r n . A s  early as the first meeting, the 
Justice Department indicated that they were not interested in divorcement 
of pipelines as much as they were in requiring pipelines to conform more 
closely to the common carrier role specified by Congress. That Justice 
was interested in assuring that pipeline companies did in fact behave as
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common carriers was an indication that they considered that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission had failed its regulatory responsibility.
In early 1941, a basic understanding was reached which would 
underlie the remaining negotiations. This understanding was that the 
pipeline part of the Mother Hubbard and the Elkins Act Cases would be 
settled on the basis of a certain percent return on the latest Inter­
state Commerce Commission valuation. The rate of return would be one 
that would not be considered a rebate, concession, or any other form of 
discrimination.^^
The bombing of Pearl Harbor and the movement of the nation into 
a wartime situation prompted the parties to accelerate their attempts to 
reach an agreement. The formal conclusion of the negotiations took 
place in District Court on December 23, 1941, when the government entered 
its complaint in the form of the United States vs. the Atlantic Refining 
C o m p a n y . T h e  consent decree accepted by the Court settled the pipeline 
issues of both the Mother Hubbard and Elkins Act Cases.
The hastily concluded negotiations generated a considerable 
furor. While the Court accepted the decree on December 23, 1941, several 
members of Justice's negotiation team refused to sign the final decree. 
The decree was signed by higher members of the Justice Department. The 
decree was also signed by 20 major oil companies, 52 of their pipeline 
companies and seven affiliates.
The decree had five major provisions. The first prevented pay­
ment in the form of "earnings, dividends, sums of money, or other valu­
able considerations derived from transportation or other common carrier 
services" in excess of seven percent of the valuation of the common
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carrier property. The second, defined valuation as the latest prepared 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The third provision was that 
excessive earnings could not be included in the.future valuation base. 
Fourth, excessive earnings could be used to retire existing debts but 
otherwise their use was restricted (i.e., frozen in terms of both payout 
and in terms of the future valuation base) . This restriction would 
continue until the sale, dissolution, transfer or divorcement of the 
carrier from its owner. The fifth provision was the "...knowing violation 
of the decree's provisions would subject the violator to a penalty of
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three times the amount of the prohibited payment."
The consent decree was found to be riddled with ambiguities.^^ 
While the provisions of the decree placed â limitation on the payout of 
dividends to the parent company, it left both rates and earnings unregu­
lated. The ambiguities were to present problems for both companies and 
the Justice Department. From the pipeline companies' perspective, they 
had three ways of interpreting the meaning of the consent decree. First, 
clarification could be sought directly and formally from the Justice 
Department. As it was indicated, members of the Justice Department 
staff had opposed the decree in the first place, and there was some 
feeling in the industry that this would be'a major problem in receiving 
favorable interpretations from the Department. The second approach was 
to seek formal clarification in the Court. The third approach was for 
each company subject to the decree to interpret the decree as it saw 
fit. They would then report to the Department what they had done or 
proposed to do in attempt to clarify their interpretation as it was 
encountered.
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The third approach was adopted by almost all companies. There 
were only a limited number of companies who approached Justice during 
the war years concerning interpretations. One of these was significant 
and played a major role in the determination in future financing methods 
of pipeline companies. The precedence that was established by Justice 
and the Court was a move by the owners of the Great Lakes Pipeline 
Company to refinance that pipeline operation.
The Great Lakes Pipeline Company (a joint venture) had been 
included in the government's Elkins Act Case. Before the final consent 
decree was issued, the shipper/owners of the company withdrew 82 percent 
of their original investment in the pipeline company. After the decree 
was signed, the owners of Great Lakes proposed to refinance their opera­
tion. The recapitalization approved by Justice allowed the Great Lakes 
owners to borrow indirectly against the equities but did not allow them 
a greater share of future profits than if the recapitalization had not 
taken place.
Both the Justice Department and the Federal District Court 
approved the substitution of debt for equity within the approved terms 
of the consent decree. The importance of this strategy by Great Lakes 
demonstrated that the equity structure of the pipeline companies could 
be altered. This represented a major innovation and a significant 
method on the part of pipeline companies to avoid partially or wholly 
the constraints of a seven percent payout.
Another problem of interpretation of the consent decree was the 
result of the fact that pipeline companies did not have the valuation 
data required by the decree. Since only the 1934 ICC valuations were
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available, the companies had to provide their interpretation of this 
part of the Act. The Justice Department accepted these reports for 
their files but did not specifically acknowledge the correctness of the 
methods used.
Another issue arose concerning the interpretation of the seven 
percent restriction as applied to interest payments made to the parent 
company on funds loaned to the pipeline company. This issue was compli­
cated by the fact that while Justice was issuing opinions to individual 
pipeline companies, they were not publicizing or distributing these 
opinions to the remainder of the companies covered by the consent decree. 
The Justice Department's unpublicized opinion expressed to one company 
was that all payments of any kind in excess of seven percent were pro­
hibited .
During World War II, certain members of Congress expressed dis­
satisfaction with the negotiations which developed the consent decree, 
as well as the Justice's enforcement of the decree. In 1944, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation of pipeline 
companies in part in response to Congressional pressures. They focused
on the companies' accounting procedures. The investigation produced no 
78public charges.
The decree, as interpreted by most companies, was considered to 
have stopped expansion out of profits. Earnings in excess of seven 
percent were frozen both in terms of payments to the parent company, as . 
well as for investment in carrier property. This was the case since the 
investment of excess funds could not be used in future valuations for 
the purposes of determining the seven percent payable. The companies'
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response to the limitation was to rely on debt financing for pipeline 
expansion in the post-war period. This resort to debt financing was to 
create a controversy which has continued to exist since that time.^^
The shift to debt financing, as well as the industry's approach 
to the consent decree, led the companies to claim the right of payment 
of dividends up to seven percent on total valuation and not just their 
equity share of it. This position was taken after the Justice Department 
raised the issue of whether dividends could be paid on the debt element 
of valuation, or if dividends could be paid only on the equity invest­
ment. The Department of Justice's interpretation of Paragraph 3 of the 
decree meant that the seven percent return could only apply to the 
oimer's equity contribution to valuation. The companies took the oppo­
site position; that they had the right to pay dividends on total valua-
tion.80
Between 1942 and 1957, 31 opinions were issued by Justice, 
both oral and written. These opinions were not distributed or dissemi­
nated by Justice to all companies but were issued only to the individual 
company. The chief value of these opinions was that they provided 
protection for the companies from "knowingly violating the decree.
The requirement that each party to the decree file an annual 
report with the U.S. Attorney General kept Justice informed as to each 
individual company's interpretation of the decree. Justice, however, 
was in a position where it could do little about these companies' expla­
nations or interpretations unless it was prepared to take the company to 
court. From the time of the signing of the decree through 1957, the 
Department of Justice did not force the issue of interpretation in the
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courts. The policy of inaction gave increased validity to the proce­
dures adopted by the pipeline companies in complying with the decree 
itself.
The practices of the pipeline companies under the consent decree, 
as well as the practices of the Department of Justice, ultimately led to 
a series of Congressional probes in 1957. The anti-trust subcommittee 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, headed by Congressman Celler, 
sought to probe the consent decree practices of the Department of Jus­
tice. One special area of the Congressional probe was the enforcement 
of the oil pipeline consent d e c r e e . ^2 Before the public hearings began 
in October of 1957, Justice brought four court proceedings involving the 
pipeline decree. These four cases involved Arapahoe Pipeline Company 
(a joint venture), the Service Pipeline Company (a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil Company of Indiana), Tidal Pipeline Company and its owner. 
Tidewater Oil Company, and Texas Pipeline Company.
The Arapahoe Case was aimed against payment of dividends to 
shippers/owners greater than seven percent of their "paid-in investment 
or their equity"; the Service Pipeline Company Case involved a charge 
that the company had violated part of the decree by its method of calcu­
lating valuation. It was alleged in the Tidal Case that the company had 
included in its valuations (for consent decree purposes) , all properties 
used for common carrier purposes whether they owned the property or not. 
In the fourth case, the Texas Pipeline Company was challenged for fol­
lowing a valuation procedure similar to that of Tidal. The difference 
was that the alleged excessive dividends had been paid to the Tidal 
Pipeline Company's parent while the Texas Pipeline Company had not \
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actually paid the dividends.
Before the cases went to trial, the case against the Texas 
Pipeline Company was dropped. The company agreed to transfer to surplus 
the funds which had been classified by the Justice Department as exces­
sive earnings. The remaining three cases, however, were placed before 
a federal court in March, 1958.®^
As noted, the issue in the Service Pipeline Case was one of 
determining the valuation base. Service Pipeline held the position that 
it could include common carrier property completed in the year of the 
valuation report, as well as deduct common carrier facilities which 
were retired from use in the same year. The Federal District Court 
ruled that action taken by Service Pipeline Company and its parent 
Standard of Indiana, had not violated the decree.
The decision indicated that the Government's case was not without 
merits, but the Court also took into account the fact that the pipeline 
company had adopted this procedure very early in its filing of its 
annual reports to the Attorney General. The defendants had made complete 
and full disclosures over a long period of time. This combined with the 
fact that Justice had waited so long to test the issues, and had 
accepted the annual reports filed by the company, had the effect of
O C
prejudicing their case.
The Court dismissed the motion against the Tidal Pipeline Com­
pany for essentially the same reason used in dismissing the Service Pipe­
line Case. In this case, the government argued that Tidal's inclusion 
of property not owned but used in their common carrier operation for 
valuation purposes was not allowed. Tidal, on the other hand, argued
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that the decree was based on the latest ICC valuation which did include 
all property employed in common carrier service.
With the dismissal of the Tidal and Service Pipeline Cases and 
the settlement of the Texas Pipeline Case, only the Arapahoe Pipeline 
Case remained to be decided. It was this case that was the most impor­
tant. The Arapahoe Pipeline Company was a joint venture company. Its 
financial structure was 90 percent debt and 10 percent equity. The 
government argued that in the calculation of the seven percent return 
for dividend purposes, the part attributable to loans from third parties 
must be deducted before the calculation was performed. The Department 
regarded this case as a test case which, if won, would apply to all 
parties to the decree. The Court disagreed with this opinion and ruled 
that it would only apply to the Arapahoe Pipeline Company. At this 
point, given the importance of the case to the pipeline industry, 12 
companies entered the case as parties to Arapahoe.
In arguing the case, the Department of Justice took the position 
that the decree was intended to prevent discrimination among shippers 
and that dividends could constitute illegal rebates. They argued that 
the seven percent dividend was allowed but this could only be calculated 
based on equity investments and not debt. They also took the position 
that loans made by shippers/owners after the decree were not to be 
included in the valuation but were entitled to interest and principal 
payments. The carriers, on the other hand, argued that the decree 
authorized a seven percent payment of dividends based on the ICC total 
valuation which included property financed out of debt. The carriers 
also argued that the Great Lakes Case, allowed by both the Department of
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Justice and the Court, supported this interpretation.^^
The District Court and ultimately the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the pipeline companies. The District Court ruling noted that 
companies had been making full disclosure of their practices for 16 
years and the Department of Justice in not taking any action had in 
effect upheld this practice. The Court also indicated that the Depart­
ment of Justice was attempting to rewrite the decree, an unwarranted 
action. The ruling stated that dividends could be computed on total 
valuation including debt as ordered in the original consent decree.
Defendant common carriers were permitted to pay seven percent dividends
go
based on this calculation.
The impact of the Arapahoe Case on the consent decree was a 
major one. The head of the Justice Department's antitrust division some 
years later in testimony before Congress was to voice the opinion that 
the Arapahoe ruling ended altogether the usefulness of what was origi­
nally considered a limited d e v i c e .
Government Investigation, Intervention, and Regulations 
1865-1959; A Summary Evaluation
That the control of pipelines could be a lethal weapon was 
demonstrated early in the history of the petroleum industry. After the 
Hepburn Act was passed, allegations persisted that major petroleum com­
panies' ownership of pipelines assisted in the development of a non­
competitive petroleum industry. The shipper/owner control of pipelines 
was allegedly the most effective means of minimizing the threat of 
successful entry and growth of small independent companies in the other 
stages of the industry (production, refining, or marketing).
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There developed during the period three major charges: (1) 
independent producers, refiners, and marketers were denied access to 
pipelines; (2) shipper/owner pipelines resulted in inequality of compe­
tition even if access was obtained; and (3) concentrated control of the 
pipeline segment of the industry by a few major oil companies created, 
if not monopoly, at least oligopoly. The third charge was the result of 
the first two. The denial of access was considered the most serious, 
but each of the charges revolved around the unique feature of the ICC 
regulation of pipelines compared to the other regulated modes, i.e., the 
absence of the application of the commodity clause.
Denial of access was allegedly achieved by five means. First, 
tariff rates were excessive. They were generally set equal to the rate 
charged by competing carriers (railroads initially). Second, access was 
denied by setting minimum tender high enough that all but the major com­
panies were excluded. Third, partial access was denied through proration 
when production exceeded pipeline capacity. The fourth means was the 
result of a considerable time lag between input into the pipeline and 
output in instances where access was obtained. For the shipper/owner, 
the time lags were minimized after the initial filling of the pipeline. 
l#iat they entered into the pipeline they could, in most cases, simultan­
eously take delivery of at their terminal facilities.
Wolbert illustrated the dilemma of the small shipper with an 
example,of a shipper attempting to get a 2,000 barrel/day contract with 
a "common carrier." In this case, the shipper was required to give 30 
days' notice that it wanted to ship 2,000 barrels/day; secondly, it 
required a fill-up where if the pipeline took 15 days to deliver, then
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the fill-up would be 30,000 barrels for its share of the pipeline.
Thus, a time lag of 45 days was required along with a large oil stock
investment. For the small refiner this could be a considerable invest-
90ment, as well as a potential disruption of its refinery scheduling.
The fifth charge centered around the provision of terminal 
facilities, facilities not covered by ICC regulations. On shipper/owner 
lines, terminal facilities were by industry practice privately owned.
The outside shipper was therefore required to construct his own terminal 
facilities or make arrangements with the privately owned terminal opera­
tors. It is of interest that common carriers identified as "independent 
pipeline companies" were eager to provide facilities to all shippers.
The government's response to the allegations and charges was to 
extend, through the Hepburn Act, ICC regulatory authority to interstate 
pipelines. The Hepburn Act did not place pipelines under all provisions 
of either the Interstate Commerce or the Elkins Act. The Hepburn Act 
was passed in 1906, the same year the antitrust suit against Standard 
Oil of New Jersey was filed. The Act was the Congressional response to 
the abuses of the Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Pipeline transportation experienced dramatic growth during the 
period between 1905 and 1931, interstate mileage increased from 24,666 
miles to 115,710 miles. During these formative years, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission took an extremely passive role resulting in virtually 
no impact on the development of pipelines. The impact of ICC regulation 
was essentially confined to reporting requirements and legal separation 
of pipeline operations from the parents.
Public opinion, as expressed in Congressional and Executive
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activities, peaked in 1906, during the Great Depression, 1940-41, and 
1957-58. Calls for divestiture reached a peak during the first two 
terms of the Roosevelt Administration.
Students of the industry in reviewing this period were to reach 
the following conclusions:
1. Crude oil pipelines were constructed by major integrated 
companies primarily for their own use. ICC regulation did not change 
this.
2. Common carrier status was initially only a pyrrhic victory
Q 9for the independent since tariff rates tended to match railroad rates.
3. Tariffs charged to the shipper/owner were paper transfers
between the parent company's subsidiaries. The parent company's refinery
subsidiary or department was furnished crude at a lower price than that
of a competitor. Access to pipeline transportation was considered a
93critical determinant of one s competitive position.
4. Outside shippers used crude lines to a very limited degree.
It was due largely to abuses committed when the structure of the indus-
94try was in its formative years.
A central issue arose and that was; could federal regulation of 
pipelines as common carriers ensure that the shipper/owner pass on trans­
portation savings to non-owners/shippers and ultimately the public?
Tariff rates and tenders did decline between 1934 and 1959. There was 
little doubt that ICC regulation brought about the reduction in the 
tender requirements. Did rate reduction occur because of ICC and Jus­
tice activities? Here there is some disagreement and several authors 
were to conclude :
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1. Active intervention by the ICC, the Department of Justice, 
and the tax laws were considered to have produced lower tariffs, accord­
ing to De Chazeau and Kahn.^^
2. ICC was considered to have achieved three things : (a) valua­
tion and systemized accounting procedures; (b) lowering of the minimum 
tender requirements; and (c) rate reduction, according to Wolbert.
3. An analysis of rates of returns by Cookenboo for the period 
1937-1953 partially challenged the position that ICC and Justice had 
produced rate reductions. Cookenboo concluded that 12 years after the 
consent decree, average transportation rates charged by all reporting 
ICC carriers were about the same as they were in 1941. He did note that 
the rate of return before taxes for all reporting companies decreased 
about 53 percent from 1947 through 1953, indicating that net earnings 
for all pipeline companies had on the average been driven down to the 
seven percent level. He poses the question, "has rate regulation 
achieved its purpose?". In a sense it has since the high profits of the 
20's and 30's no longer exist. He indicated, however, that factors 
other than the consent decree were at work in driving down earnings.
The primary responsibility for the decline was the result of an increase 
in the federal corporate income and excess profit tax. Cookenboo noted 
that in 1953, earnings before federal taxes amounted to 14.6 percent 
compared to seven percent after taxes. Actual rates were no longer 
lower than before the consent d e c r e e . ^7 Cookenboo correctly emphasized 
the importance of the corporate income and excess profit taxes. Also 
important were the federal taxes of initially 4.0 percent and eventually 
4.5 percent levied on oil pipeline total revenues which began during the
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Great Depression and continued until 1958. Also a factor during this 
period was the temporary loss of consolidated return advantages. t-Jhen 
these tax changes are combined with the emergence of the economics of 
the large diameter pipeline, the likelihood that ICC regulation was the 
primary explanation of the observed rate decline is further minimized.
In summary, the historical evidence does not indicate that inter­
state pipeline transportation and company behavior was significantly 
constrained or altered by governmental activities. Wolbert in comment­
ing on the behavior of companies during the period concluded that,
". . . the record of major companies in the absence of any regulation is 
not calculated to reassure the worried independent operator.Johnson 
concluded that, "On balance it seems warranted to conclude that neither 
federal regulation nor antitrust action between 1906 and 1959 substan­
tially altered the development of the pipeline sector of the integrated 
99oil industry." Johnson also concluded that the consent decree con­
sumed a far larger share of managerial thought and time than the ICC 
ever had.
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CHAPTER III
THE DOMESTIC PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW 
OF TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS
Traditional studies of the petroleum industry have divided the 
industry into four integrated operating stages; crude production, 
refining, transportation, and marketing.^ Sequentially, and for this 
paper's purpose, the operating stages are divided into five operating 
stages by subdividing transportation into two parts; crude oil trans­
portation and refined product transportation. As was stated in the 
first chapter, primary attention is placed on the two transportation 
functions and only peripheral attention is given to the other three 
stages of the industry. Likewise, little focus is placed on other 
means of transporting the industry's products other than to address the 
competitive and complementary aspects of these modes and their growth 
relative to pipelines.
In general terms, two sets of petroleum supply and demand rela­
tionships have determined the character of petroleum transportation in 
the United States. The demand for and supply of transportation services 
are derived from these intermediate and final goods markets. The size 
and location of the intermediate market, which is defined as crude oil
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production, crude imports, and refining, has determined the size and 
location of the crude oil transportation system. The size and location 
of the final goods market, defined as refining, product imports, and 
final consumers, has determined the size and location of the refined 
products transportation system.
The two markets are examined in this chapter from an historical 
perspective. The growth of these markets are also examined in static 
terms when in reality market conditions in both are determined simul­
taneously. The. markets are examined as if they were separate when for 
the most part they are part of the fully integrated operations of petro­
leum companies. It is informative at this point to ignore the inte­
grated character and look to the growth and geographic nature of the 
petroleum markets as if they were separate and distinct.
This chapter demonstrates the nature of the demand for trans­
portation services as well as the geographic character of this demand.
It provides a beginning for comprehending the significance of trans­
portation in the vertically integrated operation of petroleum companies.
Also, the process of defining more clearly the modern signifi­
cance of the problems caused by disequilibrium conditions in petroleum 
markets is begun in this chapter. John Blair, in The Control of Oil 
summarizes the problems of disequilibrium by stating:
Although attempts to stabilize the price of any commodity can 
be upset by only a relatively small amount of uncontrolled product, 
certain characteristics of oil make it particularly vulnerable to 
market disruption. For one thing, large-scale storage is difficult 
and expensive. As a liquid it must be contained, usually in steel 
storage tanks; but steel is costly and the tanks must be constantly 
painted to prevent rust. Hence, it is an industry axiom that oil, 
once produced, must move. Moreover, oil is a fungible commodity 
("any unit of which can replace another unit.") . . . quality 
differentials that are recognized by both buyers and sellers make
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it possible for oil from any source to compete directly with oil 
from any other source. Finally, oil's relatively low short-run 
elasticity of demand with respect to price means that any excess 
of total production will not, as a consequence of a lower price, 
be absorbed by a corresponding increase in comsumption.^
Although Blair was considering crude oil, his statement applies equally
to refined petroleum products.
The Intermediate Market 
The supply of crude oil available to the United States market 
has grown rapidly since the end of World War II. From 1950 the supply 
of crude oil has gro^ fn at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent. As 
Table 1 illustrates, the mix of the available supply has undergone 
dramatic change. In 1950, the ratio of domestic production to total 
crude supply was 93 percent. In 1975, it had decreased to 67 percent.
The average annual rate of growth in domestic production over the 
twenty-five-year period was 2.2 percent compared to 37.9 percent for net 
crude imports. Domestic production has been declining in recent years.
Domestic Production
The decline in domestic production (down 9 percent since 1973) 
has and will continue to alter historically established transportation 
patterns. Offshore production, Alaskan production, and crude imports 
are also altering transportation patterns.
The historical growth in domestic crude oil production, both in 
magnitude and geographic location, has determined the present magnitude 
and location of the crude transportation system. Even though domestic 
production is declining in relative importance, it remains, when combined 
with the location of domestic refineries, a key element in understanding
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TABLE 1
DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, NET CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, AND CRUDE 
RUNS TO STILLS, UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1975
(MILLIONS OF BARRELS)
Year
Total Supply 
of Crude Oil
Domestic
Production^
Net
Imports
Crude Runs 
to Stills
1950 2,116.5 1,973.6 142.9 2,094.9
1955 2,758.2 2,484.4 273.8 2,730.2
1957 2,939.9 2,616.9 323.0 2,890.4
1960 ' 2,943.4 2,574.9 368.5 2,952.5
1965 3,299.4 2,848.5 450.9 3,300.8
1970 3,995.0 3,517.0 478.0 3,968.0
1973 4,544.2 3,360.9 1,183.3 4,537.2
1974 4,470,7 3.202.6 1,268.1 4,428.7
1975 4,552.8 3,056.8 1,496.0 4,541.4
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products and
Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
^Includes lease condensate.
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the significance of crude pipelines. Domestic crude production has been 
historically concentrated in relatively few areas of the United States 
and this concentration has not been subject to rapid change. In Tables 
2 and 3, historical data by geographic area is presented. Table 2 
defines the important producing areas using the Petroleum Areas for 
Defense (PAD's) delineation.^ Figure 1 presents similar data for 1950 
and 1975 and also defines the five PAD's. Table 3 lists the important 
producing states. The data shown in the tables and figure represent 
the percent of domestic production accounted for by each area in selected 
years.
As the data indicates, PAD 3 has been and is the major producing 
area in the United States and has grown in relative importance since 
1950. In 1950, it accounted for 59 percent of the domestic supply of 
crude oil. In 1975, it was producing almost 67 percent of the domestic 
crude. From 1950 through most of the 1960's the mid-continent area 
(PAD II) was the second leading producing area. Beginning in 1970, how­
ever, PAD V s  production has been higher. PAD's I, II and V have, over­
all, been declining in relative importance. Because PAD V includes 
Alaska, its relative importance will grow once the Trans-Alaskan pipe­
line is completed. PAD IV may also grow in importance if recent discov­
eries prove significant.4
Domestic production is more concentrated than the data in Table 
2 would suggest. Five states in 1950 accounted for almost 81 percent of 
the total domestic production. These same 5 states accounted for 82 
percent of the total in 1975. Texas has historically been the major 
producing state, followed by Louisiana, California, and Oklahoma (not in
TABLE 2
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES 
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, BY PAD DISTRICT, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1975
Year
PAD District
I II III IV V
1950 1.0 19.0 58.6 4.8 16.6
1955 0.6 18.9 59.4 6.8 14.3
1957 0.5 18.9 60.1 7.5 13.0
1960 0.4 18.8 59.2 9.7 11.9
1965 0.4 16.6 63.4 8.1 11.5
1970 0.3 12.1 67.5 7.0 13.0
1973 1.2 10.5 68.8 7.3 12.2
1974 1.4 10.4 68.0 7.9 12.3
1975 1.6 10.6 67.1 7.8 12.9
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products
and Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
FIGURE 1
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES CRUDE 
PRODUCTION BY PAD, 1950 AND 19 75
--- \
P A D  V *  
1 9 5 0  1 6 .6
1 9 7 5  1 2 .9
P A D  IV  
1 9 5 0  4 . 8
1 9 7 5  7 .8
P A D  II 
1 9 5 0  1 9 . 0
1975  1 0 .6
P A D  I 
1 9 5 0  1 .0
1 9 7 5  1 .6
V
P A D  III
1 9 5 0  5 8 . 6
1 9 7 5  6 7 . 1
SOURCE: T a b le  2 ,  _p. 6 2 .
Includes Alaska
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order of importance).
The relative Importance of Texas has declined slightly over the 
period while Louisiana (both on and offshore) has risen. California and 
Oklahoma have been declining as major producing areas. Given the known 
reserves and recent discoveries, little change in this pattern is 
expected in the near term. Alaska will, however, replace Texas as the 
major producing state.^ Table 3 shows the historical concentration of 
crude production in these states.
The significance of this concentration of production in small 
areas is that, by and large, there has been a large geographic disparity 
between the supply of crude oil and the demand for refined products.
For example, PAD I, since 1950, has never produced more than 1.6 percent 
of the total crude production in the United States and for most years 
produced less than one percent of the total; and PAD II has been declin­
ing in relative importance since 1950. Its relative position has fallen 
by 44.2 percent in 25 years. Both PAD I and PAD II represent concentra­
tions of population and industrial capacity. Together they represented 
71 percent of the population of the United States in 1975. In the same 
year they produced only 12.2 percent of the total domestic crude produc­
tion. PAD III in contrast had only 11.9 percent of the total population 
but produced 67 percent of the domestic crude oil.^ This disparity has 
greatly increased the length and importance of the transportation of 
crude oil.
Imports of Foreign Crude Oil
It is common knowledge that the demand for refined petroleum 
products has grown at a faster rate than domestic crude production. The
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long run response to this growth has come in the form of increased 
imports of foreign crude oil. Crude oil imports, however, have not 
risen in sufficient quantity to supply the total demand. Domestic 
refinery capacity has not expanded sufficiently to make the United 
States "refinery self-sufficient." For this reason, the United States 
is importing both crude and refined products.
Imports by Country of Origin
As Table 1 indicated, the U.S. imported approximately 1.5 bil­
lion barrels of crude oil in 1975. This was ten times the number of
barrels imported in 1950 and represented 33 percent of the new crude
supply in 1975. The growing dependency on foreign crude is a develop­
ment of the 1970’s. Crude imports did not rise above 10 percent until 
after 1957. In 1970, crude imports were still a rather modest 12 per­
cent and did not exceed 15 percent until 1972.
Since 1950, the United States has imported crude oil from all 
major producing areas outside the United States. The major countries 
and areas from which the United States has imported crude oil is shown 
in Table 4. During 1960-1975 Canada, Venezuela, and the Middle East 
have been the major suppliers. - As the data indicates, the percent of 
total imports supplied by each area has fluctuated considerably over the 
time period. Through the early 1970's, these three areas annually 
accounted for over 80 percent of total imports.
During 1957-75 the United States imported a total of 11.3 billion 
barrels of crude oil. Nearly 35 percent of this was imported in the 
years 1973-1975. Two countries, Canada and Venezuela, have supplied 51 
percent of the cumulative total.^ Five countries, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,
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TABLE 3
PERCENT OF TOTAL UNITED STATES CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 
SELECTED STATES, SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1975
Year
States
Texas Louisiana California Oklahoma Wyoming
All
Others
1950 42.0 10.6 16.6 8.3 3.1 19.4
1955 42.2 10.9 14.3 8.2 4.0 20.2
1957 41.0 12.6 13.0 8.2 4.2 21.0
1960 36.0 15.6 11.9 7.5 5.2 23.8
1965 35.1 20.9 11.1 7.1 4.8 21.0
1970 35.5 25.8 10.6 6.4 4.6 17.1
1973 38.5 24.7 10.0 5.7 4.2 16.9
1974 39.4 23.0 10.1 5.6 4.4 17.5
1975 40.0 21.5 10.6 5.3 4.2 18.4
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products,
and Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
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TABLE 4
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, 
BY MAJOR COUNTRY/AREA OF ORIGIN, SELECTED YEARS,
1950-1975
Year
Total
Imports^
(Million
Barrels)
Percent of Total Imports
Canada Venezuela
Middle
East^ Africa^
All
Others
1950 178 _ 60.1 23.7 * 16.2
1955 285 5.9 49.4 35.6 * 9.1
1957 373 14.7 52.0 29.3 * 4.0
1960 372 11.0 46.5 23.9 * 18.6
1965 452 23.9 34.9 23.7 * 17.5
1970 483 50.7 20.3 21.1 * 7.9
1973 1,184 30.8 10.6 24.7 24.1 9.84
1974 1,269 22.8 9.2 28.5 28.1 11.44
1975 1,498 14.6 9.6 27.3 32.6 15.94
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, 
and Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
^Reported to Bureau of Mines.
Includes Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates; Iran and Saudi Arabia, the primary exporters, 
accounting for 87 percent of the Middle East total in 1975.
3
Includes Algeria, Angola, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, 
and Tunisia; Algeria and Nigeria: the primary exporters, accounting for 
75 percent of the African total in 1975.
^Indonesia is the remaining primary exporter, accounting for 6 
percent of total imports in 1973, 8 percent in 1974, and 9 percent in 
1975.
Percent is included in all others until 1973.
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Indonesia, Iran and Kuwait, supplied an additional 34. S percent.®
Imports by Receiving PAD's
As was the case with sources of foreign crude, the relative pat­
tern of where this foreign crude is received in the United States has 
changed since the 1950's. These changes have been most pronounced since 
1970 (see Table 5). In 1960, the East Coast (PAD I) of the United 
States received 65.7 percent of the nearly 372 million barrels of crude 
oil imported that year. In 1975, only 30 percent of the crude oil 
imported into the United States was going to the East Coast. As a per­
cent of the total, PAD's II and III had become more important receiving 
areas while both PAD I and V had declined. PAD IV has remained rela­
tively insignificant as an importing area for obvious reasons. PAD 
Ill's import totals have risen most dramatically since 1960, increasing 
from less than 1 percent (PAD II experienced a similar rise.) to 29 
percent in 1975.
The reasons for these shifts are examined in the following sec­
tion. It is sufficient at this point to note that the increase in 
imports to PAD's II and III are partially the result of declining pro­
duction as well as increased concentration of refinery capacity in these 
p a d's . Where imports originated as well as where they are received 
impacts the type, magnitude, and direction of crude oil transportation 
requirements. The more pronounced changes that have occurred since 1970 
both in origin and receipt of imports are important and have altered 
heretofore rather stable transportation patterns.
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TABLE 5
RECEIPT OF FOREIGN CRUDE OIL BY PAD DISTRICT 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1960-1975
Year
Imports
(Million
Barrels)
PAD DISTRICT^
I II III IV V
1960 372 65.7 6.3 0.8 27.2
1965 452 57.2 9.1 - 1.1 32.6
1970 483 43.7 23.9 - 3.6 28.7
1973 1,184 39.4 22.0 12.3 1.4 25.0
1974 1,269 33.8 19.8 22.8 1.3 22.3
1975 1,498 30.1 18.9 29.2 1.1 20.7
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, 
and Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
^Percentage may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
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Final Goods Market 
Supply and demand in the intermediate petroleum markets are 
derived from final consumer demand for refined petroleum products. In 
the previous section, the crude production side of the intermediate mar­
ket was outlined. In this section, the brief description of these two 
markets is completed by discussing the growth in demand for petroleum 
products; the distribution of this demand by major type of product; the 
distribution of the total demand by geographic area; and the growth in 
refinery output, and the geographic location of refineries.
Domestic Demand for Refined Petroleum Products
In 1950 the domestic demand for refined products was approxi­
mately 2.4 billion barrels. By 1975, demand had increased to nearly 6 
billion barrels. The demand for refined products increased at an 
average annual rate of 6 percent during the 25 year period. In 1973 
demand temporarily peaked at 5.4 billion barrels, due to the recession 
of 1974-75. Domestic demand in 1975 was thus some 6 percent below the 
pre-recession peak. Domestic production has, as indicated earlier, not 
increased sufficiently to meet this demand. Table 6 illustrates this 
point (column two). The table also indicates that neither domestic 
refinery capacity nor output has expanded sufficiently to meet the 
demand,
An examination of Table 6 reveals the extent of the change in 
the composition of new supply. In 1950 domestic production represented 
90.8 percent of total demand. Crude oil production accounted for 83.1 
percent while natural gas liquids totaled 7.7 percent. By 1975 domestic 
production of crude and natural gas liquids represented only 61.3
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TABLE 6
TOTAL DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR REFINED PRODUCTS AND 
NEW SUPPLY OF OILS, UNITED STATES, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1975 
(MILLIONS OF BARRELS)
Year
Domestic
Demand
Totall
New Supply^
Domestic Production Net Imports
Crude Oil^
Natural Gas 
Liquids Crude Oil
Refined
Products^
1950 2,375.1 1,973.6 182.0 142.9 56.1
1955 3,087.8 2,484.4 281.4 273.8 47.5
1957 3,218.6 2.616.9 295.0 323.0 44.4
1960 3,535.8 2,574.9 340.0 368.5 221.7
1965 4,125.5 2,848.5 441.6 450.9 381.5
1970 5,364.5 3,517.0 606.0 478.0 675.0
1973 6,317.3 3,360.9 634.4 1,183.3 926.3
1974 6,078.2 3,202.6 616.1 1,268.1 805.8
1975 5,957.5 3,056.8 596.0 1,496.0 597.9
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and 
Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
1Includes products refined and processed from crude oil, 
including still gas, liquified refinery gas and natural gas liquids.
^Includes lease condensate.
^Excludes imports of unfinished oils and plant condensate.
^New supply will not equal domestic demand primarily because 
of annual changes in stocks, processing gains, and imports of unfinished 
oils and plant condensate.
72
percent of the total. Crude oil production had fallen to 51.3 percent. 
Natural gas liquids had increased slightly in relative importance, ris­
ing to 10 percent of the total demand.
Net imports of both crude and refined products rose from 8.4 
percent of the total in 1950 to 35.1 percent of domestic demand in 1975. 
Net import of crude oil rose from 6.0 to 25.1 percent while imports of 
refined products rose from 2.4 to 10.0 percent.
During the time that the distribution of the supply of oils 
was undergoing significant change, the demand by major type of refined 
product has remained fairly stable (shown in Table 7). In 1950 gasoline
was the major product produced from crude oil. It remains so to this
date. Gasoline consumption in 1975 represented 41.2 percent of the 
total. This compares to only a slightly higher percentage (41.9 percent) 
in 1950.
Gasoline, fuel oil (distillate and residual), liquefied gas, 
jet fuels, and "all others" have risen while kerosene and residual fuel 
oils have shown pronounced relative declines.^
Imports as Suppliers of Refined Petroleum Products
As Table 6 indicated, imports of refined products have risen
sharply in importance during 1950-1975. What Table 6 does not indicate 
is the source of these importsi the type of product imported, and the 
receiving areas of the United States.
As was the case in the import of crude oil, the East Coast of 
the United States has, historically, been the major importing area. In
1975,85.7 percent of the gross import of refined products (excluding 
unfinished oils and plant condensate) went to PAD I. This was, as
TABLE 7
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL DOMESTIC PETROLEUM 
DEMAND BY MAJOR TYPE OF REFINED PRODUCT, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1975
Year Gasoline!
Distillate 
Fuel Oil
Residual 
Fuel Oil
Liquefied
Gas
Jet2
Fuel Kerosene
All
Others
1950 41.9 16.6 23.3 3.6 ___ 5.0 9.6
1955 43.1 18.8 18.0 4.8 2.0 3.8 9.5
1957 43.3 19.1 17.0 5.1 2.3 3.5 9.7
1960 42.7 19.4 15.8 6.4 2.9 3.7 9.1
1965 41.7 18.2 13.4 7.4 4.9 2.2 12.2
1970 39.7 17.3 15.0 6.8 6.6 1.8 12.8
1973 38.8 17.9 16.3 6.5 6.0 1.2 13.3
1974 39.5 17.7 15.8 6.4 6.0 1.1 13.5
1975 41.2 17.5 14.9 6.1 6.1 1.0 13.2
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Indus-
OJ
try Surveys, "Petroleum Statements," Annual and December.
1Includes aviation gasoline.
^Reported with gasoline and kerosene prior to 1952.
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columa three of Table 8 Indicates, only slightly lower than the share of 
the total for 1960-1970. PAD V has been the next largest importing 
area. During the period, 5 to 7 percent of all imports went to the 
West Coast of the United States. In relative terms, P ^ ’s II-IV have 
not been important markets for imported refined products. These three 
pad’s never represented more than 8.4 percent of the imports during the 
years shown in Table 8 .
In 1975, the United States Bureau of Mines reported that 59 
countries exported refined products to the United S t a t e s . The Western 
Hemisphere was the principal exporting area. As was the case for 
countries exporting crude oil to the United States, refined products 
exports have been concentrated in few countries. The principal coun­
tries from which the United States has imported refined products is 
shown in Table 9.
The Central America/Caribbean region supplied about half of 
all refined imports during 1957-75. The Netherland Antilles has been 
the principal exporting country in this region. In relative importance, 
the Netherland Antilles has declined from a supplier of over one-half of 
all imports in 1957 to 18 percent in 1975. The Virgin Islands and the 
Bahamas have grown in importance since 1967 and accounted for 21.8 
percent of total imports in 1975.
In cumulative terms, Venezuela exported over 3.3 billion 
barrels of refined products to the United States during 1957-75. This 
represented 34.3 percent of the cumulative total. Venezuela has declined 
in relative importance from 40.6 percent of the total in 1957 to only
16.7 percent in 1975. Venezuela remained the second major exporter in
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TABLE 8
RECEIPT OF FOREIGN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BY PAD DISTRICT AS A 
PERCENT OF TOTAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IMPORTED INTO THE 
UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS, 1960-1975
Year
Imports^ 
(Million 
Barrels)
PAD DISTRICT
I II III IV V
1960 294.1 88.1 0.5 6.0 ___ 5.3
1965 448.7 87.6 1.3 4.1 0.2 6.8
1970 764.1 89.2 2.5 2.8 0.4 5.0
1973 1,010.0 86.4 2.9 4.5 0 .6 5.5
1974 885.2 85.2 3.5 4.9 0.7 5.7
1975 672.2 85.7 5.1 2.4 0.9 5.9
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum 
Products, and Natural Gas Liquids," Annual Summaries.
^Reported to the Bureau of Mines; includes receipts from 
Puerto Rico.
TABLE 9
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES REFINED PRODUCT 
IMPORTS^ BY MAJOR AREA/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
1957-1975
Year
Total
Imports
(Million
Barrels)
Central
Total^
America &
Netherland
Antilles
Caribbean
Trinidad
and
Tobago Venezuela Canada Europe
Rest
of
World
1957% 200.4 51.6 . 50.6 1.0 40.6 1.5 0.1 6.2
1958 237.1 53.6 49.9 3.7 40.4 0.5 0.8 4.7
1959 278.3 45.8 42.6 3.2 40.7 0.7 0.6 12.2
1960 276.1 45.8 40.1 5.7 45.5 1.1 — — — 7.6
1961 293.0 45.7 36.7 9.0 44.4 1.2 0.2 8.5
1962 316.2 42.5 33.7 8.8 46.9 1.5 0.3 8.8
1963 333.2 44.8 33.1 11.8 43.8 1.5 0.2 9.7
1964 355.5 49.9 33.7 11.0 44.2 1.9 0.1 3.9
1965 415.0 46.2 30.9 10.9 47.3 2.4 0.2 3.9
1966 456.8 44.1 27.3 11.6 46.4 2.9 2.3 4.3
1967 479.1 47.OC 27.3 12.1 41.4 2.6 3.7 5.3
1968 536.7 48.3 26.1 12.3 36.0 3.0 8.3 4.4
1969 602.8 49.0 26.2 12.6 33.6 3.0 10.1 4.3
1970 724.8 48.3 23.2 10.8 35.0 4.8 8.9 3.0
1971 760.9 51.8 19.9 8.7 33.2 4.7 6.5 3.8
1972 847.0 50.9 18.0 8.7 29.4 7.3 7.6 4.8
1973 1 ,010.0 48.2 20.8 6.8 27.2 7.3 10.5 6.8
1974 885.2 54.0 20.7 7.7 25.2 7.6 7.8 5.4
1975 672.2 60.6 18.0 6.7 16.7 9.2 6.0 7.5
•^1
TABLE 9 CONTINUED
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook,
1958-1973, and Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Natural Gas Liquids," 
197A and 1975, Annual Summaries
^Excludes unfinished oils and plant condensates.
bpor years 1957-60 totals are net imports.
Cpor years 1961-75 totals are gross imports.
‘^Includes Puerto Rico.
^The Virgin Islands and the Bahamas have, since 1967, become major exporting countries; in 1975 
imports from the Virgin Islands were 16.0 percent of U.S. total imports and the Bahamas were 5.8 percent 
of the total.
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1975. Both Canada and Europe (primarily Italy) rose in relative impor­
tance during the period. Canada has never supplied, however, more than 
9.2 percent of the total. Europe since 1967 and until 1975 surpassed 
Canada as a source of refined product imports.
In 1957 the major refined product imported into the United States 
from these countries was residual fuel oil. This product alone accounted 
for 86.5 percent of the total. Fuel oils of all types (residual and 
distillate) accounted for 90.8 percent of the total. Residual fuel oil 
was still the major imported product in 1975. It, however, had declined 
to approximately 66.4 percent of the total. Fuel oils of all types still 
accounted for 74.9 percent of all imported products. On a cumulative 
basis, fuel oils have accounted for over 85 percent of all refined pro­
ducts imported into the United States during 1957-1975.^^
Domestic Refineries as Suppliers of Refined Petroleum Products
Refinery capacity in the United States did not maintain an 
overall growth rate during the period 1950-1975 sufficient to supply the 
domestic demand for refined products. Domestic refiners have declined 
in relative importance as a source of domestic supply to those refineries 
outside the United States (but.primarily in the Western Hemisphere).
Comparing crude runs to stills (column 5, Table 1) and domestic 
demand for finished products (column 2, Table 6), domestic refinery 
inputs represented 88.2 percent of total demand in 1950. In 1975 refin­
ery inputs were 76.2 percent of total demand and had been as low as 71.8 
percent in 1973. In 25 years domestic refineries have declined 12.0 per­
cent in relative importance. The reasons that domestic refinery capacity 
has failed to respond sufficiently to changes in demand are not
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altogether clear.
John M. Blair found in a study of concentration of refinery
capacity that the growth in domestic refinery capacity had undergone
13three distinct stages in the past quarter century. In the 1952-59 
period, capacity grew at a higher rate than demand (3.71 percent to 2.85 
percent), resulting in excess capacity of 600,000 barrels/day (b/d).
In 1959-66, the refinery capacity growth rate dropped to an annual rate 
of 1.28 percent while demand rose at an annual rate of 2.68 percent. 
Excess capacity at the beginning of the second period turned into a 
short fall of 500,000 barrels/day at the end. During the third period, 
1966-72, capacity increased at a more rapid rate of 4.22 percent.
Demand, however, was increasing at a rate of 4.68 percent and thus there 
was an increase in the gap between capacity and demand.
Blair did not attribute this growing gap to an inability to 
raise the necessary capital for construction, even though the minimum 
optimal new refinery (150,000 b/d) would cost $250-$400 m i l l i o n . H e  
indicated that capital was being raised by the major companies to 
increase foreign capacity by 1.72 million b/d. Blair also did not 
attribute the gap to environmental barriers. He did, however, attribute 
the lack of sufficient growth to what he considered " . . .  the 
majors' position at the refining stage has enabled them to eliminate 
excess capacity by the simple expedient of not building new refiner­
ies."^^ Regardless of the reasons, new refinery capacity has, in part, 
been exported in recent years and the United States is now much less 
self-sufficient in capacity.
The significance of this decline is more clearly understood by
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comparing the domestic refinery output mix by product to the import mix 
by product.
Taking 1973 and 1975 for illustration purposes and using the 
ratio of domestic output to domestic demand by product (listed in Table 
7) the following demonstrates the dependency on foreign sources for 
selected major products:
__________Ratio; Domestic Output/Domestic Demand___________
Distillate Residual 
Year Gasoline Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Fuel Kerosene
1973 97.8 91.1 34.4 81.0 100.0
1975 97.7 93.2 50.8 87.0 95.0
This examination indicates that the gap between domestic demand and 
domestic refinery output has been largely concentrated in fuel oils 
(primarily residual fuel oils). It will be recalled that of the cumula­
tive total for imports (1957-75), over 85 percent were fuel oils.
A major factor in the reliance on foreign sources for fuel oils 
is due to the factor that typically. United States refineries have been 
gasoline oriented. For example a "typical" U.S. refinery converts 65 
percent of each barrel of crude oil to gasoline. The European version 
converts only-35 percent to gasoline. In addition, most U.S. refineries 
run only "sweet crude" while "sour crude," is the type now in most plen­
tiful supply. Units must be revamped so they can process sour crude as 
well as undergo modifications to meet environmental emission standards. 
Only recently have domestic refiners chosen to alter refineries to run 
"sour crude" and increase the yield of fuel oils.^^
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Location of Domestic Refineries
The location of refineries in the United States has historically 
played a pivotal role in determining the transportation networks for 
moving crude oil and refined products. Since domestic refineries remain 
the dominant supplier of refined product demand (76 percent in 1975), 
their geographic location and concentration determines not only the 
direction of flow of domestic crude and crude imports but the direction 
of the flow of refinery output to ultimate consumers.
The decision as to where refineries should be built in the United 
States has historically been a choice among: locating near the source of 
crude oil (crude oriented); locating near final markets (market oriented); 
and combined with either 1 or 2, locating near an accessible transporta­
tion system (i.e., near a port or waterway). Crude oriented refineries 
minimize crude transporting distances. Market oriented refineries 
minimize refined product transporting distances. The third choice com­
bines one of the distance minimizers while maximizing the availability 
of new supplies of crude.
In 1953, Cookenboo found that of the total refinery capacity in 
the United States, 19.2 percent were crude oriented, 81.2 percent were 
either market oriented or located near major ports and waterways. He 
also found that the less integrated companies tended to have relatively
small refineries which were more likely to be crude oriented and also
19
service a very limited close-by market.
Since 1953, two trends have emerged in refining. First, new 
refinery capacity built, both for net addition to capacity and for 
replacing smaller inefficient units, has not been crude oriented. In
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1975, less than 10 percent of the refinery capacity still maintained an 
appearance of locating near the source of crude production.
The second trend in refining has been a combination of declining 
numbers of refiners and refineries combined with increases in average 
refinery c a p a c i t y . I n  1953 there were 351 refineries and approximately 
255 refining c o m p a n i e s . By 1961 the number of refineries had fallen 
to 311, while the number of companies had fallen to 175.22 of 
January 1, 1976, there were 284 refineries in the 48 states and only 148 
separate companies. Average refinery capacity had increased from 23,350 
b/d in 1953 to 53,754 b/d in 1976.23
Unlike the trend in the number and size of refineries, the trend 
in the overall geographic location of refineries has shown a rather 
stable pattern. Refineries, like crude production, have been histor­
ically concentrated in small areas of the United States. The location 
pattern, in relative terms, was well established by 1950. This is shown
in Table 10 and also in Figures 2 and 3.
In Table 10 total operating capacity during the 1950-75 period
is shown along with the distribution of this capacity among PAD’s. With
the exception of PAD's I and III, the distribution of refinery capacity 
between II, IV, and V has remained fairly stable. PAD I is the only dis­
trict that has shown a marked decline in relative terms. PAD III is the 
only PAD that has shown a marked gain in relative importance.
Refinery capacity is more concentrated than Table 10 indicates.
As is illustrated in Table 11, refineries in nine states accounted for 
89 percent of the total operating capacity in 1950. By 1975 some disper­
sion had occurred, but the same 9 states continued to represent 79 percent
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TABLE 10
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES OPERATING 
REFINERY CAPACITY BY PAD DISTRICT,
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1975
Year
Total Operating 
- Capacity^ 
(Millions of Barrels 
Per Day)
PAD District^
I II III IV V
1950 6.2 16.7 26.5 35.9 3.7 17.1
1955 8.1 16.2 28.0 36.7 3.5 15.5
1957 8.8 16.3 28.2 37.0 3.4 15.1
1960 9.5 16.1 28.8 36.3 3.4 15.3
1965 10.2 14.3 32.0 34.3 3.8 15.6
1970 11.9 12.4 27.1 40.6 3.5 16.3
1973 13.4 11.9 27.2 41.1 3.4 16.4
1974 14.2 11.8 27.3 41.7 3.6 15.6
1975 14.7 11.0 27.3 42.3 3.7 15.7
1976 14.9 11.3 27.8 41.7 3.7 15.5
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Petroleum Refineries in the United 
States," annual.
^Operating crude oil throughput capacity as of January 1 of each 
year, excluding Puerto Rico.
^Percentages may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
FIGURE 2
PRINCIPAL REFINING AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES,
LATE 1953
» # * #
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SOURCE. Leslie Cookenboo, Jr. , Crude Oil Pipelines and Competition lii The Oil Industry (Cambridge! ILirvard
University Press, 1955), p. 47.
FIGURE 3
PRINCIPAL REFINING AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 1, 1976 
(IN THOUSAND BARRELS PER CALENDAR DAY)3 3 7
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SOURCE: U.S., Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Petroleum Refineries In The United States and
Puerto Rico, January 1, 1976," p. 3.
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of the total capacity. The principal refining centers in the United 
States are defined in Figure 2 for 1950, and Figure 3 for 1975. As the 
Figures indicate little change has occurred over the period. The major 
centers are still located near ocean ports. The greatest concentration 
is found on the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana, with 36 percent of 
the total capacity in 1975. The seven coastal centers (two on the East 
Coast, three on the West Coast, and two on the Gulf of Mexico), had a 
total capacity of slightly over 8.4 million b/d and represented 56 per­
cent of the total operating capacity as of January, 1976.
The Demand for Petroleum Transportation 
Services: Summary
The examination of the intermediate and final goods markets have 
identified the demand for crude and refined product transportation ser­
vices in both quantity and geographic terms. Before examining the 
transport modes which have supplied these services, the findings of 
this chapter are summarized.
Table 1 showed the growth in the supply of crude petroleum and 
the rapid increase in imports. It also defined the physical magnitude 
of the transportation required to move crude oil from producing areas to 
refineries. In 1950, 2.1 billion barrels of crude oil were shipped to 
refineries. In 1975, 4.6 billion barrels were shipped to refineries. 
Converted to short tons, 317.5 million tons were transported in 1950.
In 1975, 683 million tons of crude oil were moved to refineries. Table 
6 showed that there was rapid growth in the demand for products and 
therefore rapid growth in the demand for refined product transportation. 
In 1950, 2.4 billion barrels of petroleum products were moved by some
transport mode to the ultimate consumer. By 1975, nearly 6 billion 
barrels were shipped to consumers.
In 1975 the petroleum transportation system in the United States 
was moving, on average, 12.5 million barrels of crude to refineries each 
day and 16.3 million barrels of petroleum products were moving to con­
sumer markets. Combined, nearly 29 million barrels a day were being 
moved by the transportation system.
The complexity of the transportation system has been amplified 
by the large disparity between the geographic location of crude produc­
tion, refineries, and final consumer markets. The geographic disparity 
and resulting complexity is not a recent development. It has existed 
at least since 1950. It has, after a long period of relative stability, 
become more pronounced in the 1970's as domestic production has declined 
and imports of crude and refined products have risen sharply.
The location of crude production in remote areas removed from 
population concentrations is an accident of nature. The concentration 
of refineries in certain areas is, on the other hand, a function of 
presumably rational decisions of petroleum company executives. The con­
centration of crude production and refineries in some parts of the 
United States, and not others, is an important variable in the analysis 
to follow. It is also relevant to an understanding of the energy prob­
lems confronted in the United States today.
The supply and demand disparity in the intermediate market is 
summarized in Table 12 for the year 1975. The supply and demand dispar­
ity in the final goods market is summarized in Table 13 for the same 
year. Although the data are for 1975, they represent a pattern that has
TABLE 11
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES OPERATING 
REFINERY CAPACITY, SELECTED AREAS,
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-19761
Year Total
Texas
Gulf Coast California
Louisiana 
Gulf Coast
Illinois
and
Indiana
New Jersey 
and
Pennsylvania
Kansas
and
Oklahoma
All
Other
1950 29.0 23.2 17.3 7.3 12.4 14.5 8.5 ■ 11.0
1955 28.3 23.8 15.3 7.9 11.8 12.5 7.8 16.4
1957 27.4 23.8 14.3 8.3 11.6 11.8 7.9 18.7
1960 26.7 22.9 13.7 8.0 11.3 12.1 7.7 20.5
1965 26.9 23.2 13.3 9.2 11.2 11.0 7.4 21.0
1970 27.2 23.8 13.7 11.6 10.9 9.7 7.2 19.7
1973 26.2 22.9 13.0 13.4 11.8 9.2 6.3 20.1
1974 26.7 23.3 12.5 13.3 12.0 9.2 6.3 20.0
1975 26.9 23.5 12.8 13.2 11.8 8.4 6.5 20.4
1976 26.1 22.5 12.2 13.5 11.8 8.7 6.7 21.0
00
CO
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Sur­
veys , "Petroleum Refineries in the United States," annual.
Operating crude oil throughput capacity as of January 1 of each year; excluding Puerto Rico.
TABLE 12
DOMESTIC REFINERY DEMAND AND SOURCES OF SUPPLY, 
UNITED STATES AND BY PAD, 1975 
(MILLIONS OF BARRELS)
Total I
PAD
II
Istricts^
III IV V
Crude Inputs to Domestic Refineries 4,541.4 513.8 1,245.6 1,919.8 155.4 706.8
Sources of Crude Inputs: 
Domestic Production 3,052.0 49.1 324.5 2,048.1 237.6 392.7
Net Imports 1,496.0 451.5 282.7 434.9 16.1 310.8
Net Receipts from other PAD's^ —- 12.9 619.6 (537.3) (109.1) 13.9
Ratio:2
Domestic Production/
Refinery Input (Percent) 67.2 9.6 26.1 106.7 152.9 55.6
Net Imports/ 
Refinery Input 32.8 87.9 22.7 22.7 10.4 44.0
Net Receipts/ 
Refinery Inputs —- 2.5 49.7 (28.0) (70.2) 2.0
CO
VO
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines In Mineral Industry Surveys, 
"Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Natural Liquids: 1975," February, 1977.
^Net receipts may also Include foreign crude.
Input sources may not add to refinery Inputs because of changes In stock during the year along 
with minor discrepancies In data reported by Bureau of Mines.
^Data In parentheses Indicate shipments to other PAD's exceed incoming shipments.
TABLE 13
DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR REFINED PRODUCTS AND SOURCES OF SUPPLY, 
UNITED STATES AND BY PAD, 1975 
(MILLIONS OF BARRELS)
Total I II
PAD DISTRICTS 
III
4
IV V
Domestic Demand, Refined Products^ 5,957.5 2,206.8 1,557.3 841.5 167.4 ' 809.1
Sources:
Domestic Refinery Output 4,995.5 560.1 1,359.4 2,141.0 175.8 758.6
Net Imports 586.6 561.0 29.7 (19.4) 5.7 9.6
Net Receipts from Other PAD's^ -- 1,085.7 168.2 (1,280.7) (14.1) 40.9
Ratio:
Refinery Output/
Domestic Demand (Percent) 83.9 25.4 87.3 254.5 105.0 : 93.8
Net Imports/
Domestic Demand 9.8 25.4 1.9 (2.3) 3.4 1.2
Net Receipts/
Domestic Demand 49.2 10.8 (152.9) (8.4) 5.0
VOo
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines in Mineral Industry Surveys, 
"Crude Production, Petroleum Products, and Natural Gas Liquids: 1975," February, 1977.
^Consistent consumption data for the five PAD's were not available to this writer. Domestic 
demand was therefore assumed to equal refinery output plus net imports and net receipts. This under­
states actual consumption.
(Continued)
TABLE 13 CONTINUED
^Excludes liquefied gases and miscellaneous products not shown by Bureau of Mines as refinery
outputs.
^Net receipts are the sum of net movement by tanker and barge plus net movement on Ohio River 
and Great Lakes, plus net movement by pipelines. The use of this method allows for only an approxima­
tion of net receipts by PAD.
^Data in parentheses indicate outbound shipments exceed inbound shipments.
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largely existed over the past quarter century. Tables 12 and 13, in 
addition, summarize the transportation services demanded within geo­
graphic areas as well as interdistrict demand. Using this data along 
with information already presented, conditions in each PAD are summa­
rized.
PAD I: East Coast
The East Coast of the United States has been and is nearly com­
pletely dependent upon outside sources for both crude oil and refined 
products. Since 1950 it has never produced more than 1.6 percent of the 
U.S. production, and in 1975 produced only 9.6 percent of its refinery 
inputs. Since 1960 foreign crude imports to this PAD have, however, 
declined from 66 percent of the U.S. total to only 30 percent in 1975. 
Relative refinery capacity has shifted to the Gulf Coast, Venezuela, the 
Caribbean, and Central America. PAD I is the largest consumer market, 
consuming 37 percent of the U.S. total in 1975. In relative terms, 
refinery inputs declined from 16.7 percent of the U.S. total in 1950 to 
11.3 percent in 1976. Refinery output in PAD I was only 25.4 percent of 
total PAD demand in 1975. The physical location of major refinery cen­
ters remained the same as in 1953. Since 1960, PAD I has imported from 
89-86 percent of total imported foreign products. Given the dependency 
of the PAD, low cost transportation is essential. Transportation has 
shifted somewhat from crude to refined products and away from coastal 
tanker movement from PAD III to I (relatively) and to greater interna­
tional tanker movement.
PAD II: Mid-Continent Region
The Mid-Continent Region experienced the most dramatic decline
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as an independent region. Unlike PAD I, PAD II has historically been a 
major domestic producing region. In relative terms, PAD II declined 
from 19 percent of U.S. production in 1950 to 10.6 percent in 1975. It 
has in recent years experienced an absolute decline. Canadian crude has 
been the major source of foreign crude. The announced curtailment by 
Canada will amplify this PAD's transportation problems. PAD III has 
been the principal region from which non-Canadian crude is imported.
PAD II has maintained its refinery capacity at approximately 27-28 per­
cent of the U.S. total and has become the major crude oil importing 
region (combining foreign and inter PAD imports). Refinery centers 
have not experienced major shifts in the past 25 years. PAD II is the 
largest geographic market and second largest consumer market. Some 88 
percent of the refined products consumed in the region are from its own 
refineries. The growing dependency of the PAD has precipitated trans­
portation shifts since at least 1970 and this has generated major pipe­
line construction.
PAD III: Southwest
The Southwest Region has historically been the major producing, 
refining, and inter-PAD exporter.. Louisiana has grown in relative 
importance as a producer while Texas experienced only a marginal decline. 
Refinery capacity increased from 36 percent of the U.S. in 1950 to 42 
percent in 1976. The increase in refinery capacity combined with 
increased PAD II demands has made PAD III the second largest importer of 
foreign crude. PAD III will become the major importer of foreign crude.
PAD IV: Mountain States
PAD IV, like III, is self-sufficient in production and refining.
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Largely land locked, it has not been nor is it likely to be a major 
importing area. Although the region has been growing in relative impor­
tance as a producing area, it is removed from principal consuming and 
refining markets necessitating long distance transportation. Its 
principal export market is PAD II followed by PAD V.
PAD V: West Coast
Historically, PAD V has depended upon production and refining 
within the District and has been a separate and distinct market from the 
rest of the United States. PAD V remains a segregated market and is a 
major importer of crude oil (principally from foreign countries with a 
small amount coming from PAD IV). PAD V, because of Alaskan reserves, 
will become crude self-sufficient by 1980. It has historically been 
refinery self-sufficient. Only 1.2 percent of its demand was supplied 
by foreign refined products. The Alaskan production will exceed pro­
jected future demand in PAD V and the district will, like PAD III, become 
a net exporter to other parts of the United States. These developments 
have set in motion a debate as to the means of transporting the excess.
CHAPTER III
^Supra, n. 6 , p. 13.
^John M. Blair, The Control of Oil (New York: Pantheon Books,
1976), p. 77.
^In this and succeeding chapters, the geographic markets (larger 
than state) are those defined and published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. 
While the Federal Energy Administration (now the Department of Energy) 
and others have used differing delineations, the Bureau of Mines offers 
consistent boundaries for historical comparisons.
^The Tulsa Tribune, May 4, 1977, p. lOF.
^U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Initial Report on Oil and 
Gas Reserves and Productive Capacity, (June, 1975), p. 91.
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of The Census, Current 
Population Reports: Population Estimates and Projections, Series P-25,
No. 646 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February, 1977).
^Imports from Canada come into the United States by pipeline.
The announced phased curtailment of Canadian exports will cause consid­
erable change in the direction of flow of crude into PAD 11 (Business 
Week, February 10, 1975, p. 46). While the decline in PAD 11 production 
increased pipeline construction designed to ship foreign crude from the 
Gulf, the Canadian announcements and the Alaska surplus have, since 1975, 
spawn a group of alternative pipeline routes, most of which are still on 
the drawing board.
8
The oil embargo, other OPEC activities, and decisions of the 
major international oil. companies have altered the historical patterns. 
One sign of this is the decline in imports from Canada and Venezuela. 
Another is the sudden rise in imports from Africa, accounting for nearly 
33 percent of the total in 1975. OPEC members supplied 78 percent of 
the U.S. crude imports in 1975 (see U.S., Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum 
Products, and Natural Gas Liquids," Final Summary: 1975 (February 24,
1977), p. 27.
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^The type of refined product consumed and its percent of total 
is important to this study because not all products can be shipped by 
pipeline. Since the early 1950's it has been common practice to "batch" 
some refined products on the same line (such as gasoline, kerosene, and 
jet fuel). Other products such as LPG, heavy fuel oils, and asphalt 
present special technological problems as does the batching of crude oil 
with refined products. Since the mid-seventies advances have been made 
in batching but as a general rule crude oil, LPG, heavy fuel oil batch­
ing with the major products have been minor occurrences.
l^Bureau of Mines, Final Summary: 1975, p. 27.
^^The Venezuela decline may be the result of that country's 
nationalization of foreign companies. Unlike crude imports (78% coming 
from OPEC members) only 20.4 percent of the 672 million barrels of 
refined product imports in 1975 came from OPEC members.
^^Compiled from Bureau of Mines, Annual Summaries, 1957-75.
l^Blair, Control of Oil, pp. 131-136.
l^Blair was referring to the major companies (Ibid., p. 131).
An initial investment of this magnitude is the major entry barrier for 
the smaller or new company (see Bain, Industrial Organization, pp. 245- 
247 and 255-269).
^^Blair, p. 132. The industry viewpoint is opposite that of 
Blair. For other reasons for not expanding see Business Week, September 
12, 1977, p. 69-72.
IGgee the International Petroleum Encyclopedia: 1974 (Tulsa: 
Petroleum Publishing Company) pp. 140, 168-169.
^^Ibid.; also a factor is the offshore capacity of U.S. otmed 
refineries (in Central America and the Caribbean) which is "sour crude" 
and fuel oil oriented.
X8
Cookenboo, Crude Oil .Pipelines and Competition In The Oil 
Industry, pp. 41-55.
^^Cookenboo found that only 11.6 percent of the majors' 
capacity was crude oriented while 43.4 percent of the independents' 
refinery capacity was crude oriented (Ibid.). The location of indepen­
dents' refineries reduced their need for crude trunk lines as well as 
placing their refineries in competition with the larger companies' crude 
pipelines and also increased the risk associated with declining produc­
tion and competition from refined product pipelines.
on
^According to Blair this has increased refinery concentration 
and refinery entry barriers (Blair, The Control of Oil, pp. 131-136).
The two trends also increased the transportation requirements.
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“^Cookenboo, pp. 58-59, 54.
“^Blair, p. 131.
23As of January 1, 1976, the top twenty.companies (ranked in 
terms of total capacity) owned 127 refineries, 83.2 percent of total 
capacity, and had an average refinery capacity of 101,104 b/d. The 
remaining 126 companies (in the 50 states) owned 160 refineries, 16.8 
percent of total capacity, and had an average refinery capacity of 16,000 
b/d (all data calculated from Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, 
"Petroleum Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, January 1, 
1976" (July 14, 1976), pp. 1-17.).
CHAPTER IV
THE PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
The extent to which transportation, both in its quantitative and 
its qualitative aspects, has been of paramount importance in 
developing and shaping large sectors of contemporary economic 
society is enormous.1
Petroleum transportation constitutes a major part of the broader 
transportation system in which it falls. Pipelines alone moved 510 
billion ton-miles of intercity freight in 1975. As Table 14 illustrates, 
this was nearly 25 percent of all intercity freight moved. Pipelines 
were second only to railroads in that year. The petroleum tonnage moved 
intercity in 1975 is understated because railroads, motor carriers, and 
water carriers also transport petroleum.
The principal means by which crude and refined products are 
transported are examined in this chapter. Pipelines are established as 
the dominant transport mode. The reasons behind this development and the 
complementary nature of the other modes are outlined. The growth in 
pipeline mileage is examined, as is the geographic distribution of this 
mileage.
2Transportation of Crude Oil
The movement of crude oil to refinery begins at the site of the
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TABLE 14
TOTAL TON-MILES OF INTERCITY FREIGHT TRANSPORTED IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION AMONG FREIGHT 
CARRIERS, SELECTED YEARS, 1940-1975
Percent Distribution^
Year
Ton-Miles
(Billions) Railroads
Mo tor 
Carriers
Inland
Waterways
Pipelines
(Oil) Airways
1940 618 61.3 10.0 19.1 9.6
1945 1,027 67.3 6.5 13.9 12.3 0.01
1950 1,062 56.2 16.3 15.4 12.2 0.03
1955 1,274 49.5 17.5 17.0 15.9 0.04
1960 1,314 44.1 21.7 16.8 17.4 0.06
1965 1,638 43.2 21.9 16.0 18.7 0.12
1967 1,764 41.4 22.0 16.0 20.5 0.15
1968 1,838 41.2 21.6 15.9 21.3 0.16
1969 1,895 40.8 21.3 16.0 21.7 0.17
1970 1,932 39.7 21.3 16.5 22.3 0.18
1971 1,931 38.4 22.3 15.9 23.2 0.19
1972 2,052 38.1 22.9 16.1 22.8 0.19
1973 2,216 38.8 22.8 15.4 22.9 0.19
1974 2,219 38.8 22.3 16.0 22.8 0.18
1975 2.070 36.8 21.3 17.1 24.6 0.19
SOURCE: Data for 1940-73 from James T. Kneafsey, Transportation 
Economic Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975), p. 
118; data for 1974-75 from Energy Research and Development Administration, 
Transportation Energy Conservation Data Book. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, Edition 1.5, p. 16.
Percentage may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
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oil well. Small flow lines carry oil from the wellhead to small volume 
storage tanks. These lease tanks accumulate the production of contig­
uous wells and usually have the capacity to hold several days' produc­
tion. The tanks not only accumulate crude for quantity shipment but are 
also used to remove water sediment and gas from the crude. At intervals 
the tanks are gauged to determine the amount of impurities still present 
in the oil. Once the tanks have the quantity and quality necessary, 
valves connecting the lease tanks with gathering lines are opened.
Gathering lines are normally larger than flow lines and connect 
adjacent fields or parts of a large field with field storage tanks.
Field storage tanks are also connected to lease tanks by tank trucks.
The field tanks, like lease tanks, accumulate sufficient quantity and 
quality of crude which are then shipped via trunk lines to refineries.
In today's new fields or marginal fields, gathering operations are more
likely performed by tank trucks. In new offshore areas, the gathering
3
operation is performed initially by barge.
In some instances crude oil of a specific gravity or sulfur con­
tent are accumulated to ship in a separate run with a minimum of inter­
mingling with preceding and succeeding runs. As a general rule most 
trunk line movement of crude is by "common stream." This method in many 
cases eliminates the time delays and shippers may draw specified quanti­
ties immediately from the common flow.^
As indicated, small diameter flow lines are used to accumulate 
sufficient quantities from many wells. It is only at the gathering stage 
and trunk line stage that truck, railroads, barges, and ocean tankers 
may be considered competing modes. They are theoretically competitive
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only under ideal geographic conditions. In actual practice the alterna­
tive transporting modes are more likely to be complementary or noncom­
peting. A case in point is foreign crude petroleum imports which are 
shipped by the only means available, the ocean-going tanker. Once 
reaching port, the transportation is completed by pipeline or barge. 
Another example is that of inland and coastal barge movement which is 
limited to only certain segments of the United States. Pipelines will 
deliver to the inland ports for movement to refineries.
Pipelines have been the dominant mode for moving crude oil from 
domestic producing areas to domestic refineries since before World War 
II (see Table 15). They are the principal means of shipping Canadian 
crude into United States; shipping crude to ports for coastal movement 
(particularly when crude moves from PAD III to PAD I); and for moving 
foreign crude from United States ports-of-entry to refineries. Water 
carriers are second in relative importance. Waterway carriers' share of 
the market was in the 16-19 percent range until 1973 when because of 
imports, they carried 25.9 percent of the crude tonnage. Railroads, 
excluding the war years, have not been an important carrier of crude. 
Trucks have maintained a fairly constant 6.5-7.0 percent because of
C
their increased gathering function in marginal fields.
The data in Table 15, prepared by the Association of Oil Pipe 
Lines, is of limited use in comparing the relative importance of the 
modes since it uses tons carried and not ton-miles. For example, one 
ton of crude oil carried by each of tne four modes results in a dis­
tribution of 25 percent for each. In an extreme case it could have gone 
400 miles by pipeline and 50 miles by the remaining three. Using
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TABLE 15
TOTAL RECEIPTS OF CRUDE OIL AT DOMESTIC REFINERIES, 
AND PERCENT OF.TOTAL CARRIED BY EACH MODE OF 
TRANSPORTATION, SELECTED YEARS, 1941-75
Year
Total 
Tons 
Carried 
(Million tons)
Method of Transportation 
As A Percent of Total^
Pipelines
Water
Carriers Trucks^ Railroads
1941 212.8 73.4 21.7 1.4 3.4
1950 318.3 72.6 21.2 4.7 1.4
1956 421.7 77.7 16.0 5.8 0.5
1957 421.4 76.0 17.6 5.9 0.5
1958 402.2 76.3 16.9 6.4 0.3
1959 429.7 76.2 17.0 6.4 0.4
1960 432.3 76.0 17.1 6.4 0.4
1961 441.8 75.4 17.7 6.4 0.5
1962 452.0 74.9 17.9 6.8 0.4
1963 468.1 75.2 17.8 6.9 0.2
1964 479.4 75.6 16.7 7.5 0.3
1965 489.9 74.9 16.8 8.1 0.2
1966 518.6 74.1 17.9 7.7 0.2
1967 549.6 73.6 18.8 7.4 0.2
1968 574.8 74.1 18.6 7.1 0.2
1969 592,9 74.4 18.5 6.9 0.2
1970 615.3 74.3 18.9 6.6 0.1
1971 616.3 74.6 18.6 6.6 0.1
1973 680.6 73.0 25.9 NA NA
1975 681.2 67.4 ■ 31.0 NA NA
SOURCE: Data for 1941-1971 from Association of Oil Pipe Lines, 
Washington, B.C.; data for 1973 and 1975 estimated by author.
^Includes ocean tankers and inland barges.
^Estimated by Association of Oil Pipe Lines.
^Percentage may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
^NA - Not Available
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this logic, it is likely that the importance of pipelines and more 
recently water carriers are understated.
Pipelines are the major transportation mode for several reasons. 
Among these are: (1) crude oil is low in value relative to its weight 
and requires rapid transportation of large quantities; pipeline offers 
the lowest unit cost for large quantity and distance (as later sections 
on cost comparisons and technical economies of scale will show); (2) tied 
to (1) is the fact that there is no "back haul" problem associated with 
pipelines; (3) pipelines, particularly the newer and fully automated and 
computerized systems, produce a more or less constant flow which is 
essential to efficient refinery operation (where the height of the fixed 
costs require a certain level of operation below which costs/losses grow 
dramatically as output declines); and (4) pipelines have historically 
served more than just a transporting function to integrated companies 
(Integrated companies, as Chapter VI shows, are the principal owners of 
pipelines.)
Transportation of Refined Products
The transportation of refined products presents the opposite 
problem of crude oil in several respects. In the first place, while 
crude oil is, initially accumulated in small quantity from many wells 
for ultimate large shipment to refineries, refined products are processed 
in large quantities and must be dispersed in smaller quantities along 
routes to final consumers. Refineries do not normally have storage 
facilities for more than a few days of output and must daily move large 
quantities.^
A second major difference is that refined products, unlike crude
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oil which can be shipped in a "mixed stream" (i.e., treated as a homo­
geneous), are heterogeneous and must be treated as such in shipping. A 
third problem is that the physical means for carrying crude are not 
immediately available to ship refined products. For example, a tank 
truck, a pipeline, ocean tanker, or barge which unloads a shipment of 
crude must undergo extensive cleaning (time consuming and costly) before 
it can carry refined products without contamination.®
Table 16 presents data on tons of refined products carried over 
the 1941-73 period, along with the modes used. The data in this table 
is also limited because it also uses tons carried rather than ton-miles. 
Nevertheless, it does illustrate the relative growth in the use of pipe­
lines and trucks and the diminishing importance of water carriers and 
railroads, particularly railroads.
Shipment by pipeline has shown the greatest increase. At least 
32 percent of the major product movement is by cross country truck lines. 
Their importance, in distance terms, is clearly understated for they are 
the principal means of mass shipment to primary terminals. Trucks,
smaller pipelines, and barges deliver products from primary terminals
9
either directly to markets or to secondary terminals.
Tank trucks are of importance because of their role as local dis­
tributors. Trucks have the principal hauling responsibility within 
cities and for relatively short and small quantity hauls. Rail movement 
has diminished for the most part since 1950. It appears to have stabil­
ized at less than 3 percent. Rail movement is now normally limited to 
movement into remote areas served only by t r u c k . T h e  relative stability 
in water carrier shipments in the range of 27 percent since 1966 is
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TABLE 16
TOTAL REFINED PRODUCTS CARRIED IN DOMESTIC COMMERCE 
AND PERCENT OF TOTAL CARRIED BY EACH MODE 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 1941-73
Method of Transportation 
as a Percent of Total^
Year
Carried 
(Million tons) Pipelines
Water
Carriers! Trucks! Railroads
1941 208.3 6.9 51.0 12.4 29.8
1950 413.0 12.7 44.8 31.7 10.7
1956 593.3 19.1 38.8 35.7 6.3
1957 598.5 20.2 37.7 36.3 5.8
1958 615.0 20.5 37.5 36.8 5.2
1959 644.6 21.2 36.8 37.1 4.9
1960 656.8 21.3 37.2 36.9 4.6
1961 668.6 22.6 36.5 36.7 4.2
1962 706.7 23.2 35.2 37.8 3.8
1963 727.9 23.2 34.7 38.5 3.6
1964 776.5 25.4 31.1 40.1 3.4
1965 832.9 26.5 29.0 41.5 3.0
1966 886.8 27.6 27.1 42.5 2.8
1967 938.8 29.2 26.3 41.9 2.6
1968 988.6 30.4 25.7 41.3 2.5
1969 1,029.8 30.9 26.1 40.5 2.5
1970 1,070.5 31.1 26.7 39.7 2.4
1971 1,103.6 31.4 27.4 39.0 2.2
1973 1,318.5 31.8 25.1 41.0 2.1
SOURCE: Data for 1941-1971 from Association of Oil Pipe Lines, 
Washington, D.C.; data for 1973 from Energy Research and Development 
Administration, Transportation.Energy Conservation Data Book. Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, Edition 1.5, p. 20.
^Includes ocean tankers and inland barges.
2
Estimated by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines.
O
Percentage may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
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attributed largely to the rise in imports. Their importance will con­
tinue to rise as imports increase.
Pipelines have historically only carried light petroleum products 
(gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, and distillant fuel oils) and liquefied 
petroleum gases (LPG). These products, as Table 7 indicates, constitute 
the majority of products consumed in the United States.
Pipelines, during the 1957-1975 period, have been segmented into 
refined product, crude and LPG carriers. Normally a pipeline system 
will ship "batches" of gasoline, jet fuel, fuel oil, etc., but will not 
batch LPG on the same line. Recently, however, pipelines have success­
fully "batched" shipments of refined products, LPG and crude along the 
same pipeline with minimum contamination p r o b l e m s . T h e  traditional 
practice, however, has been shipments via separate systems.
Intermodel Competition: Cost Comparisons
Transportation cost comparisons between the alternative modes 
are tenuous at best. As illustrated, the various modes have, histor­
ically, been more complementary than competitive. Nevertheless, inter­
model cost comparisons are useful for they established, in general 
terms, what additional costs are incurred when an owner of crude or 
refined products must, for whatever reason, shift from one mode to 
another.
Transportation costs vary according to the quantity to be shipped, 
length of haul, and terrain/spatial area to be traversed. A precise 
specification of these conditions would automatically eliminate one or 
more of the modes from the analysis. Under ceteris paribus conditions, 
however, pipelines offer the lowest per barrel mile costs of any of the
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modes. The only alternative mode that approaches the per barrel mile 
costs is the ocean tanker (see Tables 17 and 18).
Ocean tankers have limited relevance to the domestic transporta­
tion market. The major exception is movements from PAD III to PAD I and 
coastal movements on the West and Gulf Coast. In crude movement 
between III and I, ocean carriers have historically been a non-competing 
mode because no crude pipelines cross into I from III. Ocean carriers 
compete with pipelines in the movement of refined products primarily 
between PAD IIL and PAD I. Large super tankers, which offer the lowest 
per unit costs, however, have largely been excluded from the U.S. market 
because there are no ports or deep-sea terminals which can service
1 9
these carriers.
Several studies have presented cost comparisons of the alterna­
tive modes. Post World War II comparisons are most relevant for our 
purposes. Tables 17 to 19 present the available data on transportation 
costs by mode. Tables 17 and 18 represent a synthesis of several sources 
of cost information. The data in the tables support a thesis, accepted 
in the petroleum industry, that pipelines offer the lowest average and 
marginal costs. Tankers approach these costs but tank truck and rail­
road tank cars do not. Tank truck and tank cars, according to Table 17, 
have similar costs which suggest that they are competitive. The data on 
transportation method actually used, however, indicated that railroads 
are relatively insignificant.
Table 17 indicates similar costs for barges and pipelines.
Barges are fairly limited in the regions of the United States that they 
can service. The table also indicates that an average barge had a
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TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF ENERGY TRANSPORTATION COSTS
Mode Capacity!
Cents Per 
Ton Mile^
Costs
Cents/Million BTU/ 
100 Miles!
Pipeline
Gas 1000-1500 mscfd. 1.5-2.0
LNG 500-1500 MMscfd. - 1.5-3.0
Oil 300-1200 Thousand 
barrels/day 0.17-0.60 0.3-0.8
Barges 12,000 barrels^ 0.15-0.60 -
Tanker-oil 100-300 thousand 
deadweight tons - 0.5
Tank Trucks 100-130 barrels^ 3-5 -
Rail Tank Cars 12,000 barrels^ 2-7 -
^Unless noted otherwise data on capacity and costs for million 
BTU is from U.S. House of Representatives, Energy Facts prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Energy of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, 93rd 
Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print, Washington, U.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973.
Data on costs per ton-mile from Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Special Committee for Oil, Pipelines in the 
United States and Europe and their Legal and Regulatory Aspects. Paris, 
France, 1969.
^Data on capacity for barges, tank trucks, and rail tank cars 
calculated from U.S. National Petroleum Council, U.S. Petroleum and Gas 
Transportation Capacities: 1967, Washington: National Petroleum Council, 
1967.
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TABLE 18
TRANSPORTATION COST COMPARISONS, 
SELECTED MODES AND AREAS, 
1952 AND 1971 
(dollars per barrel)
Pipeline Tanker Railroad
1952
Crude Oil
Scurry County, 
Texas/
New Jersey 
Chicago 
Toledo 
Houston
$0.780
0.425
0.558
0.255
0.655 2.83
1.40
2.33
1.29
Gasoline
Houston/
Lynchburg, VA 
Pittsburg
1.12
0.40
1.05
0.66
3.18
3.15
1971
Gasoline
Port Arthur/ 
New York 0.29 0.33
SOURCE: Data for 1952 from John G. McLean and Robert Wm. Haigh, 
The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, Norwood, Massachusetts: Plimpton 
Press, 1954; data for 1971 from U.S. House of Representatives, Anti­
competitive Impact of Oil Company Ownership of Petroleum Product Pipe­
lines , Hearings before the Subcommittee on Special Business Problems of 
the Select Committee on Small Business, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
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TABLE 19
AVERAGE REVENUE PER TON-MILE FOR SELECTED 
COMMON CARRIERS, SELECTED YEARS, 
1950-1970 
(cents per ton mile)
Year
Rail 
(Class I)
Truck 
(Class I) Oil Pipelines
1950 1.33 5.01 0.31
1955 1.37 5.80 0.32
1960 1.40 6.31 0.31
1965 1.27 6.46 0.28
1970 1.43 7.50 0.27
SOURCE: TAA, Transportation Facts and Trends, Ninth edition, 
July, 1972, p. 8.
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capacity of approximately 12,000 barrels in 1967. Its carrying capacity 
compared to demand is thus quite limited (as are trunks and rail cars). 
Movement of petroleum oils by barge is also much less dependable because 
barges are affected by weather conditions and seasons of the year.13 
Table 19 compares average revenues per ton-mile for selected 
years, 1950-1970, for rail, truck, and pipeline. While the data is not 
strictly comparable, it does indicate as did Tables 17 and 18 the sub­
stantial price differences between the three modes. Pipelines are unmis­
takably the lowest cost means of transportation over land. They are, 
when combined with the lack of weather restrictions, superior to barges. 
In addition, large diameter lines can, as indicated in Table 18, effec­
tively compete with ocean tankers for movement of refined products 
between PAD III and PAD I. This as Chapter III noted is a significant 
market.
While the cost data is dated and fragmented, it does represent 
an industry concensus. Table 20, based on data published by the Inter­
state Commerce Commission for regulated carriers, traces the historical 
trend in average revenue and costs per barrel delivered out of the 
system as well as per barrel mile. While unadjusted for price changes 
(inflation), the average revenue and cost data summarizes the difficul­
ties facing other modes in attempting to compete with a mode 
which demonstrates a downward sloping average cost curve. This data 
also emphasizes that the modes used in the petroleum transportation 
system generally complement each other.
Growth in Pipeline Mileage 
There are three types of petroleum pipelines: (1) crude oil
TABLE 20
SELECTED PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL OPERATING RATIOS, 
COMPANIES REPORTING TO THE ICC,
ANNUALLY, 1957-1975
Year
Average Miles 
Barrel Shipped
Average Revenue 
Per 1000 Barrel Mllos^
Average Expense 
Per 1000 Barrel Mllesl
Groan Income 
Per 1000 Barrel Miles
Crude Product Total Crude Product Total Crude Product Total Crude Product
1957 256 298 0.62 0.33 0.29
1958 268 277 0.62 - - 0.33 - - 0.28 - -
1959 272 269 0.61 - - 0.32 - - 0.28 - -
1960 267 ■ 269 0.60 - - 0.33 - - 0.28 - -
1961 268 264 0.60 - - 0.32 - - 0.28 - -
1962 264 261 0.60 0.32 0.29 _
1963 270 260 0.59 - - 0.31 - - 0.28 - -
1964 267 283 0.57 0.51 0.72 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.24 0.21 0.30
1965 280 337 0.52 0.48 0.59 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.22 0.20 0.27
1966 281 354 0.50 0.46 0.55 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.26
1967 270 397 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.23
1968 269 373 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.21
1969 263 367 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.18 0.22
1970 270 357 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.24
1971 271 363 0.50 0.47 0.55 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.25
1972 277 346 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.29 0.2 V 0.31 0.21 0.18 0.24
1973 283 338 0.50 0.45 0.57 0.29 0.2/ 0.3 1 0.21 0.18 0.2 3
1974 203 344 0.55 0.49 0.64 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.23 0.18 0.28
1975 272 364 0.65 0.60 0.71 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.26 0.33
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Transportation 
Statistics In The United States: Part 6. Pipelines (Washington, U.C.: Government Printing Office, 
Annual).
(O
Ipor the years 1957-63, data was not published separately.
113
gathering lines; (2) crude oil trunk lines; and (3) product trunk lines. 
Product trunk lines are subdivided into (1) carriers of gasoline, kero­
sene, aviation fuels, fuel oils; and (2) "exclusive" carriers of lique­
fied petroleum products (LPG).^^
The distinction between crude gathering and trunk lines has not 
been given a precise definition in pipeline literature. A gathering 
line, in functional terms, is vaguely defined as a pipeline which "con­
nects the individual wells to the trunk lines." The Bureau of Mines 
and the Interstate Commerce Commission apparently allow reporting com­
panies to define segments of crude lines according to each individual 
company's definition.
Pipelines are classified as either interstate or intrastate 
carriers. This dichotomy has importance for this study for interstate 
carriers are the focal point of this study's empirical analysis. Inter­
state carriers are also significant for they largely resolve the inter­
district disparity in both the intermediate and final goods markets.
Pipeline mileage data is compiled by the Bureau of Mines and 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The data published by the 
Bureau of Mines is compiled and published triennially. The data is 
generated partially by means of a questionnaire sent to all known inter- 
and intrastate owners of oil pipelines and from data prepared by the 
ICC. Data is provided on pipeline mileage place as of January 1 of 
the anniversary date of the survey. Data is segmented by type of line 
(crude, product, and so forth), diameter, and location. Similar data 
is provided on pipelines constructed and removed during the three-year 
interval. The data represents net mileage in place but not necessarily
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in operation.
The Interstate Commerce Commission mileage data comes from annual 
reports filed by interstate common carriers regulated by the Commission. 
The mileage reported to the Commission is operating mileage only and 
does not necessarily represent all mileage owned. Data is segmented by 
type and state as of December 31, of the reporting year. While diameter 
information is supplied by the carriers in their annual reports, the 
information is not published by the Commission.
From these two primary sources, mileage data has been compiled. 
The data allows comparisons of total mileage, by type and geographic 
market, in the interstate and intrastate pipeline markets. The data 
has limitations which prevent precise valuation of the importance of 
interstate versus intrastate pipelines.They do, however, provide 
benchmarks for comparisons.^^
Growth in Total Pipeline Mileage in Place 
in the United States: 1931-19741^
In 1933 the Bureau of Mines reported 111,650 miles of pipeline 
were in place in the United States. By 1974, the total had almost 
doubled, with 222,355 miles in place. Table 21 shows the mileage 
growth during the 43 year period. In 1931 nearly all the mileage was 
used to carry crude oil. By 1974, product pipelines mileage represented 
34.6 percent of the total. The growth in product pipelines combined 
with increased use of large diameter pipe is the principal pipeline 
development of the post World War II period.
Crude trunk line mileage showed little net change from 1959 
through the early 1970’s. Construction activity has increased since
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1971, and has largely centered on the new lines built to carry imported 
crude from the Gulf Coast to refineries in PAD II.
Gathering line mileage in place has been declining since 1965 
after peaking at 77,041 miles. Since that time sc 7,700 miles of 
gathering lines have been removed. The decline in gathering lines has 
not been offset entirely by increases in diameter. In 1950 nearly 80 
percent of the gathering lines in the United States had a diameter of 
4 inches or less. In 1974, 75 percent of the mileage had similar dia­
meters. Of the remaining 1974 mileage, 22 percent was between 6-8 inches 
and only 2.4 percent was over 10 inches. There has been a shift to 
larger lines, but only a marginal shift.
The decline in gathering line mileage indicates a decline in the 
role played by pipeline in this, the first phase of the transportation 
system. With the growth in marginal wells and depleting fields, tank 
trucks have assumed a growing significance as a gatherer of crude for 
delivery to field storage tanks and to small crude-oriented refineries.
Crude trunk lines, after experiencing a decline of 1,558 
miles between 1965 and 1968, has expanded both in mileage and average 
diameter. The diameter change is significant in that it accounts for 
the largest response to a substantial increase in the demand for crude 
transportation services. This is illustrated in Table 22. In 1950 the 
weighted mean diameter was 9.3 inches, in 1974 it had increased to nearly 
12 inches.
From 1950 to 1974, product pipeline mileage increased in the 
United States by almost 56,000 miles [see Table 23]. This increase was 
nearly ten times the net change in crude trunk mileage. The growth in
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TABLE 21
TOTAL PIPELINE MILEAGE IN PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1931-1974
Year
Total
Mileage
Crude
Gathering
Lines
Trunk
Product 
Trunk Lines
1931 111,660 53,640 58,020 (1)
1941 127,351 53,170 65,180 9,001
1950 152,814 60,560 71,373 20,881
1956 188,540 73,526 78,594 36,420
1959 189,982 75,182 70,317 44,483
1962 200,543 76,988 70,355 53,200
1965 210,867 77,041 72,383 61,443
1968 209,478 74,124 70,825 64,529
1971 218,671 71,132 75,143 72,396
1974 222,355 69,266 76,250 76,839
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude-Oil and Refined-Products Pipeline
Mileage in the United States," (Jan. 1, 1974), Triennial Survey.
^Included'in Crude Trunk Mileage.
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TABLE 22
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF CRUDE TRUNK LINE MILEAGE, 
UNITED STATES, BY DIAMETER SIZE,
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1974
Year
Total
Mileage
Crude Trunk Lines by Size as a Percent 
of Total Crude Trunk Mileage^
2-6 8-12 14-20 22-30 32 and Over
1950 71,373 22.8 70.5 4.7 2.0
1953 75,228 21.2 66.4 8.4 3.9 --
1956 78,594 20.5 61.5 10.8 7.2 --
1959 70,317 18.5 58.4 15.4 6.9 --
1962 70,355 18.1 58.3 15.7 7.8 --
1965 72,383 17.7 58.1 16.3 7.6 0.2
1968 70,825 15.9 57.9 17.8 7.9 0.4
1971 75,143 17.4 54.8 17.7 8.1 1.9
1974 76,250 17.8 54.6 17.5 8.0 2.0
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
Mineral Industry Surveys and Information Circulars, "Crude-Oil and 
Refined-Product Pipeline Mileage in the United States," (Triennial 
Surveys).
Percentage may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
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TABLE 23
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCT TRUNK LINE MILEAGE 
UNITED STATES, BY DIAMETER SIZE, . 
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1974
Product Lines by Size as a Percent 
of Total Product Mileage^
Year
Total
Mileage 2-6 8-12 14-20 22-30 32 and Over
1950 20,881 42.4 57.6
1953 27,236 33.8 62.0 3.9 --
1956 36,420 29.8 64.5 5.8 -- --
1959 44,483 29.1 61.3 9.3 0.3 --
1962 53,200 30.5 61.3 7.9 0.2 --
1965 61,443 29.0 60.2 8.0 0.5 2.2
1968 64,529 29.5 59.2 8.6 0.4 2.2
1971 72,396 27.9 61.0 8.1 1.1 1.9
1974 76,839 26.4 59.4 9.1 2.4 2.6
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
Mineral Industry Surveys and Information Circulars, "Crude-Oil and 
Refined-Products Pipeline mileage in the United States," (Triennial 
Surveys).
Percentage may not equal one hundred due to rounding.
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mileage was paralleled by an increase in large diameter lines. In 1950
42.4 percent of the mileage in place had a diameter of six inches or 
less. In 1974, only 26.4 percent was as small as six inches. The mean 
diameter in 1950 was 7.5 inches. In 1974 it had increased to ten inches. 
The difference in diameter size between crude and product trunk lines 
suggests a greater throughput capacity for crude lines. In 1975 crude 
throughput on ICC lines exceeded product throughput by 19.3 percent.
20The number of barrel miles was 15.8 percent higher in the same year.
Interstate and Intrastate Pipeline Mileage
Growth in Interstate Pipelines
Total operated mileage for companies reporting to ICC is shown 
in Table 24 for selected years 1931-1956 and annually, 1957-1975. This
O 1
mileage data is comparable with the triennial data shown in Table 21.
In 1931 ICC carriers operated 93,090 miles of oil pipelines.
Of this mileage, 44.9 percent were gathering lines and 53.6 percent were 
crude trunk lines. Product lines represented only 1.5 percent of the 
total (1,400 miles). By 1975 ICC carriers operated 172,680 miles of 
pipelines. Of this total, only 23.2 percent were gathering lines.
Crude trunk lines represented 33.1 percent. Product lines had increased 
to 66,620 miles and represented 38.6 percent of the total mileage. This 
growth is shown in Table 24.
Column three confirms a trend noted earlier. Interstate com­
panies have reduced their role as a gatherer of crude oil in favor of 
intrastate operations and tank trucks. Gathering line mileage peaked 
at 52,077 miles in 1957 and has declined since that time.
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TABLE 24
PIPELINE MILEAGE OPERATED BY INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES, 
IN THE UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS, 1931-1975
Crude Lines
Year Total Gathering Trunk Trunk Lines Other^
1931 93,090 41,803 49,887 1,400
1941 105,435 41,858 57,502 6,075
1950 128,589 47,593 64,622 16,374
1956 142,686 51,336 61,885 29,465
1957 145,236 52,077 61,379 31,780
1958 144,354 49,787 61,702 32,865
1959 149,159 49,567 61,860 37,732
1960 151,968 49,401 62,059 40,508
1961 153,467 49,656 62,251 41,560
1962 155,053 48,063 61,702 45,288
1963 156,812 47,226 58,648^ 45,358% 5,580
1964 159,583 46,886 60,039 47,235 5,423
1965 161,412 46,640 60,795 48,627 5,350
1966 163,155 47,352 60,108 50,079 5,616
1967 165,478 47,456 60,893 51,475 5,654
1968 169,307 46,886^ 61,807 53,431 7,183
1969 170,824 45,993 61,887 56,096 6,848
1970 175,735 46,587 63,040 59,335 6,783
1971 174,722 45,759 60,946 61,525 6,492
1972 173,532 42,893 59,757 64,701 6,181
1973 170,691 41,655 57,435 64,919 6,682
1974 173,341 41,577 57,602 68,609 5,553^
1975 172,680 40,040 57,200^ 66,620 8,820°
SOURCE: Interstate Commerce Commission, Transport Statistics
in the United States: Part 6, Pipe Lines. (Annual).
^Includes mileage owned in undivided interest and mileage owned 
by others but excludes "o;-med" mileage operated by others [included in 
other columns].
bprior to 1968 gathering lines included mileage held in undivided 
interests and owned by others; prior to 1963 crude and product trunk 
lines included mileage held in undivided interests and owned by others.
(Continued)
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TABLE 24 CONTINUED
^In 1975 the ICC in error included the Lakehead Pipeline 
Company's 2,542 miles of crude trunk line under the gathering column.
^In 1975, 88 percent of "other" mileage was in undivided 
interests, of which 4,268 was crude trunk mileage, 2,987 was product, 
and 487 was gathering line mileage.
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Crude trunk lines have shown virtually no mileage growth since 
1957. Total barrels terminated on these lines, however, increased by 
64 percent and totaled nearly 3.6 billion barrels in 1975. From inde­
pendent sources it is estimated that a total of 4,268 miles of crude 
lines, in 1975, were in undivided interest lines. This mileage is 
included in column six. Combined with column four, crude trunk mileage 
in 1975 stood at 61,468 miles. This was only 89 miles more than in 
1957. It seems reasonable and is supported by the increase in throughput 
and total diameter increase that much of this mileage represents larger 
diameters than in 1957.
Interstate products lines showed dramatic growth. Including 
undivided interest mileage, product mileage increased by 37,827 miles 
from 1957 and totaled 69,607 miles in 1975. The growth has been contin­
uous since 1931.
Mileage operated by ICC carriers as a percent of total United 
States in-place mileage declined slightly during the 1931-1973 period. 
This is shown in Table 25. In 1931, 83.4 percent of the pipeline 
mileage in place in the United States was operated by ICC carriers. As 
of January 1, 1974, ICC mileage was only 75.8 percent of the total. The 
relative decline is largely explained by the decline in ICC gathering 
lines as a percent of the total (shown in column three) . ICC gathering 
lines represented only 60 percent of the total in 1974 compared to 79 
percent in 1931. Crude trunk mileage has also declined from a peak of
90.5 percent in 1950 to only 75.3 percent in 1974. [If undivided 
interest in crude lines are included, the percent rises to approximately 
80.]
123
TABLE 25
PIPELINE MILEAGE OPERATED BY INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPAÎJIES 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL MILEAGE IN PLACE,
SELECTED YEARS, I93I-I974
Year
Total
Mileage
Crude
ProductGathering Trunk
I93I 83.4 77.9 86.0 __
I94I 82.8 78.7 88.2 67.5
1950 84.1 78.6 90.5 78.4
1956 75.7 69.8 78.7 80.9
1959 78.5 65.9 88.0 84.8
1962 77.3 62.4 87.7 85.1
1965% 76.5 60.5 84.0 79.1
1968 80.8 63.2 87.3 82.8
1971 79.9 64.3 81.1 85.0
1974 76.8 60.1 75.3 8 4.5b
SOURCE: Calculated from data contained In Tables 21 and 24.
ICC data is operated mileage and Bureau of Mines mileage is mileage in 
place. In addition, ICC mileage is as of the end of the year and Bureau 
of Mines mileage is as of the first of the year. Thus, for example, ICC 
mileage is for December 31, 1973 and the Bureau's mileage is for January 
I, 1974.
^Beginning in 1963, ICC mileage by type as a percent of total is 
understated because undivided interest mileage and mileage owned by other 
are not shown by ICC as to whether they are trunk, gathering, crude or 
product. From independent sources, undivided interest mileage in 1973 
totaled 5,336 miles of which 3,248 were crude lines and 2,088 miles were 
product. The addition of this mileage in 1973 brings the product per­
cent to 87.1% and the crude mileage to 79.6%.
^The inclusion of the product mileage of the undivided lines, 
American Oil, and Champlin lines raises the total interstate percentage 
to 90.9.
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The growth in product mileage has largely been concentrated in 
the interstate market. In 1941 only 67.5 percent of the lines were
interstate. By 1974 interstate lines represented almost 91 percent of
the total product mileage in place in the United States. Carriers
22
regulated by the ICC operated 87.1 percent of the product mileage.
Growth in Intrastate Pipelines
Since 1906 much of the analysis of pipelines has neglected
intrastate operations. Within the literature, it is not possible to
determine the relative importances of intrastate lines. This void can 
be attributed to the fact that public data on intrastate lines are 
either unavailable, scattered among many states, or extremely limited 
(i.e., not shown by company, diameter, etc.). Tlie lack of attention is 
also due to their relatively small size compared to interstate opera­
tions .
Using Tables 21 and 24, total intrastate mileage can be derived. 
This mileage has increased considerably since 1931. It has never, how­
ever, totaled more than 24 percent of all mileage. In 1931 intrastate 
mileage (or at least mileage not operated by ICC carriers) totaled 
18,570 miles. This mileage was, distributed as follows: (1) crude gather­
ing, 11,837 miles and 64 percent of total intrastate lines; (2) crude 
trunk lines, 6,733 miles and 36 percent of the total. In January,
1974, intrastate mileage totaled 51,664 miles. This was an increase of 
178 percent.
The 1974 intrastate mileage was distributed approximately as 
follows: (1) crude gathering lines, 27,473 miles and 53.2 percent of 
the intrastate total; (2) crude trunk lines, 14,723 miles and 28.5
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percent of the intrastate total; and (3) product trunk lines, 9,470 
miles and 18.3 percent of the total. The 9,470 miles of intrastate 
product lines includes the mileage of American Oil and Champlin which 
actually operate interstate but do not report to the ICC. Removing 
this mileage lowers the total intrastate product mileage to approximately 
6,513 miles.
In total there were 48,707 miles of pipelines in the intra­
state market as of January, 1974. How much of this mileage is operat­
ing is unknown. Given that the majority of the mileage is in gathering 
lines (56.4 percent of the adjusted total) the intrastate system seems 
relatively inconsequential with the exception of the West Coast where 
virtually all mileage is intrastate.
The Geographic Distribution of Infra- and 
Interstate Pipeline Mileage^-^
Pipelines are distributed among the various states and PAD dis­
tricts in accordance with: (1) location of production; (2) location of 
refineries; and (3) location of major consumer markets (minor markets 
are served by the alternative modes). As shown earlier, crude produc­
tion and refineries have been concentrated in a few states, the major 
consumer markets have also been concentrated but in different spatial 
areas. Because of the greater disparity between consuming markets and 
refinery locations, product pipelines are more widely dispersed than 
are crude gathering and trunk lines.
The distribution of total pipeline in the United States, as of 
January 1, 1974, is shown by state in Figure 4. This includes total 
and interstate mileage. The year 1974 is used for the regional
FIGURE 4
TOTAL PIPELINE MILEAGE IN PLACE AND TOTAL OPERATED 
BY ICC CARRIERS, JANUARY 1, 1974%
1,440
4,950
1,263
SOURCE: See Table 21, p. 116 and Table 24, pp. 120-121.
&Upper number Is mileage in place; lower number is ICC mileage.
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comparison since it is the latest Bureau of Mines data. While Figure 4 
illustrates a wide dispersion of total mileage among the various states 
and p a d 's , the more meaningful comparisons are to be found in Figures 
5-8 and Tables 25-28.
Geographic Distribution of Crude Gathering Lines
During the period 1957-73 gathering line mileage in the United 
States declined by 8.1 percent. Lines operated by ICC carriers exper­
ienced a much greater reduction, declining 19 percent. The reduction 
was, as Table 26 indicates, experienced by four of the five PAD dis­
tricts. PAD IV was the only district experiencing mileage growth. The 
sharpest decline occurred in PAD II. This coincided with PAD II's 
relative decline as a producing district.
Table 26 also confirms the greater relative decline in the impor­
tance of gathering lines operated by ICC carriers. The exception is in 
PAD IV where 95.6 percent of the mileage is operated by ICC carriers.
The opposite holds true in PAD V where all mileage is intrastate 
mileage. The largest decline in gathering line mileage was in PAD's 
I-III. In each of these PAD's, gathering lines operated by ICC carriers 
experienced a greater reduction than the total. As a result almost 50 
percent of PAD I and II mileage in 1973 was intrastate. The majority 
of PAD III mileage in 1973, 71 percent, remained ICC-operated mileage 
(although in 1957 the percentage was 82.4).
Gathering lines in 1957 were largely concentrated in PAD's II 
and III, 84 percent of in place lines. In 1973, 82.6 percent of the 
lines were in the same two PAD's. This same trend holds true for ICC 
lines. The gathering lines in-place in PAD's I and II represent lines
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serving some of the oldest producing fields in the United States. This 
is particularly true in PAD I. As indicated, PAD I's crude production 
in 1973 was only 1.2 percent of the total. Its gathering lines in the 
same year represented 9.3 percent of total mileage.
Figure 5 shows gathering mileage by state in 1973. The upper 
figure is mileage in place, the lower figure is ICC-operated mileage. 
Three states, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas, accounted for almost 55 per­
cent of the total 1973 gathering lines. Combined with California and 
Louisiana, the .total for the five states rises to 65.2 percent.
Most of the intrastate mileage was also concentrated in these 
five states. There were 27,473 miles of intrastate lines in 1973.
Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas accounted for 59 percent of these lines. 
Including California and Louisiana, this total increases to almost 70 
percent.
Figure 5 also shows the large number of states that neither
produce nor gather crude oil. In 1973, 30 states were shown by the
Bureau of Mines to be producing states. In the same year 28 states had
gathering lines. Only Missouri and South Dakota were producing oil
without having gathering lines in place (the combined production of the
24two states was only 335,000 barrels).
Geographic Distribution of Crude Trunk Lines
During 1957-73 crude trunk mileage in place in the United States 
increased by 8.7 percent. Mileage operated by ICC carriers showed 
almost no change during that period. PAD I experienced the only decline. 
Total mileage in PAD I declined by 18.6 percent while ICC-operated 
mileage dropped by 59 percent. This PAD's sharp decline in ICC-mileage
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TABLE 26
TOTAL CRUDE GATHERING LINE MILEAGE AND INTERSTATE GATHERING 
LINE MILEAGE BY PAD, 1957 AND 1973
Gathering 
Line Mileage 
Total ICC
ICC as a 
Percent of Total
PAD I
1957 7,659 6,313 82.4
1973 6,446 3,381 52.4
Percent Change -15.8 -45.4 -
PAD II
1957 30,284 17,396 57.4
1973 25,263 13,107% 51.9
Percent Change -16.6 -24.6 -
PAD III
1957 32,817 27,046 82.4
1973 31,915 2 2,679b 71.1
Percent Change -2.7 -16.1 -
PAD IV
1957 2,078 1,322 63.6
1973 3,151 3,014 95.6
Percent Change 51.6 128.0 “
PAD V
1957 2,527 0 0
1973 2,491 0 0
Percent Change -1.4 - —
Total, United States
1957 75,365 52,077 69.1
1973 69,266 42,181 60.9
Percent Change -8.1 -19.0
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude-Oil and Refined-Products Pipe­
line Mileage in the United States," Triennial Surveys and from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Transport Statistics in the United 
States: Part 6, Pipelines. Annual
^Includes 374 miles of leased lines and 150 miles of undivided 
interest lines.
^Includes 22 miles of leased mileage.
FIGURE 5
CRUDE GATHERING LINE MILEAGE IN PLACE AND TOTAL OPERATED 
 ____  BY ICC CARRIERS, JANUARY 1, 1974a
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490
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728
286
1,725
1,749
2,885
634
2,460
350
247
2,967
2,197
131
117 [3,039
,657/434
354
6,207
3.662
3,288
2,947
1,06210,162
4,246
459
313
2.247
24,794
16,974 1,858
13
SOURCE: See Table 26, p. 129.
^Upper number is mileage in place; lower number is ICC mileage.
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explains the lack of growth in total ICC mileage. The trends by PAD 
districts are shown in Table 27. Mileage growth occurred in PAD’s II-V. 
PAD TV's growth paralleled the growth in its gathering line mileage.
The majority of the trunk lines in the United States are concen­
trated in p a d's II and III, as is the domestic production and refinery 
capacity. Throughout 1957-1973 approximately 81 percent of the crude 
trunk mileage has been contained in these two PAD's. An even higher 
percentage (87) of the ICC-operated lines are in PAD's II and III.
Interstate crude lines have never been important in PAD V.
Only one line runs from III to V and only one line moves crude from
PAD IV to V. In 1957, 98.7 percent of the mileage was intrastate. In 
1973, 85 percent of the crude mileage in PAD V was intrastate mileage.
The opposite holds true for PAD's II-IV. In these, the major 
trunk line areas, ICC-operated lines have dominated the market. More 
than 85 percent of the lines are operated by interstate carriers. The 
relative importance of these lines has declined slightly during 1957-73. 
In 1957, 96.2 percent of the PAD II lines were operated by ICC carriers. 
In 1973 the percent had fallen to 86 percent. In 1957, 92.3 percent of 
PAD III mileage was ICC-operated mileage. In 1973 this had dropped to 
87 percent.
In 1957 only 4.4 percent of the trunk lines were in PAD I. In
1973 this had fallen to 3.3 percent. In 1957 the Bureau of Mines showed
less mileage in place than was reported operated by ICC carriers. Dis­
regarding this discrepancy, ICC carriers operated all the trunk lines 
in PAD I. In 1973 only 53 percent of the lines were operated by ICC 
carriers. During the same period, however, refinery capacity in PAD I
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TABLE 27
TOTAL CRUDE TRUNK MILEAGE AND INTERSTATE CRUDE 
TRUNK MILEAGE BY PAD, 1957 AND 1973
Trunk Line Mileage 
Total ICC
ICC as a 
Percent of Total
PAD I
1957 3,068 3,231% 100.0
1973 2,498 1,325 53.0
Percent Change -18.6 -59.0 — -
PAD II 
1957
-
25,278 24,309 96.2
1973 26,488 22,742^ 85.9
Percent Change 4.8 6.4 —--
PAD III
1957 31,746 29,299 92.3
1973 35,127 30,406c 86.6
Percent Change 10.6 3.8 ---
PAD IV
1957 5,039 4,476 88.8
1973 6,799 6,119 90.0
Percent Change 34.9 36.7
PAD V
1957 4,998 64^ 1.3
1973 5,338 803% 15.0
Percent Change 6 .8 Over 100% ---
Total, United States 
1957 70,129 61,379 87.5
1973 76,250 61,395 80.5
Percent Change 8.7 0.03
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude-Oil and Refined-Products Pipe­
line Mileage in the United States," Triennial Surveys and from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Transport Statistics in the United 
States: Part 6 , Pipelines. Annual.
^Mileage reported operated by ICC exceeds the Bureau of Mines 
estimate of in-place mileage.
(Continued)
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TABLE 27 CONTINUED
^Includes 42 miles of leased lines and 1681 miles of undivided 
interest lines.
‘^Includes 374 miles of leased lines and 1827 miles of undivided 
interest lines.
*^Includes 17 miles of undivided interest lines.
FIGURE 6
CRUDE TRUNK LINE MILEAGE IN PLACE AND TOTAL OPERATED 
BY ICC CARRIERS, JANUARY 1, 1974^ 229
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SOURCE: See Table 27, pp. 132-133.
Upper number is in place mileage, lower number is ICC mileage.
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increased by approximately 54 percent.
Figure 6 illustrates that crude trunk lines in PAD I are largely 
confined to the Northeastern states. The mileage shown for the states 
of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine comprise a pipeline that transports 
foreign crude from South Portland, Maine to Montreal, Canada. This line 
does not supply U.S. refineries. The removal of this mileage leaves 
only West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York with crude trunk lines 
serving refineries in the Northeast.
The unmistakable conclusion is that crude trunk lines are 
relatively minor suppliers to eastern refineries. This is supported by 
noting that 88.3 percent of total refinery receipts of crude oil in 
1975 came by tanker.
Figure 6 also indicates that outside PAD I, crude trunk lines 
are the major means of transporting domestic crude oil. Only four 
states in PADS II-V did not have trunk mileage in 1973. Two of these 
states, Idaho and South Dakota, did not have refineries. The other two 
states, Nevada and Oregon, had refineries, one in each state, but 
neither were in operation as of January, 1974.
Data on refinery receipts of crude by transportation method 
emphasizes the importance of crude trunk lines. In 1975, pipelines 
delivered the following percentage of refinery receipts :
PAD I, 10.3% of total, 12.0% of domestic crude;
PAD II, 97.9% of total, 97.3% of domestic crude;
PAD III, 67.2% of total, 86.6% of domestic crude;
PAD IV, 91.0% of total, 90.0% of domestic crude;
PAD V, 49.9% of total, 73.7% of domestic crude; and for the
U.S., 67.3% of total, 87.4% of domestic c r u d e . 26
As was the case with gathering lines, only 15 percent of PAD V's trunk 
lines are in the interstate market. In California, all trunk line
136
mileage is intrastate.
Geographic Distribution of Product Lines
From 1957 to 1973 product pipeline mileage in the United States 
increased 72.7 percent. The growth occurred in all five districts. 
Unlike crude pipelines, product lines operated by ICC carriers exper­
ienced greater mileage growth than intrastate lines. The percent of 
total mileage operated by these carriers increased in all PAD's. This 
is shown in Table 28.
The greatest present and historical concentration of product 
mileage is in PAD II, the greatest land mass, and applies to both total 
and interstate mileage. PAD III has the next largest concentration of 
mileage and experienced the greatest growth during between 1957 and 
1973. Approximately 74 percent of the 1973 total U.S. mileage was in 
PAD II and III. This is only slightly higher than the refinery capacity 
(69 percent). While crude lines were relatively unimportant in PAD I, 
this is not the case in terms of product lines. In 1973 there were 
10,928 miles of product lines in PAD I. These lines, as Figure 6 indi­
cates, serve each state in PAD I (with the exception of Vermont and New 
Hampshire).
Product pipeline mileage is concentrated in the interstate mar­
ket . Only in PAD V does the percentage fall below approximately 85 
percent. Even in PAD V 65 percent is in the interstate system. The 
wide dispersion among states supports the significance of pipelines as 
the dominant mode for moving refined products from refinery centers to 
bulk terminals located in the population centers of the United States.
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TABLE 28
TOTAL REFINED PRODUCT TRUNK LINE MILEAGE AND 
INTERSTATE TRUNK LINE MILEAGE BY PAD, 
1957 AND 1973
Trunk Line Mileage 
Total ICC
ICC as a 
Percent of Total
PAD I
1957 6,772 4,942 73.0
1973 10,928 10,391& 95.1
Percent Change 61.4 110.3 —
PAD II
1957 22,089 15,078 68.3
1973 35,250 29,892% 84.8
Percent Change 59.6 98.2 ——
PAD III
1957 10,495 7,965 75.9
1973 21,293 19,206*= 90.2
Percent Change 102.9 141.1 ----
PAD IV
1957 2,332 2,144 91.9
1973 3,907 3,927° 100.0
Percent Change 67.5 83.2 *-
PAD V
1957 2,795 1,651 59.1
1973 5,461 3,568 65.3
Percent Change 95.4 116.1 — -
Total, United States 
1957 44,483 31,780 71.4
1973 76,839 66,984 87.2
Percent Change 72.7 110.8 — —
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Crude-Oil and Refined-Products Pipe­
line Mileage in the United States," Triennial Surveys and from the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Transport Statistics in the United States: 
Part 6 , Pipelines. Annual.
^Includes 95 miles of undivided interest lines and 2 miles of 
leased lines.
(Continued)
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TABLE 28 CONTINUED
^Includes 136 miles of undivided interest lines.
^Includes 1390 miles of undivided interest lines.
^Includes 440 miles of undivided interest lines; the ICC 
reported more operating miles in Wyoming than shown by the Bureau of 
Mines.
FIGURE 7
PRODUCT TRUNK LINE MILEAGE IN PLAGE AND TOTAL 
OPERATED BY IGG CARRIERS, JANUARY 1, ^974&
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155 1,705
1,347
I jl,490c/\
I \1,144 1
673
772 466
464
1,148633
633 642
563
1,212
1,327
1,135
890
3,939
3,877
2,293
2,015198 3,892
3,830
1 \ 3,581
4,159 2,671 12,270
3,317 1,903 \605
306
839
603
2,908
1,434 5,577
5,514
834
834
3,711
3,564 108
900
900
443
443
967
948
4,035
3,2241,183
1,387 669
6691,077
1,020
1,579/ 1,462 \l,886 
1,494 1,458 >1,87413,188
10,133 2,804
2,323
232
SOURCE; See Table 28, pp. 137-138.
&Upper number Is mileage in place, lower number is ICG mileage.
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The Petroleum Transportation System: Summary 
The domestic petroleum transportation system in 1975 was handl­
ing an average of 29 million barrels of crude and refined products each 
day. The principal mode used was the pipeline, as it had been since at 
least the 1950's. A comparison of costs indicated that pipelines offer 
the lowest per unit cost. The closest mode was the ocean going tanker, 
which can only serve a limited, but important market.
The intermodal cost comparisons demonstrated why access to inter­
state pipelines, remain a debated issue. The geographic concentration of 
refinery capacity combined with the access (or lack of access) to pipe­
lines largely defines a petroleum company potential market.
An examination of the growth in pipeline mileage found that there 
were in 1974, 222,355 miles in place in the United States, nearly double 
the 1931 mileage. The principal pipeline development since World War II 
has been the shift to large diameter lines and the rapid growth in 
refined product mileage.
Gathering lines, particularly ICC lines, have been declining in 
recent years. Other modes, as well as intrastate pipelines, have been 
increasing their share of this market. Interstate pipelines, primarily 
trunk lines, represent the major means of moving both crude and products 
to markets. The intrastate system was found to be relatively unimpor­
tant, overall. It is, however, significant in PAD V and for gathering 
lines. The dispersion of product lines among the lower 48 states 
signifies a greater importance than Table 16 would indicate.
CHAPTER IV
^James T. Kneafsey, Transportation Economic Analysis. 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1975), p. 7.
2For a more detailed discussion of petroleum transportation see 
National Petroleum Council, U.S. Petroleum and Gas Transportation 
Capacities: 1967 (Washington, D.C.: National Petroleum Council, 1967); 
Pipelining is Everybody's Business (Tulsa: The Petroleum Publishing 
Company, 1965); U.S., Department of Interior, Office of Oil and Gas, 
Vulnerability of Total Petroleum Systems by Maynard M. Stephens 
(Washington, B.C.: Department of Interior, 1973).
Vulnerability of Total Petroleum Systems, pp. 16-20.
^See U.S., Department of Justice, Second [Third and Fourth] 
Report [si of the Attorney General Pursuant to Section 2 of the Joint 
Resolution of July 28, 1955, Consenting to an Interstate Compact to 
Conserve Oil and Gas (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1957, 1958, and 1959).
^Ibid., Third Report, pp. 79-86.
^Supra, pp. 158-169.
^The largest refinery in the United States as of January 1, 
1976, Exxon’s Baton Rouge refinery, had a capacity of 455,000 b/d 
(Bureau of Mines, "Petroleum Refineries in the United States and Puerto 
Rico, January 1, 1976," p. 7).
O
Vulnerability of Total Petroleum Systems, p. 58.
9lbid. l°lbid., pp. 58-62.
l^Tnterview with Joe Bohannon, Williams Pipeline Company, 
August 18, 1975.
12Numerous deep sea terminals have been proposed, primarily off 
the northeast coast, Louisiana, Texas, and California. As of February, 
1978 none were in operation.
13In 1978 Congress was considering levying a use tax on the 
inland water way system. If levied, the cost differential between 
barges and pipelines will increase.
^^This breakdown is not based upon modern technological con­
straints but upon historical industry practice.
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^^Intrastate pipeline movement was recently estimated to account 
for less than 5 percent of the total pipeline market (U.S., Federal 
Energy Administration, Petroleum Market Shares: Report on Indices of 
Market Structure in the Petroleum Industry (Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Energy Administration, January, 1976), p. 31).
^^The major limitation is the reporting of in-place vs. operating 
mileage. Others includes: (1) the Bureau of Mines does not report owner­
ship data; (2) the ICC does not publish diameter data; and (3) the latest 
triennial survey of the Bureau available for the present study was 
January 1, 1974 which limited the comparison to year end 1973 rather 
than 1975.
^^See footnote 15.
^^There are two aspects to be considered in evaluating mileage 
growth. The first is the absolute change in total mileage by type and 
location. The second is capacity changes which are shown by the shift­
ing distribution of mileage by diameter. A shifting diameter distri­
bution to large sizes of pipeline implies a more than proportional 
shifting in throughput capacity. It is possible given diameter changes, 
that mileage may decrease while capacity is rising (see Chapter V).
^^The increasing use of tank trucks was noted as early as 1958 
(Department of Justice, Third Report of the Attorney General, pp. 79-86).
on
Calculated by the author from data published by the ICC in 
Transportation Statistics in the United States: Part 6 , Pipelines, 1975 
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, released in 1977).
21ln 1963 the ICC discontinued the practice of reporting 
"other" mileage by type (i.e., product, crude, or gathering). "Other" 
mileage is defined by ICC as mileage owned in "undivided interest" 
lines and mileage owned by others but excludes "owned" mileage operated 
by others. An "undivided interest" pipeline is a contractual joint 
venture without corporate identity. The "undivided interest" pipeline 
is discussed in later chapters.
O  O
As Chapter II noted, two interstate product pipeline networks, 
Champlin and American Oil (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana), are 
outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. American Oil operated 2,357 miles 
of product lines in PAD II in 1973; Champlin operated 600 miles in 
PAD II in 1973. [Also see footnotes 1 and 2, Table 25.]
^^The delineation of market boundaries is a necessary initial 
step in the construction and interpretation of concentration ratios 
utilized in a later chapter; the delineation allows a more meaningful 
comparison of the relative importance of intra-and interstate lines and 
the competition between these lines ; the delineation provides an addi­
tional perspective on how the transportation problems of the petroleum 
industry are resolved; and finally, the delineation more clearly out­
lines the substitutability between pipelines and other transport modes.
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^^Bureau of Mines, "Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and 
Natural Gas Liquids: 1973," p. 7.
-^Ibid., 1975, p. 15. ^^Ibid.
CHAPTER V
THE ECONOMICS OF THE PIPELINE FIRM:
THE THEORY AND THE ROLE 
OF INTEGRATION
Petroleum pipelines operate separately from the rest of the 
domestic petroleum industry from only a legal perspective. From an 
economic perspective "there is probably no single point in the oil pro­
cess where the tendency toward vertical integration has been more pro­
nounced than with respect to the ownership and operation of crude oil 
trunk and products pipe lines.Overwhelmingly pipelines have been 
conceived, financed, and operated by the petroleum interests they 
served.^
Pipelines in the first stage of the industry's development 
evolved as an instrument of monopoly on the part of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey and then in the second stage, epitomizing vertical integration, 
they became ”... an instrument of competition among large companies, and a
3
possible threat to the survival of small." The issue in terms of the
modern industry is thus in their functioning as a unit in a vertically
integrated industry. Stigler in discussing the concept of vertical
integration outlined the economic interest in pipelines:
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Vertical integration loses its innocence if there is an appreciable 
degree of market control at even one stage of the production pro­
cess. It becomes a possible weapon for the exclusion of rivals by 
increasing the capital requirements for entry into the combined 
integrated production process or it becomes a possible vehicle of 
price discrimination.4
This chapter's purpose is to examine the reasons behind petro­
leum companies' integration into petroleum pipelines. It also explores 
the economic behavior of pipeline firms on a theoretical level.
Several theses are developed in this chapter. Among these are: (1) the 
competitive model is inappropriate for the study of pipeline transpor­
tation; (2) pipelines are a classic example of natural monopoly and 
therefore have potential market power from the supply side; (3) theoret­
ically, pipelines have market power as a factor input and initial 
empirical analysis of price elasticity provides limited support for 
this thesis; and (4) pipelines are operated primarily as "cost mini- 
mizers" although they may also have a dual role of profit maximization 
on outside shipments (nevertheless, pricing appears to be independent 
of demand influences).
Demand for Pipeline Transportation Services 
The demand for crude oil, transportation, refining, and market­
ing are jointly determined. As a factor input the demand for pipe­
line services is derived from the final consumer demand for refined 
petroleum products. There are in effect two derived demand functions 
for petroleum transportation services. The first, for crude oil, can 
theoretically be obtained by summing the demand functions of individual 
refineries in the United States. The second, for refined products, 
can theoretically be obtained by summing the demand functions of
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individual consumers in the United States.
The issue is what demand function does the individual trans­
portation firm face as well as what form does the market demand function 
take? One cannot turn to the petroleum literature for explicit answers 
to these issues, particularly in relation to the firm, for they have 
largely been ignored. The emphasis has been on the supply function of 
the firm and the market.^
Market Demand
The interest in the derived demand for pipeline transportation 
services concerns the shape of the demand curve and its price elasti­
city.^ More specifically, the interest is in the possibility that the 
demand curve is inelastic, which if the case results in market power 
accruing to this factor.
The Marshallian theory of joint demand offers what Milton 
Friedman calls "in some ways the most useful tool of orthodox economic 
theory for understanding the circumstances under which the demand curve 
will be inelastic."^ Friedman cited four conditions which would result 
in an inelastic demand for one of a number of jointly demanded factors. 
These are: (1) the more essential the given factor is in the production 
of the final product, (2) the more inelastic the demand for the final 
product, (3) the smaller the fraction of total cost accounted for by 
the factor in question, and (4) the more inelastic the supply of
g
co-operating factors.
With respect to pipeline operations, condition (1) is satis­
fied because pipeline transportation is essential to the production of 
refined products and the other transport modes do not presently
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represent close substitutes. Condition (2), the more inelastic the
demand for the final product has empirical support in terms of the
9
short-run demand for gasoline and according to Blair in terms of the
short-run demand for crude oil.^^
With regard to condition (3) limited recent empirical evidence 
supports a conclusion that transportation costs are not a substantial 
part of the total cost of refined products. In 1965, the estimated 
unit costs for one barrel of gasoline was $5.88. These costs were dis­
tributed as follows: (1) crude production, $1.24; (2) crude transporta­
tion, SO.14; (3) refining, $1.18; (4) wholesaling, $1.51 and (5) 
retailing, $1.81.^^ Embodied in the wholesale and retail components 
are additional transportation costs not estimated. These costs should 
not be substantial. Condition (3) was satisfied with respect to crude 
transportation in 1965 and likely was satisfied with regard to refined 
product transportation. This, however, is not a clear cut conclusion 
because the specification of condition (3) by Friedman is vague in the 
sense of knowing what a "smaller fraction" actually means. While the 
1965 costs appear to meet the criteria, does the cost of 15-33 percent
quoted by McLean and Haigh for 1952 or the nearly 33 percent quoted
12
in 1977 for Alaskan crude represent a small fraction?
Condition (4), the more inelastic the supply curve of the other
factors (crude production and refining) would intuitively appear to be
correct in the short run. The history of the domestic and international
industry also supports the position that the supply of co-operating
13factors are comparatively unresponsive to changes in price. Theoret­
ically then it seems reasonable to conclude that the four conditions are
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satisfied. The demand for pipeline services should be inelastic and
pipeline firms therefore should possess some control over the price at
which they sell their services.
To empirically test for the correctness of this conclusion in
terms of interstate pipelines, a simple demand function was specified
14
and elasticities estimated. Using the following formulation:
(1) TO = F (RARBM) where
TO = total barrels delivered out of the interstate system 
(and TOC = crude, TOP = product),
RARBM = Average revenue per barrel mile in constant dollars 
(and RARBMC = crude, RARBM? = product), the constant 
dollars were calculated using the GNP implicit price 
deflator;
Using ordinary least squares (OLS), the elasticity of demand,
TO, with respect to price, RARBM, was tested using
(2) TO = a + 8 (RARBM), and
(3) An TO = &n a + 6 &n (RARBM),
The regression results are listed on page 149. Combining the 
crude and product markets together does not yield an inelastic demand 
(-1.04 and -1.06) but rather an almost unitary elasticity. Separating 
the crude and product markets, the initial results indicate that there 
is an inelastic demand for crude pipeline transportation but apparently 
not for refiner product pipeline transportation. In log form, the 
demand for product pipelines appears to be elastic. The implications 
of this difference is examined in Chapter IX. The limited empirical 
results shown thus provide only limited support to a conclusion that the 
response to price changes is comparatively small.
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Demand
Variable
Time
Period
Equation
Form
T-Statistic 
ct 6 Elasticity R“
TO 1957-75 linear 28.55 -14.97 -1.037 0.93
TO 1957-75 in 3.62 -28.08 -1.062 0.98
TOC 1964-75 linear 28.17 -12.65 -0.797 0.94
TOC 1964-75 in 4.44 -13.11 -0.841 0.94
TOP 1964-75 linear 8.92 -4.53 -0.992 0.67
TOP 1964-75 in -1.37 -6.76 -1.34 0.82
The Pipeline Firm's Demand
Spatial-conditions in both the crude and refined product
transportation market normally means that few transport sellers will
be in that market. Given this factor and the complementary nature of
the other modes, pipeline firms do not operate in a competitive market.
The competition model is inappropriate because each pipeline
firm faces a do^mward sloping demand curve and cannot be considered a
price taker. The more appropriate model of market behavior is generally
the oligopoly model and in some cases the monopoly m o d e l . T h e  price
behavior prior to 1934 support this hypothesis for pipeline rates were
established equal to or slightly below the rate of the nearest competing 
18
mode. The extent of the interdependency implied in the oligopoly 
model is examined in Chapters VI-VIII.
The Supply of Pipeline Transportation Services 
The pipeline firm must choose among various input combinations 
to produce certain levels of output (i.e., the transportation service). 
The development of a pipeline production function gives mathematical 
expression to the relationship between various quantities of inputs and 
quantities of output. Understanding the properties of the pipeline
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production function and costs functions derived from these properties is 
essential in evaluating firms' behavior. Cost functions underlie the 
decisions of the firm under varying demand conditions. The theoretical 
development of production and costs provides a foundation for a fuller 
understanding of the decision making/allocation process of the petroleum 
industry. It provides a basis for evaluating alternative public policies 
that have been employed in the past and that are now being proposed.
Modern pipeline companies are not homogeneous in respect to the 
type of pipelines operated or the exact type and quantity of inputs used. 
Some companies operate only a single line running from point A to B with 
little variation in pipe diameters. Other companies operate several 
systems serving multiple points with large variation in pipe diameter as 
well as other inputs. Each pipeline firm, however, faces similar tech­
nical and engineering/physical constraints and can be described using a 
single production function where only the absolute values change and 
not their relative position. The development of this function is 
relatively straight forward for it lends itself to the use of engineer­
ing estimates. The functions discussed are engineering production 
functions.
19Following the pattern used by previous authors, the behavior 
of product and cost curves are examined using the following assumptions: 
1000 mile line, crude trunk line, 5 percent terrain variation, and 
fourth inch wall thickness. Under these assumptions, the production 
function can be defined as:
(1) Q = f(x^,X2 ,Xg); where
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= variable inputs in every time period (i.e., manpower, fuel, 
communication system, office, site improvements, etc.);
Xg and x^ = fixed inputs (i.e., capital equipment) in the short 
run; and
Q = barrel throughput.
The separation of the fixed inputs into two groups departs from the
traditional analysis. It is useful, given the importance of pumping
20equipment (i.e., horsepower), which is a quasi-fixed capital input.
The introduction of the quasi-fixed input (xg) entails the intro­
duction of the intermediate-run where x^ and x^ (pumping equipment) are 
variable, but x^ (pipeline diameter) remains fixed. The development of
the intermediate-run analysis was first introduced by Cookenboo in the
21early 1950's and is generally accepted in pipeline literature.
From (1), the time periods are defined as:
(2) short-run; Q = f(x^,X2 ,x^ )
(3) intermediate-run; Q = f(x^,X2 ,x^), and
(4) long-run; 0 = f(x ) where all inputs are variable per unit 
of time. ^
Although Cookenboo specified three periods, he essentially dropped the 
short run (2) and considered only the intermediate (3) and long-run (4). 
Cookenboo's intermediate run becomes analogous to the short-run in most 
theoretical development (i.e., the long-run cost curve of the pipeline 
form is the envelope of the intermediate-run curves).
Under ceteris paribus conditions, using two factors of produc­
tion (x^ and x^) and a hydraulic formula, (1) becomes
(5) q2-735 = (x^)(x^^‘^^^)/0.01045, and by letting 1/0.01046 = k,
(5) reduces to
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(6) 0 = (x^’ and therefore
(7) Q = where a and 3 are constant and equal 2.1.
Equation 7 is homogeneous, exhibits increasing returns to scale (a + 3 =
22
2 .1), and produces convex isoquants.
By holding in equation 7 constant, the behavior of the produc­
tion process can be examined in the intermediate run. Figure 8A illus­
trates the throughput effects of varying horsepower on a fixed diameter 
pipe. (Again this is analogous to the usual physical productivity 
curves except the short-run is replaced by the intermediate run.) As 
more horsepower is added to a specific line diameter, the curves exhibit 
decreasing returns, i.e., there is a less than proportionate increase in 
throughput (AP and MP decrease throughout the range of throughputs).
The reduction of horsepower below designed capacity (from point A to A^ 
in Figure 8A) produces a sharp reduction in throughput in the large 
diameter pipe but relatively minor reductions in smaller pipelines.
Because pumping stations represent a fixed cost, a reduction 
below point A represents idle capital equipment with only minor reduc­
tion in variable costs. Offsetting rising average and marginal costs 
attributed to horsepower throughout a proportion of the range of 
throughputs is the fixed cost associated with a given pipe size. AFC 
will be declining throughout the range. In the intermediate run, ATC 
initially falls, levels off, and then rise as horsepower continues to 
be added.
By holding horsepower constant and allowing pipe diameter to 
vary, the opposite case is exhibited and is shown in Figure 8B. In this 
instance, there are increasing returns throughout the range of
FIGURE 8
PIPELINE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
(PHYSICAL PRODUCTIVITY CURVE)
Varying Horsepower on a Fixed Diameter b. Varying Diameters on a Fixed Horsepower
(OGO's)
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SOURCE: Leslie Cookenboo, Jr., Crude Oil Pipelines and Competition in The Oil Industry
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 16 and 19.
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throughputs. AP and MP rises while AC and MC fall. Horsepower
and line diameter (x^ ) are thus offsetting forces and the behavior of
total and marginal costs depends on the relative magnitude of both. By
varying x^ and Xg in fixed proportions, Cookenboo found that output
23
increased by more than a proportionate amount (Figure 9A) .
The cost curves derived from equation (7) are illustrated in 
Figures 9B-10B. Figure 9B illustrates the behavior of total costs under 
varying diameters. Figure lOA illustrates the behavior of costs for an 
18 and 30 inch line in the short and intermediate-run. In Figure lOB 
both diameter and horsepower are varied and produce a family of cost 
curves from which long-run costs can be derived. Figure 9B demonstrates 
that for the smaller diameter pipelines, total cost rises dramatically 
as output is increased by adding horsepower; with the larger diameter 
pipe, total costs do not rise as dramatically as horsepower is increased.
The importance of this relationship is shown in Figure lOA 
where costs in the short- and intermediate-run for an 18 and 30 inch 
line are compared. The 18 inch line is designed for an optimal capacity 
of 150,000 barrels per day and the intermediate-run curve is the fami­
liar U-shaped average cost curve. In the case of the 30 inch line the 
average cost curve, while still U-shaped, is elongated. In both exam­
ples, short-run costs are always above the intermediate-run costs and 
is the result of the fact that any quantity below design capacity has 
the same fixed costs which must be spread over a smaller output.
The short-run cost curve becomes non-existent at the point of 
optimal capacity design, where by definition the output cannot be 
increased without increasing horsepower and therefore pumping stations.
FIGURE 9
TOTAL COST CURVES
Varying Inputs in Fixed Productions b. Varying Pipeline Diameters 
Total Annual Costs 
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FIGURE 10
AVERAGE COST CURVES
Short- and Intermediate-Run Long-Run Envelope of Intermediate-Run 
Cost Curves
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SOURCE: Leslie Cookenboo, Jr., Crude Oil Pipelines and Competition in The Oil Industry
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 29 and 26.
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Also, once a pipeline is designed and constructed variable costs in the
short run are relatively unimportant because the only significant
24
variable cost is generally power.
The 30 inch line has significant advantages over the 18 inch 
line. It can, in both the short run and the intermediate run, vary 
output without an appreciable rise in average cost when compared to the 
18 inch line. The 18 inch line is competitive with the larger line in 
only a very narrow range of throughput.
In Figure lOB, average total cost curves for each combination of 
horsepower and diameter shown in Figure 9B are displayed. The envelope 
of these intermediate curves is the long run cost curve. The curve is a 
decreasing cost curve and demonstrates economies of scales. In the 
long run there are marked returns to scale if larger and larger through­
puts are used. The slope of the long-run average cost curve is the 
result of the fact that the same horsepower applied to a large diameter 
line produces a more than proportionate increase in throughput. Only 
if the price of one or both factors increases significantly with the
amount of the factor used to offset these increasing returns will long-
25run average cost curve turn up.
In actual practice, Cookenboo found that the price of horsepower 
declined with quantity used and the price of line diameter did not fluc­
tuate dramatically with quantity used (at least not sufficiently to 
offset the physical relationship).^^ These conditions generally pre­
vailed through at least 1968. There is some indication that once 
diameters exceed some size, long-run costs may turn up as larger 
diameter lines require payment of a premium price per ton of steel.
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Pipelines and Vertical Integration
Overview
As emphasized, pipelines have historically been owned and 
operated primarily by integrated oil companies and have represented 
both upstream and doimstream integration efforts of parent companies. 
This ownership of pipelines by companies engaged in production, refin­
ing, and marketing has resulted in additional functions and objectives 
being assigned to pipelines. Pipelines have been used and are being 
used to achieve overall objectives of integrated corporations that 
extend beyond the function of transportation. Vertical integration, 
particularly with regard to petroleum, is a topic that has generated 
much research and controversy. The modern day controversy surrounding 
vertical integration in petroleum (and therefore pipelines) is only a 
variant of a very early industry development. DeChazeau and Kahn 
state the issue succinctly:
The significant facts are that they [Rockefeller Group] con­
sistently sought and came very close to achieving a complete 
monopoly over the American Petroleum Industry, and that vertical 
integration played a critical role in that achievement . . . .
The key was transportation control . . . •
In the case of pipelines, ownership was necessary both to achieve 
the advantages of the lower costs they made possible, and to assure 
their fullest utilization a^s a bulwark of m o n o p o l y . 27
To give these statements and the controversy a modern context, one need
only to replace the Rockefeller Group (Standard Oil of New Jersey prior
to 1911) with the eight to twenty major petroleum companies of 1977.
The place that pipelines have played in vertical integration 
efforts exceeds the relative amount they represent of the total invest­
ment of the industry. As of December 31, 1957, DeChazeau and Kahn
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found that the average U.S. gross investment dollar in petroleum was 
distributed as follows: 59.3 cents to production; 18*5 cents to refining; 
10.7 cents to marketing; 1.5 cents to others; and only 10 cents to
transportation. Of the 10 cents invested in transportation, 7.2 cents
. , . 28 were in pipelines.
An examination of selected companies' annual reports for 1975
and 1976 indicates a similar investment pattern by companies in plant,
equipment, and properties. Two of the major companies, Texaco and
Shell, showed more than 50 percent in producing properties and from. 2.9%
(Texaco) to 5.7% (Shell) in pipelines. Both companies represent sizable
domestic pipeline operations but yet these operations are only a small
29percentage of their total investments.
Non-Transportation Functions of Pipelines
The best description of the added role given pipelines within 
integrated firms is found in the major study by John McLean and Robert 
Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, published in 1954.
Although the work is a quarter of a century old, it is relevant to the 
modern period and remains one of the few studies of the petroleum 
industry where the authors had direct and cooperation access to inte­
grated company records. Seven companies— Gulf, Texaco, Sinclair, Ohio 
Oil, Atlantic Refining, Standard Oil Company of Indiana, and Standard
Oil Company of Ohio— formed the core of this case study of integration
30in the petroleum industry.
Crude Oil Gathering Lines
As specialized carriers, crude oil pipelines, both gathering and
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trunk lines are fixed in location and under most circumstances fixed
in the direction of the flow of crude. Both, it is argued, have a
high element of risk because the throughput (supply) is certain to 
31
deplete over time. Gathering lines have a higher risk since they 
serve a narrow group of wells within a field or adjacent fields while 
trunk lines can draw from a larger number of fields. Gathering lines, 
however, require a smaller investment than trunk lines and under present 
technological conditions are more flexible than in the early fifties.
McLean and Haigh found that the seven companies engaged in 
gathering operations for three primary reasons: to reduce gathering 
charges below those charged by outside companies; to gain access to a 
supply of crude— many refining companies used gathering lines to inte­
grate upstream without actually integrating into production; and for 
expediency, to insure that oil was getting to trunk line terminals and 
refineries.
None of the companies cited profits from gathering as a major
reason for engaging this activity. Ohio Oil Company (now Marathon) was
one of a few companies which found that operating gathering and trunk
lines was profitable. This company built a substantial business in
transportation for other companies and always sold crude at the wellhead
33and before the oil crossed state lines.
Records supplied by the seven companies for 1940-52 indicated 
that the companies had earned only negligible profits on this transport­
ing activity. Records also showed that companies that were net pur­
chasers of crude oil for their refineries (own production was insuf­
ficient) gathered more than they produced. Companies with higher
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production ratios had a lower gathering ratio and thus, gathering
34activities declined as net buying diminished.
The importance of gathering activity by integrated companies has 
diminished sharply since the work of McLean and Haigh, particularly in 
the interstate market. As noted in Chapter IV, gathering mileage in 
the interstate market declined from 52,077 miles in 1957 to 42,582 miles 
in 1975, an 18.2 percent decline. The shift away from the interstate 
and integrated company gathering was addressed in the third report of 
the U.S. Attorney General, pursuant to the resolution creating the 
Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas.
The Attorney General report found a large and growing field of 
gathering by trucks and means other than major refiners' pipeline com­
panies. In Texas, for example, it was estimated that 350-400 gatherers 
were handling 390,000 barrels daily. None were found to report to any
regulatory agency and generally these gatherers were purchasing the oil
35for resale at the crude trunk line terminals or refineries.
Integrated companies, it was concluded, were partially with­
drawing from the gathering of crude oil and farming the function out to 
numerous small companies. It was also concluded that the change could only 
take place with the active aid of the major integrated pipelines since 
the small operator could not function without assurances that the crude 
would be repurchased at the trunk line terminal (especially when the 
interstate line remained the only trunk line carrier).
The reasons offered for the withdrawal were: (1) most large 
companies found that the gathering line operations were not profitable;
(2) the small gatherers provided a flexibility in serving new fields
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without a large pipeline investment; (3) there was apparently a cost 
advantage to repurchase at the trunk terminal; and (4) the arrangement 
minimized the regulation of purchasing arrangements since the inte-
37grated companies were not dealing directly with the lease operator.
Crude Oil Trunk Lines
McLean and Haigh summarized the importance of crude trunk line
ownership: "Ownership of a pipeline outlet from a producing region is
second only to ownership of proven and developed acreage as a means of
33
assuring a crude supply." Be Chazeau and Kahn emphasized this by
noting that " . . .  for the refiner not located in the field, crude oil
availability is economically inseparable from access to pipelines; and
the competitive margin within which he must live will be vitally
39affected by the tariff he has to pay for transport."
Crude oil pipelines were built by integrated companies for the 
following reasons: (1) to reduce costs, refiners who owned lines mini­
mized transportation costs and insured that costs were comparable with 
or lower than competitors; (2) to integrate downstream (i.e., outlets 
for production); (3) to serve as a principal tool in the overall 
strategy of integrated companies to smooth out supply and demand condi­
tions whose erratic past behavior had plagued the integrated companies 
since before 1900 (McLean and Haigh noted that all of the companies 
considered pipelines subordinate and supporting to other phases of their 
business.); (4) to serve as purchasing agents and for trading purposes
(i.e., exchanges); and (5) to generate additional profits on shipments
40
by non-owners Once trunk lines became common carriers.
None of the seven companies (except Ohio Oil) were in trunk
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line activities for the profits earned from outside shippers. Inte­
grated companies did not look upon pipelines as a principal source of
41profits to their overall profit picture.
Refined Product Trunk Lines
With the rapid post World War II growth, pipelines are now the
major carrier of certain products. Pipelines did not become important
carriers of refined products in the United States until the late 1930's.
Tuscarora Pipeline Company converted a crude line to carry products in
1931; the line was not only converted but the direction of flow was also
reversed. Product lines' growth was limited until after World War II
42because of technological restraints.
Product lines, like any line, are fixed investments. Unlike 
crude lines, product lines have few inherent risks since the flow from 
refinery to market is relatively continuous and subject to less rapid 
change in location. Once the technology permitted the shipment of 
heterogeneous products by pipeline, large companies integrated rapidly 
into product lines. And once the issue of common carrier status was 
resolved, the lines were operated in a similar fashion to crude lines.
McLean and Haigh found six major reasons for the integration: 
pipelines were a means of reducing costs; product lines enabled refin­
eries to extend their market; companies could close doim marginal 
refineries and continue to serve existing markets; pipelines could 
assure a continuous supply to several geographic markets and also could 
extend the companies into new markets; common carrier status provided 
an additional source of profits (although the importance of profits 
was secondary to the support role to refining and marketing); and
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finally, product line ownership enhanced the integrated companies'
43overall supply and demand strategy.
Importance of Crude and Product Lines to Supply and 
Demand Strategies of Integrated Companies
The fact that the construction of pipelines reduced the costs of 
transporting crude oil [and refined products] must not be per­
mitted to obscure the essentially strategic character of these 
decisions to integrate.44
The integrated petroleum industry is a high fixed cost industry. 
This characteristic combined with the bulk of crude oil relative to its 
price gives rise to the necessity of operating at a capacity level 
which, while rising over the long-run, requires the minimization of 
erratic shifts in supply relative to a fairly inelastic demand (in the 
short run). The cheapest place to store crude oil is in the well, the
cheapest means of handling refined products in the short-run is to move
them to ultimate consumers, regardless of price.
The integrated companies, individually, have not normally been 
able to expand production, marketing, and refining and also maintain 
supply and demand equilibrium at prevailing prices. Production, refin­
ing, and marketing also take place in many geographic regions and 
increase the probability of supply and demand disequilibrium. This 
disequilibrium, on an individual company basis, places pressure on 
prices to either rise or fall in a manner inconsistent with prevailing 
prices of integrated firms within these existing geographic markets and 
has historically given rise to active "spot markets."
Under individual company disequilibrium conditions, the crude 
and refined markets would potentially be chaotic encouraging entry in
some markets and exits in others. These conditions parallel to some
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extent the early industry problems associated with erratic behavior of 
crude oil prices which were subject to major swings as new and larger 
fields were discovered. This, problem, as many have indicated, was 
solved by government regulation of production.
The well established integrated firms which entered the 1930’s 
were seeking strategies which would reduce the complexity of disequi­
librium in the various markets. Chmership of the means of transporta­
tion by these integrated companies was a principal step in this direc­
tion, at least for those which had the financial means to do so. Pipe­
lines thus emerged not only as the least cost transportation method but 
their ownership allowed the various owners an evolving tool to reduce 
the problems of short-run disequilibrium (principally with the combined 
use of exchange agreements).
That pipelines and exchanges have contributed to efficiency and 
short-term price stability seems to be a point of agreement. The issue 
is: to whom have the benefits of efficiency accrued and has short-run 
price stability been at a level comparable to that achieved through the 
workable competition model?
Pipeline Companies-of Integrated. Parents : Profit 
Maximizers or Cost Minimizers
As integrated units, the question arises as to the pricing 
motives of pipeline companies. There is little evidence that suggests 
that these companies are profit maximizers in the traditional sense.
As the previous sections indicated, rarely have pipeline companies been 
looked upon by their petroleum parents as profit centers but rather as 
a means of minimizing transportation costs and balancing flows
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throughout each company's market.
Through the late 1930's the pricing policy of shipper owned
pipeline companies were used as an exclusion device and therefore
46generated large earnings. These earnings were largely illusionary
since they represented paper transactions between affiliated companies.
In the Spahn Report conducted for the House of Representatives
in 1933, 60 percent of the large companies were found to have carried
no outside oil on their gathering lines. Fifty percent of the large
companies carried no outside oil on their trunk lines and those with
outside shippers were found typically to be members of other large 
47
integrated units. The TNEC questionnaire which covered the period
1929 through 1938 found that less than 10 percent of the crude and less -
48than 20 percent of the products belonged to non-affiliated shippers. 
Professor Spahn voiced an opinion that, under a facade of common car­
riers, pipeline companies o;<med by major oil companies were in fact
49
plant facilities of their owners.
In the late 1930's tariffs began to fall. This decline was
attributed to changes in federal tax policy, the consent decree, the
Reduced Pipeline Rates and Gathering Charges Case, and the economies of
50large diameter pipe. None of these factors suggested that pricing 
policies had any stronger relationship to demand influences than before 
the 1930's. There were indications, that continue to persist, that 
cost-minimization was, and is, the primary motivation. Cost-minimization 
is a goal pursued independent of demand influences'^ and applied to 
affiliated companies' shipments and not to non-owner shipments. Modern 
pricing policy while influenced by rate of return regulation is more a
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function of the outside shipper.
Cost minimization is consistent with the operation of plant
facilities but not consistent to the operation of common carriers.
The extent to which shipper-owned pipelines carry for outside shippers
since the 1930’s is not clear-cut. This uncertainty is a result of a
void in the public data collected on pipeline companies.
Limited information for 1950-1974 suggests that the Spahn
findings still apply. For example, Wolbert found that the percent of
outside shipments remains significantly lower than originally expected
5?
of a transportation service rendered by legal common carriers; “ in the 
Fourth Attorney General's Report it was estimated that non-owner ship­
ments represented 15 percent or less of the total volume on single owner
53lines and perhaps 25 percent on joint venture lines; and in the 
unpublished work by John Wilson, based on questionnaires sent to the
major companies, the indications were that the pattern remains essentially 
the same as it was in the 1930's.
The prospectus on two major pipeline companies, the Exxon Pipe­
line Company and the ARGO Pipeline Company, reveals the following: 78.2 
percent of ARCO revenues from 1969 operations came from affiliated com­
panies; the remaining 28.1 percent came from non-affiliated companies.
This pattern remained, with slight variation, the same from 1970-73, 
where in 1973, 77.3 percent of the revenues came from affiliated compan­
ies. In the case of Exxon Pipeline Company for the same period 1969-73, 
revenues coming from affiliated companies ranged from 87.8 percent in 
1969 to a low of 83.8 percent in 1973. In the five-year period the 
maximum amount of operating revenue coming from non-affiliated companies
168
was 16.2 percent in 1973.^^
As Chapter VII explains, the major pipeline development of 
1957-1975 is the development of joint-venture pipelines. In comment 
on this development Simon Whitney in a study for the 20th Century Fund, 
stated
Most big recent lines have been built as joint ventures rather 
than by a single company. Although continued expansion of the 
pipeline system can be interpreted to mean that current regulation 
permits a high enough return to induce new investment, it may also 
mean a line is usually built not as a means of earning money 
directly but as a unit in integrated petroleum structure.56
As noted the Fourth Attorney General Report estimated that perhaps as
much as 25 percent of joint-venture shipments came from non-participants
in the pipeline. There was no indication that joint-venture operations
departed from the pricing behavior of single owner lines.
The modern extent to which pricing policy is used as an exclusion/ 
penalty device cannot be answered without a detailed analysis of outside 
shipments in terms of both volume and shippers. The issue, however, is 
quite different if the outside shippers are other major integrated com­
panies with whom the pipeline companies' parents have extensive exchanges 
and corresponding pipeline relationships than if the outside shippers 
are smaller companies with no corresponding relationships.
The developments since the 1930's do not indicate that pipeline 
firms are profit maximizers or -common carriers in the normal construed 
manner. The advent of joint venture lines do not alter these conclu­
sions. Joint venture lines, in fact, point to the continued resistance 
in the industry to common carrier status. McLean and Haigh posed the 
question of why should a company participate in a joint venture instead 
of just requesting space on a "common carrier line." Among the answers
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given the following demonstrated the industry position: "It was generally 
expected in the industry that if a company planned to use any very sub­
stantial part of the capacity of a line, it should bear a share of the
. 57capital investment in the line.”
Supply/Demand/Vertical Integration: A Summary 
The notion that the market demand function for pipeline trans­
portation is inelastic has limited theoretical and empirical support.
In addition, there is a high probability that individual pipeline firms 
possess some control over prices because they do not operate within the 
constructs of a competitive model. This is also an implication drawn 
from the behavior of the production and cost functions.
While companies rarely face situations that conform exactly to 
the theoretical behavior defined, the important point is that the cost 
relationships defined do hold for firms operating pipelines. Pipelines 
have high fixed costs and total operating costs are relatively fixed 
irrespective of throughput. Because of this it is extremely important 
that a pipeline operates at or near the designed throughput and 
emphasizes the necessity of having assured throughput agreements.
The decreasing long run cost curves demonstrate that companies 
must be able to predict the initial and potential throughput, i.e., the 
demand that the pipeline will be facing over a relatively long period 
of time. The economies of scale also demonstrated that it is optimum 
for both the firm and society that oil be conglomerated in very large 
quantities for it is only under these conditions that the lowest costs 
are obtainable. The presence of increasing returns to scale raises 
monopoly and regulatory questions and signifies the importance of access
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to pipelines as well as the actuality or wiseness of competition between 
pipelines.
Given that integration has been a way of life on the part of 
large companies and that pipeline investments have epitomized vertical 
integration, the issue is has pipeline ownership since 1957 evolved as 
an instrument of competition among companies? How important and perva­
sive are the modern day economies of vertical integration into pipelines? 
Are they justified on a cost basis? Have pipelines, particularly through 
joint ventures, evolved into instruments of cooperation among large com­
panies and therefore posed possible threats to the survival of small 
companies?
As the discussion of vertical integrated indicated, pipelines
have an importance that extends beyond their transport function.
De Chazeau and Kahn, for example, concluded that pipelines were important
in the determination of domestic crude prices as well as the actual
pattern of buying and selling crude. This importance is illustrated in
the following statements:
. . . the pipeline was responsible also in part for the pattern of 
market forces that governed the price behavior of crude oil. It 
brought the market to the well of the producer . . . .
Next to prorationing [as a primary explanation of price stability], 
the most important such influence is the vast network of pipelines, 
that creates something like a single crude-oil market in this 
country east of the Rockies'. . . [combined] with intercompany 
exchanges of crude and p r o d u c t s . 58
Finally, there is little reason to conclude that pipelines 
operate as profit maximizers or in a competitive environment. Nor is 
there reason to believe that they in reality function as common carriers. 
The question then is one of determining the modern results of
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integration into pipelines. Has this integration served as a means of 
increasing the market power of the integrated petroleum parent or group 
of parent companies? It is this question that is addressed in the 
remainder of this studv.
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CHAPTER VI
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT, PART I: NUMBER OF 
SELLERS AND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS
The term "structure" refers to those characteristics of the 
organization of the pipeline segment that have a strategic influence on 
the nature of competition and pricing within not only pipelines but the 
entire petroleum market. The elements thought relevant in the study of 
market structure are (1) number and size distribution of buyers and 
sellers; (2) entry barriers; (3) presence or absence of product differen­
tiation; (4) cost structure; (5) the presence of regulations; and (6) the 
environment in which the market functions (legal, institutional, and 
physical)
Certain aspects of the structure of the pipeline segment were 
defined in previous chapters Ci-e., regulation, physical environment, 
cost structure, and entry barriers). This chapter examines the number of 
sellers of pipeline transportation services, the services offered, and 
the ownership of pipeline companies. The study of ownership patterns 
introduces elements of market conduct. Market conduct refers to those 
patterns of behavior that companies have followed in adjusting to the
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markets in which they operate (again within both pipelines and the entire 
2
petroleum market).
Because of extensive vertical integration, this chapter begins 
the explicit analysis of shipper/owner relationships. Given the long 
history of vertical integration, how have petroleum companies organized 
and operated their pipeline investments? To what extent have a small 
number of major companies dominated petroleum pipeline transportation?
Or to rephrase the question, have major petroleum companies dominated 
pipeline transportation during the period under study? To answer these 
questions requires an evaluation of the presence and magnitude of both 
non-major petroleum companies and companies with only investments in 
pipeline transportation. It also requires that "major" companies be 
defined.
The analysis of pipeline companies takes place on the national 
level. This may be less than satisfactory since physical market seg­
mentation impedes the functioning of a national market. A pipeline run­
ning from Louisiana to Illinois does not directly compete with one running 
to New York. Although it may be of value to do a more extensive evalua­
tion of the spatial aspects of buyers and sellers, it will be argued that 
the pipeline segment of the domestic petroleum industry does not have the 
degree of segmentation as it initially appears to have, especially for a 
small group of companies.
Vertically Integrated Petroleum Companies
In The Control of Oil, John Blair comments:
In domestic oil monopoly power does not stem from a simple, highly 
concentrated, oligopolistic structure but rather from an amalgam of a 
moderately high level of concentration, an extraordinary maze of
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interlocking corporate relationships, an extreme degree of "vertical 
integration, and governmental intervention to limit supply.3
A major part of this and similar arguments can be examined within the 
context of a study of domestic pipelines. The significance of pipe­
lines to the monopoly argument has its origins in a persistent charge 
that a small group of vertically integrated companies have used their 
control over pipelines to monopolize the remainder of the industry.^
To address the domestic monopoly issue raised by Blair and 
others and the pivotal role (if any) that pipelines have played requires 
that a major part of the study of pipelines revolves around an analysis 
of how petroleum companies have organized and operated their pipeline 
investments. To do this requires that the petroleum companies be iden­
tified and that a clarification be made as to the identity of the small 
group of integrated companies.
Traditionally, domestic petroleum companies have been classified 
as "major" and "independents" or as "integrated" and "non-integrated.
The primary criteria for determining these companies has been the degree 
of vertical integration and relative size (measured by total sales, 
assets, and so forth). A firm is vertically integrated when its activ­
ities span two or more of the following stages: exploration and produc­
tion, transportation, refining, wholesale and retail marketing. A fully 
integrated company would be engaged in each of these activities. The 
definition implies nothing about self-sufficiency in any of the stages.^ 
The "major" label has commonly been used to denote a fully ver­
tically integrated company. The term is used in this paper for the pur­
pose of consistency of comparison with other works as well as for denot­
ing relative size and control. A degree of consistency is useful in the
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development of concentration measures where the intent is to measure the 
presence of "major" companies in pipeline transportation activities.
Perhaps the simplest, definition of the differences between a 
major company and all other companies is found in the Temporary National 
Economic Committee (TNEC) Study:
The petroleum industry is characterized by a relatively small 
number of enterprises constituting probably two-thirds of the 
investment of the entire industry. The remainder of the industry is 
made up of thousands of small producers and marketers and several 
hundred refining companies. The largest units are commonly referred 
to as "major companies.
In this context the reference was to domestic operations and not inter­
national operations.
Numerous authors have used varying definitions and criteria for 
delineating major companies. Regardless of the method used, the end 
results have been essentially the same group of domestic ai.d inter­
national companies. Listed below is a 1976 delineation of domestic and 
international companies. Although the "lesser majors" and leading 
"independents" groups are somewhat limited in number, the listing repre-
g
sents a concensus group of companies.
Domestic International
"Top Eight"
Exxon
Mobil
SoCal
Stan. (Ind.)
Texaco
Gulf
Shell
ARCO
"Lesser Majors"
Getty
Phillips
Signal
Union
Continental
Sun
Amerada Hess 
Cities Service 
Marathon
"Seven Sisters"
Exxon
Mobil
SoCal
Texaco
Gulf
Leading
"Independents"
Compagnie Fran­
çaise Petrole 
Continental 
Marathon 
Amerada Hess
Royal Dutch Shell Occidental 
BP
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The commonality of the delineation is a function of the relative stabil­
ity of the major companies over a long period of time. This is shown in 
Table 29 and Figure 11.
In Table 29 the major companies as of 1930, 1938, and 1955 are 
listed. With two exceptions (Signal and Amerada Hess) the companies of 
1930 are the same as listed above (allowing for acquisitions and mer­
gers). The commonality does, however, tend to break down once the 16th 
or so company is defined. Thereafter, the delineation does depend on 
the definition and criteria used.
To quantify the extent of the involvement of major companies in 
domestic pipeline activities, both annually and over 1957-75, a more 
specific delineation of the twenty major companies was developed. Using 
the criteria of domestic integration and size, measured by total sales, 
the twenty largest domestic petroleum companies in each year were 
defined and are shown in rank order in Figure 11. It is this group of 
major companies that is used in the remaining analysis.
Four companies presented special problems and are excluded from
the group. The first, the Signal Companies, does not meet the criteria
of integration. Occidental Petroleum, which ranks high in terms of
assets and sales, has largely concentrated its operations in the inter- 
9national market. The third company, Champlin Petroleum, is a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Union Pacific. It may in fact belong in the group 
but because of the lack of consistent data is o m i t t e d . T h e  final com­
pany omitted is Tenneco. Its diversification is such that it distorts 
its actual importance in petroleum activities. For example, in 1975 the 
company's total revenue was $5.6 billion of which only 21.6 percent came 
from petroleum production, refining, and marketing.
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TABLE 29
MAJOR DOMESTIC OIL COMPANIES, SELECTED YEARS,
1930-1955
Year of Rank
Company Incorporation 1930 1938 1955
Standard Oil (NJ) 1882 1 1 1
Socony-Vacuum*^ 1882 2 2 2
Standard Oil (IN)* 1889 5 3 3
Texas Corporation 1926® 6 4 5
Standard Oil (CA)* 1926G 7 5 6
Gulf Oil 1922® 3 5 4
Cities Service 1910 12 7 10
Shell Union Oil Corp.^ 1922 4 8 8
Consolidated Oil Corp.c 1919 9 9 7
Phillips Petroleum 1917 18 10 9
Tidewater Associated Oil 1926 8 11 15
Atlantic Refining Co. 1870 11 12 11
Pure Oil Co. 1914 13 13 17
Union Oil Co. 1890 10 14 12
Sun Oil Co. 1901 14 15 13
Ohio Oil Co.* 1887 19 16 18
Continental Oil Co.* 1920 15 17 14
Standard Oil (Ohio)* 1870 16 18 19
Mid Continent Pet.d 1917 - 19 16
Skelly Oil Co. 1919 17 20 20
SOURCE: Data for 1930 is for crude runs to stills (Leslie 
Cookenboo, Jr., Crude Oil Pipelines and Competition in the Oil Industry 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 44); data for 1938 is for 
total assets (U.S., Congress, Investigation of Concentration of Economic 
Power, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th 
Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940),
Part 14A, p. 7,708); data for 1955 is for total assets (Melvin G.
De Chazeau and Alfred E. Kahn, Integration and Competition in the Petro­
leum Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 30-31).
'■'Original members of Standard Oil group
^Successor by 1955, Socony-Mobil
CONTINUED
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TABLE 29 (CONTINUED)
^Successor by 1955, Shell Oil
^Successor by 1955, Sinclair Oil
'^Successor by 1955, Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.
^Texas Corp. originally incorporated in 1902, Standard Oil (CA) 
in 1879, and Gulf in 1907.
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With only small variation, the defined group of companies are 
consistent with those found in the literature during 1957-75. The 
differences are generally confined to companies ranked 16 to 20. The 
use of other criteria such as production, refinery capacity, and gasoline 
sales tends to change companies' relative positions but have only a mar­
ginal impact on concentration measures.
Figure 11 indicates the modern degree of stability within the 
industry. Exxon continues to be the largest oil company, as it has since 
the 19th century. The next three companies, Mobil, Gulf, and Texaco 
changed relative positions but remained in the top four until 1975 when 
Standard Oil of California emerged as the fourth largest in terms of 
total sales. The next three. Standard Oil of Indiana, Shell Oil, and 
Standard Oil of California, also remained relatively stable as the 5th, 
6th and 7th largest companies throughout most of the period. The eighth 
largest company has shifted among several companies. Since 1969, the 
eighth position has been an exchange between Atlantic Richfield and 
Continental Oil.
Below the tenth position and after 1953, the stability tends to 
disappear. As Figure 11 indicates there is a strong cursory correlation 
between upward movement and mergers and acquisitions activity. In fact, 
the reason there are three newcomers in the top twenty group is the 
result of mergers between the companies comprising the top twenty in 
1957.
Total assets for these companies in 1957 and 1976 are shown in 
Appendix A. An examination of the distribution of assets between com­
panies reveals an interesting fact about the stability of companies and
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the contrast between the top company, Exxon, and the 19th company. In
1957 Exxon's assets were 23.74 times as great as the 19th company. In
1975 Exxon's assets were 23.66 times as large as the 19th company. Dur­
ing this period Exxon's assets increased by 277 percent.
Also contained in Appendix A is a list of international major/ 
minor petroleum companies and government owned companies. These com­
panies are included to facilitate a comparative analysis of joint venture 
participation patterns. The international majors, the "seven sisters," 
is a distinction that first gained wide recognition in a Federal Trade 
Commission study entitled The International Petroleum Cartel, published
in 1949. This listing of international majors includes five domiciled 
12in the U.S. The listing of the international minors are as defined by
Hunkers and Sturgeon, in their study of joint-venture activity outside
13the United States and includes 18 companies.
Sellers of Pipeline Transportation Services 
In the absence of vertical integration, petroleum transportation 
as Chapter III suggests would be subdivided into two separate industries. 
The first would be comprised of sellers of crude transportation services 
who supply a common group of refineries. The second would be sellers of 
refined product transportation to a common group of wholesalers, bulk 
stations, retailers, and so forth for distribution to ultimate consumers.
While the separation has a theoretical basis, vertical integra­
tion blurrs the distinction between buyers and sellers. The differences 
can partially be maintained, however, by the introduction of a third 
group of sellers; those who transport both crude and refined products, 
i.e., the all-phase company. The all-phase company was a logical
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development of refiners which integrated both apstream and downstream 
and have become the focal point of the investments of integrated firms.
The separation by services provided is used because of its usefulness 
for public policy evaluation as well as for clarity of analysis.
Pipeline companies can provide a number of services and also 
function as either a single plant, i.e., single one-direction lines, or
14a multi-plant operation, where separate pipeline networks are operated.
The non-integrated services a pipeline company can provide are: crude oil 
gathering; crude oil trunk line shipping; crude oil tank storage and 
terminating services; product trunk line shipping; and product- storage 
and terminating services.
If a company provided all five services it would, because of 
short-run technological constraints, be a multi-system, multi-terminus 
company. This applies only in the short run for there are no technolog­
ical restrictions preventing the conversion of trunk lines to carry 
products other than those they were originally designed to carry. In 
addition, by converting pumping stations, the direction of flow can also 
be changed. Gathering lines, however, do not lend themselves to conver­
sion.
There are instances where conversions have occurred but have been 
the exception rather than the rule. Lines once dedicated to a particular 
use have continued to perform the service throughout the period under 
examination. One notable exception has been the Williams Pipeline 
Company (formerly the Great Lakes Pipeline Company). This company has 
recently converted small segments of their traditionally refined products 
operation to include both crude and liquid fertilizers. In addition, they
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have successfully batched refined products and crude oil over the same 
line.
For purposes at hand, companies are classified as: crude gather­
ers; crude gatherers and trunkline shippers; crude trunk line shippers; 
refined product shippers; and all-phase companies— those which perform 
all functions. This classification conforms to the historical pattern 
of companies reporting to the ICC and differs from the initial classifi­
cation system only in that storage and terminating services are omitted. 
These services are not examined.
Storage and terminating services are apparently a function of 
who owns the pipeline. As a rule, the more independent or the less 
attached a company is to integrated petroleum companies the greater the 
likelihood that these services are offered to non-owner shippers. The 
general non-availability of these services on shipper/owner lines 
(including their joint ventures) has been a controversial issue.
In 1957, 82 companies were reporting to the ICC. Of these, 80 
were common carriers (see Table 30). Twenty four were all-phase compan­
ies, 27 offered refined product transportation, and 29 companies provided 
crude oil transportation. Of the 29 crude companies, 6 performed 
gathering services only, 7 provided both gathering and trunk-line ser­
vices, and 16 companies operated only trunk lines. By 1975 the number of 
firms reporting to ICC had increased to 104. Two of these firms, although 
reporting as common carriers, were specialized carriers and are excluded 
from the analysis. One was a coal slurry pipeline and the other carried 
anhydrous ammonia exclusively.^^
In the 19 year span, the number of ICC carriers increased by 22.
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TABLE 30
DISTRIBUTION OF PIPELINE COMPANIES REPORTING 
TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
BY TYPE OF SERVICE PROVIDED,
1957 AND 1975
Type of Service
Number of 
1957
Comnanies
1975
All Phase 24 25
Refined Products 27 40
Crude Oil, Total 29 37
Gathering only 6 4
Gathering and Trunk Line 7 10
Trunk Line only 16 23
Total 80^ 102^
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
Excludes two companies which were relieved from filing by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.• Also excludes Utah Oil Refining Com­
pany which merged into Service Pipeline Company in June, 1957.
^Excludes Black Mesa Pipeline Company (a coal slurry pipeline); 
Gulf Central Pipeline Company (an anhydrous ammonia pipeline); and Lion 
Oil Company (granted temporary relief from filing).
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Refined product carriers increased by 13, the largest gain in com­
panies.^^ This was consistent with the product mileage growth. Also 
consistent with mileage changes, the number of gathering companies 
declined (by two). Companies operating crude trunk lines, however, 
increased from 33 to 43 companies. The all-phase companies demonstrated 
the greatest stability. As Table 25 indicated, approximately 77 percent 
of the total United States pipeline mileage in 1974 was operated by 
these companies. It was only in the area of crude gathering that the 
ICC reporting companies had failed to operate at least 80 percent of 
the total pipeline mileage.
Given the magnitude and location of the transportation require­
ments of the petroleum industry and the dominance of pipelines, the 
number of firms operating in the interstate market is relatively small. 
The actual short-run competitive potential is more narrowly defined in 
terms of services provided and geographic location of existing facili­
ties, For example in 1975 only 65 companies transported refined 
products and only 58 carried crude oil.
Pipeline Companies; Evolution of Ownership Patterns 
Types of Ownership
Pipeline investments in interstate operation have taken primar­
ily six organizational forms, five of which are examined here. The 
five are: Cl) unaffiliated pipeline companies, i.e., the "pure indepen­
dents"; those companies classified as "parent" pipeline companies; (2) 
subsidiaries of non-petroleum parents; (3) subsidiaries of petroleum 
companies; (4) pipeline departments, i.e., a division or department of 
a parent company; and (5) corporate joint ventures. The sixth form of
190
pipeline investment is the joint-venture system. Unlike the other five 
it is not a corporate entity but is a contractual arrangement. It is 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
The distribution of carriers reporting to the ICC in 1957 and 
1975 are shown by type of ownership and by type of service in Table 31. 
The table indicates that the independent pipeline companies are few in 
number. Only three companies, two of which transported products, oper­
ated over the entire period. Like the independents, subsidiaries of 
non-petroleum parents have been a relatively insignificant ownership 
form. Only three were operating in 1957, two of which transported 
crude oil. In 1975, however, their numbers had increased to 12 com­
panies, 11 of which transported refined products.
Until recently, the dominant ownership form was the subsidiary 
of a petroleum parent. In 1957, 36 companies, 45 percent, were wholly 
owmed by petroleum companies. In 1975 the number had risen to 39, but 
the percent of total had dropped to 38. The majority of the petroleum 
subsidiaries throughout the period were all-phase companies. Pipeline 
departments at one time were a significant means of controlling invest­
ments in pipelines. By 1957 they had declined to six, and by 1975 only 
five departments were reporting to the ICC. Two were departments of top 
twenty petroleum companies.
The ownership form experiencing the largest increase has been 
the corporate joint venture. In 1957 there were 32 corporate joint 
ventures. These were about equally divided among crude and product 
carriers. By 1975 the corporate joint venture had become the largest 
ownership form. The greatest increase in the number of joint ventures 
occurred in crude transportation.
191
TABLE 31
DISTRIBUTION OF PIPELINE COMPANIES REPORTING TO THE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, BY OWNERSHIP FORM,
1957 AND 1975
Type of Ownership
Non- Joint
Petroleum Petroleum Pipeline Venture
Independents^ Subsidiaries Subsidiaries Depts. Companies
All Phase
1957 1 0 19 1 3
1975 0 1 22b 0 2
Crude
1957 0 2 10 2 15
1975 1 0 9 1 26
Product
1957 2 1 7 3 14
1975 2 lie 8 4 15
Total
1957 3 3 36 6 32
1975 3 12 39 5 43
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^Not owned by another corporation.
^Includes Pasco Pipeline Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Pasco, Inc. On December 30, 1975, stockholders of company voted to 
liquidate and dissolve company; as of July, 1976, stock in pipeline 
company was pledged to Rosley and Company.
^Of the eleven companies, four were wholly owned subsidiaries 
of railroad holding companies, and three were wholly o:med by natural 
gas transmission companies.
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Ownership Patterns: Petroleum Company Investments
The majority of the pipeline companies reporting to the ICC are 
affiliated in varying degrees with integrated companies. Of the 80 
companies reporting in 1957, 72 were affiliated with petroleum parents. 
Of the 102 companies reporting in 1975, 86 were affiliated with petro­
leum parents. It is in the affiliation between petroleum parents and 
their pipeline investments that the unique characteristics of the cor­
porate structure of the pipeline segment of the industry are found.
The pipeline interests of the integrated petroleum parent are 
almost entirely confined to separate legal entities. In 1975 in only 
three cases were integrated parents operating interstate pipelines 
directly through a division or department. This legal separation which
took place long before 1957 was a response to ICC regulation as well as
18the threat of divorcement (i.e., divestiture).
Industry reasons for separation of pipeline investments from
the parent were outlined in a speech by J. K. Spangler in July 8,
191970. Spangler cited several reasons for this separation: the first 
was due to ICC's supervision powers over carrier books and their audit 
powers; second, the State of Texas has long had a statuatory prohibition 
against a corporation engaging in both production and transportation; 
and third, its was a reaction to a strong divorcement movement in the 
1930's.
By separate incorporation, the integrated companies insulated
ICC jurisdiction activities "thereby fence off the pasture to be so 
21closely grazed" and also overcame Texas’ statuatory prohibitions. 
Separate incorporation reached a high mark in the 1930's when a strong
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divorcement movement was encountered in Congress and in the Roosevelt
administration. The industry apparently felt that arm's-length dealings
might lessen the thrust for divorcement and was to some degree a prepar-
22ation for this possibility.
The divorcement issue, until the 1970's, was muted by declining
tariffs (See Table 20) and by the increasing use of joint ventures, both
23
corporate and contractual. The use of joint ventures, as indicated 
in Chapter VII, also minimized the legal liabilities raised by extensive 
cooperation.
The advantages of separate incorporation have apparently out­
weighed the disadvantages. The principal disadvantage, the double tax
bite of 15% on dividends, has been avoided by consolidating returns in
24cases where the pipeline interests were 80 percent owned.
In Figure 12, a typical modern organizational chart is outlined. 
The bolder lines indicate the major means by which the parent holding 
or operating company's pipeline investments are organized. The thinner 
black lines and dotted lines indicate minority organizational methods. 
The major integrated company will typically have pipeline investments 
allocated in this fashion.
The focal point of investments and control of pipelines is 
found in the principal pipeline subsidiary. It is without exception an 
all-phase pipeline company. Its significance is increased by the fact 
that it generally holds the interests in corporate joint venture compan­
ies in which the parent company participates. Participation in corpor­
ate joint ventures and joint-venture systems is not confined, however to 
the principal pipeline subsidiary. In many instances, the parent will
FIGURE 12
TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF DOMESTIC PIPELINE INVESTMENTS 
BY MAJOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES
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participate directly or indirectly through a subsidiary other than its
principal domestic operating subsidiary or division.
Pipeline departments and intrastate subsidiaries are now found
25
primarily in the state of California. In addition, minor interstate 
pipeline subsidiaries have all but disappeared with the consolidation 
movement that has occurred over the 19 year period.
On the right hand side of Figure 12, the organization of 
Canadian operations are sho\-m. The Canadian companies are relevant 
for they are the dominant means by which Canadian crude comes into the 
United States. There are three pipelines that cross into the United 
States. All three are corporate joint ventures indirectly controlled 
primarily by the eight major companies through their Canadian subsidi­
aries (See Appendix B).
The three Canadian corporate joint ventures are; Trans Mountain 
Pipeline Co., Ltd.; Interprovincial Pipeline Co., Ltd.; and Montreal 
Pipeline Company. Their respective U.S. subsidiaries are: Trans­
mountain Pipeline Co., Lakehead Pipeline Co., and Portland Pipeline 
Company. Transmountain crosses into the state of Washington. Lakehead,
and its parent, is the largest crude pipeline company in North America
2 6and crosses into PAD II and PAD I. Portland Pipeline Company receives 
imports on the East Coast of the United States for shipment to Montreal 
refinery centers; it has no output terminals in the United States.
Ownership Patterns: Investments by Independents
As noted, the "pure" independent, those unaffiliated with 
another company(s) has been rare in domestic pipeline operations. 
Broadening the definition to include subsidiaries of non-petroleum
196
parents does not greatly increase the total. Though their numbers are 
small, a closer examination of these companies is important since to 
have a competitive industry one must have an adequate number of truly 
independent and self-motivated sellers.
It has often been stated that oil companies are in pipeline
activities because outside investors have not come forth to take the
27
risks "inherent” in pipeline activities. To properly evaluate this 
contention it is necessary to analyze the outside interests that have 
made pipeline investments. From a public policy evaluation and 
decision-making perspective (particularly in relation to divestiture 
and regulation), the performance and behavior of independent companies 
are necessary elements in evaluating the necessity of shipper/owner 
relationships.
In 1957 only eight companies were unaffiliated with petroleum 
parents. Two of the eight were wholly owned subsidiaries of Buckeye 
Pipeline Company. These companies are shown in Table 32. By 1975 
there were 15 pipeline companies and one pipeline department unaffili­
ated with petroleum parents. Five were operating in 1957, nine were 
new entries, and two companies’ entries were the results of acquisi­
tions and expansion of in-place pipelines. The 16 entities are shora 
in Table 33. The three companies operating in 1957 that did not sur­
vive through 1975 (New York Transit, Northern, and Augusta) were either 
merged or acquired by one of the unaffiliated companies shown in Table 
33.
The characteristics of these companies are in contrast to the 
pipeline companies affiliated with petroleum companies. The contrast
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TABLE 32
INDEPENDENT COMPANIES REPORTING TO THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE COMMISSION, 19571
Pipeline Company and 
Parent Company
Service
Provided
Buckeye Pipeline Company 
(Publicly Traded)
All Phases
Cooperative Refinery Association 
(Farmland Industries)
Crude
New York Transit, Inc.
(Buckeye Pipeline Company)
Crude
Northern Pipeline Company 
(Buckeye Pipeline Company)
Crude
Augusta Pipeline Company 
(Publicly Traded)
Products
Kaneb Pipeline Company 
(Kaneb Services, Inc.)
Products
Southern Pacific Pipeline Company 
(Southern Pacific Co.)
Products
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.
Products Division (Publicly Traded)
Products
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^Not owned or controlled by company or companies whose principal 
business involves production, refining or marketing petroleum products.
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TABLE 33
INDEPEI'IDENT COMPANIES REPORTING TO THE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,. 19751
Pipeline Company Service
and Parent Company Provided
Buckeye Pipeline Company All Phases
(Pennsylvania Company)
Cheyenne Pipeline Company All Phases
(Nielson Enterprise, 33.3%;
Gesli Investment Co., 33.3%; 
and Ecodor Investment Co., 33.3%)
Bell Fourche Pipeline Company Crude
(individuals)
CRA, Inc. Crude
(Farmland Industries)
Allegheny Pipeline Company Products
Trans-Ohio Pipeline Company LPG
Products Division Products
(Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.)
Airforce Pipeline Company Products
(Southern Railway)
Calnev Pipeline Company^ Products
(Union Pacific Railroad)
Hydrocarbon Transportation, Inc. Products
(Northern Gas Products Company)
Jet Lines, Inc. Products
(individuals)
Kaneb Pipeline Company Products
(Kaneb Services, Inc.)
MapCO, Inc. LPG
(publicly traded)
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TABLE 33 CONTINUED
Pipeline Company 
and Parent Company
Service
Provided
Okie Pipeline Company^ 
(Kock Industries)
LPG
Santa Fe Pipeline Company 
(AT & SF Railway System)
Products
Southern Pacific Pipeline Company 
(Southern Pacific Company)
Products
UCAR Pipeline, Inc. 
(Union Carbide Corp.)
Products
4
Williams Pipeline Company 
(Williams Companies)
Products
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^Not ovjned or controlled by company or companies whose principal 
business involves production, refining or marketing petroleum products.
2
Pipeline is operated by Champlin Petroleum Company (wholly 
ovmed by Union Pacific Railroad); Champlin is an integrated petroleum 
company and in 1970 ranked among the top twenty petroleum companies in 
terms of crude production and refinery capacity.
3
Kock Industries is privately held with large energy related 
investments.
^Williams Pipeline until 1974 was primarily a products pipeline; 
it now carries crude oil.
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was in terms of one or more of the following factors: services offered,
spatial aspects; integration; or innovation. The independent pipeline
company, with the exception of Buckeye and its former subsidiaries,
has not engaged to any great degree in the trunk-line transportation of
crude oil. Only four companies offered this service in 1975. The
modern significance of the independent is to be found in its ownership
29and operation of product and LPG lines. As Table 33 indicates, 14 of 
the companies offered non-crude transportation services.
In addition to a concentration in non-crude services, many of 
the carriers are specialized in that they transport LPG (exclusively) to 
a specific market (e.g., the rural farm market); they are single termi­
nal lines serving airports (military and civilian, notably Air Force 
and Jet Lines, and part of South Pacific Pipeline Company's mileage); 
they carry light hydrocarbons (Santa Fe Pipeline Company) or petro­
chemicals (UCAR Pipeline).
Unaffiliated companies also have had a propensity to offer 
storage and terminating services to all shippers. This is also in 
contrast to the practice of pipeline affiliates of petroleum companies. 
In the latter case, terminating and storage facilities are normally 
o^ fned and operated by a petroleum company and not by the pipeline com­
pany. The offering of storage and terminating services by unaffiliated 
companies is important because in the planning and construction of these 
facilities there is an attempt to maximize the pipeline’s ability to 
reach the largest number of potential shippers. This attempt to maxi­
mize access is in contrast to pipelines not offering these services
30
which inherently restricts/limits access by non-owner shippers.
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The independent pipeline company in 1975 by and large did not 
operate (interstate) in the major refining and producing area of the 
United States (PAD III). None of the crude companies operated in PAD 
III and only two of the 14 non-crude companies had lines extending into 
PAD III (Santa Fe and Texas Eastern's Product Division). The largest 
independents operate primarily in PAD II. These are Buckeye, Hydro­
carbon Transportation, Kaneb, Mapco, Okie, and Williams. In addition, 
the Southern Pacific Pipeline Company is the only interstate carrier 
which carries refined products across state boundaries in P^ AD V.
Twelve of the pipeline operations shown in Table 33 are wholly- 
o;vned subsidiaries. Seven of these operations represent horizontal 
integration efforts (five by railroads and two by natural gas companies). 
Three operations (CRA, Inc., Okie Pipeline Company, and UCAR Pipeline, 
Inc.) are examples of vertical integration efforts by their respective 
parents.
By most standards, the non-petroleum parent companies are large
corporations. Southern Pacific, Union Pacific and the Pennsylvania
Company are among the largest railroad holding companies. Other
examples of size are the Williams Companies (sales of over $880 million
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in 1975) and Mapco, Inc. (sales of over $340 million in 1975). The 
most recent independent pipeline entry (Okie Pipeline Company) is owned 
by Kock Industries. A privately owned corporation, Kock Industries 
sales were estimated by Forbes to be in excess of $2 billion in 1974. 
Forbes also estimated that the company was transporting and distributing 
800,000 barrels of crude each day (none apparently in the interstate 
market). The company o^ vned (in 1974) some 10,000 miles of pipeline of 
which only a small portion involved in the interstate transportation
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32of petroleum. The company operates primarily in PAD II.
Pipelines unaffiliated with integrated petroleum companies have
primarily operated in markets that were to some extent ignored or
abandoned by the integrated companies. One example, already noted, was
in intrastate gathering of crude oil, another was in the interstate
product market in PAD V. These examples are relatively insignificant
compared to the independent's role in PAD II. It is in this geographic
area that the independent carriers are concentrated. The concentration
is primarily in.the farm market.
The farm petroleum market was estimated in 1977 to be a $3.3 
33
billion market. Farm cooperatives capture approximately 40 percent 
of this market. Much of the market is served by either co-op pipelines 
or other independents’ pipelines. In several respects the co-op success 
in the farm petroleum market is a result of lack of interest and mis­
takes by the major oil c ompanies.For example, in the 1920's the 
cooperatives were born largely to purchase fuel in large quantities and 
make deliveries directly to the farmers, a service that the oil compan­
ies had refused to provide. The largest cooperative. Farmland Indus­
tries, built its own refinery in the 1940's and found that the majors 
refused to sell it crude. For this reason Farmland began to integrate 
into the drilling, production, and transportation of crude oil and 
refined products.
In the 1960's the major oil companies began a push into the 
midwestern farm market but when the oil shortage hit in the 1970's,
companies such as Gulf, Arco, Cities Service, and Mobil pulled out of 
35the farm market.
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The independent pipeline companies' modern significance is also 
attributed to the innovatives, innovations that were required to estab­
lish a foothold in pipeline transportation. Among the major innovations 
were: (1) Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation was the first pipeline 
company to deliver Gulf Coast products to the upper Midwest and North­
east. They were also the first private company to operate a large 
diameter (20 inch) products pipeline; (2) Mapco's Mid-America system 
was the first large scale LPG carrier connecting a large number of west 
Texas and New Mexico natural gasoline plants and the Midwest; (3) Santa 
Fe's subsidiary. Gulf Central, and part of Mapco's sytem were the first 
to transport anhydrous ammonia by pipeline; (4) a subsidiary of Southern 
Pacific, Black Mesa, was the country's largest coal slurry pipeline (in 
1974, it was the only one in operation); (5) Kaneb Pipeline Company was 
originated in 1953 to transport products from seven landlocked refiner­
ies in Kansas that lacked meaningful pipeline outlets of their own; (6) 
the largest independents. Buckeye and Williams, were formerly oïfned by 
major oil companies and have progressively expanded their operations.
In addition, Williams was the first company to "batch" crude and refined 
products on a large scale; and (7) the independents have offered storage 
and terminating facilities to non-owner shippers.
Summary
In 1957, 82 companies were operating the nearly 143,000 miles 
of interstate pipelines. In 1975, 104 companies were operating approx­
imately 173,000 miles of interstate lines. Over the 19 year span the 
number of ICC carriers increased by 22. More than half of the net gain 
was in product carriers. Along with the entry of new product carriers
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came greater attempts to differentiate pipeline activities in terras of 
services offered, petroleum products carried, and raarkets served. This 
was most apparent in terms of the independent carriers (which increased 
in number from 8 to 16) .
Five ownership patterns were delineated and examined in terms 
of the organization of major petroleum companies' pipeline investments 
and non-petroleum investments. In 1957, 72 pipeline companies were 
affiliated with petroleum companies. In 1975 affiliated companies had 
increased to 86. The focal point of major petroleum companies' invest­
ments in pipelines was found to reside in an "all-phase" pipeline sub­
sidiary. The pipeline operations of the majors were also found to be 
almost always confined to separate legal entities. The separation 
occurred because of ICC regulatory jurisdiction, Texas statutes, and 
the threat of divestiture.
Independents' entry into pipeline activities has largely been 
a result of their concentration in specialized services, markets, and 
innovations. The markets they service are to a degree those ignored 
or withdrawn from by petroleum companies. With few exceptions, the 
independents are not actively involved in the interstate transportation 
of crude oil. The quantification of the independents' share of both 
the product and crude transportation is to be found in Chapter IX.
To this point, the independents have been narrowly defined to 
include only unaffiliated companies and companies affiliated with non­
petroleum parents. This definition has excluded non-major petroleum 
companies' investments in pipelines. The definition is broadened in 
the remaining chapters to include all companies not controlled by the
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major oil companies. The major ownership form, the joint venture 
(corporate and system) has thus far been given only cursory attention. 
Joint ventures are the topic of Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VII
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT, PART II 
PIPELINE JOINT VENTURES
A joint venture can be broadly defined as the sharing of costs, 
profits, or both by two or more legal entities in one or more activi­
ties.^ In an analysis of the international petroleum industry, it was 
found that joint ventures took two forms. The first was the "jointly 
owned subsidiary"; a company o;<med by two or more legal or political 
entities. The second was the "contractual joint venture." The contrac­
tual venture takes many forms but in no instance is a separate legal
2
enterprise formed and in all cases the contract has a limited life.
There are three theoretical types of joint ventures: the verti-
3
cal, the horizontal, and the conglomerate. The vertical venture
involves firms in the same industry forming a venture to operate in
another stage of the industry. Most pipeline ventures fall into this
group. The horizontal venture involves firms in the same industry
forming a venture to engage in the same activity in the same or another
geographic area. The conglomerate venture involves firms forming a
venture to enter a new industry.
Joint ventures are common in international commerce and are a
4
dominant part of international petroleum activities. They have not
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been, until recently, a significant part of domestic industrial organ­
ization with the exceptions of steel, chemicals, and petroleum.
While joint ventures are common in all stages of the inter­
national petroleum industry, venture activity in the domestic industry 
has historically been on a smaller scale. In the domestic industry, 
joint ventures are found in production (on and off shore), and both 
crude and product pipelines. They are not found in domestic refining,
marketing or transmission of natural gas.^
Joint ventures are not a recent development in the international 
or domestic petroleum industry. One of the first international ventures, 
the Turkish Petroleum Company, was formed in 1912. The first joint 
venture in which important American and foreign oil companies were united 
in one operation, Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., was the successor to the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. The American companies became participants 
in 1928. In the United States, the first known joint venture pipeline
was put into service in 1927.^
Joint Ventures and Competition 
The competitive impact of inter-industry firms engaging in joint 
ventures activities has received limited rigorous empirical or theoret­
ical attention— this despite the fact that joint ventures are a common 
and growing part of the foreign-and the domestic economy. The analysis 
that has taken place has been generated by three primary issues: (1) a 
"suspicion that firms that are partners in significant joint ventures 
cannot at the same time be arm-length competitors";^ (2) often "it [a 
joiuL venture] is the offspring of two or more giant corporations, each 
with vast financial resources, which— for one reason or another— want to
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conduct jointly through it an enterprise in a field in which they have a
g
common interest"; and (3) the common interest and the necessity of work­
ing together for the benefit of the joint enterprise presents an oppor­
tunity for cooperation of other policies of mutual interest to the poten— 
9
tial competitors.
Much of the focus of the joint-venture literature has centered 
on either international ventures or on the antitrust implications of 
domestic ventures. The antitrust literature has focused on the legality 
of joint ventures. More specifically, the issue has been on the stand­
ing of joint ventures under the Sherman Act. Does the collaboration 
required to participate in a joint venture result in restraint of trade; 
a result prohibited under section 1 of the Act? Do joint ventures 
exclude competition and therefore violate section 2 of the Sherman Act? 
The concensus is that joint ventures are neither illegal per se nor do 
they have absolute immunity under antitrust laws. This is based on 
the historical case-by-case approach to antitrust law as well as a 
concern for substance over form.^^
In addition to the Sherman Act, joint ventures have generated
uncertainty in relation to two other sections of antitrust legislation.
11The first is in relation to the Anti-Merger Act of 1950. The second
is in relation to existing law which prevents interlocking directorates
12
between certain competing corporations. The joint venture presents a
dilemma because it involves characteristics common to mergers. Tfhen a
merger occurs it combines all the assets of two existing firms. A
corporate joint venture on the other hand combines only parts of the
13
assets of the participating firms and places them in a new entity. A
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14merger undergoes greater antitrust scrutiny than have joint ventures. 
Joint ventures have also escaped scrutiny in terms of interlocking 
directorates since to disallow interlocks would eliminate intra­
industry participation in joint-ventures.
Joint ventures raise economic questions concerning the alloca­
tion of resources and market power, questions that are central to both 
antitrust and industrial organization theory. There are five major 
economic advantages that justify the formation of joint ventures.
These are: (1) overcoming capital barriers, i.e., capital requirements 
so high that only a few firms are potential entrants separately; (2) 
natural monopoly cases, i.e., separate operations would result in 
inefficient use of resources; a joint operation would achieve maximum 
scale economies; (3) risk is so great that few or no industries or firms 
would be willing or able to assume the risk separately; (4) augmentation 
of technological activities, i.e., a reduction of duplicative research 
or increased appropriability of new knowledge; and (5) external economies 
which accrue indiscriminately to firms in a given industry rather than 
primarily to the investing firms (this justification is a function of 
the other four).^^
The major anti-competitive effects have been alluded to and are 
reciprocals of the pro-competitive outcomes. Among these are: (1) exter­
nal economies flowing discriminately to only the participating firms;
(2) a reduction in entry, an increase in concentration and market power; 
and (3) a reduction in output below the socially optimum level (i.e., 
monopoly pricing).
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Domestic Joint Venture Pipelines 
As was the case in the international petroleum industry, there 
are two forms of joint-venture pipelines in this segment of the domes­
tic industry. The first are "corporate joint ventures," i.e., jointly 
owned subsidiaries. The second, the joint-venture "system," is a con­
tractual venture. The majority of the pipeline joint ventures can be 
classified as vertical ventures.
A corporate joint venture is ". . . the creation of a new 
business entity by two or more corporate partners. The characteris­
tics of the corporate joint-venture pipeline company departs little from 
those found in other industries. The joint-venture pipeline system, 
however, is a unique organizational form and is largely a product of 
pipeline regulation.
The pipeline system is often referred to as an undivided inter­
est pipeline where the participants in the system are tenants in common. 
A system can be described as a series of separate pipelines bundled 
together with the owners filing separate tariffs and maintaining separ­
ate terminals, storage facilities, and shipping practices. The system 
is a relatively new development in comparison to the corporate joint
venture. The first known pipeline system began operation in 1942 some
1815 years after the first corporate joint venture was started.
Characteristics of Domestic Joint Venture Pipelines
Joint-venture pipelines have been justified by the petroleum
industry using economic arguments largely identical to those stated
earlier. These center around the height of the capital requirements,
19the risks involved, and the economies of scales. The justifications
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seemingly contradict the purpose of ICC regulation which was to have 
pipelines function as common carriers and not as private facilities of 
the shipper/owner(s).
As indicated in Chapter II, the historical argument against regu­
lation has revolved around the position that pipelines are plant facil­
ities built to serve the needs of their owners. Thus while pipelines 
may in form serve as common carriers, the attitudes and practices of the 
industry continue to support the plant facility argument. For example, 
in recent testimony before Congress, a Standard Oil of Ohio spokesman
justified the joint venture because "no single company could supply the
20oil through to operate a large pipeline at near capacity." A Cities
Service spokesman offered a related argument when he noted that
petroleum pipelines have been built by oil companies because they 
alone have the sources of supply in established markets necessary 
for the line's successful operation and because they have been the 
only investors willing to venture the requisite risk capital.21
Joint ventures have been used by major shippers to encourage
the small but substantial shipper to participate and therefore bear the
22full costs, including risk, of this type of operation. This again
seems to defy the regulatory intent of a pipeline serving as a common
carrier. Tying a small but substantial shipper to a line on an economic
basis prevents the shipper from jumping to another common carrier when
a better deal comes along. This tie limits the potential of "upsetting
23
the scheduling and most efficient operation of the line."
hliile the merits of the pro-joint venture arguments are examined 
in a latter section, a somewhat related question, the motivation for the 
selection of one form of venture over the other by potential partici­
pants, requires attention. When a venture is in the conceptual and
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planning stage, potential participants must choose between the compet­
ing organizational forms. Each form has advantages and disadvantages; 
the weighing of each will vary with the special circumstances of the 
venture under consideration. The complexity of the choice rises with 
the number of participants and their characteristics (i.e., majors vs. 
independents, preferences of individual companies, and so forth).
Prior to 1957 nearly 71 percent of the pipeline ventures were 
corporate joint ventures. This suggests that the advantages of this 
form outweighed.its disadvantages. Since 1957, however, 22 systems 
have been formed compared to only 11 corporate joint ventures which 
suggests a slight shift in both advantages and preferences.
Characteristics of the Corporate Joint Venture Pipelines
A joint venture pipeline corporation is a new corporation
formed to construct, own, and operate a pipeline or pipelines. The
participants' equity in the corporation is evidenced by the percent
of shares subscribed to and participation is generally proportionate
to the expected volume throughput (as well as refinery capacity or
crude production). A corporate joint venture pipeline company is
initially financed with approximately 10 percent equity and 90 percent 
24
debt. This financing has historically been obtained by throughput 
guarantees on the part of the participating owners.
As a general rule, the corporate joint venture offers the fol­
lowing advantages to participants; (1) it is insulated from other 
parts of the owner's business; (2) leverage can produce a higher rate 
of return on equity; (3) the proportionate debt of a minority owner 
does not have to be shown on the minority o^mer's balance sheet; (4)
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there is a joint advantage of leverage financing which allows a 
minority owner to leverage his financing to a higher degree chan would 
be possible otherwise; (5) the corporate joint venture eases staffing 
problems since new staffs can be hired; and (6) a participant may not 
have a going pipeline organization; the joint venture minimizes startup
costs and the administrative costs of having to establish a separate
25
regulated common carrier company.
The corporate joint venture has four significant disadvantages. 
First, there is an added tax which must be paid on 15 percent of divi­
dends paid out by stock companies. Second, corporate laws require that 
directors act in concert and thus the minority ovmer(s) has few options 
if there is a disagreement with the majority stockholders. Third, the 
formation of a corporate joint-venture pipeline operation runs a greater 
risk of antitrust review.
The fourth disadvantage is the "free-rider effect." A free 
rider is defined as a participant in a venture who by error or design 
subscribes for a percentage in excess of actual use. The free rider 
receives the benefits of the leveraged rate of return without having its 
own affiliates bear the full percentage costs in terms of tariffs paid 
to the pipeline company. The possibility of having free riders gave 
rise to the "readjustment clause," now a common feature of corporate 
joint ventures. The readjustment clause requires that after a specified 
period of time, the percent ownership in the pipeline is reevaluated
and altered based upon the usage of the line by the partners over the
• 27period.
In addition to the advantages and disadvantages of the corporate
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form from the participants' vantage, there are two additional character­
istics of interest from the vantage of a non-participant. The first has 
to do with the "stock transfer restriction" and the second with the 
provision of services other than shipping. The stock transfer restric­
tion is common to most corporate joint venture pipelines. This restric­
tion gives preferential rights of purchase to the existing owners if 
one of the participants wishes to sell its percentage. An example of 
this type of clause is found in the Colonial Pipeline Company's owner­
ship agreement. In this agreement, a participant cannot sell to an out­
sider without giving the other owners a first, second, and third right 
28to purchase.
As noted in Chapter VI it is a common practice among non­
independents to provide only pipeline shipping services and not to pro­
vide terminal or storage facilities to non-owners. This practice is 
also common to joint ventures of both forms. The owners of the pipe­
lines, as a general rule, have their owi private terminal and storage 
facilities, facilities which are not a part of the pipeline company. In 
many cases (see Chapter VIII) these facilities will also be joint 
ventures.
Characteristics of the Joint Venture System
Normally under the system form, one participant becomes the con­
tractor for the remaining partners to construct, operate, and maintain 
the pipeline. There usually is an attempt to insure that the contractor
(and often the operating agent) has no legal involvement in the business
29
affairs of the other owners.
Each participant in a system publishes separate tariffs and
218
accepts tenders through its capacity in the line. The partner's capacity 
is almost always a function of the percent ownership. To illustrate 
this, assume a 100,000 b/d pipeline system with five owners each holding 
a 20 percent interest. Each owner under this arrangement would publish 
tariffs and accept tenders from itself or outside shippers up to an 
amount of 20,000 b/d. This would be the maximum tender each owner could 
accept.
The system ownership agreement usually provides for the design,
construction, operation, and expansion of the pipeline. The costs of
construction, maintenance, and operating (except fuel and power) are
paid on the basis of the percent ownership. Fuel and power costs are
paid based upon a proration among the owners of that proportion of each
o^mer's use of the line to the total use of the line.
The joint venture system when first introduced was considered a
major organizational innovation and offered advantages over both the
30
corporate joint venture and the single owner pipeline operation. Like
the corporate venture, participants enjoy the economies of scale of a
large pipeline which they might not justify themselves but unlike the
corporate venture each owner exercises full control over tenders,
tariffs, and other requirements'on his share of the line. Also if an
owner has throughput greater than his share of the line can accommodate,
he must offer it to the other owners as though they were operating a
separate pipeline. Another innovation was that each owner reports to
the ICC only his share of the line as though it were a part of his
wholly owned facility and the share reported to the ICC may be included
31
in an owner's total valuation base for consent decree purposes.
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Additional advantages of the system when compared to the corpor­
ate joint venture are: it docs not incur costs in terms of income tax or 
miscellaneous administrative expenses; it allows depreciation and other 
charges to be written off against the parent’s total records; the tax 
liability on the 15 percent of dividends paid by stock companies is
eliminated; and it is less vulnerable to antitrust review than are cor-
32
porate joint ventures because separate tariffs are filed.
The system also prevents the free-rider effect since costs are 
prorated based upon percent ownership except for fuel and power. Only 
an extremely limited return, the revenue on the small amount that the 
participant did transport, would be paid to those with excess capacity. 
Participation in excess of usage poses a severe economic disadvantage 
under the system form and a potential advantage in a stock company.
A system organization usually allows a participant to force or
refrain from being involved in an expansion. Normally, the ownership 
agreement does not require an owner to finance additional expansion if
he elects not to participate. Under the stock ownership form the
directors must act in concert in making a decision to expand. The 
small owner in this instance has few options if he disagrees with those 
pushing for an expansion.
As noted, neither the corporate joint venture nor the pipeline 
system normally provides common carrier terminals or storage facilities. 
A non-owner's access to a pipeline system is restricted to a greater 
degree than in the corporate case because each o;mer has separate 
tariffs and often differing requirements and terminal locations for 
receipt of tenders from outside shippers.
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The world's largest pipeline system, the Trans Alaskan Pipeline 
System, pro\'ides common carrier storage facilities. Tliis was not the 
result of a change in industry practice but a result of an amendment to 
Section 28 of the Minerals Leasing Act. This section provides that oil 
pipelines constructed persuant to a right-of-way permit through public 
lands granted by the Secretary of the Interior should be maintained as 
common carriers. The act was amended to make clear that storage facili­
ties constructed persuant to a right-of-way permit must also be operated
33as common carriers.
Empirical Analysis of Joint Venture Pipelines
Joint Ventures' Share of the Interstate 
Pipeline Transportation Market
An exact measurement of joint ventures' share of the interstate 
market is not possible, given the available published data. This is 
because pipeline systems' operating data is incorporated on a prorated 
basis (based on percentage owned) into the operating statistics of each 
participant. Data on corporate joint-venture pipelines, since they are 
separate legal entities, is readily available. This data allows for a 
partial evaluation or joint ventures' share of the short-term and 1957- 
1975 market.
In 1957 there were 50 identified joint-venture pipelines oper­
ated in the United States. Of these, 45 were operating in the inter­
state market and 5 were in the intrastate market. Of the 45 interstate 
operations, 32 were corporate joint ventures and 13 were systems. By 
1975 the number of identified joint ventures nearly doubled and totaled 
92.^^ Of these, 78 were operating in the interstate market and 14 were
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intrastate operations- Of the 78 interstate operations, corporate joint 
ventures continued to be the most common (43). Joint-venture systems 
did, however, experience the greatest net gain in the number of new 
lines. There were 35 systems in the interstate market in 1975.
Including systems, joint-venture pipelines accounted for 26.8 
percent of the total operating interstate mileage in 1957. Approxi­
mately 90.6 percent of the 38,945 miles were operated by corporate 
joint ventures. Joint ventures' share of the refined product trunk 
line mileage was 43.6 percent compared to only 24.0 for crude lines. 
Joint-venture gathering lines represented 19.7 percent of the total 
gathering mileage.
By 1975 total joint venture mileage had increased 18.6 percent 
from 1957 and totaled 45,204 miles. System mileage had increased by 
112 percent but still only accounted for 16.8 percent of the total 
joint-venture mileage (system mileage totaled 7,742 miles in 1975).
Joint venture's share of the total mileage in 1975 remained about the 
same (27 percent) as it was in 1957 but the composition of the share 
had changed considerably. Product mileage declined to 26.6 percent 
while crude trunk line mileage increased its share by slightly more 
than 7 percent. Thirty one percent of the crude trunk line mileage 
operated in 1975 was operated by joint venture pipelines. Gathering 
lines remain at about the same percentage level as in 1957.
Table 34-35 provide annual data on corporate joint venture 
mileage and their share of the market. As indicated, corporate joint- 
venture mileage has been declining as a percent of total since 1966.
This is explained by the decline in the product lines' share which
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TABLE 34
PIPELINE MILEAGE OPERATED BY JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE
COMPANIES, ANNUALLY, 1957-1975
Year Total^
Trunk
Crude
Lines
Product
Gathering
Lines
1957 35,293 12,196 12,757 10,259
1958 36,882 12,943 13,371 10,487
1959 37,663 12,924 14,219 10,440
1960 37,843 13,059 14,160 10,541
1961 39,348 13,271 14,622 11,372
1962 40,749 13,720 15,976 10,970
1963 42,980 14,064 17,593 11,240
1964 44,399 14,020 19,046 11,250
1965 44,976 14,268 19,410 11,296
1966 45,749 14,284 19,622 11,841
1967 40,001 14,747 13,422^ 11,830
1968 40,235 15,613 13,960 11,660
1969 41,494 15,915 14,210 11,369
1970 41,659 15,940 14,458 11,258
1971 41,838 15,783 15,331 10,724
1972 41,287 15,244 16,976 9,067
1973 39,303 15,306 15,827 8,170
1974 40,394 14,942 17,044 8,408
1975 38,462^ 14,913 15,538 8,011
SOURCE: Compiled from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Transportation Statistics In The United States: Part-6 , 
Pipelines (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, Annual).
^Includes mileage (other) not shown separately.
^Decline from 1966 result of sale of Great Lakes Pipeline Co.
^Decline from 1974 result of change of ownership and reorganiza­
tion of Cherokee Pipeline Company from a corporation to a system.
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TABLE 35
PIPELINE MILEAGE OPERATED BY JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE
COMPANIES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL ICC MILEAGE,
ANNUALLY, 1957-1975
Trunk Lines Gathering
Year Total Crude Product Lines
1957 24.6 21.0 42.2 20.0
1958 25.8 22.2 42.9 21.3
1959 ' 25.4 21.9 39.7 21.2
1960 25.1 22.1 37.0 21.5
1961 25.8 22.4 36.8 23.2
1962 26.6 23.3 37.6 23.1
1963 27.7 24.0 38.9 24.1
1964 28.1 23.3 40.3 24.3
1965 28.1 23.5 39.9 24.6
1966 27.2 24.0 34.9 25.6
1967 24.4 24.2 26.1^ 25.2
1968 24.6 25.3 26.2 24.9
1969 24.6 25.7 25.6 24.7
1970 24.2 25.3 25.5 24.1
1971 24.6 25.9 26.6 23.3
1972 24.4 25.5 27.6 21.1
1973 23.7 26.7 25.6 19.6
1974 23.9 26.0 26.0 20.2
1975 22.9^ 26.1 24.4 20.0
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Transportation Statistics In The United States: Part 6 , 
Pipelines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Annual)
^Includes mileage (other) not shown separately.
^Decline from 1966 result of sale of Great Lakes Pipeline Co.
^Decline from 1974 result of change of ownership and reorgani­
zation of Cherokee Pipeline Company from a corporation to a system.
224
more than offset the rise in crude trunk lines.
The mileage data does not adequately reflect the growth in joint
ventures or their actual share of the transportation market. There are
two reasons for this. First, the change in the mileage data represents
net change and not total new entries over the 19 year period. For
example, one of the oldest and largest corporate joint-venture pipeline
companies, Great Lakes Pipeline Company, was sold in 1966 to the
35Williams Companies. Great Lakes at the time of the sale operated 
6,229 miles of refined-product trunkline mileage. The second reason is 
that there is not necessarily a correlation between mileage and either 
throughput capacity (as indicated in Chapter IV) or revenue generating 
capacity. This is illustrated in Table 36 and 37 where corporate joint- 
venture market shares measured in terras of barrel input/output and 
operating revenue/expense are shown.
On average, the reliance on mileage tends to understate corporate 
joint ventures' importance to the interstate market. The statistics 
shown below further illustrate this point.
Corporate Joint Ventures 
Meanl Market Share
Total Operating Gross 
Mileage Input Revenue Income
Crude Trunklines 
Product Trunklines
25.1
29.1
28.1
36.8
29.0
42.6
32.9
45.0
Mean for 1964-75; statistics are calculated from data in 
Tables 35-37.
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These statistics indicate that the use of mileage as the market share 
measure for crude pipelines can understate the share by as much as 7.8 
percent (in terms of gross income). The difference is even greater 
for product trunklines, where a mileage measure is 15.9 percent lower 
than the share of total gross income.
The averages emphasize the importance of joint-venture pipelines 
and even this is understated because systems are not included. The 
inclusion of 1975 system mileage increases the total share shown in 
Table 35 by nearly 4 percent. Assuming the same relationship between 
mileage and operating/financial measures, joint ventures now represent 
about 40 percent of the interstate market.
This section has demonstrated that joint ventures are now the 
dominant organizational form in domestic pipeline transportation.
Their rise to predominance occurred largely over 1957-75 though they 
were well established by 1957. Joint venture pipelines do not yet 
represent the majority of pipeline mileage but they appear to be 
approaching and in some years have exceeded 50 percent of the market in 
terms of throughput/revenue operating income. The post-World War II 
development of joint-venture activity is as significant to the struc­
ture of pipeline transportation, if not more so, than the separation 
of pipelines from the parent companies. Joint ventures' share of the 
domestic market are such that the implications of joint activities 
cannot be ignored.
Control of Joint Venture Pipelines
Traditional concentration measures have commonly been used to
TABLE 36
SELECTED PHYSICAL OPERATING DATA OF JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL ICC, ANNUALLY, 1957-1975
Year
Total Input Originated Total Output Terminated
Crude Product Crude Product Crude Product Crude Product
1957 22.3 40.2 18.6 33.7 22.3 39.9 14.7 44.2
1958 23.3 36.6 20.4 30.9 23.3 36.5 16.7 40.8
1959 23.6 37.3 21.3 33.1 23.9 37.2 17.3 42.0
1960 23.4 35.1 20.7 29.8 23.5 35.1 16.9 39.6
1961 24.5 34.0 22.6 29.0 24.5 32.4 18.2 38.0
1962 25.1 34.6 23.4 30.3 24.9 34.5 18.1 38.3
1963 25.8 34.1 24.4 30.3 25.7 33.7 18.9 37.6
1964 25.4 37.4 24.9 36.4 25.4 37.0 19.1 41.2
1965 25.8 40.7 25.1 39.9 25.8 40.7 19.6 43.3
1966 26.0 36.4 25.2 36.5 26.0 36.5 20.0 39.5
1967 25.4 35.9 24.6 35.8 25.2 35.6 20,0 38.2
1968 26.5 37.3 26.0 37.0 26.4 37.3 21.3 40.0
1969 27.2 36.7 25.8 36.9 27.1 36.6 22.0 39.2
1970 28.6 35.3 27.2 36.5 28.6 36.3 23.3 38.5
1971 29.6 36.4 28.7 36.3 29.5 36.3 24.1 38.7
1972 30.3 36.5 29.8 35.9 30.3 36.5 25.1 39.0
1973 32.1 36.7 31.3 36.2 31.9 36.9 24.4 39.3
1974 30.5 36.3 29.7 35.4 30.5 36.2 23.9 37.9
1975 29.7 34.8 29.6 34.5 29.7 34.9 24.3 36.4
ro
to
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Trans­
portation Statistics In The United States: Part 6 , Pipelines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, Annual).
TABLE 37
SELECTED FINANCIAL OPERATING DATA OF JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL ICC, ANNUALLY, 1957-1975
Operating Revenue Operating Expense Gross Income
Year Total Crude Product Total Crude Product Total Crude Produi
1957 29.3 _ _ 24.5 _ 34.8 _
1958 31.9 - - 26.1 - - 38.8 - -
1959 32.6 - - 26.9 - - 39.1 - -
1960 32.0 - - 26.2 - - 38.7 - -
1961 31.9 - - 27.3 - - 37.1 - -
1962 32.3 _ 29.0 _ 35.8 _ _
1963 32.8 - - 28.6 - - 37.5 - -
1964 34.2 27.1 45.9 32.1 23.8 45.8 37.0 31.6 46.2
1965 37.4 28.4 50.5 33.1 24.3 47.0 42.9 34.2 54.7
1966 34.4 27.5 43.9 29.9 23.9 39.0 40.3 32.8 49.4
1967 34.0 27.0 42.8 30.2 24.3 38.5 39.0 30.9 47.6
1968 34.4 28.7 41.5 31.6 26.0 39.3 38.3 32.8 44.2
1969 33.8 28.3 40.5 31.2 25.8 38.4 37.4 32.1 43.2
1970 34.0 29.1 40.1 31.4 26.3 38.4 37.2 33.0 42.1
1971 35.0 30.1 40.8 32.4 27.6 38.6 38.4 33.6 43.5
1972 35.4 30.9 40.5 34.0 28.5 40.4 37.4 34.3 40.6
1973 36.7 32.6 41.0 35.3 29.5 41.9 38.6 37.2 40.0
1974 35.6 30.1 41.4 33.8 28.4 40.1 38.3 32.8 43.2
1975 35.4 28.5 42.3 33.1 27.5 39.3 38.2 29.9 45.7
to
to-o
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Trans­
portation Statistics In The United States: Part 6 , Pipelines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, Annual).
For the years 1957-1963, data was not published separately.
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evaluate the extent of competition in a given industry. The assumption 
has been that the lower the level of concentration, the greater the 
probability that firms in the industry are independent competitors.
The presence of joint ventures in the market if ignored reduces the 
value of traditional concentration m e a s u r e s . T h e  traditional measures 
need not lose their usefulness if the control of joint ventures is con­
sidered and if measures of market share incorporate the ventures.
The question of who controls the joint venture has obvious 
importance to the investing companies. It is also important to non­
owner/shippers and for public policy considerations. Control, as the 
term is used here, means the ability on the part of a participant or a 
subset of participants to direct the management and decisions of the 
venture. From a public policy perspective, the implications of the 
control of joint ventures by a small number of the same petroleum com­
panies IS much different than if the control is randomly distributed 
among many petroleum companies. The same applies to participation 
patterns considered in the next section. Does a small group of com­
panies consistently come together to participate in joint activities?
The control characteristics of the interstate joint ventures 
operating in 1957 and 1975 are shown in Tables 38 and 39. By comparing 
1957 and 1975 an evaluation can be made of the changes resulting from 
entries during 1957-75. Table 38 compares the control of corporate 
joint ventures for the years 1957 and 1975. The determination and class 
of the controlling petroleum companies were derived from their rankings 
as shoim in Chapter VI, Figure 11.
In 1957 the top four companies controlled only six corporate
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TABLE 38
CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE 
JOINT VENTURES, 1957 AND 1975
Total
Ventures
Crude
Ventures
Product
Ventures
Control By^ 1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 197]
Top 4 Petroleum Companies 6 8 3 5 3 3
Top 8 Petroleum Companies 14 22 8 12 6 10
Top 12 Petroleum Companies 18 30 11 18 7 12
Top 20 Petroleum Companies 27 35 15 21 12 14
Others 5 8 3 7 2 1
Total 32 43 18^ 28^ 14 15
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^Control implies that participants as defined can either individ­
ually or collectively (within their classification) vote a majority of 
the shares.
Includes three all-phase companies. 
'Includes two all-phase companies.
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TABLE 39
CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS OF JOINT 
VENTURE SYSTEMS, 1957 AND 1975
Control By'
Total
Systems
Crude
Systems
Product
Systems
1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
Top 4 Petroleum Companies 7 6 3 3 4 3
Top 8 Petroleum Companies 11 19 7 11 4 8
Top 12 Petroleum Companies 12 27 7 16 5 11
Top 20 Petroleum Companies 13 32 7 20 6 12
Others 0 3 0 1 0 2
Total 13 35 7 21^ 6 14
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^Control implies that participants as defined can either individ­
ually or collectively (within their classification) vote a majority of 
the stock.
Includes one all-phase company.
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joint ventures (18,6 percent). In 1975 this group controlled eight 
corporate ventures (still only 18.6 percent). The top eight companies, 
however, controlled 44 percent of the ventures in 1957 and 51 percent of 
the ventures in 1975. Few corporate ventures are controlled by compan­
ies not ranked in the top twenty. In 1957 only five of the 32 ventures 
were controlled by companies outside the top 20. In 1975 only eight of 
the 43 ventures were controlled by the non-top 20. Seven of these were 
crude operations. Product joint ventures have almost entirely been 
controlled by top twenty firms.
Turning to the control characteristics of joint-venture systems, 
a similar pattern is found and is shown in Table 39. In 1957 all joint 
venture systems were controlled by the top 20 petroleum companies and 
in 1975, 32 of the 35 systems were controlled by the top 20 companies. 
The number controlled by top 8 companies declined in percentage terms 
from approximately 85 percent in 1957 to 54 percent in 1975. The con­
trol patterns for both crude systems and product systems are quite 
similar. Both tables indicate an increase in the control of joint 
venture by companies other than the top 20 but this remains a minority 
occurrence.
Participation Patterns
A competitive market structure implicitly assumes that companies 
are separate, independent, and free of influence through inter-corporate 
relationships. The act of participating in a joint venture binds other­
wise independent participants together for the furtherance of the joint 
activity. The effects of joint ventures on a market structure depend in 
part upon the frequency of the joint activities relative to the total
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activity.
The growing number of joint-venture pipelines and their present 
market share implies a large degree of interdependence and cooperation.
The development and operation of these lines have required detailed and 
close cooperative planning. Planning that extends from producing/import 
terminals to refineries and from refineries to consumer markets. Plan­
ning on this scale requires an extensive inter-company flow of informa­
tion on both current and future demands since pipelines are not merely 
designed for current capacity needs.
Interlocking relationships resulting from joint ventures pipe­
lines provide opportunities for collective rather than independent decision 
making, opportunities which extend beyond the individual venture.. The 
issue then is not confined to the circumstances surrounding individual 
ventures but rather upon the implications of the totality of interlock­
ing relationships. John Wilson clarifies this by noting:
It is not necessarily the case that any single one of the 
thousands of joint venture arrangements which constitute so much 
of the petroleum industry in itself undermines workable competi­
tion between the joint venture partners. Nor would it be correct 
to conclude merely from their existence that join,t venture inter­
ties are necessarily collusive arrangements consciously aimed at 
restraining competitive conduct. Rather, it is the totality of 
all of the individual partnerships which constitutes the petroleum 
industry's unique form of structural integration. Regardless of 
the specific motives which may justify any individual combination, 
because of the extensive and widespread nature of mutual inter­
corporate interests it cannot be presumed that the competitive 
result will be the same as if the proprietary and commercial 
interests of each firm were independent of and competitively 
opposed to the self interests of the other market participants.
Whether or not one believes that certain combinations constitute 
collusive restraints of trade, when the entire mosaic is viewed in 
context, the extent to which these interlocks dominate the indus­
try's structure is u n d e n i a b l e . 37
The magnitude of the interdependency and cooperation in pipeline
233
transportation is given empirical significance by evaluating the fre­
quency of interlocking ownership arrangements. This is accomplished by
the use of an expanded version of a matrix methodology developed by 
38
Walter Mead. Using this methodology, the total number of interlocking
ownership arrangements in 1957 and 1975 were derived and are summarized
in Table 40. The interlocks arc distributed by type (corporate, system,
39and intrastate) and by service offered.
The 50 joint ventures operating in 1957 produced 238 ownership 
ties. By 1975 ownership interlocks had increased by 156.8 percent and 
totaled 638. The change in interlocking ownership arrangements was 
approximately double the 84 percent increase in the number of joint- 
venture operations and is the result of a rise in the average number of 
participants per venture.
The majority of the interlocks (over 60 percent) involved 
corporate joint ventures and was the case throughout the period. Crude 
joint ventures involved the largest number of participants in both 
1957 and 1975. In 1975 there were 310 interlocking ownership ties in 
crude joint-venture pipelines. The greatest increase in interlocking 
arrangements, however, resulted from the increase in joint-venture 
product pipelines, primarily corporate pipeline ventures. This narrowed 
the difference in number of interlocks involving crude and product 
transportation.
The number of interlocking ownership arrangements is not parti­
cularly meaningful without knowing the companies involved and the magni­
tude of this involvement. In Tables 41 and 42 the total interlocks are 
distributed among the participating companies as of 1957 and 1975.
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TABLE 40
NUÎ-IBER AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP 
ARRANGEMENTS IN DOMESTIC JOINT VENTURE PIPELINES,
1957 AND 1975
1957 1975 Percent
Change
1957-75
Number Percentage
Distribution
Number Percentage
Distribution
Corporate, Total 145 60.9 397 62.5 173.8
Crude 81 34.0 158 24.9 95.1
Product 64 26.9 239 37.6 273.4
Systems, Total 80 33.6 192 30.2 140.0
Crude 47 19.7 152 23.9 223.4
Product 33 13.9 40 6.3 21.2
Known Intrastate 13 5.5 46 7.3 253.8
Total, Crude
(Interstate) 128 53.8 310 48.8 142.2
Total, Product
(Interstate) 97 40.7 279 43.9 187.6
GRAND TOTAL 238 100.0 635 100.0 166.8
SOURCE: Calculated from data contained in Appendix C.
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Participating petroleum companies are ranked as they were in Figure 11 
with the exception that companies ranked 21-25 are included. Two other 
classes of companies are also included, the first, "all other petroleum 
companies," includes all petroleum companies who participate in joint 
ventures but are not among the top 25. The second, "non-petroleum," 
includes participants whose involvement in the petroleum industry is 
primarily through pipeline transportation.
In 1957 the 238 interlocks did not appear to have produced 
unique patterns.of participation [Table 41]. Of the 25 companies 
shown all but two had at least one tie with another company with 
frequency of the interlocks ranging from zero to 39. Participation by 
companies ranked below 25 or classified as non-petroleum was limited.
Of the 238 interlocks only 52 (21.8%) involved non top 25 companies 
and only three participants were classified as non-petroleum partici­
pants .
A more complex pattern of participation has evolved since 1957 
xd-th the entry of 42 new joint ventures [see Table 42]. Participation 
by companies outside the top 25 increased significantly both in terms 
of other petroleum companies and also non-petroleum companies. In 1975 
these companies accounted for about 26 percent of the total interlocks 
compared to 22 percent in 1957.
The second major change that Table 42 illustrates is the rela­
tively limited participation by companies ranked 19-25. In 1975 they 
had only 23 interlocks with companies larger than themselves (3.6 per­
cent) compared to 29 in 1957 (or 12.2 percent). One explanation is 
that mergers and acquisitions occurring over the period push five
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TABLE 41
TOTAL NUMBER. OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS 
IN THE DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL /VND 
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PIPELINES, 1957
§1 1155 94 5=» ooc
•oO 55
1. STANDARD 
O IL(N J)
2. SOCONY 
MOBIL
3. GULF
4. TEXAS CO.
5. STANDARD 
OIL (IN)
6. SHELL 115
7. STANDARD 
OIL (CA)
8. SINCLAIR
). PHILLIPS
10. CITIES 
SERVICE 22
11. SUN
12.C0NTINENTAL
13. TIDEWATER
14. ATLANTIC 
REFINING
3215. PURE OIL
16. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
17. STANDARD 
OIL (OHIO)
18. SUNRAY 
MID-CONTINENT
19. ASHLAND 
OIL
20. OHIO OIL
21. SKELLY OIL
22. RICHFIELD 
OIL
23. PLYMOUTH 
OIL
24. AMERADA 
PETROLEUM
25. KERR 
MC GEE
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO 49
NON
PETROLEUM
262439 34 2 3 8GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix C. Included inter and intrastate 
joint ventures and both corporate and system forms of ventures.
237
TABLE 42
TOTAL NUÎ'IBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGE^IENTS 
IN THE DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL /JÎD 
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PIPELINES, 1975
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1. EXXON
—
1 *
2. TEXACO 3 3
3. MOBIL 3 7 1 10
4. STANDARD 
O tL(C A ) 3 1 0 \ 4
5. GULF 4 9 3 2 I ! 18
6. STANDARD 
OIL (IN) 4 5 4 2 r 4 ! . J .  i i
I
i i i i i i i 1 !19
7. SHELL 7 10 4 4 7 7 . i i > M M i l ! ! i | 39
8. ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD 2 6 4 3 7 5 7 I i ! 1 3 4
9 CONTINENTAL 3 5 4 1 6 3 4 i 31
10. PHILLIPS 2 6 3 1 3 5 4 6 3 3 3
11. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA 3 9 6 0 8 1 4 6 5 ! 3 1
j-
53
12. SUN 1 3 2 1 4 1 1 3 0 2 1 4 i 1I 22
13. ASHLAND 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 i 1 1 11
14. CITIES
SERVICE 2 13 5 0 7 |  3 5 6 6 5 9 4 0 .| i1 i
1
65
15. AMERADA
HESS 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 j 5
16. GETTY o i l ’ 0 1 2 0 ,0 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 10
17. MARATHON 
OIL 1 7 4 0 3 2 5 3 | 4 1 7 3 1 4 1 0 i 4 6
18. STANDARD, 
OIL (OHIO) 2 5 2 0 6 2 2 2 1 ! 2 7 5 2 3 1 0 1
1
■ 1 43
19. KERR
MC GEE 1 1 1 11 1 ■1 ! j '■ ! 3
20. DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK 1 2 1 ! ! ! 3 |  I 11 I 1 5
21. PENNZOIL i i 1 1 1 1 ! 1 j ! 1 i ' . 0
22. CHARTER
1
1 1 1 1
- ■ ■'
1 1 1 ! ! 5
23. AM ER IC A N ] 
PETROFlN/r 1 1 I ! 1 3 8
24. MURPHYOIL 11 '1 i 1 1 i ! ! ! ! i 1 ' 1 2
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM 1 ! i 1 1 ! 1 1 j 0
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO 5 11 1 9 3 ! 6 8 14 5 8 1 4 i 1 0 ; 9 9 7 i 0 | 7 i 7 1 l 7 0 1 j l 1 3 0 \ \ 136
NON
PETROLEUM 1 ! i 1 4 0 ! 1 1 2 1 2 1 11 I 1 ! 1 1 lo 3 |o 0  i 2 0 3 0 1 0 0 3 \ | 3 0
GRAND TOTAL 4 8 1 0 3  59:171 63; 4 5 !5 7  42132124141 ;26 !14 !16 ; 2 112 1 8
1
| 4 |9 i 0 4 2 i 3 0 |3 |o [635
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix C. Includes inter and intrastate 
ventures, both corporate and systems. Also includes the Trans Alaskan Pipeline 
System which was not (in 1975) in operation.
^Includes Skelly; ^Includes British Petroleum; Includes Canadian Petrofina
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companies into the top 25 in 1975 and these companies have shown a 
smaller propensity to engage in joint activities.
Mergers and acquisitions also resulted in the surviving company 
inheriting the interlocking ownership ties that existed prior to the 
merger. For example, in 1957 Union Oil of California had 11 interlocks 
with larger companies. In 1975 it was interlocked 53 times with larger 
companies and most of the new interlocks were the result of the acquisi­
tion of Pure Oil Company.
Three additional changes occurred over the nearly 20 year 
period. First, the completeness and frequency of the interlocks 
between the larger companies in 1975 is significant. To illustrate this 
consider that for each company in the top 12 to be linked together one 
time requires 66 interlocks (one each in each row and column). In 1957 
this requirement was some 28 interlocks short (i.e. , 28 blanks among 
the top 12). In 1975 the top 12 companies fell short of this require­
ment by only three (the top 8 by only one in 1975 compared to 9 in 
1957).
The second change of note is the much stronger cursory correla­
tion between company size and frequency or interlocks in 1975 compared 
to 1957 (bottom row). kTiile the pattern is not uniform, there is a 
definite tendency for interlocks to vary directly with firm size. The 
major exception to this observation is Standard Oil of California. 
Standard Oil of California has historically had a much smaller asset 
base east of the Rocky Mountains than the other major companies. This 
was especially true prior to the company's acquisition of Standard Oil 
of Kentucky (which operated primarily in PAD I).
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The final change that emerges from Table 42 is the cursory 
correlation between the frequency of interlocks with larger companies 
and the historical patterns of cooperation or ties within the petroleum 
industry. This is illustrated by the higher frequency of interlocks of 
Marathon and Standard Oil of Ohio with companies larger than themselves 
(both were original members of the Standard Oil Trust). This is in 
contrast to the frequency of interlocks for Ashland, Getty, Kerr McGee, 
and Diamond Shamrock.
Participation Patterns: The Top Eight Petroleum Companies
Joint participation by an industry’s dominant firms is more 
important than participation by smaller firms. Collective action by 
small firms may be justified on competitive grounds assuming that the 
resulting combinations continue to have no influence over prices and 
output. Collective action by the dominant firms may not be justified on 
the grounds that they already are in a position to influence prices and 
output.
Because joint ventures among the dominant petroleum firms carry 
a higher probability of producing anti-competitive effects, their 
involvement in joint ventures are examined in greater detail. This is 
accomplished by examining the distribution of pipeline investments, the 
number and type of ventures, and the number of ownership interlocks the 
participation produces.
Distribution of Pipeline Investments
Using ICC valuation dockets filed for the year ending December 
31, 1972, the total market value of pipeline investments of the twenty
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largest petroleum companies were derived and are shovm in Table 43. The 
investment totals represent only interstate investments. They do 
include the prorated interests in corporate joint ventures and are 
standardized by expressing the dollars in terms of cost of reproduction 
less depreciation (market value of the investment).
The market value of the total investment of these twenty com­
panies was slightly more than $3.8 billion in 1972. Of this total 
investment, 45.4 percent was in corporate joint ventures. The remaining 
54.6 percent of.the total investment was made through wholly owned sub­
sidiaries. Investments via wholly o;med subsidiaries do not entirely 
represent wholly owned pipelines since investments in joint-venture 
systems are embodied in these data. The amount of the system invest­
ment can not be directly measured since it is not reported as a separate 
investment.
In Figure 13 the percentage distribution of each company's 
investment dollar between corporate joint ventures, joint-venture 
systems, and wholly owned lines is presented. Care should be exercised
in using this figure since the system percentage share is only an
■ 41approximation.
The data in Table 43 and Figure 13 adds additional support to 
the contention that joint-venture pipelines in 1975 represent as much 
as one-half of the interstate market. Figure 13 also indicates that 
even with the rapid growth in pipeline systems, the twenty companies, 
with only two exceptions, still have a concentration of their invest­
ment in subsidiaries and corporate joint ventures.
Figure 13 does not on the surface indicate any uniformity in
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TABLE 43
TOTAL OTT INVESTMENTS IN INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES, 
HÆNTY PETROLEUM COMPANIES, IN THE UNITED STATES, 1972 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Market Value of Investments
Company Total
2
Subsidiaries
Corporate 
Joint Ventures
Exxon Corporation 455.6 253.9 201.7
Gulf 393.4 152.2 241.2
Texaco 368.9 169.8 199.1
Shell 326.5 163.3 163.2
Standard Oil (IN) 323.1 234.5 88.6
Mobil 307.9 221.2 86.7
Atlantic Richfield 266.4 180.3 86.1
Phillips 181.3 129.9 51.4
Continental 171.9 70.4 101.4
Standard Oil (CA) 171.0 95.4 75.6
Cities Service Co. 153.5 27.4 126.1
Union Oil of CA 144.0 43.6 100.4
Standard Oil (Ohio) 139.6 55.3 84.3
Sun 133.9 75.4 58.5
Marathon Oil 116.9 88.1 29.8
Ashland 68.4 60.2 8.2
Diamond Shamrock 31.6 31.6 ----
Clark Oil & Refining 21.6 ---- 21.6
Amerada-Hess 19.8 19.8 —  —
Getty Oil3 13.1 7.2 5.9
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport Statistics 
in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1972. Pipeline investments 
were assigned to the above companies based on the ownership data shown 
in Appendix B. Joint venture investments were prorated to these compan­
ies based on the percent owned by the participants.
Clarket value of investments (net investment) is defined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for valuation purposes as the cost of 
reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
2
Includes investments in joint-venture systems.
3
Includes the pipeline investments of Skelly Oil Co.
FIGURK 13
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF NET PIPELINE INVESTMENTS, BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION,
TWENTY PETROLEUM COMPANIES,
DECEMBER 31, 1972
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the distribution of pipeline investment. This gives at least superfi­
cial support to the contention that the historical selection of the 
type of investment (i.e., corporate joint venture pipeline, system pipe­
line, or wholly owned pipeline) has been a function of a variety of 
factors— the weighting of each a function of the individual project.
In terms of major recent projects, however, the selection has almost 
always been a joint venture.
While Figure 13 indicates a broad divergence in the investment 
distribution, only Amerada Hess (in 1972) held no joint-venture invest­
ments. On the other extreme, all of Clark Oil and Refining Company's 
interstate investments were in corporate joint ventures. Through its 
participation in corporate joint ventures, Clark also held an interest 
in a crude joint-venture system. The inclusion of the estimate of 
system investments had the greatest impact on Diamond Shamrock and 
Ashland. The system investment by Standard Oil (IN), Mobil, Standard 
Oil (Ohio), and Sun were only 1.1 to 0.8 percent of their total invest­
ment. Only four of the twenty companies, however, had no system 
investments in 1972.
Overall size of parent company did not (in 1972) appear to be 
a major factor in determining the distribution of the investment.
While, a priori, one could reasonably expect an inverse relationship 
between size of parent company and investment in joint ventures, the 
1972 experience does not support this hypothesis.
Number of Ventures with Top Eight Participants:
1957 and 1975
Tables 44-45 indicate that each of the eight companies increased
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their participation over the period. There was also a wide range of 
participation in both 1957 and 1975 (from 1 to 15 in 1957 and from 6 
to 28 in 1975) with no uniformity among companies. This is consistent 
with the distribution of investments, as shown in Figure 13. Texaco 
participated in the largest number of ventures in both 1957 and 1975 
and also joined the largest number of new ventures over the period 
(13). Shell was second in number of ventures participated in (1975) 
and was the second most active joiner.
The top eight companies as a group have participated in more 
corporate ventures (63.6 percent of the interstate ventures participated 
in 1957 and 60 percent in 1975) than systems. In 1957 they participated 
in more crude ventures than product ventures but by 1975 more than half 
of the participation was in product ventures. The eight companies' 
preference for corporate ventures and until recently a preference for 
crude ventures does not appear to be overly significant. I'Jhat is 
significant is that,excluding intrastate activities, the eight compan­
ies have been present in all types of ventures.
The ownership tables in Appendix B indicate that the eight 
companies do participate in joint ventures in which they individually 
or collectively do not control but the lack of control is an exception 
rather than a rule. The top eight companies have with one exception 
participated only in ventures controlled by the top 20 companies. The 
issue of control may be significant in explaining the top eight's 
historical selection of corporate joint-venture participation over 
system participation.
TABLE 44
NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES THE TOP FOUR 
PETROLEUM COMPANIES PARTICIPATED IN, 
1957 AND 1975
Exxon Texaco Mobil Standard (CA)
1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
Joint Venture 
Participation, Total 5 10 15 28 3 12 1 6
Corporate, Total 5 7 8 13 2 9 1 4
Crude 3^ 3^ 3 3 0 3 1 3
Product 2 4 5 10 2 6 0 1
2
Systems, Total 0 2 7 14 1 3 0 2
Crude 0 1^ 4 8 0 2 0 1
Product 0 1 3 6 1 1 0 1
4
Intrastate 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
SOURCE; Compiled from data 
^All three are through its
in Appendix B. 
Canadian subsidiary , Imperial Oil, Ltd.
to
Ul
'Includes one intrastate system. 
^Trans Alaska Pipeline System
Excludes Alaskan non-regulated pipelines.
TABLE 45
NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES THE SECOND 
PETROLEUM COMPANIES PARTICIPATED 
1957 AND 1975
FOUR
IN,
Gulf Standard (IN) Shell ARCO3
1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
Joint Venture
Participation, Total 13 17 5 10 11 23 14 , 19
Corporate, Total 9 10 3 7 6 11 8 11
Crude 6 6 2 3 4 5 5 8
Product 3 4 1 4 2 6 3 3
Systems, Total^ 4 7 2 3 4 9 6 8
Crude 1 3 1 3 3 7 3 4
Product 3 4 1 0 1 2 3 ' 4
2
Intrastate 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
to
cr\
SOURCE: Compiled from Appendix B.
^Includes one intrastate system in 1975.
2
Excludes Alaskan non-regulated pipelines 
^Data for 1957 is for Sinclair.
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Interlocking Ownership Arrangements
In 1957 the eight major oil companies collectively controlled 
55 percent of the known inter-, intrastate joint-venture pipelines. In 
1975 the eight majors collectively controlled 53 percent of the known 
joint ventures. This factor, while significant, understates the influ­
ence and pivotal role played by the companies. This influence is more 
clearly illustrated by examining the interlocking ownership arrangements 
involving these companies.
In Table 46 the interlocking patterns displayed in Tables 41 
and 42 are summarized. In 1957 the eight companies had 163 ownership 
ties with themselves and other companies and of the total interlocks 
only 31.5 percent did not involve a top eight company. Between 1957 and 
1975 the number of interlocks increased by nearly 167 percent. Total 
interlocks involving top eight companies (434) continued to represent 
about the same percentage (68.3) as in 1957.
The interlocking relationships among only the eight majors 
increased from 45 in 1957 to 127 in 1975 (20 percent of the total), a 
182 percent increase. Reflecting the limited joint-venture participa­
tion by and with non-petroleum companies, the eight majors had only two 
interlocks in 1957 and eleven in 1975 with these companies.
Considering the number of petroleum companies operating in the 
United States, their participation in joint ventures without one of the 
eight majors was limited. Only 74 of the 1957 interlocks and 182 of 
the 1975 interlocks involved only smaller petroleum companies. The 
joint venture mechanism offers the greatest potential for non-major 
entry into pipeline transportation. The lack of significant
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TABLE 46
INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AMONG THE TOP EIGHT 
PETROLEUM COMPANIES AND OTHER COMPANIES IN JOINT
VENTURE PIPELINES , 1957 AND 1975
Interlocking 1957 1975 Percent
Ownership % of all % of all Change
Arrangements Number Interlocks Number Interlocks 1957-75
TOP 8 COMPANIES WITH:
Top 8 Companies 45 18.9 127 20.0 182.2
Other Petroleum Co's 116 48.7 290 46.6 155.2
Non-Petroleum Co's 2 0.8 11 1.7 450.0
Sub-Total 163 68.5 434 68.3 166.3
INTERLOCKS WITHOUT 
TOP 8 PARTICIPANTS
Other Petroleum Co's 74 31.1 182 28.7 146.0
Non-Petroleum Co's 1 0.4 19 3.0 1800.0
TOTAL, ALL INTERLOCKS 238 100.0 635 100.0 166.8
SOURCE: Calculated from data in Tables 41-42.
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participation indicates underutilization and also the need for the 
consideration of regulatory review of participation which was 
suggested by Cookenboo in 1955.^^
Interlocks by Type and Product Carried
IVhile there has been rapid growth in total interlocking owner­
ship arrangements (see Table 47-48), the eight majors had a well estab­
lished pattern of interlocks prior to 1957. Since then, the pattern 
has become more complex. Between 1957-75 the number of crude interlocks 
involving the eight majors more than doubled but the percent of total 
declined from 75 to 62 percent. The largest increase in crude inter­
locking ownership, occurred among companies ranked 9th and below.
Crude interlocks involving these companies increased 232 percent during 
the period.
The opposite pattern occurred in product interlocks. Product 
joint ventures increased sharply during the period as did product inter­
locks. Interlocks involving the eight companies experienced the great­
est growth. This growth came primarily from corporate joint ventures 
and not systems. In 1957 the eight majors had only 16 product owner­
ship ties among themselves. In 1975 this had increased to 66 ties 
representing nearly 24 percent of the total product interlocks and 
exceeded the number of crude ownership ties.
In 1957 the eight companies had a total of 65 interlocks with 
other companies (67 percent of the total). By 1975 the number had 
increased to 216 and the percent of total had risen to 77 percent. 
Interlocks with non-petroleum companies were unimportant in both 1957 
and 1975. Of the 30 total 1975 interlocks involving non-petroleum
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TABLE 47
INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AMONG THE TOP EIGHT 
PETROLEUM COMPANIES AND OTHER COMPANIES IN 
CORPORATE JOINT VENTURE PIPELINES,
1957 AND 1975
1957 1975
Ownership
Arrangements Number
% of 
Total Number
% of 
Total
Percent
Change
CRUDE
Top 8 Companies with:
Top 8 Companies 
Other Petroleum Co's 
Non-Petroleum Co's
19
40
1
23.5
49.4
1.2
32
61
3
20.2
38.6
1.9
68.4
52.5 
200.0
Subtotal 60 74.1 96 60.8 60.0
Interlocks without Top 8 
Participant
Other Petroleum Co's 
Non-Petroleum Co's
20
1
24.7
1.2
48
14
30.4
8.9
140.0
Total, All Interlocks 81 100.0 158 100.0 95.1
PRODUCT 
Top 8 Companies with:
Top 8 Companies
All Other Petroleum Co
Non-Petroleum Co's
8
's 32 
0
12.5
50.0
58
117
7
24.3
49.0
2.9
625.0
265.6
Subtotal 40 62.5 182 76.2 355.0
Interlocks without Top 8 
Participants
Other Petroleum Co's 
Non-Petroleum Co's
24
b
37.5 52
5
21.8
2.0
116.7
Total, All Interlocks 64 100.0 239 100.0 273.4
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix C.
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TABLE 48
INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AMONG THE 
TOP EIGHT PETROLEUM COMPANIES AND OTHER 
COMPANIES IN JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE 
SYSTEMS, 1957 AND 1975
Interlocking 1957 1975
Ownership
Arrangements Number
% of 
Total Number
% of 
Total
Percent
Change
CRUDE
Top 8 Companies with:
Top 8 Companies 
Other Petroleum Co's 
Non-Petroleum Go's
10
26
0
21.3
55.3 
0
20
77
13.2
50.7
100.0
196.2
Subtotal 36 76.6 97 63.9 169.4
Interlocks without Top 8 
Participants
Other Petroleum Co's 
Non-Petroleum Go's
11
0
23.4 55
0
36.1 400.0
TOTAL, ALL INTERLOCKS 47 100.0 152 100.0 223.4
PRODUCT
Top 8 Companies with:
Top 8 Companies 
Other Petroleum Co's 
Non-Petroleum Go's
8
17
0
24.2
51.5
8
25
1
20.0
62.5
2.5
N.C.
47.1
Subtotal 25 75.7 34 85.0 36.0
Interlocks without Top 8 
Participants
Other Petroleum Go's 
Non-Petroleum Go's
8
0
24.3 6
0
15.0 -25.0
TOTAL, ALL INTERLOCKS 33 100.0 40 100.0 21.2
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix C.
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companies, more than half involved crude pipelines.
A second development of the period was that the rapid growth 
in product interlocks was primarily confined to corporate joint ventures 
dominated by the eight majors. The opposite pattern emerged when inter­
locks not involving the eight majors are examined. In this case, the 
greatest growth has come from crude system interlocks.
Participation Patterns: A Summary
This section has demonstrated that one result of the development 
of joint ventures is the development of a complex maze of interlocking 
ownership participation patterns. Extensive ownership ties were well 
established in 1957, since that time interlocks have increased 167 per­
cent.
The eight major companies have been and are the dominant influ­
ence. One or more of these companies was represented in 68.3 percent 
of the 1975 interlocking ownership arrangements and are interlocked 
extensively with themselves. Standard Oil of California stands out as 
the one company with few interlocks. This was explained by its concen­
tration (domestic) on the West Coast (PAD V). While the eight companies 
participate with companies ranked 9th or below, they rarely interlock 
with non-petroleum pipeline interests. Either by choice or chance the 
eight majors have a higher percentage of their interlocks resting in 
corporate joint ventures. One of the characteristics of the corporate 
form (as earlier noted) was the limited influence of minority o^mers.
The right hand column of Table 42 illustrated that four compan­
ies are heavily interlocked with larger companies. These are: Union 
Oil, Cities Service, Marathon, and Standard Oil (Ohio). The latter
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three companies are by virtue of a long standing participation in 
joint ventures. The three companies represent 47 percent of the inter­
locks involving the 9th-20th companies. Adding Union Oil raises the 
total to 63 percent. Union Oil's involvement is more the result of the 
acquisition of Pure Oil in the 1960's than its active participation.
Product interlocks experienced the greatest gain from 1957.
This greatly enhanced the ability of the participating companies to 
deal with short-run disequilibrium without resorting to sale or purchase 
or on the spot market. This participation, as Chapter VIII indicates, 
may also increase the propensity to engage in exchanges. The eight 
major companies were central to the growth of product ownership inter­
locks .
International Petroleum Joint Ventures and Domestic 
Pipeline Joint Ventures: A Comparison
Outside the United States, Mexico, and Russia, the operation of 
the 7 international petroleum companies are combined through various 
inner-company holdings and subsidiary and affiliated companies.
These holdings constitute partnerships in various areas of the world. 
Each of the companies has pyramids of subsidiary and affiliated com­
panies in which ownership is shared with one or more of the other 
large companies. Such a maze of joint ownership obviously provides 
opportunity and even necessity for joint action. With decision- 
making thus concentrated in the hand of a small number of persons, a 
common policy may be easily inforced.43
This statement, in referen,ce to the international petroleum industry in
44
1949, also applies to the 1970's.
Tito recent studies evaluated joint-venture activities in the 
international petroleum industry (outside the United States). The 
period of the evaluation, 1957-72, provided an opportunity to compare 
the international ventures with those found in the United States. The 
empirical work focused on production, refining, and crude pipeline
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transportation. The authors did not examine refined product pipe­
lines, other transportation modes, or the refined products market. Ten 
major geographic areas of the world outside of the United States and 
the Communist countries were included in the analysis.
The authors, following a classification system first used in the 
International Petroleum Cartel, divided companies in the international 
industry into the international majors and international minor petro­
leum companies [see Appendix A]. In addition the joint venture partici­
pation of three other groups was examined. These were: local private 
capital, local government, and non-host government companies (minor 
government-owned petroleum companies). Participation by the latter 
three groups have historically been the result of host country require­
ments and the tradition of governments outside the United States to own
46outright or investment directly in petroleum companies.
The joint ventures found to be active in 1972 resulted in 6,419 
direct ownership interlocks between the international majors, minors, 
and the other participants. This was slightly more than 10 times the 
number of domestic U.S. pipeline interlocks found to exist in 1975 
[see Table 49]. The seven international majors had 916 direct otfner- 
ship interlocks among themselves in 1971 compared to the 127 interlocks 
resulting from joint venture pipeline participation of the eight majors 
operating in the United States [see Table 50].
Although the magnitude of the international ownership inter­
locks is much greater, the pattern of participation is similar to those 
found in U.S. domestic pipelines. This is particularly the case now 
that British Petroleum Company is a part of the U.S. market through its
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TABLE 49
JOINT VENTURES OF INTERNATIONAL MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 
WITH INTERNATIONAL MINORS AND OTHER GROUPS
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GRAND TOTAL 8 5 0 530 401 388 263 197 356 2740 697 6419
SO'JUCE: Based upon data in Janes I. Sturgeon, "Joint Ventures in the 
International i’ctroleum Industry: Exploration and Drilling" (unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Oklahoma), pp. 159-150.
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TABLE 50
JOINT VENTURES OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL 
OIL COMPANIES WITH EACH OTHER
1 0 O
EXXON
SHELL 186 186
32TEXACO 45 77
59 46MOBIL 136
GULF 22 23 8014
STANDARD 
OIL (CA) 100 26315
British
Petroleum
33 4 4 22 37 17425
82 91640255 176350TOTAL
SOURCE: James I. Sturgeon, "Joint Ventures in the 
International Petroleum Industry: Exploration and Drilling" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma), p. 166.
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47merger agreement with Standard Oil Company of Ohio. One pattern 
that does differ in comparison with domestic pipeline joint ventures is 
the fact that participation by local private capital, local government, 
non-host government, and others represents 49.8 percent of the total 
international interlocks. This is a much higher total than was found 
in domestic pipelines.
While there was not a strong preference for one form of joint 
venture over another in domestic pipelines, the authors found that the 
major oil companies in the international arena preferred to establish 
joint subsidiaries rather than use contractual arrangements.
The international ventures produced a consistent set of partner­
ships which involved Standard Oil of California and Texaco, Exxon and 
Shell, Shell and British Petroleum, and Exxon and Mobil. These were 
the most prominent partnerships found in the 10 areas of the world out­
side the U.S. and the communist companies.
In 1949 the dominant mode of petroleum transportation was the 
water carrier (primarily ocean tankers). This continues to be the case. 
Pipelines in 1949 were used primarily to move crude to crude-oriented 
refineries or to water terminals. Of the 12 major systems operating
in 1949, only one was owned by a single company; the others were joint 
49ventures. A similar pattern was found to exist in 1972.
In 1972 crude pipelines operating outside the United States 
were found to have several important characteristics.^^ First they 
were not necessarily independent money-making enterprises since they 
were likely to only be one unit in an integrated industrial structure. 
Second, the ownership of the pipeline operations in the 10 areas were
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identical with no major exceptions to the companies which owned the 
producing operations. Although separate, the partners in the producing 
joint ventures were usually the same partners in the pipeline joint 
ventures serving the areas. Third, although the analysis was concen­
trated on pipeline mileage, mileage was not found to be a good represen­
tation of capacity. For example, the Canadian and Central American 
mileage, 10,693 miles, represented 31 percent of the 10 study areas 
mileage but only 6 percent of the crude transported.
The consistent and close relationship between crude oil control 
and crude pipeline mileage control produced similar patterns of concen­
tration. For example, in South America the international majors con­
trolled 76 percent of the crude production and also 76 percent of the 
crude pipeline mileage. In Africa the 7 majors controlled 50 percent 
of production and 48 percent of the pipeline mileage. In Europe they 
controlled 74 percent of the production and 75 percent of the pipeline 
mileage. The fourth characteristic was the lack of common carrier 
status on the part of the international pipelines; the lines were built 
to serve the needs of the shipper/owners.
In 1971 there were 119 crude pipelines operating in the 10
geographic regions. The ownership of 116 was identified. Of the 116,
5273 were joint ventures and 38 were single owner pipelines. This
reliance on joint ventures was somewhat higher than that found in the
United States. Including product pipelines, there were 56 one-owner
pipelines in the U.S., 43 joint venture companies and 35 systems in
1975. The 73 international crude joint ventures had an average of 3.7 
53participants. This compared to the average of 3.9 for U.S. crude
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TABLE 51
NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES AND INTERLOCKING 
OWNERSHIP TIES IN PETROLEUM PIPELINE OPERATIONS, 
SELECTED COMPANIES, AS OF JUNE, 1972
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joint ventures and 5.0 for product ventures.
Tlie 73 international pipeline joint ventures produced 619 inter­
locks between the international majors, the international minors and
other groups. As Table 51 indicates, the 7 majors were interlocked with
themselves 148 times, 142 times with the minors, and 54 times with other 
groups. The 7 international majors had a higher number of pipeline 
interlocks with themselves in the international market than they did in 
the U.S. pipeline market. The percentage distribution of the interlocks 
was similar with one major exception, the 7 majors participated in 55 
percent of the total international crude pipeline interlocks whereas 
in the U.S. the same 7 accounted for 49 percent of the crude pipeline 
total.
The 7 international majors participated in 55 joint ventures 
and controlled 49 percent of these. This was similar to the control 
pattern found in the United States. With the exception of South America, 
the international major oil companies seldom operated in one owner 
systems. This was quite the opposite of the pattern in the U.S.
The Royal Dutch Shell group had more international pipeline
interlocking ties than any of the other 6 . This was not the case in
the U.S. where Texaco had more interlocks than any of the other compan­
ies. The most active minors in international pipeline operations were 
Arco and Phillips. Tenneco and Occidental, on the other extreme, 
participated in no joint ventures during the period. This parallels the 
pattern in the U.S. where Occidental participated in no joint ventures 
and Tenneco was involved in only one venture.
The international minors were found to own and participate in
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smaller pipelines that connected to the major trunk lines. This gave
the majors a larger say in the operation of the minors' pipeline
operation. Governments have long participated in pipeline operations
outside the U.S. They owned 14 lines in 1971. This represented 7,659
54miles and were located primarily in the Middle East.
In summary, international joint venture pipeline operations 
were quite similar to those within the United States. The major differ­
ences were: (1) crude pipelines are less important as a transportation 
mode outside the United States; (2) pipelines are more likely to be 
joint ventures outside the U.S. and the control of these by the inter­
national majors was slightly higher; (3) international pipelines were 
not operated as common carriers in either form or fact but served only 
their shipper/owners; and (5) international pipelines were fully inte­
grated into a larger unit (which in many cases were also joint ventures) 
and were not operated as profit centers.
In summarizing the overall findings concerning international 
joint ventures, the authors concluded that the 7 international majors 
were the primary force in the world’s petroleum industry. They con­
trolled 77 percent of the oil production, 60 percent of the pipeline 
mileage, and 60 percent of the refinery capacity outside of the U.S. 
and communist bloc countries in 1972. The international minors con­
trolled 19 percent of the oil production, 32 percent of the pipeline 
mileage, and 40 percent of the refinery capacity in the 10 areas. 
Collectively the international majors and international minors controlled 
96 percent of the oil production, 92 percent of the pipeline mileage, 
and nearly 100 percent of the refinery capacity in the 10 areas. Much,
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if not most, of the control was through joint ventures.
They found that joint-venture participation required cooperation. 
Cooperation, in turn, demanded planning and a sophisticated communica­
tions network. Joint ventures thus provided a means of achieving a 
most sought-after goal— that of order in organizations. Cooperation, 
planning, and order in organization may, the authors felt, work to the 
benefit of the ultimate consumer. However, it may also work to the
vested interest in pecuniary gain of the select participants in the
• 56industry.
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Investors Service, Inc., 1977), pp. 2882-2883; also see "For Sohio;
It Was Alaskan Oil— or Bust," Fortune, August, 1977, pp. 172-183.
48
Sturgeon, p. 230.
49The International Petroleum Cartel (Reprint), pp. 27-29.
^^Material on pipelines operating outside the United States 
comes from John Munkirs, "Joint Ventures In The International Petroleum 
Industry: Production and Pipelines," Chapter V, pp. 171-209.
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Ibid. Ibid., p. 176. Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 187. ^^Sturgeon, p. 231.
^^Ibid., p. 232.
CHAPTER VIII
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT, PART III: OTHER FORMS OF 
COOPERATION AND INTERDEPENDENCY
Joint ventures are the major form of cooperation within the 
pipeline segment of the industry. The close cooperation needed to plan, 
construct, and operate these pipelines raises important questions con­
cerning the elimination or lessening of competition between the owners 
and also their effect on non-owner companies. By definition, a certain 
amount of competition in transportation is eliminated among joint o^ raers.
Cooperation and interdependency does not end with joint owner­
ship. This chapter considers the other major forms of cooperation.
Three principal forms of cooperation are examined and are found to be 
an outgrowth of joint ventures, the characteristics of pipeline trans­
portation, and ICC regulation.^
Phantom Pipeline Companies
It was initially assumed that pipeline companies reporting to 
the ICC were in fact operating companies, as well as legally separate 
companies. This is not the case. In 1957 of the 80 relevant companies 
reporting to the ICC, 19 were not operating companies (24 percent of the
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total). By 1975 there were 102 relevant companies reporting to the ICC,
2
29 were not operating companies, 28 percent of the total [see Table 52]. 
The term "not operating" means the legal entity reporting to the ICC did 
not operate the pipeline facilities. Thus, the term "Phantom Pipeline 
Companies" was appropriate for nearly 28 percent of the pipeline compan­
ies reporting to the ICC in 1975.
The majority of the nonoperating companies have been corporate 
joint ventures. With a few exceptions, these companies have been oper­
ated by either the majority stockholder or the stockholder with the 
largest individual block of stock. The majority stockholder has histor­
ically been a major petroleum company and with only one exception (in 
1975) the operating agent has been a major's principal pipeline subsid­
iary.
Over time there has evolved three standard means of staffing a 
joint venture pipeline company. The first requires a complete and full­
time staff to operate the pipeline facilities. In 1957, 58 percent of 
the joint venture companies were fully staffed but by 1975 only 42 
percent of the companies were fully staffed. The second form of staff­
ing, the "bare bones" staff, involves two salaried officers but no other
3
personnel and in the third case, no personnel is required. In both 
instances an agent operates the pipeline facilities. The agent normally 
is the largest stockholder and is always a participant in the venture.
Each joint venture company, regardless of its staffing plan has 
a board of directors, a requirement of incorporation. Each board has 
nominal control over tariffs, budgeting, and financing whether the com­
pany operates the pipeline or not.
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TABLE 52
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF PIPELINE 
COMPANIES REPORTING TO THE INTERSTATE. 
COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1957 AND 1975
All Phase Crude Product
Total
1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
Operating Companies 61 73 22 24 19 22 20 27
Non-Operating Companies 19 29^ 2 1 10 15 7 13^
"Shell" Companies^ 6 5 0 0 2 4 4 1
Joint Ventures operated
by others, total^ 13 23 2 1 8 11 3 11
Operated by major
stockholder^ 13 17 2 1 8 11 3 5
Operated by sub­
sidiary of major
petroleum company 13 22 2 1 8 11 3 10
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^"Shell" companies are those companies whose function is to hold 
interest in and report operating data on joint venture systems operated 
by others. In 1957, one of these "Shells” was a corporate joint ven­
ture; in 1975, 2 were corporate joint ventures.
2Company's pipelines are operated by others.
3
Owns at least 50% of stock in instances where there are only 
two participants; for companies with more than two participants, major 
stockholder is one with largest block of voting stock.
4
Includes Calnev Pipeline Company which is operated by Champlin 
Petroleum Company.
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Table 52 contains a group of companies designated as ''shell" 
companies; companies incorporated to hold an interest in a joint venture 
system. The primary reason for incorporation is to comply with ICC 
regulatory and reporting requirements. The ICC requirements can be 
complied with without resorting to the use of a separate corporation but 
as noted the separation limits the jurisdiction of the ICC. Table 53 
lists the five "shell" companies reporting to the ICC in 1975 and 
designates the system, the percentage participation, and the system's 
operating agent. Two of the five "shell" companies are joint venture 
corporations (Paloma and Southcap Pipeline Companies).
With the exception of two of the participants in Paloma and 
Southcap, the "shell" companies owners' involvement in interstate pipe­
line transportation is primarily through participation in systems.
Acorn Pipeline Company, for example, participated (6.9%) in the Rancho 
Pipeline System in 1975. Acorn, a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Charter Company, represents Charter's involvement in interstate opera­
tions. Crown Central Pipeline and Crown Rancho Pipeline Company, wholly 
owned subsidiaries of Crown Central Petroleum Company, represent the 
parent's involvement in interstate pipeline transportation. With the 
exception of Union Oil of California participation in the Southcap Pipe­
line Company, major petroleum companies have not found it necessary in 
recent years to use the "shell" company as a means of reporting system 
operations. The obvious reason for this is that each has at least one 
pipeline subsidiary functioning in the interstate market and this sub­
sidiary holds and reports the system interest.
As previously explained a joint venture system, although it is a
Ill 
TABLE 53
"SHELL” COtffANIES REPORTING TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
COMMISSION, DECEMBER 31, 19751
Reporting
Company
Pipeline System and 
Operating Agent
Percent
Participation
Acorn Pipeline Co. Rancho Pipeline System 
(Shell Pipeline Company)
6.9
Crown Central 
Pipeline Company
Crown-Shell-Baytown Feeder line 
(Shell Pipeline Company)
65.7
Bayou Pipeline System
(leased to Plantation Pipeline Co.)
29.2
East Texas Main Line System 
(Texas Pipeline Co.)
21.2
2
New Hope System 
(Texas Pipeline Company)
50.0
2
Texas-Empire-Tidal 
(Texas Pipeline Company)
20.0
Crown Rancho 
Pipeline Corp.
Rancho Pipeline System 
(Shell Pipeline Company)
6.4
3
Paloma Pipeline Co. Ship Shoal Pipeline System 
(Shell Pipeline Company)
17.5
Whitecap Pipeline System 
(Pure Transportation Company)
13.3
3Southcap Pipeline Co. Capline Pipeline System 
(Shell Pipeline Company)
20.6
SOURCE: Appendix B.
l"Shell" is defined as a company who does not operate a pipeline 
but only reports data for share of pipeline system owned but operated by 
others.
^System operated during the period but current status unknoxm. 
^Company is a joint venture.
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separate physical operation, is a contractual venture and is not reported 
to the ICC as a complete entity. The reporting is accomplished by each 
participant and thus each system has an operating agent. The character­
istics of these agents are displayed in Table 54. As was the case with 
corporate pipeline operations, the system's operating agent is usually 
the major participant and,with one exception, the pipeline subsidiary of 
a major petroleum company.
The 1975 operating agents for 55 pipeline corporations and 
systems are shown in Table 55. The 54 interstate operations involved 27, 
485 miles of pipeline in 1975, 16 percent of the interstate total. As 
Chapter VI pointed out, the all phase pipeline company is the key to the 
major oil company interstate pipeline operation. Table 55 adds a new 
dimension to their role since these pipeline companies are the operating 
agents for 50 of the 54 interstate pipelines. Also significant is that 
in only one instance is a system operated by an "independent" pipeline 
company (Buckeye).
Shell and Texas Pipeline Company were found to be the most 
active operating agents. Each company operated nine pipelines, in 
addition to their wholly owned networks. Arco and Continental Pipeline 
companies were the next most active operating agents. In total there 
were 22 companies operating the 55 pipelines, one of which was a short 
intrastate system operating in California (the Venture System).
The operation of both corporate and sytem joint ventures by a 
participation is a logical extension of the economies of scale argument 
used to justify the creation of joint ventures. The use of the agent 
eliminates the need for separate staffing and spreads an existing
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TABLE 54
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF JOINT 
VENTURE PIPELINE SYSTEMS,a 
1957 AND 1975
Total
Systems
All Phase 
Systems
Crude
Systems
Product
Systems
Operating Agent 1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
Major Participant^ 11 27 0 1 7 17 4 9
Minor Participant 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 3
Pipeline Subsidiary 
of Major Petroleum 
Company 11 30 0 1 7 18 4 11
Others^ 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1
Joint Venture 
Systems, Total 13 35 0 1 7 20^ 6^ 14^
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^All pipeline systems have operating agents.
^Major stockholder as defined in Table 52.
^Trans Alaska Pipeline System will be operated by Alyeska Pipe­
line Service Company; Bayou System is leased to a non-owner company. 
Plantation Pipeline Company.
^Includes two systems which may be inactive, one of which does 
not indicate the operating agent.
^Operating agents for two systems are unknown.
Four companies are either inactive or intrastate; operating 
agent for one system is unknown.
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TABLE 55
COMPANIES REPORTING TO THE INTERSTATE COIC-IERCE 
CO^IMISSION WHICH OPERATED OTHER COMPANIES 
AND SYSTEMS, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1975
Operating Agent and 
Company/System Operated
Type oEj 
Service Mileage
SHELL PIPELINE CO.
Butte Pipeline Co.
Four Corners Pipeline Co. 
Wolverine Pipeline Co. 
Capline System 
Capwood System 
Crown-Shell Baytown System 
Ozark System 
Rancho System 
Ship Shoal System
C
C,G
P
C
C
P
C
C
C
373
910
569
650
57
14
441
460
107
TEXAS PIPELINE CO.
Kaw Pipeline Co.
Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. 
Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Co. 
Basin System
East Texas Main Line System 
New Hope System^
Port Arthur Products System 
Texas-Empire-Tidal System^ 
Evangeline System^
G
C,P,G
C.G
C
C
P
P
C
P
1,410
1,904
4,200
517
117
42
64
196
ARCO PIPELINE CO.
Blacklakes Pipeline Co.
Tecumseh Pipeline Co.
Cushing-Chicago System
Casa Products System
Groves To Nederland, TX System^
C
c
c
p
p
255
206
711
249
23
CONTINENTAL PIPELINE CO. 
Lake Charles Pipeline Co. 
Pioneer Pipeline Co. 
Yellowstone Pipeline Co. 
Cherokee System
P
P
P
C,P,G
12
303
749
2,358
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TABLE 55 CONTINUED
Operating Agent and 
Company/System Operated
Type of 
Service^ Mileage
SOHIO PIPELINE CO.
Harbor Products System 
Neale System 
Paline System
MARATHON PIPELINE CO.
Platte Pipeline Co.
East Cameron Block 321 System 
Wood River-Patoka System
GULF REFINING
Laurel Pipeline Co.
West Texas Gulf Pipeline Co.
Mesa System
PURE TRANSPORTATION CO.
Arapahoe Pipeline Co.
Chicap Pipeline Co.
White Cap System
AMOCO PIPELINE CO. ^
West Shores Pipeline Co.
Wyco Pipeline Co.
EXXON^
Dixie Pipeline Co.
Jay Pipeline System
BUCKEYE PIPELINE CO.
L & L System
CHEVRON PIPELINE CO.
El Paso-Warfield Products System
CITIES SERVICE PIPELINE CO.
Badger Pipeline Co.
DOME PIPELINE CORP.
Sarnia System
KOCK OIL CO.
Chase Transportation Co.
P
C,G
C
C
C
C
P
C
C
C,G
C
C
P
P
LPG
P
C,P
81
120
190
1,258
32
55
451
582
80
1,416
235
44
326
731
1,298
9
96
255
331
13
478
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TABLE 55 CONTINUED
Operating Agent and 
Company/System Operated
Type of 
Service
2
Mileage
MOBIL PIPELINE CO. 
Olympic Pipeline Co. P 391
PHILLIPS PIPELINE CO. 
Borger Denver System P 319
PLANTATION PIPELINE CO, 
Bayou Pipeline System P 256
SHAMROCK PIPELINE CO. 
Saal Product System P 181
SUN PIPELINE CO.
Mid-Valley Pipeline Corp. C 1,004
UNION OIL OF CALIFORNIA 
Venture Pipeline System 
(Intrastate system)
C 17
WEST EMERALD PIPELINE CO. 
ATA Products System P 296
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
^C = crude trunk lines, G = gathering lines, P = 
lines, LPG = liquefied petroleum gases.
product trunk
2
Company mileage as of December 31, 1974, system mileage as of
December 31, 1975.
3
System may no longer be in operation.
4
May be operated by another Standard Oil of Indiana subsidiary 
(American Oil, Inc.)
^Sources only indicated Exxon, agent could be pipeline subsidiary 
or Exxon, USA Division.
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overhead to larger outputs. Along with the possible increase in the 
efficiency of the operations has come an increase in the influence of 
the largest stockholder or participant since they are, with a few excep­
tions, the operating agent and a major petroleum company.
Physical Connections Between Pipeline Companies And Systems 
Little attention has been given to the fact that legally separ­
ate pipelines and pipeline companies are not necessarily physically 
separate. Some authors have been quick to point out that a pipeline
running from Texas to Chicago, for example, does not compete with one
4
running from Texas to New Jersey. A more likely scenario is that one
company has a line running part way which in turn is connected to two
other companies which run to Chicago and New Jersey. Although a
hypothetical example, it does illustrate that petroleum pipelines in
the United States are more often physically tied together than separate.
The physical tie is accomplished at terminal points where one pipeline
terminates on one side of a storage tank and the other begins on the
other side of the tank. Regardless of how is has occurred, pipelines
both intra- and interstate have coalesced into a semi-national network.
The network is not national since the West Coast of the United States
has historically operated as a separate part of the domestic petroleum 
5
industry.
The interconnecting of trunk lines has increased petroleum trans­
portation’s capacity and efficiency. It has also served to increase 
the interdependency and, in some cases, dependency of pipeline companies 
and systems. A crude oil pipeline company with upstream connections
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with a partially or wholly owned gathering network and downstream termi­
nals at several refineries is more independent than a pipeline company 
that offers a connecting service without major connections to either 
producing areas or refineries. The same thing is encountered by product 
pipeline companies linked to only one refinery and a small consumer 
market or only connects to another line without having a refinery/ 
consumer market link. Although these examples are extremes, they do 
illustrate that as pipelines continue to coalesce, companies can find 
themselves in a position where they are only a small part of a larger 
network.^
The flexibility and efficiency resulting from physical ties 
between pipeline companies is illustrated by three actual cases:
1. Portal Pipeline Company - This company (a joint venture) 
operated a total of 763 miles of crude gathering and trunk lines in 
1975. It connects to the Minnesota Pipeline Company which operates 364 
miles of crude trunk lines. Minnesota in turn has connections with the 
Lakehead Pipeline Company. Lakehead operates over 2,500 miles of crude 
trunk lines. Thus, via connections and joint tariffs, crude oil 
gathered and shipped on the Portal lines could be transported at least 
four times the total length of the Portal lines?;
2. Texoma Pipeline Company - This company (a joint venture) is 
an example of the PAD XT's response to declining crude production within 
the PAD. Texoma’s crude trunk lines originate at the Gulf Coast and 
run to Cushing, Oklahoma. Cushing has developed into a major inter­
section of many pipelines. Through its terminals at Cushing, Texoma has 
the potential to reach nearly every refinery center in the Mid-Continent
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and Upper Midwest area ; and
3. Colonial Pipeline Company - This company (a joint venture),
the largest pipeline operating in the United States, connects major
refineries in PAD III with the major consumer markets in PAD I. To a
large degree, it parallels the older and somewhat smaller Plantation
Pipeline Company which serves a similar market area. In 1970, it was
reported that through interconnections the two operated in tandem and
thus refined products could reach all terminal facilities on both lines.
Plantation, in turn, leases an older system (Evangeline) which along
with Plantation connects to the same refining areas in PAD III, as does 
9
Colonial.
The ICC publishes data on the movement of petroleum in such a
manner that the linkage and associated degree of interdependency can be
empirically examined. The ICC publishes, by company, data on barrel
input and output subdivided by source. Input is divided into barrels
received from connecting ICC carriers and barrels originating on company
lines. Output is divided into barrels terminated on company lines and
barrels delivered to connecting ICC carriers. The data is limited in
that input and output to intrastate lines are incorporated in varying
10degrees as originating and terminating on the ICC carrier lines.
Aggregate data for all companies reporting to the ICC indicates 
that crude pipelines have a higher degree of interconnects than do 
product pipelines. In 1975, 39 percent of the interstate crude input 
came from connecting ICC carriers. This compared to only 14 percent 
for refined products. Since one company's input from connecting carriers 
are another company's (or companies') output, the aggregate percentage of
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of output delivered to connecting carriers should be by definition equal 
the aggregate input percentage (allowing for transfer from storage 
facilities and minor in-transit/storage facilities losses).
The average percentage of crude received from connecting 
carriers during 1957-75 was 35.8 percent while the average percentage 
delivered to connecting carriers was 35.3 percent. The average percen­
tage of refined products received from connecting carriers during 1957- 
75 was 15 percent but the average percentage delivered to carriers was 
a much higher 19.6 percent. The 4.6 percent difference is too high to 
be explained by transfer from storage and losses. The discrepancy may 
be a difference in interpretation of the reporting form but regardless 
of the reason, the output percentage indicates a higher degree of prod­
uct interconnects.
As has been the case with other facets of pipeline operations, 
interconnects were well established by 1957. Somewhat surprising, 
however, is the small decline in percentage of crude oil received and 
delivered to connecting carriers from 40 percent in 1957 to a low of 
32 percent in 1967. Since that time, the percentage has risen to 
nearly the 1957 level. A similar pattern is noted for refined product 
interconnects but only on the input side. In 1957 nearly 20 percent 
of input came from connecting product carriers, compared to 13.8 
percent in 1975. On the output side, the percentage has been very 
stable after 1958 at 19 to 20 percent.
The degree to which a company is physically tied to another 
company or companies would intuitively affect that company's decision 
making process. A completely independent pipeline company in physical
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terms would be one where 100 percent originated on its own lines and 
100 percent was terminated on its own lines. The completely dependent 
company would be one where 100 percent was received from connecting 
carriers. Between these two extremes would be varying degrees of 
interdependency and one would not expec t to find companies operating 
in the interstate market that were completely dependent upon other pipe­
lines .
In Table 56 pipeline companies are distributed by degree of 
interdependency for the years 1957 and 1975 and confirms that the inter­
dependency in 1975 was less than it was in 1957. The data also indi­
cates that the majority of companies are relatively independent (more 
than 51 percent originates on their lines). The greatest degree of 
independence is found in the refined product pipelines, especially those 
of all phase companies. There is currently little difference on the 
other end of the scale where the crude lines by type of companies are 
about the same.
Of greater interest is the question of physical ties between 
groups of companies. For example, do major petroleum companies' pipe­
lines have greater interconnects than other companies? Are the indepen­
dent pipeline operations more dependent than other pipeline companies? 
Table 57 addresses these issues by comparing averages for 1957-75. The 
standard deviations for these averages are also presented to measure 
their stability.
From the crude input side, the top eight companies were found 
to be the least dependent companies with an average of 74 percent of 
the input originating on their own networks. This degree of independence
DISTRIBUTION OF 
ORIGINATING AND
TABLE 55
PIPELINE COMPANIES BY PERCENT 
TERMINATING ON COMPANY LINES, 
1957 AND 1975
Type of 25% or Less 26 - 50% 51 - 75% 76 - 100% Average Percentage
Company Originating Terminating 0 T O  T O  T Originated Terminated
All Phase, Crude 
1957 5 3 4 3 7 8 8 10 62 67
1975 4 1 6 3 5 10 12 13 61 67
Crude Companies
1957 12 18 3 1 5 0 8 9 54 37
1975 10 13 3 4 2 1 18 15 63 53
Total Crude
1957 17 21 7 4 12 8 16 19 60 60
1975 14 14 9 7 7 11 30 28 61 63
All Phase, Product
1957 3 3 0 2 0 3 19 14 89 77
1975 1 4 0 2 3 8 22 12 89 73
Product Companies
1957 2 3 1 1 3 2 18 18 69 91
1975 5 4 3 1 4 5 25 27 83 86
Total Product
1957 5 6 1 3 3 5 37 32 80 83
1975 6 8 3 3 7 13 47 39 86 81
N)
00
LO
SOURCE: Compiled from data published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Transport 
Statistics in the United States: Part 6 , Pipelines. 1957 and 1975.
TABLE 57
AVERAGE PERCENT ORIGINATING AND TERMINATING ON COMPANY LINES,
BY CLASS OF COMPANY, 1957-75
Crude Oil
■
Refined Products
OriginatinR Terminating Originating Terminating
Class of 
Company Mean (x)
Standard 
Deviation (S.D.) X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
All 64 2.8 64 2.5 84 2.8 80 1.1
Top 4^ 74 2.3 69 2.3 85 5.7 76 4.2
Top 8^ 74 2.5 71 2.2 85 5.2 78 3.5
Top 20^ 66 2.6 63 2.2 86 4.0 78 2.4
Unaffiliated Pipeline 
Co ' 8 43 40.6 61 19.9 87 6.3 77 7.8
Subsidiaries of 
Non-Petroleum Co's 12 6.7 73 26.0 80 8.1 94 3.1
All Independents^ 47 15.2 74 5.9 78 3.6 88 4.0
Joint Ventures 61 4.9 49 4.4 79 8.0 87 2.8
All Phase 64 1.9 70 2.1 89 1.1 72 2.5
Crude 65 5.5 48 5.9 - — — -
Product — - — -- 79 5.8 88 1.8
lo
CO
4N
TABLE 57 CONTINUED
SOURCE: Compiled from data published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Transport 
Statistics in The United States: Part 6 , Pipelines, 1957 and 1975.
^Companies are ranked as shown in Figure 11, p.184 ; all pipeline holdings (including prorated 
joint venture holdings) are included.
All pipeline operations of all companies not ranked within the top 20 petroleum companies (also 
includes their prorated joint venture interests).
w
00
Ln
286
was consistent throughout 1957-75 (with a standard deviation of only 2.5 
percent). The input control exercised by the eight companies was con­
siderably higher than that of major petroleum companies ranked 9-20. 
"Independents," all pipeline activities of non-major companies, were 
very dependent upon other carriers for their input, averaging .53 per­
cent of the total throughout the 19 years. The dependency was not, 
however, stable year-in year-out as the standard deviation was 15.2 
percent. T\fo classes of companies, the subsidiaries of non-petroleum 
companies and the unaffiliated pipeline companies, were in a more 
precarious position in terms of input control. To a large extent these 
companies were little more than connecting carriers and were dependent 
upon having throughput contracts with large shippers.
On the crude output side, the variation in means were not 
nearly so great across classes of companies. The most significant 
difference shora in Table 57 was the much lower average for crude joint 
ventures and crude companies in general. In each of these cases, 
slightly more than one half the volume was delivered to a connecting 
carrier. The top eight companies had a slightly higher average of 
crude terminated on their lines than companies ranked 9-20; they did, 
however, deliver more to connecting carriers than they received (an 
average of 29 percent compared to 26 percent on the input side). The 
terminating percentages for the majors varied very little over the 
years suggesting little change in prevailing patterns of the 1950's.
The refined product side of Table 57 does not show the contrasts 
that the crude side did. While the "independent" operations had a 
lower degree of independence, the mean of 78 percent originating on their
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lines was high enough to render the differences insignificant. In addi­
tion the independents terminated on their lines by far the largest 
amount of output compared to any of the others. The top 4, 8 , and 20
companies had their relatively largest interconnects on the refined
products output side. This seems consistent with the increase in the 
majors' participation in refined product joint ventures.
The Phantom Pipeline: The Exchange Agreement
A form of cooperation has emerged in the petroleum industry
that has a definite transportation and pricing function. The exchange
of petroleum products, both crude oil and refined products, by two or
12more companies is now a standard industry practice.
Exchanges are a form of barter that eliminates cash purchases
and sales. In its simplest form, a two company trade, a company trades
crude or product at one location in return for an equal volume of crude
or product at another location. The terms of the trade can have many
variations, the simplest involves an equal trade in terms of the dollar
value, kind, and grade of petroleum product being traded. Other
exchanges may include a "place differential" where the differential is
a function of the supply and demand conditions in each locale and the
relative transportation costs. Exchanges may also include a grade or
kind differential which compensates for relative market value differ- 
13ences. More complicated exchanges involving more than two companies
do occur, one of which is illustrated below.
The exchange serves a definite transportation role and the
14mechanism has been labeled the "phantom pipeline" by one source. 
Exchanges, as a transportation technique, have historically been linked
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to the ownership of pipelines. Two encamp les illustrate this: (1) A two- 
company exchange occurs when Company A {crude oil/product 1 is more suit­
able for Company B's Irefinery/pipeline/market} and where B's {crude oil/ 
product) is more suitable for A's {refinery/pipeline/market}.(2) A 
three-company exchange example: "A's production in West Texas delivered
to gatherer B; B's production in Montana delivered to C; and C, in turn, 
will deliver equivalent oil to A at some other point.
The motivation for engaging in exchange activities, however, has 
not been merely to minimize transportation costs but rather to minimize 
short-term fluctuations in the price of (crude oil/products}.^^ As indi­
cated earlier in this paper, short-run disequilibrium in both the crude 
oil and refined products markets can quickly impact prevailing prices. 
Exchanges are thus aimed at minimizing or eliminating "spot" shortages 
or surplus and thus have become an integral part of vertical integration
in much the same fashion as have pipelines, particularly joint venture
. T . 19pipelines.
Exchanges have played a central role in dealing with what the 
industry calls "distressed cargoes." In the pre-World War II era, 
companies would purchase "distressed cargoes" to avoid "violent fluc­
tuations" in prices. The concern over these cargoes was described by 
McLean and Haigh:
A large company could occasionally absorb these cargoes in its 
o ™  operations and market them over a period of time in an orderly 
manner. If, however, these distress cargoes passed into the hands 
of cut-price jobbers, price wars were sometimes precipitated all 
along the line to the retail level.20
This potential impact on prices led one author to conclude that the
crude oil exchanges were transactions whose "principal common
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denominators are reciprocity in pipeline use and insulation of the oil
transported against competitive pricing." He added that "The functioning
structure of the business of gathering and purchase of crude oil, by
virtue of these extensive contracts [exchanges] makes each pipeline a
21
gathering arm of all integrated refiners who have pipelines."
The reasons cited by various authors for what now is a prevail­
ing industry practice of engaging in both product and crude exchanges 
is strikingly similar to those put for owning pipelines. For example:
(1) balancing production, refining and marketing activities; (2) 
getting products to markets which could not be reached on a competitive 
basis from its own refineries; (3) developing a new market; (4) 
reducing costs of moving product to refinery and market; and (5) shut­
ting down inefficient refineries via the use of exchanges until other
22
arrangements were made. In addition the development between 1957-75 
of joint venture refined product pipelines has allowed companies to 
establish pipeline connections between major refineries enabling them 
to shift products from one refinery area to another to stabilize 
conditions where supplies exceed demand or supplies fall below demand.
This facilitated the ease of systematically engaging in refined prod-
. 23uct exchanges.
The question of how pervasive exchanges are within the industry 
remains largely unanswered because of the lack of data. There are 
indications that on the refinery input side of the exchange business, 
exchanges have tied up a considerable share of refiners' crude oil
24
supply in complicated and longer term agreements not easily altered.
On the output side, information on 41 refiners for the year 1974
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indicated that exchanges represented 38% of average daily runs (4.8
million b/d). Exchanges of the 20 majors represented 85% of the 1974
total but is not particularly significant on a one year basis and with-
25
out kno^fing who exchanges with whom. The existence of these exchanges 
and their volume suggests, however, that they achieve in a more flexible 
way the same results joint venture refineries would. This then explains 
perhaps why joint venture refineries are not used in the U.S. to the 
extent they are in the international industry.
Exchange agreements are considered to have anticompetitive 
consequences. These consequences depend upon who barters with whom and 
more importantly if exchanges are used to stabilize implicit cartel 
arrangements among the majors. If the majors only barter among them­
selves, then the independent and small company is cut off from much of 
the barter market; and would therefore have a more difficult time 
competing at the prevailing price. The use of exchanges under a cartel 
arrangement would be aimed at guaranteeing "fair" market shares, stabil­
izing the shares, and preventing price cutting, i.e., cheating on the 
implicit arrangements. Finally, the question arises as to why exchange 
agreements are preferred to allocation {crude oil/refined products} 
rather than reliance on selling for monies and using the pricing 
mechanism to allocate.
The potential anticompetitive effects of exchanges are matters 
for empirical study, study that faces significant constraints in 
obtaining meaningful data. The analysis would require data on where, 
when, and with whom exchanges take place over a long period. Data 
would also be required on where, when, and for whom is outside {crude
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oil/products} carried on shipper aimed pipelines. The latter research 
would help establish the reciprocity between pipelines and exchanges.
Cooperation in the Pipeline Segment of the 
Petroleum Industry: A Summary
This chapter and the preceding one has demonstrated the extent 
of the cooperation found in pipeline transportation. This cooperation 
extends beyond pipelines into other segments of the industry both 
domestically and internationally. Pipelines in the United States are a 
pivotal link in this cooperation and interdependency.
The cooperation via joint venture pipelines, exchange agreements, 
physical interconnects, and the operation of pipelines by existing 
staffs certainly seems to have increased the efficiency of the industry. 
This cooperation has had the effect of reducing the physical segmenta­
tion of the petroleum industry’s markets. For many companies coopera­
tion has greatly extended their refining and marketing horizons.
The participants in this cooperation are dominated by 8 to 12 
majors and the lack of involvement below that level is significant. The 
evolution of this involvement is such that the benefits of cooperation 
seem inherently limited to these companies and thus violates a justifi­
cation of joint activity, i.e., that the outcomes accrue indiscriminately 
to all firms in the industry. Certainly the empirical analysis supports 
the discrimination premise.
The justifications offered for engaging in joint activities are 
not convincing in light of the financial resources and size of the 
participants and the existence of common carrier provisions. In reality 
the reasons given for joint activity appear to be to a large extent
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after-the-fact justifications of practices that are both a reflection 
of an evolution of cooperation found in the Old Standard Oil "Trust" 
and within the international industry and also a rejection among the 
majors of common carrier status that extend beyond form.
The pervasiveness of the demonstrated cooperation does little 
to support the competitiveness of the industry. While the foundations 
of oligopoly are essentially based upon the interdependency resulting 
from game theory— responses to independent actions— interdependency in 
pipelines goes considerably beyond this. In Chapter IX this cooperation 
is examined by analyzing the final element in the structure of pipelines 
and that is the level of concentration and control.
CHAPTER VIII
^The forms of cooperation discussed in this chapter, while major 
ones, nevertheless do not exhaust the list. Other forms found in the 
research for this paper include cooperation with parent companies, 
joint venture terminal facilities, leasing of pipelines, and the inter­
change of corporate personnel. The cooperation between parent and 
subsidiary in and of itself is normal except for the factor that the 
major's pipeline subsidiary, as a section of this chapter indicates, 
operates joint venture pipelines for other companies. This practice 
establishes a direct albeit minor link between companies, a practice 
normally prohibited by antitrust law.
2
The companies excluded from this analysis are those described 
in the footnotes of Table 30, p. 188.
3
J. K. Spangler, "Corporate Structure and Financing Oil Pipe­
lines," July 8, 1970 (mimeographed).
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Market Performance and Competition in 
the Petroleum Industry, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on 
Integrated Oil Operations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), Part V, Statement of 
Professor Stewart C. Myers, pp. 1634-1635.
^As has been noted, PAD V has historically been an independent 
petroleum market; for additional comments see U.S., Federal Trade 
Commission, Bureau of Competition and Bureau of Economics, Report to 
The Federal Trade Commission on The Structure, Conduct and Performance 
of The Western States Petroleum Industry (Washington, B.C.: Federal 
Trade Commission, September, 1975).
^A good illustration of this is found in the relationship 
between the newer pipeline. Explorer to that of Williams Pipeline 
Company (see U.S., House, Anticompetitive Impact of Oil Company Owner­
ship of Petroleum Product Pipelines, pp. 6-31, 112-125, A55-57; also 
see Brief of Complainants, MidContinent Petroleum Shippers, before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in the matter of American Petrofina 
Company of Texas, et al. v. Williams Brothers Pipe Line Company, et al. 
(I.C.C. Docket No. 35720), July 27, 1973).
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^Pine Line News, November, 1962.
O
Tulsa World, December 5, 1976, p. G6 .
9
Anticompetitive Impact . . ., pp. A75-84; also see Pipe Line 
News, July, 1970, p. 27.
^^The Intrastate market is relatively insignificant, see Supra, 
pp. 125-143.
^^In comparing classes of companies one would not expect the 
percentage originating on these lines to equal the percentage terminat­
ing as it should for all companies in the interstate market.
12
U.S., Department of Justice, Fourth Report of the Attorney 
General Pursuant to Section 2 of the Joint Resolution of July 28, 1955, 
Consenting to an Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 46; also see U.S., Federal 
Energy Administration, National Information Center, Petroleum Market 
Shares (Washington, B.C.: Federal Energy Administration, December, 1976), 
p. 34.
f 13' McLean and Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies,
p. 426.
14Federal Energy Administration, Petroleum Market Shares, p. 34.
^^Federal Trade Commission, Report . . .  of The Western States 
Petroleum Industry, p. 57.
^^Department of Justice, Fourth Report of The Attorney General,
p. 46.
^^The authors of Petroleum Market Shares were one of few to 
cite transportation costs as the main reason for engaging in exchanges 
(p. 34); neither the Justice Department (Fourth Report . . ., pp. 46-47), 
the FTC (Report . . .  of The Western States Petroleum Industry, 
pp. 57-58) or McLean and Haigh (pp. 425-439) singled out transportation 
as the main reason for exchanges.
1 Q
See Supra, pp. 154-165; also see McLean and Haigh, pp. 425-439.
19Petroleum Market Shares, p. 34.
20
McLean and Haigh, p. 430.
21Fourth Report . . ., pp. 46-47.
22McLean and Haigh, pp. 425-439; at the time of the McLean and 
Haigh analysis, companies viewed exchanges as a temporary tool and hoped 
to reduce their use. The reason was the fear of legal criticism on the
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grounds that they involved misrepresentation of products (Ibid., p. 437),
23
Anticompetitive Impacts . . . , pp. 129-135 and A93; crude 
exchanges were considered to be most extensively used on the West Coast 
of the United States. The reason for the above normal usage was to 
avoid the loss of the intrastate status of their West Coast pipelines 
(see Report . . .  of The Western States Petroleum Industry, pp. 42-45 
and footnote p. 57).
24
Fourth Report . . ., p. 47.
25
Petroleum Market Shares, p . 35.
^^Market Performance and Competition in the Petroleum Industry, 
Part III, statement of Professor Stephen Breyer, pp. 442-447.
CHAPTER IX
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT, PART IV: CONCENTRATION TRENDS
Interest in concentration ratios, i.e., the share of market 
accounted for by the 4, 8 , and 20 largest companies, has been a central 
part of the structure/conduct/performance analytical schema. The tradi­
tional approach has depended heavily upon the hypothesis that the greater 
the concentration/control the greater the probability of excess/monopoly 
profits and therefore the less optimal the allocation of scarce resources.
This chapter examines concentration in the pipeline segment of 
the domestic petroleum industry. The present interest in pipeline con­
centration, however, is not strictly a traditional one since the concern 
is over the control of pipeline transportation by major petroleum com­
panies. There are several reasons why the traditional analysis is not 
strictly applicable. First, as Chapter V revealed, pipelines have 
natural monopoly characteristics which means the competitive model is 
inconsistent with efficiency arguments. Clearly the fewer the firms, 
the lower the respective costs of providing transportation services. 
Related to this is the presence of "regulation” and the existence of 
"administered prices" at least in the short-run. This factor is compli­
cated by the presence of shipper/owners where buyers and sellers are the
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same. Market shares held by unaffiliated/non-petroleum companies are 
quite different than those held by petroleum affiliated pipelines.
The impact of concentration in pipelines is thus not necessar­
ily related to pipeline performance per se but rather to performance in
the other segments of the industry. In other words, do the "taajors" 
have substantial power which impedes the functioning of the other stages 
of the industry, i.e., where does the sale of crude oil take place, what 
does this do to entry barriers to refining, and to the barriers to 
expanding into potential end use markets?
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in a quantitative
fashion the control of pipelines by the major companies, as defined in
Chapter VI. In examining the majors' position in this segment of the 
industry it should be reemphasized that 1957-75 produced a major shift 
towards dependency on imports of both crude oil and refined products 
and also an export of relative refinery capacity. These factors are 
often ignored in the analysis of concentration in the domestic petroleum 
industry. Given that the majors are for the most part multinational 
corporations their foreign operations cannot be ignored. This is 
especially the case since their domestic pipeline activities are related 
to overall corporate policies, policies which require the balancing of 
crude and product imports from foreign subsidiaries with the domestic 
production and refining along with the minimizing of the cost of serving 
domestic geographic markets.
This chapter examines concentration in terms of: (1) the 
national market: (2) the impact of joint ventures on market share 
measures; (3) the relevant markets in terms of measures used and 
geographic markets; and (4) a brief examination of the entry/exit of
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companies. Unless otherwise noted, aggregate concentration ratios 
(4, 8 , and so forth) are derived,based upon the size of the parent 
petroleum company and not the size of the pipeline company or interest.
Concentration Trends at the National Level 
There is an inclination to argue that aggregate national 
measures are not particularly good indicators of market concentration. 
While the section on regional concentration gives credence to this argu­
ment, the quantity and quality of the national data is such that it 
does provide an indication of the relative involvement of the majors in 
pipeline ownership and control. In addition as has been noted, the 
interstate data is essentially PAD I-IV data with little influence from 
PAD V where nearly all the market is intrastate.
In Figure 14, the national market shares for originating crude 
and products of the 4, 8 , and 20 majors are shown along with three 
other classes of companies. These shares are averages for 1957-75.
The figure illustrates that the majors have relatively greater control 
over the crude market with the top 4 controlling an average of 41 
percent and the top 8 controlling 67 percent. In the crude market, 
companies outside the top 20 have been insignificant especially the 
non-petroleum affiliated pipelines. The opposite is true for products 
where nearly 24 percent of the long-term share has been held by non- 
20 companies. An examination of annual shares indicates that there has 
been an erosion in the major's share of both markets, especially for 
the top 4 companies. The decline has been less in the products market.
Concentration measures are sensitive to the beginning and ending
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FIGURE 14
LONG-RUN CONCENTRATION RATIOS, FOR CRUDE AND REFINED 
PRODUCTS ORIGINATING ON COMPANY LINES,
MAJOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES AND OTHERS,
I957-I975I
Unaffil-
iated
Companies
Subsidi­
aries
Non-petro
All
Others
Top
20
TopTop
100.0%
90
60
50
40
20
10
1441 30 67 91Mean
13NC
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Transportation Statistics in the United States: Part 6 , 
Pipelines, Annual.
^Includes prorated joint venture participation; S = percent share, 
C = crude, P = product, S.D. = standard deviation.
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period of analysis as well as the -measure used. In Figures 15-16, the 
period is extended back to the late 1930's and two alternative measures 
are used, share of crude trunk line mileage and crude pipeline output 
(throughput). In addition the companies as defined at the beginning 
of the time period are traced through to 1975. Both figures illustrate 
a decline in control but on a smaller scale than from 1957-75. The 
trend shown in Figure 16 is a more modest decline (with fewer companies 
in 1975 than in 1938) and demonstrates that the companies' capacity has 
been increasing-to offset the mileage erosion. Given the market’s 
growth over the 35 years the companies have maintained a fairly stable 
and dominant position in crude pipelining.
Turning to the shares of the individual maiors one can get a 
better indication of the changes that have been occurring. Again using 
long-run averages and crude/product originating on companies' lines, 
market share for the twenty petroleum companies are shown in Figures 
17-18. As was the case in the previous figures, joint venture interests 
of the companies are included by prorating their participation.
Figure 17, for crude oil, demonstrates Exxon's predominance 
(17.2 percent) as well as the rapid decline in shares after the eighth 
company, Atlantic Richfield. The figure also indicates that the top 8 
decline in market share shown in Figure 14 was experienced by all but 
two companies (Shell and Standard of Indiana) with Gulf experiencing 
the greatest loss (its share in 1975 was 4.7 percent less than in 1957). 
The next ten companies fared considerably better with 6 experiencing 
increasing shares of the crude market.
Figure 18, for refined products originating on company lines.
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FIGURE 15
CONCENTRATION RATIOS FOR CRUDE TRUNK LINE MILEAGE, 
14 MAJOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES,
SELECTED YEARS, 1938-19751
100.0%
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
L
Year
TOP
TOP
1938 1957 1960 1965 1970 1975
4 50.3 45.5 44.4 41.1 41.8 38.0
8 78.7 68.8 68.1 66.1 65.3 64.2
14 89.0 82.9 82.1 80.3 80.1 79.6
SOURCE: Data for 1938 from U.S., Congress, Investigations of 
Concentration of Economic Power, Hearings before the Temporary National 
Economic Committee, 76th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office), Part 14A, p. 7,723; data for 1957-75 calculated 
from data published by the ICC in Transportation Statistics in the 
United States: Part 6 , Pipelines, annual.
^14 major companies as of 1938, for years 1957-75 includes the 
same companies or their.successors.
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FIGURE 16
CONCENTRATION R:\TIOS FOR CRUDE THROUGHPUT 
19 MAJOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES, SELECTED YEARS,
I94O-I975I
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Year 1940 1948 1957 1960 1965 1970 1975
TOP 4 37.4 40.0 35.7 35.7 35.2 34.3 31.8
TOP 8 56.8 58.5 59.0 58.4 57.2 54.2 51.0
TOP 19 84.4 88.3 86.1 89.2 87.1 84.3 ■ 82.3
SOURCE: Data for 1940 and 1948 from Leslie Cookenboo, Jr., Crude 
Oil Pipelines and Competition in the Oil Industry (Cambridge : Harvard 
University Press, 1955), pp. 34-35: data for 1957-75 from data published 
by the ICC in Transportation Statistics in the United States, Part 6, 
Pipe!ines, annual.
^19 major companies as of 1940, for years 1957-75 includes the 
same companies or their successors; for years 1957-60 includes only 18 
companies, for 1965 only 17 companies, and for years 1970-75 only 16 
companies.
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FIGURE 17
AVERAGE PERCENT SHARE OF TOTAL CRUDE ORIGINATING ON ICC LINES, 
■niENTY FIVE MAJOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES, 1957-19751
S75-
11 1395 731Percent 57
1. EXXON
2. TEXACO
3. MOBIL
4. STANDARD 
OIL (CA)
5. QULF
0. STANDARD
OIL (IN)
7. SHELL
8. ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD
». CONTINENTAL
10. PHILLIPS
11. UNION OIL \ 
OF CALIFORNIA >
12. SUN
13. ASHLAND
14. CITIES
SERVICE
15. AMERADA 
HESS
16. GETTY OIL
17. MARATHON 
OIL
18. STANDARI
OIL (CHI'
19. KERR
WC GEE
20. OtAMOND 
SHAMROCK
21. PENNZOIL
22. CHARTER
23. AMERICAN  
F cTmOF iN a 1.0
24. MURPHYOIL NC
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM
ALL OTHER
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the ICC in Trans­
portation Statistics in the United States: Part 6 , Pipelines, annual; 
data for certain companies reflects merges and acquisitions (see 
Figure 11).
^Includes prorated joint venture participation; S = percent
share.
*Less than one half of one percent.
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FIGURE 18
AVERAGE PERCENT SEfUlE OF TOTAL PRODUCTS ORIGINATING 
ON ICC LINES, TIÆNTY FIVE MAJOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES,
, I957-I975I -  c
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SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the ICC in 
Transportation Statistics in the United States: Part 6, Pipelines, 
annual; data for certain companies reflects merges and acquisi­
tions (see Figure 11).
^Includes prorated joint venture participation; S = - 
percent share.
Less than one half of one percent.
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demonstrates a smaller divergence in shares across companies as well as 
a different picture in terms of declines in shares. Five of the top 
eight companies increased their market position over the period as did 
five of the next ten companies. This is to a large extent a reflection 
of the sharp increase in these companies' participation in joint ventures. 
In viewing the Figure it should be recalled that Standard Oil of Indiana 
operates a large private product system not reflected in its market 
share. Also Standard of California's relatively low share (as well as 
its share of crude) is consistent with its PAD V concentration. Atlantic 
Richfield's decline of 6.7 percent is a special case since its beginning 
share is that of Sinclair. With the merger of Atlantic and Sinclair the 
company was required to sell off part of the Sinclair assets (which were 
subsequently purchased by British Petroleum).
Thus far the market share measures have been physical measures. 
This raises the question as to their appropriateness as well as what 
they are indicating. Table 58 compares 19 differing long-term average 
concentration ratios for the 8 majors. This also provides an oppor­
tunity to examine in more detail the control by companies that includes 
six of the international majors (i.e., 6 of the seven sisters).
The eight majors control via these measures ranges from a low 
of 38.4 percent of product mileage to a high of 67.3 percent of origi­
nating crude. Although their share of the market, by any definition, is 
substantial, the concentration ratios by traditional definitions would 
be considered as moderate (i.e., below Bain's 70 percent threshold).^
In addition, between 1957 and 1975 their control has eroded in all but 
three areas (all product related). A closer look indicates that the
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TABLE 58
EIGHT MAJOR PETROLEUM COWAMIES, AVERAGE PERCENT 
SHARE OF THE PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION MARKET, 
1957-1975, SELECTED VARIABLES
Variable
Average
Percent
Share
Standard
Deviation
Shareyg-
Shareg7
Shareyg-
Sharegg
Mileage :
Total 52.1 3.1 -8.2 -0.1
Crude Trunk 63.4 2.3 -2.9 2.9
Product Trunk 38.4 2.1 -5.1 -1.9
Gathering 51.0 3.4 -6.2 2.4
Crude Input
Total 57.9 2.5 -3.3 -0.7
Originated 67.3 2.7 -7.0 -0.9
Crude Output
Total 57.9 2.5 -3.2 +0.4
Terminated 63.9 2.6 -6.9 2.3
Product Input
Total 47.2 1.8 1.3 -0.8
Originated 47.4 3.0 4.0 -0.6
Product Output
Total 47.3 1.8 1.4 -0.7
Terminated 45.7 1.7 -0.8 -1.1
Operating
Revenue 53.1 3.8 -10.7 -3.1
Expense 53.2 3.8 -11.2 -4.3
Income 53.0 4.0 -9,9 -1.6
Net Income 54.3 7.0 -11.2 -2.7
Total Assets 49.4 4.7 -9.0 -2.4
Net Assets 47.1 5.0 -10.3 -1.0
Debt 50.0 4.4 -8.0 -2.3
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in Transportation Statistics in the United States: 
Part 6, Pipelines, annual.
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erosion occurred primarily between the years 1957-1964 with only modest 
declines between 1965-1975. One significant facet shown in Table 58 is 
the divergence between the shares of assets and debt held and the 
higher share of operating and net income.
Joint Ventures ' Impact on Concentration Measures 
Concentration measures in this and other segments of the petroleum 
industry are influenced in no small way by joint ventures. The ratios 
shown to this point have included the prorated interest in joint ven­
tures held by the individual companies. Although it does enhance the 
usefulness of the measures, there is still the risk that control is 
understated since the subscribed share may be less than actual control 
(in the sense of decision making).
The impact on concentration ratios of prorating the joint ventures 
to their participants is shown in Figure 19 and Table 59. Table 59 also
compares concentration measures used by Teece which treated joint ven-
2
tures as separate companies. The measures shown in Table 59 are not 
the ranking of the majors, as previously the case, but rather ranks 
pipeline holdings in rank order of the holdings.
By using prorated shares, the crude market is more concentrated 
than shown by Teece. In addition the decline shown for the Top 20 
companies is not shown with proration. On the product side, concentra­
tion is in some years overstated by not considering joint ventures and 
for the Top 4 companies the sharp decline between 1957-71 does not exist 
with joint ventures included. The presence of the large product inde­
pendents in the ratio also overstates the concentration since the
3
independent functions to a greater extent as common carriers.
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FIGURE 19
CONCENTRATION RATIOS FOR TOTAL REVENUES, WHOLLY OWIED 
SUBSIDIARIES AND JOINT VENTURES OF MAJOR PETROLEUM 
COMPANIES, 1957 AND 1975
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1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
RTiolly Owned 
Total Share
21.1 15.2
27.8 26.0
46.9
60.1
29.6
49.6
60.6 49.6
85.5 73.6
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the ICC in Trans­
portation Statistics in the United States: Part 6 , Pipelines, 1957 
and 1975.
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TABLE 59
JOINT VENTURES" BIPACT ON CRUDE AND PRODUCT TRUNKLINE 
MILEAGE MARKET SHARES, SELECTED YEARS, 1957-1971^
TOP 4 TOP 8 TOP 20
Without
Proration
With
Proration
Without
Proration
With
Proration
Without
Proration
With
Proration
1957
Crude 42.2 47.4 58.6 70.0 86.9 90.6
Product 40.5 35.4 62.5 57.2 87.1 85.1
1964
Crude 42.3 44.0 58.4 67.1 87.6 91.8
Product 31.4 29.9 52.8 52.4 84.4 87.1
1971
Crude 40.1 43.4 58.1 67.7 84.6 90.7
Product 31.1 34.1 51.1 56.3 85.7 86.8
SOURCE: Data without proration from David J. Teece, "Vertical 
Integration in the U.S. Oil Industry," Vertical Integration In The Oil 
Industry, ed. Edward J. Mitchell (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1976), p. 164; data with proration calculated from data 
published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Transportation 
Statistics in the United States: Part 6 , Pipelines, 1957, 1964, and 1971,
Clarket shares of top 4, 8, and 20 companies are derived from 
rankings in each year. Rankings without proration treats joint ventures 
as separate entities. Rankings with proration were derived by adding 
joint venture shares to their respective owners.
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In Figure 19, market shares of the major petroleum companies are 
compared for the years 1957 and 1975 using total revenues. The figure 
illustrates as have previous ones the decline in market shares but also 
illustrates the moderating effects exerted by the large increase in joint 
participation on the part of each class of companies.
The Relevant Market: A Regional View
One overriding conclusion has emerged from the national compari­
son of concentration and that is the erosion in shares held by the major 
companies in all but the product market. Does this lead to the conclusion 
that the level of competition has increased? Perhaps, but there are 
countervailing arguments that are best addressed using regional measures 
of concentration. Before examining concentration by PAD it is worthwhile 
to note that the following interrelated factors may have a significant 
influence on the declining trend: (1) the decline in U.S. production in 
recent years; (2) the majors' withdrawal somewhat from gathering activi­
ties; (3) the dramatic rise in imports of both crude and products; (4) 
the growth in the LPG market (dominated by the independents); (5) the 
export of relative refinery capacity; and (6) the expansion of pipe­
lines to carry foreign crude to PAD II.
Tables 60-62 compare pipeline and refinery shares by PAD for the 
year ending December 31, 1972. ' The data on pipelines is limited because 
it lumps both crude and product investments together and thus has only 
partial usefulness. Table 60 demonstrates that the individual major 
companies are not necessarily concentrated or operating in the same 
markets, although eight of the top 12 majors have pipeline investments 
in each PAD. Comparing refinery shares by PAD indicates that only one
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TABLE 60
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INTERSTATE NET PIPELINE INVESTMENTS, 
SELECTED COMPANIES, IN THE UNITED STATES 
AÎÎD IN PAD DISTRICTS, 1972^
PERCENT OF TOTAL NET INVESTMENT
Total PAD PAD PAD PAD PAD
Company United States I II • III IV V
Exxon Corp. 9.1 9.5 3.6 16.2 3.8 1.0
Gulf Oil 7.8 11.0 4.6 11.5 1.5 2.3
Texaco, Inc. 7.4 9.0 4.9 10.2 3.3 3.9
Shell Oil Co. 6.5 5.0 4.8 8.8 3 .9 9.3
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 6.4 6.1 6.8 5.3 19.3 0.1
Mobil Oil 6.1 7.9 2.7 9.5 1.5 7.4
Atlantic Richfield Co. 5.3 5.3 5.7 5.0 3.9 6.3
Williams Companies 4.7 - 12.2
Phillips Petroleum 3.6 3.3 4.1 3.4 5.3 -
Continental Oil 3.4 3.1 2.9 1.6 24.3 1.7
Standard Oil Co. CA 3.4 4.1 C2) 4.8 12.4 8.9
Pennsylvania Co. 3.4 11.7 4.7 - — -
Cities Service Co. 3.1 5.7 2.5 3.5 (2) -
Union Oil Co. of CA 2.9 1.6 3.4 2.3 4.7 5.0
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 2.8 5.2 2.7 2.9 - —
Sun Oil Co. 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.2 ——
Mapco, Inc. 2.4 - 4.6 1.5 —— -
Marathon Oil 2.3 - 4.1 0.8 4.9 4.7
Southern Pacific Co. 2.3 -- - 0.4 (2) 47.0
Texas East. Trans. Corp. 2.2 2.8 2.4 2.5 - -
Ashland Oil 1.4 2.0 1.5 —— '
Diamond Shamrock 0 .6 — 0.2 1.2 1.6 -
Clark Oil & Refining Co. 0.4 —— 0.9 (2) - -
Amerada-Hess Corp. 0.4 - - 1.0 - -
Getty Oil Co.^ 0.3 -* 0.3 0.3 0.7 -
All Others 9.0 5.7 17.3 2.8 8.7 2.1
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix E.
^Net investment. as the term is used here,is an estimate of cur-
rent market value and is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
as the cost of reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
^Less than 0.3% of the total in that PAD District. Unless 
designated otherwise, a dash in the column indicates no known investment 
in that PAD.
^Includes Skelly Oil Company.
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TABLE 61
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY, 
SELECTED 20 COMPANIES, IN THE UNITED STATES^
AND IN PAD DISTRICTS, 1973
COMPANY
Percent of Total Operating Capacity
Total 
United States
PAD
I
PAD
II
PAD
III
PAD
IV
PAD
V
Exxon Corp. 8.7 15.8 14.2 8.9 3.9
Shell Oil Co. 7.9 - 6.7 9.9 - 12.7
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 7.5 4.5 14.8 5.6 16.2 -
Texaco, Inc. 7.4 5.3 5.3 10.6 4.1 5.1
Standard Oil Co. CA 6.7 5.3 - 5.2 8.9 22.9
Mobil Oil 6.7 8.9 7.0 5.6 — _ 8.8
Gulf Oil 5.0 10.1 2.4 8.8 - 3.5
Atlantic Richfield Co. 5.5 11.0 3.2 3.6 - 11.8
Union Oil Co. of CA 3.4 - 3.9 2.0 - 9.9
Sun Oil Co. 3.4 9.9 6.7 1.0 - —
Phillips Petroleum 2.8 —— 2.2 3.0 5.7 5.0
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 2.7 6.0 7.4
Continental Oil 2.6 — 3.6 1.7 16.3 1.9
Ashland Oil 2.5 4.2 7.5
Marathon Oil 2.2 - 6 .6 1.0 — “
Cities Service Co. 1.9 — 1■■ — —» 4.5 ■
Getty Oil Co.^ 1.5 8.4 1.9
American Petrofina Co.^ 1.4 - 0.6 2.9 - -
Champlin Oil Co .4 1.0 - 1.3 1.0 - 1.3
Coastal States Petrochemical 0.9 - - 2.3 - -
All Others 17.3 10.6 18.9 17.1 49.1 13.2
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix E.
^Excluding Puerto Rico.
^Includes Skelly Oil Co.
Includes American Petrofina of Texas and Cosden Oil and 
Chemical Co.
^A wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Pacific Railroad.
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TABLE 62
CONCENTRATION RATIOS, INTERSTATE PIPELINE NET INVESTMENTS 
AND OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY, BY PAD DISTRICTS, 19731
PAD PAD PAD PAD PAD
I II III IV V
Major Petroleum Co's.
TOP 4
Pipelines ' 37.4 15.8 47.4 10.1 14.6
Refineries 40.1 14.7 39.2 13.0 21.3
TOP 8
Pipelines 57.9 33.1 71.3 49.6 32.9
Refineries 60.9 39.4 63.5 30.8 68.7
2
Total Majors
Pipelines 79.6 57.9 92.9 91.3 50.9
Refineries 94.4 79.2 74.8 60.1 85.8
All Companies 
TOP 4
Pipelines 41.2 29.6 47.4 61.3 72.6
Refineries 46.9 36.7 43.5 50.6 57.3
TOP 8
Pipelines 66.2 48.3 71.3 79.1 92.5
Refineries 75.5 62.0 64.4 81.3 80.1
TOP 20
Pipelines 95.4 ■ 83.7 96.7 95.6 97.9
Refineries 94.4 90.7 88.8 94.4 91.9
SOURCE: Compiled from data sho%fn in Tables 60-61 and Appendix E.
^As of January 1, 1973.
2
The 20 largest majors do not operate in each and every PAD 
therefore there are less than 20 companies included in each of the 
PAD totals.
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company, Texaco, has refineries in each PAD and is apparently the only
company marketing in all fifty states.
Table 62 summarizes the data in Tables 6.0-61 by comparing
concentration ratios in each PAD using both the measure of majors and
pipeline shares in rank order. The most noteworthy results shown are
the small presences of the top 4 and 8 majors in PAD's II, IV, and V
in both pipeline investments and refinery capacity (except for V).
PAD V refinery capacity held by the 8 majors is the main difference and
is explained by the fact that the pipeline investments in PAD V are
primarily intrastate. One recent study using 1967 pipeline capacity
found the intrastate crude shares held by eight of twelve majors
4
represented 98.9 percent of the total. On the interstate side. Table 
60 indicates that 47 percent is held by South Pacific which operates 
product lines.
Table 62 also confirms that PAD II was in 1972 the least 
concentrated market in both refinery capacity and pipeline investments. 
It also represents the independent pipeline operators' major market.^ 
p a d's I, III, and V have the highest concentration ratios via the major 
companies. PAD IV as Chapter III emphasized is a minor market. Chapter 
III also demonstrated the importance of PAD III as a producing and 
refinery center and PAD I and PAD V as major consumer markets which 
coincides with the majors' concentration in these markets.^
Entry/Exit of Pipeline Companies; 1957-1975 
As Figure 14 demonstrates the 20 majors' share of the crude 
originating market was 9 percent less in 1975 than in 1957. Their share 
of the product originating market was 2 percent less in 1975 than in
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1957. Figure 14 also illustrates that the. offsetting gains in the crude 
market were made by petroleum companies below the Top 20, The offsetting 
gains in the product market, however, were made fay non-petroleum pipeline 
subsidiaries.
On the crude side, the changes were predominantly the result of 
mergers, acquisitions and increased participation in joint-venture lines. 
During the period no pipeline company or operation was found in either 
the crude or product market to have gone out of business because of 
financial losses. Many companies below the top 20 have acquired crude 
facilities from the majors. For example, America Petrofina's entry has 
been via acquisition of existing majors' facilities. Complete entry 
of new capacity (other than via joint ventures) has virtually been non­
existent.
On the product side, the picture is somewhat different, as 
indicated in Chapter VI.^ The major change was the sale of Great Lakes 
to Williams Pipeline Company. Other than this, a large amount of the 
entry has come in the area of companies serving specialized and PAD II 
markets.
Concentration Trends ; A Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the substantial control held by 
the majors over interstate pipelines. Concentration ratios have, with 
the exception of product lines, been declining over 1957-1975. Much of 
the erosion occurred between 1957-1964. Joint ventures were shown to 
have a substantial impact on concentration measures, an impact that 
should not be ignored.
Regional concentration ratios demonstrated the need to improve
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the data in this area for the majors are much more dominant in the 
significant crude, refining, and consumer PAD's. PAD I, III, and V are 
highly concentrated markets, a factor not apparent using only national 
measures.
Entry/exit activity has primarily been a result of acquisitions, 
mergers, and new joint ventures. The crude market changes have been 
the result of gains by smaller petroleum companies. Product gains have 
come via non-petroleum pipeline subsidiaries.
p. 164.
CHAPTER IX
^Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization, pp. 438-452.
2
David J. Teece in Vertical Integration in The Oil Industry, 
3,
Supra, pp. 197-205.
Report to The Federal Trade Commission on The Structure,
Conduct and Performance of The West Coast Petroleum Industry, p. 17.
^Supra, pp. 197-205.
^The influence of foreign operations of the majors is demon­
strated by the concentration in PAD I. In 1973, 86.4 percent of the 
refined products imported into the U.S. went to this PAD. Of the U.S. 
total, 75.4 percent came from central and South America (see Chapter III) 
The refinery capacity in these exporting areas were controlled (66.1 
percent by the top 4 companies) by the majors (see Appendix E, Table 6).
^Supra, pp. 197-205.
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CHAPTER X
THE POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND REGULATORY EfWIRONMENT,
1959-1977
The legal and regulatory environment in which pipeline companies
have had to operate since 1959 has largely been free of statuatory or
judicial restraint that differed from the environment prior to 1959.
The series of cases culminating in the second Champlin decision was the 
last ruling on the ICC's pipeline jurisdiction. The Arapahoe decision 
culminated in a resolution of questions concerning the pipeline consent 
decree, as well as its effectiveness.
After 1959 the interest of various governmental entities shifted
from a focus on crude oil pipelines to the operation of product pipe­
lines and joint ventures pipelines. The issues, however, remained the 
traditional ones concerning the shipper/owner relationship and the 
denial of access to non-owners, non-members of the "group." The period 
between 1959 and 1971 was largely uneventful in terms of Congressional 
activities. Although Congress did not suspend its investigations of 
the petroleum industry, it did move from an emphasis on pipelines into 
other areas. The Hepburn Act of 1906 remained the major legislation 
concerning interstate pipelines.
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The public advent of the energy crisis in 1972 produced a series 
of congressional hearings and agency investigations unmatched in the 
history of the petroleum industry. This activity in reference to pipe­
lines culminated (but did not end) in 1977 when the ICC's role as the 
regulator of interstate pipelines ended and the Department of Energy 
role began. The purpose of this chapter is to review the developments 
since 1959. Much of this review focuses on the post-1972 developments 
and on the substance of the pipeline issues that continue to create 
controversy.
Activities of the Department of Justice: 1959-77
In 1962 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began an investiga­
tion of the Colonial Pipeline Company. The Company, a joint venture, 
was in the process of constructing the largest product pipeline in the 
United States which would, via connections, link the major refining centers 
of PAD III with the eastern part of the United States. The investigation 
was instigated in response to complaints by competing transportation 
modes.^
The FTC in 1963 transferred the investigation to the Department 
of Justice's Anti-trust Division. Justice had earlier begun to focus on 
joint ventures and as an outgrowth of the initial investigation of the 
Colonial Pipeline Company, determined that there was a need to 
investigate a number of other joint-venture pipelines. In 1966 the 
antitrust division began an investigation of the proposed Gateway and 
the Glacier Pipelines and towards the end of the 1960's also began an 
investigation of the Explorer Pipeline Company, the Olympic Pipeline
320
Company, and the proposed Trans Alaska Pipeline."
In testimony before Congress in 1972 the Deputy Assistant Attor­
ney General outlined the reasons for Justice's investigations of joint- 
venture pipelines. These revolved around the following considerations: 
(1) the close cooperation needed to plan, construct, and operate jointly 
oïfned lines and their effect of eliminating competition between owner 
companies as well as non-owner competitors; (2) the possible replacement 
of alternative transportation modes already in existence; (3) the 
efficiency of the line and other facilities were such that it gave an 
inherent competitive edge to the shipper/owner since it was exclusively 
designed for them and because invariably jointly omed pipeline companies 
did not operate either input or output terminals but simply provided 
connections to the shipper/owner terminals or their customers; (4) the 
non-owner shipper would have to pay the tariff rate while the shipper/ 
owners would in effect have to pay cost; (5) the effect on refinery 
operations and the location of these refineries, by influencing input/ 
output points, there was the possibility that the shipper/owners could 
share in the disposition of excess product and thus eliminate the need 
to dispose of products on regional spot markets at lower prices; and 
(6) the impact on marketing, the planning of these pipelines necessarily 
involved an extensive study into the supply and demand balance of mar­
kets which were to be served by the pipeline. The planning of the line 
provided owners the opportunity to establish new joint-venture terminal 
facilities which provided a common cost facility. This provided an
incentive for the owners to pool their interests and specifications to
3
supply common points for several individual companies.
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The issues raised by the Justice investigations were substantial
since they affected not only transportation but refining and marketing
as well. They were eventually to include nearly all major joint ventures
4
that were constructed after 1963. Little is known about the Justice 
activities other than what has been disclosed in testimony before Con­
gress. This information is not substantial since the Department's 
response to questions were invariably that they were matters still under 
investigation and legal inhibitions preclude them from discussing many 
of the facts involved in these ongoing investigations.^
Of the investigations, the Colonial Pipeline Company was by far 
the most important because of its location and since the participants in 
the venture included 7 of the 10 largest major petroleum companies. Its 
status remained confidential until 1976 when Business Week reported that 
"the Justice Department has quietly shut down its 13-year-old antitrust 
investigation of Colonial Pipeline . . . .  Top officials decided they 
have no case.
The investigation of the proposed Glacier and Gateway pipelines 
did lead the Department to conclude that they had sufficient information 
to proceed with an antitrust suit. Upon announcing their intentions to 
the parties involved both the Gateway and the Glacier System were aban­
doned by the prospective oimers of these lines.^ The proposed Gateway 
system is of historical interest because it initially involved 11 owners 
who proposed to acquire the Little Big Inch refined products pipeline. 
This line, owied by Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, was origi­
nally built by the U.S. government during World War II. Its disposal
g
at the end of the War was of considerable concern to the industry.
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The Gateway System was plagued from the start with disagreement
among the prospective oimers as to a suitable route. One opposing
group (the Match Group) called for part of the route to extend to
Chicago, Although Justice had proposed to bring suit, a more plausible
reason for the abandonment was that the disagreement over a suitable
route was never resolved. The Match Group was eventually reformed to
9
build the Explorer Pipeline Company.
While the 1976 announcement ended speculation concerning Colo­
nial, the status of the other investigations are unknora. By surrounding 
its investigation in secrecy the Justice Department continued to fuel a 
controversy that has its origins in the Elkins and Mother Hubbard cases. 
For whatever reason, the Justice Department never succeeded in bringing 
the substantial pipeline issues to court for litigation. This has 
denied all parties a public forum in which the allegations could be
T j 10resolved.
The Federal Trade Commission; 1959-1977
The FTC began the initial investigation of the Colonial Pipeline 
Company but later transferred the case to the Department of Justice. 
Beyond the Colonial Pipeline case the FTC was publicly silent in the 
area of pipelines until 1973.
In October of 1970, the Chairman of House Small Business 
Committee sent a letter to the FTC urging an investigation and action 
in the energy field. In 1971 an investigation into the petroleum indus­
try was authorized by the C ommission.An outcome of this investiga­
tion was a staff report on the petroleum industry. This initial and 
internal report was apparently finished in the first six months of 1973.
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It was at about this time that the energy shortages had become most
obvious and numerous committees and subcommittees of both the House and
Senate were conducting hearings into the shortages. It was in this
environment that the internal report became the subject of numerous
leaks and newspaper releases and was soon given wide publicity as it
12
was published by two Congressional committees.
The New York Times reported that the Federal Trade Commission
was publicly prodded into saying when it would report the results of
13its investigation of the structure of the oil industry. In supplying 
the preliminary staff report to the Permanent Select Committee on Small 
Business, the Chairman of the FTC indicated that the report had neither 
been evaluated nor approved by the Commission and the findings and con­
clusions in the report did not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Commission. He went on to say that the Commission itself would not 
make the report public and asked that care be taken in avoiding unneces­
sary publicity which would weaken any future law enforcement action by
14
the Commission in this area.
The staff report set out to investigate the structure, conduct,
and performance of the petroleum industry.That  the report took a
structure/performance approach was a major departure from the antitrust
approach that had long marked the history of both the FTC and the
Department of Justice's antitrust division. The FTC had sought to
determine anti-competitive structure as opposed to anti-competitive 
16
practices.
The five major conclusions of the staff report were:
(1) The eight largest majors have effectively controlled the output 
of many of the independent crude producers' (2) A high degree of
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control over crude, is matched by few crude exchanges with indepen­
dents, an exclusionary practice which denies a degree of flexibility 
to the independent sector while reserving it for the majors; (3) 
Independent refiners are largely dependent on the majors for their 
crude supply, but independents sell very little of their gasoline 
output back to the major oil companies, . . . the welfare of the 
independent marketing sector is largely dependent on the well-being 
of independent refiners; (4) The continued existence and viability 
of the independent refiners is necessary for the survival of the 
independent marketer. This is especially true since the eight 
largest majors rarely sell gasoline to the independent marketers;
(5) The major oil companies in general and the eight largest majors 
in particular have engaged in conduct which exemplifies their market 
power and has served to squeeze independents at both the refinery 
and market level . . . [this was particularly true] in Districts 1 
and 3, results in a threat to the continued viability of the 
independent .sector in this m a r k e t . ^7
The report became not only public but the basis for a July,
1973 FTC complaint alleging that eight corporations— Exxon, Atlantic
Richfield, Gulf Oil, Mobil Oil, Shell Oil, Standard Oil Company of
California, Standard Oil Company of Indiana, and Texaco— were in viola-
1 8
tion of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The complaint filed by the FTC was reminiscent of the Mother 
Hubbard Case in its complexity and comprehensiveness. The complaint 
alleged three separate violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. The first charged that the respondents were, through 
combination or agreement, monopolizing the relevant market (defined as 
PAD I and III); the second charged the respondents with maintaining 
monopoly power in the relevant market; and third, the respondents were 
charged both individually and with others with restraining trade and
19m&intaining a non-competitive market structure in the relevant market.
All three charges allegedly arose out of the same acts and 
practices. The contemplated relief sought by the FTC staff was not 
precisely defined but would have the following goals: (1) reduce refinery
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concentration; (2) reduce barriers to entry into refining; (3) make the
industry more responsive to consumer demand with respect to the product
mix; and (4) create conditions and incentives which would promote open
20market transactions. The chief form of "structural" relief would be
the divestiture of refinery capacity from each of the respondents in
the relevant market. This refinery capacity should be divested into
21some ten to thirteen firms.
In the matter of pipelines, the divestiture relief would include 
some pipeline assets. The Commission staff proposed that all crude and 
product lines which connected directly to the spin-off refineries be 
divested totally to the new firms. They also suggested that the owner­
ship shares in the connecting joint ventures would also be transferred 
to the new refining company. Although they suggested other relief, the 
remedies were essentially the same type as were being sought in vertical
divestiture bills before Congress. They were, however, not as compre-
22hensive as were the bills before the Senate.
The ETC complaint was the most important petroleum antitrust
case since the Mother Hubbard Case. It was also important because it
marks a departure from the traditional approach to antitrust since the
FTC was seeking relief directly related to an anti-competitive structure
23
rather than directed to anti-competitive practices.
Since 1973 the FTC and the industry have been sparring over 
procedures, chiefly discovery procedures and not the merits of the com­
plaint. More than 35 months after the complaint was filed both the
companies and the FTC staff continued the struggle over the subpoena of
24
material and the discovery process. In newspaper accounts of the
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process it was indicated that the FTC staff estimated it would need at
least three years to prepare for the trial before an administrative law
judge and would take another 8-10 years to complete. The long struggle
over the discovery procedures would indicate that the staff estimates
were optimistic in terms of reaching the stage of a hearing before an
25
administrative law judge.
The FTC complaint was opposed by the Nixon Administration and
then by the Ford Administration. In addition, the Department of Treasury
and its Secretary, William Simon, mounted a major effort to oppose the
26preliminary staff report as well as the entire complaint.
The Federal Trade Commission continued in early 1978 to pursue
the Exxon, et al. Case. On at least two occasions between 1973 and 1978
there have been internal FTC recommendations that the case should be 
27
withdrawal. The history of petroleum antitrust since 1911 and the 
complexity of this case suggest that it will eventually go the way of 
the Mother Hubbard Case and the Department of Justice's Colonial 
Pipeline Company investigation.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 1959-77
On August 4, 1977 President Carter signed legislation creating 
the Department of Energy. The new department consolidated three energy- 
related agencies and parts of several others. The Department began
official operations in October. The law also transferred all ICC oil
28pipeline functions to the new Department. VIhat changes in pipeline 
regulations the transfer will produce remains to be seen. The law did 
not provide new powers for pipeline regulation and one must assume that 
in the short-run the recent behavior of the ICC and its rulings remains
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not only relevant but also merely transferred.
Recent Congressional hearings provide an insight into the ICC 
modern role as regulators of interstate pipelines and also the prevail­
ing philosophy with regard to this regulation. The chairman of ICC 
offered the following opinions concerning pipeline regulations:
1. Considering the size and economic significance of pipelines, 
the expenditure on regulatory efforts had not been large compared to 
that devoted to other types of regulated carriers. This was a reflec­
tion of a congressional determination that the protection of the public 
interest required a less comprehensive range of regulatory devices;
2. There were real limitations to the regulatory power of the 
Commission over pipelines. These revolved around the issuance of certi­
ficates of public convenience and necessity, issuance of securities, the 
construction and abandonment of lines, and the formation of interlocking 
directorates ;
3. Pipeline transportation is one of the most highly concen­
trated segments of transportation. The concentration was justified on 
the basis of cost. A more competitive market structure could entail 
losses in efficiency;
4. The economies of large diameter pipelines explained why 
pipelines were jointly ovmed;
5. The ICC has adequate regulatory power over pipelines and 
required no changes in the present form of regulation. It had the 
power to investigate and correct abuses as they occurred.
6 . Pipelines were one of the best run transportation systems, 
rates were just and reasonable, and the system was largely free of
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?9
of complaints of abuse.“
The Chairman's views were not shared by Congressional committees 
nor has it been shared by other groups. It may have also increased the 
support for transferring the regulatory function to the Energy Depart­
ment. One committee concluded that while there are limitations to the 
ICC power, pipelines are subjected to a number of significant regulatory
provisions but the ICC, however, had never exercised its power with
30
respect to oil pipelines. They also criticized the complacent attitude
of the Commission as expressed by its chairman and expressed a concern
that pipeline transportation, which accounted (at that time) for more
than 20 percent of all inter-city freight movement, could be so casually
regulated. They criticized the Commission's position that their action
was the result of the lack of complaints from injured parties or more
31
urgent prodding by the Congress.
Historically, the resources and time of the ICC has been domi­
nated by railroad and motor carrier issues and the record supports the 
statement that there have been relatively few pipeline complaints.
There have been probably more complaints lodged with the Congress and 
the Department of Justice than with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
The lack of complaints can be interpreted two ways. The first, accepted 
by industry proponents and by the ICC ,is that interstate pipeline opera­
tions are largely free from abuses. The second interpretation is that 
pipeline operations are not free of abuses but complaints have not been 
filed with the ICC for three reasons: time delays, costs of filing com­
plaints, and the fear on the part of a non-owner/shipper of retaliation. 
That the ICC moves slowly in regard to developing regulatory
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procedures is an established historical fact. It is also well estab­
lished that once procedures and rules were established, the length of
time required after a complaint was filed was so long as to render the
32
process almost useless. In terms of costs, this problem is well
illustrated by the fact that the ICC is not a forum for the poor man.
It is extraordinarily expensive to make and present a case before the
ICC. Cost to litigate include attorney fees, witnesses' expenses,
consulting fees, and printing. A relatively simple case which is opposed
will certainly run to several thousands of dollars. Most complicated
33cases will run hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The issue of the fears of retaliation is an important and 
normative question. In testimony before Congress, two members of the 
Department of Justice staff illustrate the influence of the fears of 
retaliation. The testimony of William John Lamont, a senior attorney 
in the antitrust division, indicated that " . . .  independent refiners 
and marketers of substantial size would admit privately that the pipe­
line situation was strangling them, but would hasten to add, 'don't say 
we said so, because if we do, we will die very quickly and, no, we will 
not t e s t i f y . M r .  Clearwater, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
stated
Many of those who would seem to have some basis for complaint about 
the operation of oil company-owned pipelines have been reluctant to 
come forward, perhaps because of the feeling of dependence upon the 
goodwill of the major oil companies in other phases of their opera­
tion. In short, they may fear retaliation.35
The most lucid statement on pipeline regulation by the Inter­
state Commerce Commission and the control of common carriers by the 
major oil companies was offered in the testimony of Charles B. Siess,
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Jr. , then President of Apco Oil Corporation. In responding to the ques­
tion raised concerning the control of common carrier transportation 
facilities by the major oil companies and whether this condition had 
contributed to the decline of the independent segment of the industry, 
Mr. Siess stated;
Apco— and other independents— do have difficulty obtaining 
access to the common carrier transportation system to move crude 
to our refineries when it is needed there.
There are a number of reasons given why the so-called "common 
carriers" crude pipelines cannot ship your crude, if it does not 
suit the interest or convenience of that pipeline's major company 
owners to do so. This is the day to day, practical, operating 
truth of the matter. The fact that the independent shipper theo­
retically has available administrative remedies at the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to test the validity of those "reasons why"—  
is practically speaking, no help at all.
It is difficult to operate your refineries on a supply of docu­
ments filed in the ICG. Inevitably regulatory delays render these 
remedies useless. Resort to those useless remedies serve only to 
make it more difficult later to obtain access to those pipelines 
essential to keeping your refinery running.
Statistical data prepared by the ICC for the years 1959-1975
give some insight into the pipeline cases that the Commission has
addressed over this period. During this time 23 pipeline cases came
before the Commission. Of the 23, eight cases involved the Williams
Pipeline Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Tulsa-based Williams
Companies. Twenty cases involved product lines and only three involved
crude lines. Only five involved companies controlled by major compan- 
37xes.
The majority of the cases involved refined products, LPG, or
ammonia lines and operations in PAD District II. PAD District II is
the least concentrated pipeline and petroleum market in the United
States. The PAD II cases involve mostly independent pipeline companies
38
and other small independents. Thus, between 1969 and 1975, the ICC
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regulatory process seems to function in a market (PAD II) that has the 
greatest number of independent oil companies and independent pipeline 
companies.
The cases involving Williams Pipeline Company, since consolidated
into one, was the first major case involving important pipeline issues to
come before the ICC since the Reduced Rates and Gathering Charges Case.
The Williams' case has its origins in the pipeline consent decree of 1941
for Williams purchased the Great Lakes Pipeline (a party to the decree)
in 1964. Although there were several reasons the owners gave for selling
Great Lakes, one of the most conspicuous was that the sale would free
39assets which were in effect frozen by the decree.
With the purchase of the pipeline, Williams began to file tariffs 
based upon the new valuation of the assets (i.e., related to the purchase 
price of the pipeline network). This was in its simplest form, the pri­
mary issue involved in the case. The shippers' complaint argued that 
the valuation (upon which the 10 percent return was to be calculated)
should reflect the valuation used by Great Lakes. The Commission ruled
40in favor of the new valuation.
The Williams Pipeline case had a second effect for it served as 
a stimulus for the Commission to address pipeline issues that Congres­
sional hearings continued to request. The Commission's study of the 
piepline valuation process led the ICC to initiate a proceeding, ex 
parte number 308, which was an investigation of the valuation of common 
carrier pipelines. In issuing their decision in the Williams Brothers 
Pipeline Case on October 10, 1975, the majority suggested that the 
ex parte number 308 should be extended to an investigation of the
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determination of a proper rate of return for regulatory purposes. They
also suggested that pipeline structures and practices deserve closer 
41
scrutiny.
In a dissenting opinion, one commissioner indicated that the
investigation was not sufficiently broad and recommended that it be
extended to include an investigation of possible violations of Section 8
of the Clayton Act. The pertinent part of the Clayton Act follows:
" . . .  that no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
42
to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." “ The commissioner
also felt that there should be an extension of the investigation into
43
Elkins Act violations.
Congressional investigations certainly played a role in this 
dissent. In the dissenting narrative a portion of the recommendations 
made by the House Select Committee on Small Business in 1972 were cited. 
These included five major recommendations:
(1) Initiate a comprehensive investigation of the structure and 
operation of joint venture pipelines in order to determine which 
such pipelines operate as true common carriers;
(2) Investigate the possibility of discrimination in pipeline 
rates by segments with respect to the entire pipeline industry;
(3) Investigate practices regarding the setting of joint through 
pipeline rates . . .  ;
(4) Investigate the failure of joint-venture pipelines to pro­
vide common terminal facilities for use of a shipper . . .  ;
(5) Investigate the possibilities of violations of . . .  ^^ 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act by joint-venture pipelines . . .
In 1976, the Commission was to undertake an investigation of the broader
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pipeline issues, an investigation now being carried out by the Department 
45of energy.
The Trans Alaska Pipeline System; A Challenge 
To The Government's Rate Making Authority
In preparation for the 1977 startup of the Trans Alaska Pipeline 
System, the eight participants in the system filed with the ICC proposed 
tariffs ranging from $6.04 to $6.44 per barrel. The tariffs were 
immediately challenged by the Justice Department, the state of Alaska, 
the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, and the ICC's Bureau of Investi­
gations and Enforcement. On June 28, 1977 the ICC unanimously rejected 
the proposed tariffs as excessive and ordered them cut 20 percent. The 
ICC order was upheld by a lower court but was appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. On November 15, 1977 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (4-3) 
that seven of the eight companies could continue to charge the tariffs 
pending a full hearing.
This case raises substantial questions concerning the ICC's 
method of rate regulation. It is complicated by the state of Alaska's 
involvement. The state's interest in the case is directly related to 
the determination of royalties to be paid to Alaska. Royalties are 
based upon the wellhead price of oil (pegged at the world price of 
oil, around $13.50 in June of 1977) less transportation c o s t s . A s  
has been emphasized in this paper, the tariffs paid are largely paper
transfers between subsidiaries (certainly the case in the initial start­
up of the Trans Alaska System) and thus the higher the rates the more 
directly the offset to the royalties cost of the companies.
The royalty issue has no direct bearing on the ICC ruling. The
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determination of the valuation base and the definition of expenses and 
therefore net income is apparently at the center of the case. Is 
interest paid on debt an expense? Is the rate of return allowable 
calculated on equity or total valuation (equity plus debt)? Are 
federal taxes paid a hypothetical payment (at the 48 percent rate) or 
will they be based on actual payments? It is the companies' contention 
that the ICC has reversed its historical method of addressing these 
questions. These are the issues awaiting the Supreme Court ruling.
Public Policy Developments 1959-1977: A Summary 
In many respects, the pipeline issues of 1959-1977 were a repeat 
of 1906-1958. After a large expenditure of public/private monies and 
manhours, the pipeline controversy continues. The Department of 
Justice, the FTC, the Department of Energy, Congress, and now the 
Supreme Court are debating issues that are only a variant of issues 
debated in 1906. A resolution in the near future appears unlikely.
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CHAPTER XI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Ownership and control of pipelines by the largest integrated 
petroleum companies has had a long and controversial history. The 
controversy has its origins in nineteenth-century development of the 
industry and the rise of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The 
control of pipelines and other modes of transportation by the Standard 
Oil group was a key element in the monopolization of the industry by the 
turn of the century. It was this abuse of the ownership of pipelines 
that led to the passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906 which extended par­
tially the jurisdiction of the ICC to cover pipelines. The failure at 
that time to apply the commodity clause to pipelines as it was in the 
case of railroads was the genesis of the controversy over shipper/owner 
pipelines that would continue for at least the next 70 years.
Pipelines have largely .been built and controlled for the con­
venience of the major oil companies, companies which survived the 1911 
stock redistribution of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey as well 
as those companies which emerged in the first 30 years of this century 
when major discoveries and over-production was the norm.
During this time the alleged abuses of the shipper/owner
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relationship shifted from a focus on a single holding company to a 
group of companies. The complaints have largely remained the same. 
Pipelines have allegedly been used as an instrument by these companies 
to prevent entry and effective competition at all stages of the industry.
These complaints and the alleged abuses have persisted for 
over 70 years in the face of numerous Congressional hearings, other 
governmental investigations, court decisions, and ICC regulation. Since 
the end of World War II the emphasis of these activities shifted along 
with the development within the industry toward joint-ventures and 
product pipelines.
The purpose of this paper has been to review the origins of 
the controversy through 1959 and to examine the structure and conduct of 
the pipeline segment of the domestic petroleum industry since that 
time. This study initially focused on the changing character and geography 
of domestic production, refining, and imports and the transportation 
responses to these changes.
It was concluded that pipelines continue as the dominant mode 
for moving crude to refineries and moving refined products to major 
consumer markets. The economies of scale associated with pipeline opera­
tions were found to be so pervasive that the alternative modes were 
complementary and not competing modes.
The domestic transportation system in 1975 was moving an average 
of 29 million barrels of crude and refined products each day. Pipelines 
were moving these commodities at a unit cost only slightly higher than 
in 1957. In constant dollars, the unit costs had actually declined.
Total mileage in place in the United States in 1974 was 222,355 miles
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nearly double the 1931 mileage. The interstate system, which was the 
primary empirical focus of this paper, constituted nearly 77 percent of 
the total. Outside of gathering activities and mileage in PAD V, intra­
state pipelines were found to be relatively insignificant. The princi­
pal post World War II pipeline developments were the dramatic growth in 
refined product pipelines and the shift to larger diameter lines.
Having established the characteristics of the domestic industry 
and the growth in pipelines, overall and geographically, the focus moved 
to a theoretical examination of the pipeline firm and the role of verti­
cal integration. Pipelines were shoim to be a classic example of 
natural monopoly and in addition possess power on the demand side of 
the equation. The economic rationalization for public regulation was 
clearly established. The decreasing long-run average cost curves demon­
strated that society is best served when oil and refined products are 
conglomerated in large quantities. They also demonstrated how impor­
tant access to pipelines is for integrated companies.
Pipelines were found to epitomize the historical trend towards 
vertical integration within the petroleum industry. The role 
pipelines played as an integrated unit extended beyond their transport 
function. They have historically served as a means for balancing 
market forces, as an agency for excluding possible entry, and as an 
instrument of cooperation. Pipeline affiliates of integrated companies 
have little incentive to operate as common carriers or as profit maxi­
mizers, and the competitive model was found to be inappropriate for 
this segment of the industry.
In the second half of this paper, the structure and conduct of
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the pipeline segment was explicitly analyzed by examining the number of 
sellers and their owners, the extensive pattern of cooperation among 
owners through joint venture, primarily, as well as through other 
organized forms of cooperation. The number of firms operating inter­
state pipelines were found to be relatively small with no more than 104 
operating in any given year. More than half of the increase in com­
panies over 1957-75 were product companies.
Five ownership patterns were found to exist and were dominated 
throughout the period by affiliations with petroleum parents. The 
focal point of the major petroleum companies’ investment in pipelines 
resided in the "all phase" company. Pipeline operations of the majors 
were found nearly always to reside in legally separate entities. This 
was the result of ICC regulatory jurisdiction, Texas statutes, and the 
threat of divestiture. The major ownership form, the joint venture, was 
well established in 1957 but over the 19 years emerged as the dominant 
method of investing in pipelines.
The number of independents (i.e., unaffiliated with petroleum 
companies) doubled during 1957-75 but still totaled only 16 companies. 
Their entry was significant in that they concentrated in specialized 
services, geographic markets, and made significant innovations. With 
a few exceptions their entry was confined to refined products and not 
crude oil.
Because joint venture pipelines have emerged as the dominant 
form of organization and because they raise significant anti-competitive 
implications they were examined in some detail. Two forms were found 
to exist in domestic pipeline activities— the corporate and the system.
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While the corporate joint venture is a common feature of other indus­
tries the joint venture pipeline system is a unique form. The system 
form has minimized the impact of regulation and has other significant 
advantages especially for the minority owners. Although joint venture 
systems experienced the most rapid growth the corporate joint venture 
pipeline continues to be the most numerous.
Joint ventures were found to represent from one third to one 
half of the interstate market and participation patterns were found 
to have created- a maze of interlocks which greatly reduce the 
independency in this segment of the industry. Although participation 
by smaller companies had increased significantly, the participation 
continues to be relatively limited with the major companies being the 
predominant force in joint activities.
Joint ventures, while the principal form of cooperation, were 
not the only form of cooperation found to exist in pipelines. Three 
other forms were examined, these were "phantom pipeline companies," 
"phantom pipelines" (i.e., exchange agreements), and the physical 
interconnecting of pipelines.
The extent of the cooperation has increased the efficiency 
of pipeline transportation and transformed the pipeline networks into 
a semi-national one. The cooperation among the major companies raises 
substantial questions concerning the likelihood that the benefits of 
cooperation flow indiscriminantly to all firms. The empirical analysis 
does not suggest that this is likely. The pervasiveness of the 
demonstrated cooperation within a pivotal segment of the entire petro­
leum industry does little to support the competitiveness of the industry.
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While the foundations of oligopoly are based upon interdependency 
which is a function of'responses to independent actions— interdependency 
in domestic pipelines and the international industry extends considerably 
beyond this.
A study of concentration trends in Chapter IX, demonstrated 
the substantial control held by the major’s interstate pipelines. 
Concentration ratios have, with the exception of product lines, been 
declining over 1957-1975. The erosion occurred largely between 1957- 
1964. Joint ventures were shown to have a substantial impact on concen­
tration measures, an impact that should not be ignored.
Regional concentration ratios emphasized the need to improve 
the data since the majors are more dominant in the significant crude, 
refining, and consumer PAD's. PAD's I, III, and V are highly concen­
trated markets, factors not apparent using only national measures.
The structure and conduct of the pipeline segment of the indus­
try has been under investigation by Congress, the Justice Department, 
and the Federal Trade Commission since the latter part of the 1900's.
It also has been "regulated" by the ICC since 1906. In reviewing 
the period 1906-1959 Arthur Johnson concluded that impact of this 
extensive governmental activity through 1959 was miniminal at least in 
its effects on the structure and conduct of pipelines. This conclusion 
has also been supported by the public policy review of Chapter II.
In Chapter X the focus was on public policy developed since 
1959. Public policy changes through 1977 do not alter the conclusion 
that government activity, both judicial and regulatory, has not 
altered the structure of the pipeline segment of the petroleum industry.
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The Trans-Alaska Pipeline is an exception resulting primarily from 
environmental issues. The changes that have occurred have largely 
been of a legal and accounting nature with the economic functions and 
relationships remaining unaltered.
It is the conclusion of this paper that public policy has 
been ineffective and pipelines have for all practical purposes been 
unregulated. There are several reasons for reaching this conclusion, 
among these are:
1. The. slow process of the governmental activity as opposed
to the rapid growth and development within the industry. The structure 
of the industry was determined and cemented prior to any real action 
on the part of the government;
2. A misplaced emphasis on the rate of return analysis that 
was developed;
3. The role of taxation and the economics of large diameter 
pipelines has been more important than either the consent decree or the 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation;
4. The impact of the consent decree was avoided largely because 
of a restructuring of the equity/debt ratio.
The slow process of governmental action and activity is illus­
trated by the fact that in 1880, at the time the Standard Oil group was 
emerging, there was a total of 1,216 miles of crude gathering and trunk 
lines in the United States. In 1905, one year before the passage of the 
Hepburn Act there was a total of 24,666 miles of interstate pipeline.
By the time the 1934 valuation process was completed and the Reduced 
Pipeline Rate and Gathering Charge Case was tentatively concluded there
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125,950 miles of pipeline. By the time the consent decree was ruled 
upon by the Supreme Court there were almost 190,000 miles of pipeline.
This data illustrates that by the time the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion and the Department of Justice made its major rulings concerning 
pipelines the structure of the pipeline segment of the industry had 
for all practical purposes been determined.
In terms of the rate of return analysis neither the ICC nor the 
consent decree has dealt effectively with the issues of:
1. The-rate of return on segments of the system rather than 
on the entire system;
2. Rates of return are calculated based upon a theoretical 
net income; and
3. For the major shipper/owner lines much of the "profit" is an 
accounting transfer among subsidiaries which may or may not have any 
economic meaning.
The Congress, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the 
Department of Justice and now the Department of Energy have all had 
the opportunity to resolve the controversial issues surrounding pipe­
lines. Each of these agencies (except Energy) have in varying degrees 
failed in this obligation. Never have the central issues concerning 
the shipper/owner relationship reached the ultimate forum, a court of 
law. Whether any of the current actions will resolve these issues 
remains to be seen.
While it is the opinion that the 1957-1975 structure of pipe­
lines has been unaltered by governmental intervention, pipeline companies' 
conduct/behavior has been altered as they sought to cope with the time
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and cost of governmental intervention.
Finally, this study has laid the groundwork for future research 
on the functioning of the domestic petroleum industry. Of the issues 
remaining unresolved concerning pipelines, those involving concentra­
tion by region, and the where, when and for whom outside shipments are 
carried, as well as where exchanges take place needs research as does 
the performance side of pipeline activities.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A: ASSETS OF MAJOR 
PETROLEUM COMPANIES
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TABLE Al
ASSETS OF MAJOR UNITED STATES PETROLEUM COMPANIES, 
1957 AND 1976 (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Company Assets
(1957)
Company Assets
(1976)
Standard Oil (NJ) 8.71 Exxon 36.3
Gulf Oil 3.24 Mobil 18.8
Socony Mobil 3.10 Texaco 18.2
Texas Co. 2.73 Standard Oil (CA) 13.8
Standard Oil (IN) 2.54 Gulf 13.4
Shell 1.76 Standard Oil (IN) 11.2
Standard Oil (CA) 1.65 Atlantic Richfield 8.9
Sinclair 1.25 Shell 7.8
Phillips 1.13 Standard Oil (OH) 6.3
Cities Service 1.05 Continental 6.0
Tidewater Oil 0.80 Phillips 5.1
Sun Oil 0.77 Sun 4.8
Atlantic Refining 0.75 Union Oil of CA 4.2
Union Oil of CA 0.67 Cities Service 3.6
Continental Oil 0.60 Getty 3.6
Sunray Mid-Continent 0.54 Marathon Oil 3.0
Pure Oil 0.53 Amerada Hess 2.8
Ohio Oil 0.39 Ashland Oil 2.1
Standard Oil (OH) 0.39 Kerr McGee 1.6
Skelly Oil 0.38 Diamond Shamrock 1.5
SOURCE: Fortune, July, 1958 and May, 1977.
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TABLE A2
INTERNATIONAL MAJOR/MINOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES AND 
SELECTED STATE Ol-JNED COMPANIES,
SALES AND ASSETS, 1976
Company Country Sales Assets 
(Billions of 
Dollars)
Exxon U.S. 48.6 36.3
Royal Dutch/Shell Britain/Netherlands 36.1 29.6
Texaco U.S. 26.5 18.2
Mobil U.S. 26.1 18.8
Standard Oil (CA) U.S. 19.4 13.8
British Petroleum, Ltd.^ Britain 19.1 14.9
Gulf Oil U.S. 16.5 13.4
Minors^
Standard Oil (IN) U.S. 11.5 11.2
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi^ Italy 10.0 12.8
Française des Pétroles^ France 9.9 8.9
Badische Anilin-und Soda Fabrik^ Germany 9.2 6.6
Atlantic Richfield U.S. 8.5 8.9
Continental U.S. 8.0 6.0
Tenneco U.S. 6.4 7.2
Phillips U.S. 5.7 5.1
Occidental U.S. 5.5 3.9
Sun U.S. 5.4 4.8
Union Oil of CA U.S. 5.4 4.2
Ashland U.S. 4.1 2.1
Petrofina S.A. Belgium 4.1 4.7
Cities Service U.S. 4.0 3.6
Amerada-Hess U.S. 3.9 2.8
Marathon U.S. 3.5 3.0
Getty U.S. 3.1 3.6
Standard Oil (OH) U.S. 2.9 6.3
State Owned
National Iranian Oil Iran 19.7 6.5
Petroleos de Venezuela Venezuela 9.1 5.0
ELF-Aquitaine France 7.5 9.8
Petrobras (Petroles Brasileiro) Brazil 7.3 8.3
(Continued)
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TABLE A2 (CONTINUED)
SOURCE: Fortune, May, 1977 and August, 1977.
^The Major/Minor Companies are those shown in Jim I. Sturgeon, 
"Joint Ventures in the International Petroleum Industry: Exploration and 
Drilling" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1974), pp. 197- 
198.
2
Company is partially government owned.
-^Company is government ovmcd.
^Fortune identified company's primary business as being 
chemicals (Fortune, August, 1977, p. 226).
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TABLE B1
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COI-IPANIES THAT TRANSPORTED BOTH CRUDE
PETROLEUM AND REFINED PRODUCTS IN THE Uî^ ITED STATES,
DECEMBER 31, 1975
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company^
Corporate/Ownership 
Changes, 1957-75
AMDEL PIPELINE INC.^
AMDEL INC.
(American Petrofina, Inc., a 
subsidiary of Petrofina, S.A. 
(72%))
None
AMERICA PETROFINA PIPELINE CO.^ 
American Petrofina, Inc. 
(Petrofina, S.A. (72%))
None
AMOCO PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of Indiana
Formerly the Service Pipeline Co.
ARCO PIPELINE COMPANY 
Atlantic Richfield Co.
Formerly the Sinclair Pipeline Co. 
until merger of Sinclair and Atlan­
tic Richfield in 1969. Atlantic 
Pipeline Co. merged into ARCO Pipe­
line Co. in 1971.
ASHLAND PIPELINE COMPANY 
Ashland Oil Co.
None
BUCKEYE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Pennsylvania Co.
Purchased Tucarora Pipeline Co., Ltd 
in 1960. New York Transit and North­
ern Pipeline Co. merged into Company 
in 1965. Pennsylvania Co. purchased 
company in 1964. Buckeye was a pub­
licly traded company from 1957-64.
CHEVRON PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of California
Formerly the Salt Lake Pipeline Co.
In 1970 new company formed by same 
name in Delaware combining the Chevron 
Pipeline Co. (Nevada) and Cal-Ky 
Pipeline Co.
(Continued)
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TABLE B1 (CONTINUED)
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company!
Corporate/Ownership 
Changes, 1957-75
CITIES SERVICE PIPELINE CO. 
Cities Service Co.
Formerly the Empire Pipeline Co. 
Arkansas Pipeline Co. merged into 
company in 1963.
CONTINENTAL PIPELINE COMPANY 
Continental Oil Co.
None
DOME PIPELINE COMPANY 
Dome Petroleum Corp. 
(Dome Petroleum Ltd.)
None
EXXON PIPELINE COMPANY 
EXXON Co., U.S.A. 
Division
Formerly the Humble Pipeline Co. 
Wholly owned subsidiary. Interstate 
Pipeline Co., merged into company in 
1960.
GULF REFINING COMPANY 
Gulf Oil Co.
Purchased the Toronto Pipeline Co. 
. from British-American Oil in 1967. 
(Gulf held a majority interest in 
BA Oil).
MARATHON PIPELINE COMPANY 
Marathon Oil Co. 
(Formerly Ohio Oil Co.)
Illinois Pipeline Co. of Texas, 
Muskegon Pipeline Co., and pipeline 
department of Ohio Oil Co. merged in 
1960. Plymouth Pipeline Co. merged 
in 1962.
MOBIL PIPELINE COMPANY 
Mobil Oil Co.
Formerly the Magnolia Pipeline Co.
PASCO PIPELINE CO. 
PASCO, Inc.
PASCO, Inc. was in 1975 a subsidiary 
of Studebaker-Worthington.
PHILLIPS PIPELINE COMPANY 
Phillips Petroleum Co.
None
PURE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
Union Oil of California
Ute Pipeline Co. merged into Co. in 
1964. Pure Oil merged into Union Oil 
in 1965.
SHAMROCK PIPELINE CORPORATION 
Diamond Shamrock Oil & Gas Co.
Shamrock merged with Diamond Alkali 
in 1967.
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TABLE B1 (CONTINUED)
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company^
Corporate/Ownership 
Changes, 1957-75
SHELL PIPELINE CORPORATION 
Shell Oil Co., U.S.A.
Shell Oil is 69.57% owned by Shell 
Petroleum N.V. which is in turn 
owned by the Royal Dutch Group (60%) 
and the Shell Transport & Trading Co. 
of England (40%).
SKELLY PIPELINE COMPANY 
Skelly Oil Co.
Skelly Co. is controlled by Getty Oil 
Co.3
SOHIO PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of Ohio
Purchased Sun Pipeline Co. of 
Illinois in 1964.
SUN PIPELINE COMPANY 
Sun Oil Co.
None
TEXAS PIPELINE COMPANY 
Texaco, Inc.
None
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport 
Statistics in the United States, Part 6 ; Pipelines, 1957-1975; The 
International Petroleum Register, 1966-67; and Moody's Industrial 
Manual, selected annual issues.
Unless noted, ownership is 100 percent.
In 1971, American Petrofina, Inc. purchased terminal facilities 
and a trunk line system from ARCO Pipeline Co.; in 1973, American Petro­
fina, Inc. purchased interest in crude pipelines from BP OIL CO., a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (Ohio).
^In February of 1977, Skelly Oil was, along with Mission Corpor­
ation, merged into Getty Oil Co.
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TABLE B2
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES THAT TRANSPORTED CRUDE PETROLEUM
IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 31, 1975
Pipeline Company Corporate/Ownership
& Parent Company^ Changes, 1957-75
ACORN PIPELINE COMPANY 
Charter Oil Co.
Nantucket Pipeline Co. transferred 
to Acorn in 1971.
BELL FOURCHE PIPELINE COMPANY 
(Individuals)
None
COOPERATIVE REFINERY ASSOCIATION 
(Since 1964, CRA, Inc.)
Farmland Industries
CRA, Inc. operates a pipeline dept.
CROm-RANCHO PIPELINE CORP. 
Crown Central Petroleum Co.
None
HESS PIPELINE COMPANY
Amerada Hess Petroleum Co.
Prior to 1969, was owned by Hess 
Oil and Chemical Company
KERR-MCGEE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Kerr-McGee
None
KIANTONE PIPELINE CORPORATION 
United Refining Co.
None
MICHIGAN-OHIO PIPELINE CORP. 
Leonard Refineries
Leonard Refineries merged into Total 
Petroleum Ltd. in 1970 and now 
operates as Total Leonard, Inc.
Total Petroleum Ltd. is partially 
owned (44%) by Compagnie Française 
des Petroles S.A.
OWENSBORO-ASHLAND CO. 
Ashland Oil Co.
Formerly an intrastate gathering 
line company.
ÏVESTERN OIL TRANSPORTATION CO. 
Permian Corp.
(Occidental)
None
(Continued)
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TABLE B2 (CONTINUED)
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company^
Corporate/Ownership 
Changes, 1957-75
WESCO PIPELINE COMPANY 
Western Crude Oil Co. 
(Reserve Oil & Gas)
PANOTEX Pipeline Co. was merged into 
WESCO in 1974. Did not represent 
ownership change.
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statis­
tics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; The Interna­
tional Petroleum Register, 1966-67; and Moody's Industrial Manual, 
selected annual issues.
Unless noted, ownership is 100 percent.
TABLE B3
INTERSTATE CORPORATE JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES TUAT TRANSPORTED
CRUDE PETROLEUM IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 31, 1975
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes,
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Ownership, 1975 1957 or entry date
ARAPAHOE PIPELINE COMPANY
Union Oil of California . . . 50.0 
Atlantic Richfield . . . . .50.0
Pure Oil Co............. 50.0
Sinclair Oil Co......... 50.0
Change in ownership is the 
result of the merger of 
parent companies. The com­
pany is operated by the Pure 
Transportation Co. (a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Union 
Oil).
OJU;
BLACKLAKES PIPELINE COMPANY
Atlantic Richfield ........  50.0
Placid Oil Co................ 50.0
Sinclair Oil Co. 
Placid Oil Co. .
50.0 Change in ownership is the
50.0 results of the merger of 
Sinclair and Atlantic Rich­
field in 1969. Placid Oil 
Co. is part of the Hunt 
interests. Company is oper­
ated by ARCO Pipeline Co.
BUTTE PIPELINE COMPANY
Shell....................... 51.0
Murphy Oil Co................ 17.5
Continental Oil Co........... 12.5
Burlington Northern, Inc. . . 10.0 
Western Crude Oil Co.......... 9.0
Shell ............
Murphy Oil Co. . . . 
Continental Oil Co. 
Northern Pacific RR
(Continued)
60.0 Shell sold 9% to Western
17.5 Crude Oil Co. Company is
12.5 operated by the Shell Pipe-
10.0 line Co.
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes,
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Ownership, 1975 1957 or entry date
CHICAP PIPELINE COMPANY 
Union Oil of California 
Clark Oil and Refining 
Standard of Indiana . .
COOK INLET PIPELINE COMPANY
Union Oil of California
48.1 Union Oil of California . 43.4
22.7 Clark Oil and Refining . 33.2
29.2 Standard of Indiana . . . 23.4
EUREKA PIPELINE COMPANY
Universe Ltd.................. 5.7
O t h e r s ..................... 24.9
30.0 Marathon Oil Co. . . . (a)
30.0 Union Oil of California (a)
20.0 Atlantic Richfield. . . (a)
20.0 Mobil Oil Co.......... (a)
Cities Service . . . . (a)
52.0 Elks Refining Co. . . . 22.
17.4 Quaker State ........ 16.
South Penn Oil............ 9.1
O t h e r s ................. 52.3
Company is operated by the 
Pure Transportation Company. 
Change in ownership reflects 
use of pipeline.
(b)
(b)
FOUR CORNERS PIPELINE COMPANY
Shell Oil Co................. 25.0
Standard of California . . . 25.0
Gulf Oil Co.................. 20.0
Atlantic Richfield ........ 10.0
Continental O i l ............. 10.0
Superior O i l ............... 10.0
Shell Oil Co............. 25.0
Standard of California . 25.0
Gulf Oil Co.............. 20.0
Richfield............... 10.0
Continental O i l ......... 10.0
Superior O i l ........... 10.0
Change in ownership the 
results of the merger of 
Atlantic Refining and Rich­
field Oil Co. Shell Pipe­
line Co. operates company.
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (Continued)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
JAYHAWK PIPELINE COMPANY
Colorado Interstate Corp. . 
Farmland Industries . . . .
50.0
50.0
Colorado Interstate Corp. 
Farmland Industries . . .
. 50.0 
. 50.0
None
KAW PIPELINE COMPANY
Cities Service ..........
Phillips ............... .
Texaco ................
33.3
33.3
33.3
Cities Service ........
Phillips ..............
Texaco ................
. 33.3 Operated by the Texas Pipe­
line Co.
KENAI PIPELINE COMPANY
Standard of California . . 
Atlantic Richfield . . . .
50.0
50.0
Standard of California 
Richfield Oil and Gas . .
. 50.0 
. 50.0
Change is the results of 
the merger of Atlantic 
Refining and Richfield.
LAKEHEAD PIPELINE COMPANY 
Interprovincial Pipeline Co. 100.0 Same None
LO
CT>
Imperial Oil, Ltd. . . .  32.8
Gulf Oil Canada, Ltd. . . 7.0
(Gulf Oil)
Shell Canada, Ltd. . . .  2.0
Amoco Canada
(Standard of Indiana) . (a)
O t h e r s ................  (a)
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
MID VALLEY PIPELINE COMPANY
Sun Oil Co................
Standard of Ohio ........
(Gulf Oil owns 9% of Class B
50.0
50.0 
Stock)
Same Sun is the operating agent.
MINNESOTA PIPELINE COMPANY •
Kock Industries ..........
Ashland Oil Co..........
J. Howard Marshall . . . .
59.6
33.3
7.1
Woodley Petroleum . . . .
Sinclair ..............
J. Howard Marshall . . .
40.0
40.0
20.0
Pure Oil acquired Woodley in 
1960. When Sinclair sold 
its interest is unknown.
Union Oil sold its (Pure) 
interest to MPL Financial 
Corp., which in 1973 sold 
its interest to Kock Indus­
tries. Ashland acquired its 
interest in 1970.
U)
Is)
NATIONAL TRANSIT 
Fennzoil . . . 
Whitco Chemical
91.0 Quaker State. . .
9.0 Kendall Refining.
Waverly Oil Works 
South Penn Oil Co. 
Cities Service
(a)
(a)
(a)
(a)
(a)
Bradford Transit purchased 
company in 1965 and now both 
operate as the National 
Transit Co.
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes,
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Ownership, 1975 1957 or entry date
OSAGE PIPELINE CO.
Skelly Oil (Getty) ........ 50.0 Same None
Mobil Oil ................ 20.0
Farmland Industries . . . . 20.0
American Petroflna, Inc. . . 10.0
PALOMA PIPELINE COMPANY
Hunt Interests ............ 30.7 Same Owns an Interest In the Ship
Ashland Oil .............. 25.6 Shoals and White Cap Pipeline
Transocean Oil Co.......... 15.7 Systems
Kewanee Oil Co............. 11.2
Hamilton Bros. Oil ........ 6.8
General Crude Co........... 6.1
Highland Resources ........ 3.9
PLATTE PIPELINE COMPANY
Marathon Oil Co............ 25.0 Ohio Oil Co.............. 25.0 Change In ownership Is the
Atlantic Richfield ........ 25.0 Sinclair ................ 25.0 result of the merger of
Continental Oil Co......... 20.0 Continental Oil Co. . . . 20.0 parents.
Union Oil of CA .......... 15.0 Pure Oil Co.............. 15.0
Gulf Oil .................. 15.0 Toronto Pipeline Co. . . . 15.0
PORTAL PIPELINE COMPANY
Burlington-Northern . . . . 50.0 Great Northern RR . . . . (a) (b)
Hunt Oil Co................ 50.0 Hunt Oil Co.............. (a)
Northwestern Refining . . (a)
U)
U)
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
1957 or entry date •
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
PORTLAND PIPELINE CORPORATION
Montreal Pipeline Co. . . . 100.0 Montreal Pipeline Co. . . 100.0 British Petroleum, Ltd. pur­
Imperial Oil, Ltd........ 32.0 Imperial Oil, Ltd. . . 36.0 chased a 10% interest in
Shell, Canada .......... 16.0 Shell, Canada ........ 18.0 1960. McColl-Frontenac Oil
Texaco Canada .......... 16.0 McColl-Frontenac Oil, was controlled by Texaco and
Gulf Oil, Canada . . . . . 16.0 Ltd................. 18.0 British American Oil by Gulf.
Canadian Petrofina . . . . 10.0 British American Oil,
British Petroleum, Ltd. 10.0 Ltd................. 18.0
Canadian Petrofina . . 10.0
LO
SOUTHCAP PIPELINE COMPANY
Union Oil of C A ..........  64.0
Clark Oil and Refining Co. . 36.0
Same Southcap owns and uses an 
undivided interest in the 
Capline Pipeline System.
TECUMSEH PIPELINE COMPANY
Union Oil of C A ..........  40.0
Atlantic Richfield ........  40.0
Ashland Oil Co.............  20.0
Pure Oil Co.............  40.0
Sinclair Oil Co.........  40.0
Ashland Oil Co..........  20.0
Change in ownership is result 
of the merger of parent com­
panies. Company was operated 
by Sinclair and now operated 
by ARGO Pipeline Co.
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Ownership, 1975 1957 or entry date
TEXAS-NEW MEXICO PIPELINE COMPANY
Texaco................45.0
Atlantic Richfield ........  35.0
Getty Oil..............10.0
Cities Service ............  10.0
TEXOMA PIPELINE COMPANY
Sun Oil Co.............25.0
Reserve Oil and Gas....20.0
Mobil O i l ............10.1
Kerr-McGee............10.1
Skelly (Getty) ............  10.1
United Refining Co...  7.0
Texas Eastern Trans . . . .  5.0
Rock Island Refinery . . . .  5.0
Lion O i l .........   5.0
Bicker Petroleum Corp. . . .  2.7
Texaco.................. 45.0
Sinclair................ 35.0
Tidewater Oil............ 10.0
Cities Service ........  10.0
Same
Change in ownership is result 
of merger of parent companies. 
Texas Pipeline Co. is operat­
ing agent.
None u>o\
L n
TRANS MOUNTAIN OIL PIPELINE COMPANY 
Trans Mountain Oil Pipeline
Co., Ltd.................... 100.0
Imperial Oil, Ltd........  8.6
Standard Oil of British
Columbia, Ltd............  8.6
Shell, Canada ..........  8.6
Gulf Oil, Canada........  8.6
Trans Mountain Oil Pipeline
Co., Ltd.............. 100.0
Standard Oil (NJ). . . 8.7
Standard Oil (CA). . . 8.7
Shell...............  8.7
G ul f ...............  8.7
Union...............  6.7
(c) (b)
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company 
Participants,and Percent 
Œmership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
Trans Mountain Oil Pipeline Company
(Continued)
Amoco, Canada ............ (a) Richfield ............ 3.3
Others.................... (a) Independents..........
Others................
16.6
38.6
NEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE COMPANY
Gulf Oil.................... 57.7 Gulf Oil.............. 57.7 Change in ownership is the
Sun Oil .................... 12.6 Sun Oil .............. 12.6 result of the merger of
Cities Service ............ 11.4 Cities Service........ parent companies. Company is
Standard of Ohio............ 9.2 Standard of Ohio. . . . 9.2 operated by Gulf.
Union Oil of CA ............ 9.1 Pure Oil.............. 9.1
WHITE SHOAL PIPELINE COMPANY
Kerr McGee ................
Cabot Corp. . . .  ..........
Case-Pomeroy Oil Corp. . . . 
Felmont Oil Corp............
64.5
16.1
9.7
9.7
Same None
OJ
a>
SOURCE: data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statistics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975;
USA Oil Directory, 1973-1976; Directory of Pipe Line Companies and Pipeline Contractors, 1953-1976;
The Oil and Gas Journal, 1957-1975. Data was cross checked against Ownership data published in con­
gressional hearings and prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission; data prepared by the Association 
of Oil Pipe Lines; the International Petroleum Register, 1966-67; Moody’s Industrial Manual, selected
(Continued)
TABLE B3 (CONTINUED)
annual issues. Additional data came from a variety of sources, such as the Tulsa Daily World, Tulsa 
Tribune, and Prospectus and Annual Reports of Petroleum and Pipeline Companies.
^Percent ownership not available.
^Date and sequence of changes is unknown.
^Ownership data shoym by Cookenboo in Crude Oil Pipe Lines and Competition in the Oil Industry,
p. 42.
UJ
Ch
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TABLE B4
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMP.\NIES THAT TRANSPORTED REPINED PRODUCTS
IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 31, 1975
Pipeline Company Corporate/Ownership
& Parent Company^ Changes, 1957-75
AIRFORCE PIPELINE, INC.
Southern Railway
ALLEGHENY PIPELINE COMPANY
Texas Eastern Transmission Co.
None
None
AMERICAN PETROFINA COMPANY OF 
TEXAS
American Petrofina, Inc.
CALNEV PIPELINE COMPANY 
Union Pacific Railroad
CROWN CENTRAL PIPELINE AND 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
Crown Central Petroleum
Petrofina, S.A., Brussels, Belgium 
o\-ms 72% of American Petrofina, Inc.
Since 1970 operated by Champlin 
Petroleum Co. (Since 1970, Champlin 
has been a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Union Pacific. Prior to 1970 
and from 1964, Champlin was a part 
of the Celanese Corp. of America.)
None
DIAMOND SHAMROCK OIL AND 
GAS COMPANY (Pipeline Dept.)
EMERALD PIPELINE CORPORATION 
Emerald Corp.
(Diamond Shamrock)
Formerly the Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. 
until merger in 1967 with Diamond 
Alkali.
Emerald Corp. was a subsidiary of 
Shamrock Oil and Gas Co. until 1967 
when Shamrock merged with Diamond 
Alkali.
GETTY PIPELINE COMPANY 
Getty Oil
HYDROCARBON TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
Northern Gas Products Co.
Formerly Tide-water Pipeline Co., Ltd.
None
JET LINES, INC. 
(Individuals)
None
(Continued)
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TABLE B4 (CONTINUED)
Pipeline Company^ Corporate/Ownership
& Parent Company Changes, 1957-75
KANEB PIPELINE COMPANY 
Kaneb Services, Inc.
MID-AMERICA PIPELINE COMPANY 
Independent
OHIO RIVER PIPELINE COMPANY 
Ashland Oil Co.
Augusta Pipeline Co. merged into 
Kaneb in 1960.
Name changed to MAPCO in 1968.
Formerly a joint venture between 
Ashland Oil Co. (50.0) and
Standard Oil (Ohio) (50.0). 
Ashland purchased Ohio interest in 
1972.
OKAN PIPELINE COMPANY 
Gulf Oil
Control in 1957 by Gulf was via 
Warren Petroleum Co. (The Warren 
Co. and the Warren Employee Pension 
Trust were the sole owners of Okan.)
OKIE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Kock Industries
None
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
(Pipeline Department)
POTOER RIVER CORPORATION 
Phillips Petroleum Co.
51.0% of Co. is held by First National 
Bank of N.Y., trustee for Phillips 
retirement income plan.
SANTA FE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Chanslor-Western Oil and 
Development Co.
(AT & SF Railway System)
SOUTHERN PACIFIC PIPELINE CO. 
Southern Pacific Co.
None
None
SUN PIPELINE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN 
Sun Oil Company
TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORP. 
(Products Division)
None
Project Five Pipeline Corp. merged 
into Corp. in 1959.
(Continued)
370
TABLE B4 (CONTINUED)
Pipeline Company Corporate/Ownership
& Parent Company^ Changes, 1957-75
TRANS-OHIO PIPELINE COMPANY 
Texas Eastern Transmission 
Corp.
UCAR PIPELINE, INC.
Union Carbide Corp.
RTIST EMERALD PIPELINE CORP. 
Emerald Corp.
(Diamond Shamrock)
None
None
Change in ownership results of 
merger of Shamrock and Diamond 
Alkali.
WILLIAMS PIPELINE COMPANY 
Williams Companies
Purchased Great Lakes Pipeline Co, 
in 1966. Operated as Williams 
Brothers Pipeline Co. until 1974.
SOURCE; Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport 
Statistics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; The 
International Petroleum Register, 1966-67; and Moody's Industrial Manual, 
selected annual issues.
^Unless noted, ownership is 100 percent.
TABLE B5
INTERSTATE CORPORATE JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES
THAT TRANSPORTED REFINED PRODUCTS IN THE
UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 31, 1975
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
BADGER PIPELINE COMPANY 
Atlantic Richfield . . . 
Cities Service . . . . ,
Texaco ................
Union Oil of California.
34.0 Sinclair............  34.0
32.0 Cities Service . . . .  32.0
22.0 Texaco..............  22.0
12.0 Pure Oil Co..........  12.0
Change in ownership is the 
result of merger of parent 
companies. Operated by Cities 
Service Pipeline Company.
U)
CHASE TRANSPORTATION CO. 
Chase Pipeline Co. . . 
Skelly (Getty) . . . .
50.0
50.0
Same Chase Pipeline Company is an 
intrastate joint venture cor­
poration owned by Kock Oil 
Co. (50%) and Skelly (Getty) 
operated by Kock Oil.
CHEYENNE PIPELINE COMPANY 
(Both crude and product) 
Nielson Enterprise, Inc.
(Managing Partner) 
Geoli Investment Co. . . 
Ecodor Investment Co.
33.3
33.3
33.3
Same Formerly the Wyoming-Nebraskn 
Pipeline Co. until 1966 when it 
was purchased by Nielson Enter­
prise, Inc. (now a partnership).
(Continued)
TABLE B5 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes,
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Œmership, 1975 1957 or entry date
COLLINS PIPELINE COMPANY
Tenneco, Inc.........
Murphy Oil Corp. . . .
COLONIAL PIPELINE
Gu l f ................
Standard of Indiana. .
Texaco ..............
Cities Service . . . .
Mobil ..............
Standard of Ohio . . .
Continental..........
Phillips ............
Union Oil of CA . . .  
Atlantic Richfield . .
80.0
20.0
Same
16.8 G u l f ................... . . 14.9
14.3 Standard of Indiana. . . 13.6
14.3 Texaco ............ . . 15.9
14.0 Cities Service . . . . . 15.3
11.5 Mobil.............. . . 10.5
9.0 Continental........ . . 3.7
7,5 Phillips .......... . . 11.0
7.1 Pure Oil .......... . . 4.4
4.0 Sinclair .......... . . 10.7
1.6
None
Change in ownership is the 
result of: Merger of parent 
companies; purchase of an 
Interest by B. P. Oil Co.
(now a subsidiary of Stand­
ard of Ohio under the merger 
agreement with British Petrol­
eum Company, Ltd.); change in 
percent ownership of the 
original participants in 1970 
which reflects the use of the 
pipeline from ,1962-70.
U)'Jto
DIXIE PIPELINE COMPANY
Gulf O i l ..................... 18.2
Phillips..................... 14.5
Standard of I n d i a n a......... 12.1
E x x o n ....................... 11.1
Union Texas Petroleum..........8.6
Atlantic Richfield ..........  7.4
Same Union Texas Petroleum is a 
division of Allied Chemical 
Corporation. Operated by 
Exxon Pipeline Company.
(Continued)
TABLE B5 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Oïfnership, 1975 1957 or entry date
Dixie Pipeline Company (Continued)
Shell...............   5.5
Cities Service ............  5.0
Texaco......................  5.0
Mobil......................  5.0
Continental........... •. . . 4.0
Transcontinental Gas Pipe 
Line Corporation..........  3.6
EXPLORER PIPELINE COMPANY
Shell........................ 26.0
G u l f ........................ 16.7
T e x a c o ...................... 16.0
Marathon...................... 10.0
Sun O i l ....................  9.4
Continental................  7.7
Cities Service..............  6.8
Phillips....................  4.5
APCO Oil Co r p ..............  2.9
LAKE CHARLES PIPELINE COMPANY
Continental.................. 50.0
Cities Service................ 50.0
LAUREL PIPELINE COMPANY
Gulf.......................... 49.1
Shell.................. 26.0
G u l f .................. 26,7
T e x a c o ................ 16.0
Sun O i l ..............  9.4
Continental..........  7.7
Cities Service........  6.8
Phillips..............  4.5
APCO Oil C o r p ........  2.9
Same
Gulf........
(Continued)
40.0
U>
Lo
Gulf sold a 10% interest to 
Marathon in 1974.
Operated by Continental 
Pipeline Company
Operated by Gulf. Change in 
ownership result of merger of
TABLE B5 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes,
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
CXfnership, 1975 1957 or entry date
Laurel Pipeline Company (Continued)
Texaco....................  33.9
Standard of Ohio  ........  17.0
OLYMPIC PIPELINE COMPANY '
Shell.................  . . 43.5
Mobil...................... 29.5
Texaco....................  27.0
PIONEER PIPELINE COMPANY
Continental................  80.0
Pasco, Inc................   20.0
(Studebaker-Worthington)
Sinclair 
Texaco .
Same
Continental
Sinclair
35.0 Sinclair and Atlantic Rich-
25.0 field and required sale of 
part of Sinclair assets.
Operated by Mobil Pipeline 
Co.
65.0 Atlantic Richfield sold its
35.0 interest to Pasco in 1972. 
Pasco, in 1973, sold 15% 
interest to Conoco. Oper­
ated by Continental Pipeline 
Co.
U)
-S'
PLANTATION PIPELINE COMPANY
E x x o n ....................  48.8
Standard of California . . .  27.1
S h e l l ....................  24.0
TEXACO-CITIES SERVICE 
(Both crude and product)
Standard of New Jersey 
Standard of Kentucky . 
Shell ..............
(Continued)
48.8 Standard of California
27.1 became a participant in 1961
24.0 when it acquired Standard of
Kentucky.
TABLE B5 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes,
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Ownership, 1975 1957 or entry date
Texaco-Cities Service (Continued)
Texaco................  50.0
Cities Service ............  50.0
TOST SHORES PIPELINE COMPANY
Shell • . . 20.0
Standard of Indiana. . . . . 15.5
M o b i l ................  14.0
Texaco................  9.0
Marathon..............  9.0
Cities Service ............  8.0
Clark Oil & Refining . . . .  8.0
Continental............  6.5
U n i o n ................  5.5
E x x o n ................  3.5
WOLVERINE PIPELINE COMPANY
Union Oil of CA . . . . . .  26.0
M o b i l ................  21.0
Texaco................  17.0
Clark Oil & Refining . . . .  11.0
Marathon..............  10.0
Cities Service ............  8.0
S h e l l ................  7.0
Same
Same
Shell.................. 40.0
Cities Service.......... 35.0
Texaco.................. 25.0
Operated by Texas Pipeline 
Co.
Standard of Indiana (via 
American Oil) is operator. 
Union holds Interest pre­
viously held by Pure Oil.
Operated by Shell Pipeline 
Co. In 1968 Union purchased 
26% of Co.
(Continued)
TABLE B5 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes 
1957-75
\nCO PIPELINE COMPANY
Texaco ....................
Standard of Indiana . . . .  
Mobil . ..................
40.0
40.0
20.0
Same Operated 
Go.
by Amoco Pipeline
YELLOWSTONE PIPELINE COMPANY
E x x o n ...............
Continental................
Union Oil of California. . .
40.0
40.0
20.0
Standard of New Jersey
Continental ..........
Husky Oil ............
Union Oil of CA . . . .
40.0
40.0
6.0
14.0
Operated
Pipeline
by Continental 
Co. U)
■^i
o\
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statistics in the United States, Part 6 ; Pipelines, 1957-1975; 
USA Oil Directory, 1973-1976; Directory of Pipe Line Companies and Pipeline Contractors, 1953-1976; 
The Oil and Gas Journal, 1957-1976. Data was cross checked against Ownership data published in 
congressional hearings and prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission; data prepared by the 
Association of Oil Pipe Lines; the International Petroleum Register, 1966-67, Moody's Industrial 
Manual, selected annual issues, Moody's Transportation Manual, selected annual issues. Additional 
data came from a variety of sources, such as the Tulsa Daily World, Tulsa Tribune, and Prospectus 
and Annual Reports of Petroleum and Pipeline Companies.
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TABLE B6
JOINT VENTURE SYSTEMS THAT TRANSPORTED
CRUDE OIL IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975
Joint Venture System, Operating Agent
Participants, and and Significant Pipeline
Percent Ownership Changes, 1957-75 Mileage
BASIN PIPELINE SYSTEM Operated by Texas Pipeline Co. 517
Texaco .......... 46.0 Atlantic Richfield now owns
Shell .......... 30.9 Sinclair's former interest.
Atlantic Richfield 14.3
Cities Service . . 8.8
CAPLINE PIPELINE SYSTEM Southcap is owned jointly by 650
Southcap Pipeline Co 20.6 Union Oil of California (64.0)
Ashland.......... 18.7 and Clark Oil and Refining (36.0)
Texaco .......... 18.0 Mid Valley Pipeline Co. is owned
Shell .......... 14.4 jointly by Sun Oil (50.0) and
Marathon ........ 9.6 Standard of Ohio (50.0). System
Standard of IN . . 9.6 is operated by Shell Pipeline Co.
Mid Valley Pipeline 9.1
CAPWOOD PIPELINE SYSTEM In 1969, Shell purchased Capwood 57
Shell .......... 80.0 from Marathon and sold 20% to
Clark Oil and Ref. 20.0 Clark. Operated by Shell Pipe­
line Company.
CHEROKEE PIPELINE SYSTEM
Continental . . . (a) Formerly a corporate joint venture, p 1445
A PC O ............ (a) System is operated by Continental c 417
Pipeline Co. and owns majority g 436
interest in system.
CUSHING-CHICAGO PIPELINE 
SYSTEM
Atlantic Richfield 71.4
Union Oil of CA. . 28.6
Operated by Arco Pipeline Company 
Shares were previously held by 
Sinclair and Pure.
711
EAST CAMERON BLOCK 321 
PIPELINE SYSTEM
Marathon Oil . . . (a)
Amerada Hess . . . (a)
Operated by Marathon Pipeline Co. 32
(Continued)
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TABLE B6 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture System, Operating Agent
Participants, and and Significant Pipeline
Percent Ownership Changes, 1957-75 Mileage
EAST TEXAS MAIN LINE SYS.
Texaco.......... 63.5
Cities Service . . 36.5
Operated by Texas Pipeline Company. 
Tidal Pipeline originally had an 
interest which was sold to Crown 
Central (20.0). Crown Central 
sold its interest to other two 
participants between 1973 and 
April, 1975.
177
EL PASO-WARPIELD PRODUCTS SYS. 
Standard Oil Co. (CA) (a) 
Texaco, Inc.......... (a)
MESA PIPELINE SYSTEM
Gulf..........
Cities Service . 
Standard of Ohio 
Union Oil of CA 
Sun............
61.0
14.5
9.5
8.8
6.2
Operated by Chevron Pipeline Co.
Operated by Gulf. Pure Oil held 
interest prior to merger with 
Union Oil of California.
255
80
NEALE PIPELINE SYSTEM
Standard of Ohio . . 70.0
Amdel Pipeline Co. . 30.0
OZARK PIPELINE SYSTEM
S h e l l ........ 55.0
Texaco........ 45.0
Sohio Pipeline Company is operator, c-71 
Amdel is o^med by American Petro- g-49
fina. Inc.
Operated by Shell Pipeline Co. 441
PALINE SYSTEM
Standard of Ohio . .70.0 
Amdel Pipeline Co. . 30.0
RANCHO PIPELINE SYSTEM'
Shell ..........
Atlantic Richfield 
Standard of IN . 
Phillips . . . .  
Acorn Pipeline Co 
Ashland . . . .  
Crown Rancho . .
40.0
23.7
7.3 
8.0
9.3 
6.0 
5.7
(See Neale System)
Operated by Shell Pipeline Co.
Acorn Pipeline Company is owned by 
Charter Oil Company. Croira Rancho 
is owned by Crown Central Petroleum. 
Atlantic Richfield's interest was 
previously o^med by Sinclair.
190
460
(Continued)
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TABLE B6 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture System, Operating Agent
Participants, and and Significant Pipeline
Percent Ownership Changes, 1957-75 Mileage
SARNIA PIPELINE SYSTEM
Dome Petroleum Corp. (a) Operated by Dome Pipeline Corp.
Standard Oil Co. (IN) (a)
SHIP SHOAL PIPELINE CO Operated by Shell Oil Company.
Shell ............ 42.5 Paloma Pipeline Co. is a corpor­
Union Oil of CA . . 40.0 ate joint venture.
Paloma Pipeline Co. 17.5
STERLING PIPELINE SYSTEM Arapahoe is a corporate joint
Toronto (Gulf) . . 50.0 venture. Data is for 1957, no
Shell ............ 33.3 record of system after 1967.
Arapahoe.......... 16.7
TEXAS-EMPIRE-TIDAL Operated by Texas Pipeline Co.
Texaco .......... 80.0 (May no longer be operating.)
Crown Central . . . 20.0
TRANS ALASKA PIPELINE SYSTEM
Standard (OH) and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
British Petroleum. 49.18 is building and will operate
Atlantic Richfield 21.00 system for owners.
Exxon .......... 20.00
Mobil .......... 5.00
Union Oil of CA. . 1.66
Phillips ........ 1.66
Amerada Hess . . . 1.50
VENTURE PIPELINE SYSTEM
G u l f ............ 17.0 Operated by Union Oil of California
Texaco............ 17.0 (Intrastate System)
Union Oil of CA . . 17.0
Mobil ............ 17.0
Continental . . . . 8.0
Cities Service. . . 8.0
Sun Oil .......... 7.0
Superior.......... 5.0
Marathon.......... 4.0
c 4 
P 9
107
64
800
17
(Continued)
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TABLE B5 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Systems 
Participants, and 
Percent Ownership
Operating Agent 
and Significant 
Changes, 1957-75
Pipeline
Mileage
WHITE CAP PIPELINE SYSTEM 
Union Oil of CA . . 53.3 Operated by Pure Transportation 44
Paloma .......... 33.3 Company. Both Paloma and White
White Shoal Pipeline 13.3 Shoals are corporate joint ven­
tures .
WOODPOT PIPELINE SYSTEM
T e x a c o .......... 60.0
Marathon........ 40.0
Operated by Marathon Pipeline Co. 55
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statis­
tics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; USA Oil Direc­
tory, 1973-1976; Directory of Pipe Line Companies and Pipeline Contrac­
tors, 1953-1976; The Oil and Gas Journal, 1957-1976. Data was cross 
checked against Ownership data published in congressional hearings and 
prepared by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission; the International Petroleum Register, 1966-67, 
Moody's Industrial Manual, selected annual issues, Moody's Transportation 
Manual, selected annual issues. Additional data came from a variety of 
sources, such as the Tulsa Daily World, Tulsa Tribune, and Prospectus and 
Annual Reports of Petroleum and Pipeline Companies.
^Percent ownership not available.
System has three segments with varying percent ownership in each 
segment. Percents shown are average for the three segments.
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TABLE B7
INTERSTATE JOINT VENTURE SYSTEMS THAT TRANSPORTED
REFINED PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES,
DECEMBER 31, 1975
Joint Venture System, Operating Agent
Participants, and and Significant Pipeline
Percent Ownership Changes, 1957-75 Mileage
ATA PRODUCT SYSTEM 
Phillips Petroleum . . 33.3
Texaco................ 33.3
Diamond Shamrock . . .  33.3
Operated by Diamond Shamrock's 
subsidiary. West Emerald Pipe­
line Company.
296
BAYOU PIPELINE SYSTEM
Marathon O i l .......... 33.8
Crown Central.......... 29.2
Atlantic Richfield . . 21.5
Shell Oil.............. 15.5
In 1963, Standard of Indiana and 
Pure Oil sold their interest to 
the remaining four. System is 
leased and operated by Plantation 
Pipeline Company.
256
BORGER-DENVER PRODUCTS 
PIPELINE SYSTEM
Phillips ............
Diamond Shamrock . . .
81.1
18.9
Operated by Phillips Pipeline Co. 319
CASA PRODUCTS PIPELINE 
SYSTEM
Gulf Oil ............
Atlantic Richfield . .
50.3
49.7
CROWN-SHELL-BAYTOWN 
FEEDER LINE
Crown Central.......... 65.7
Shell Oil.............. 34.3
EVANGELINE PIPELINE SYSTEM 
(as of 1957)
G u l f .................. 40.5
Texas Company.......... 23.7
Sinclair.............. 20.4
Teche Pipeline Co. . . 15.3
(Pure 68.0)
(Cities Service 32.0)
Atlantic Richfield's interest was 
held previously by Sinclair. 
Operated by ARCO Pipeline Co.
Operated by Shell Pipeline Co.
249
14
In 1957, this system tendered 
products to the Plantation Pipe­
line Co. The Texas Pipeline Co. 
was operator. No record after 1963,
196
(Continued)
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TABLE B7 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture System, 
Participants, and 
Percent Ownership
Operating Agent 
and Significant 
Changes, 1957-75
Pipeline
Mileage
GROVES TO NEDERLAND, 
TEXAS PIPELINE SYSTEM 
Atlantic Richfield . . 
Union Oil of CA . . .
50.0
50.0
Operated by Atlantic Pipeline 
Co. (may no longer be in 
operation).
23
HARBOR PRODUCTS 
Standard of Ohio . . .
Texaco ..............
Gulf Oil ............
33.3
33.3
33.3
Standard of Ohio acquired part 
of interest previously held by 
Sinclair. Remaining interest 
was redistributed so that all 
participants held one-third 
interest. Operated by Sohio 
Pipeline Company.
81
JAY PIPELINE SYSTEM
Exxon................
Standard Oil of CA . .
Sun Oil..............
Louisiana Land & Expl. 
Company
(a)
(a)
(a)
(a)
Operated by Exxon 9
L & L PIPELINE SYSTEM 
Buckeye Pipeline Co. . 
Texas Eastern Trans­
mission Corp . . . .
50.0
50.0
Operated by Buckeye 96
MEDICINE BOW PRODUCTS 
Pasco Pipeline Co. . . 
(controlled by Stude­
baker-Worthington, Inc 
in 1975)
100.0 Prior to 1972, system was owned 205 
equally by Atlantic Richfield &
Skelly Oil. Pasco acquired 
Atlantic Richfield's interest in 
1972 & Skelly's in 1973 (may no 
longer be operating as a system) .
NEW HOPE SYSTEM
Crown Central........
Texaco ..............
50.0
50.0
Operated by Texas Pipeline Co. 
(May no longer be in operation.
42
)
PORT ARTHUR PRODUCTS
Texaco ..............
Gulf Oil ............
Union of CA..........
43.4
31.4 
25.2
Union of California holds 
interest previously held by 
Pure Oil. Operated by Texas 
Pipeline Company
Terminal
Pacilitie;
(Continued)
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TABLE B7 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture System, 
Participants, and 
Percent Ownership
Operating Agent 
and Significant 
Changes, 1957-75
Pipeline
Mileage
PRODUCTS PIPELINE SYSTEM 
Texas Eastern Trans­
mission Corp....  50.0
Mobil O i l ......  50.0
SAAL PRODUCTS PIPELINE SYSTEM
Phillips 33.3
Diamond Shamrock. . . 33.3
T e x a c o ........  33.3
(May no longer be in 
operation.)
Operated by Shamrock Pipeline 
Company (a subsidiary of 
Diamond Shamrock).
180
181
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statis­
tics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; USA Oil 
Directory, 1973-1976; Directory of Pipe Line Companies and Pipeline 
Contractors, 1953-1976; The Oil and Gas Journal, 1957-1976. Data was 
cross checked against ownership data published in congressional hearings 
and prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission; data prepared by the 
Association of Oil Pipe Lines; the International Petroleum Register, 
1966-67, Moody's Industrial Manual, selected annual issues, Moody's 
Transportation Manual, selected annual issues. Additional data came 
from a variety of sources, such as the Tulsa Daily World, Tulsa Tribune, 
and Prospectus and Annual Reports of Petroleum and Pipeline Companies.
^Percent ownership not available.
TABLE B8
INTRASTATE CORPORATE JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES
DECEMBER 31, 1975 (Includes both crude and product pipelines)
Joint Venture Company, Participants and Significant Changes
Participants, and Percent Percent Ownership, 1957-75
Œfnership, 1975 1957 or entry date
ARBUCKLE PIPELINE COMPANY 
(Product only)
Skelly (Getty) ..............  66.7
S u n ....................  33.3
CHANSLOR-WESTERN OIL AND 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
(Product only)
Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railroad..............  50.0
South Pacific..............  50.0
CHASE PIPELINE COMPANY
Kock Oil Co................  50.0
Skelly (Getty) ............  50.0
EVERGLADES PIPELINE COMPANY
Buckeye....................  41.0
Cities Service ............  39.0
Union of California........  10.0
Phillips..................  10.0
S k e l l y ................ 33.3
S u n .................... 33.3
Continental............ 33.3
Same
Same
Buckeye................ 41.0
Cities Service.......... 39.0
Pure.................... 10.0
Phillips................ 10.0
In 1973 Skelly increased its 
interest by purchase of Conti­
nental's 33.3%. Operated by 
Skelly Pipeline Co.
None
None
Change in ownership is the 
result of merger of parent 
companies only.
Buckeye is operator.
(Continued)
TABLE B8 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Oimership, 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
INLAND CORPORATION 
(Product only)
Standard of Ohio ............ 46.8 Standard of Ohio. . . . 50.0 Sun Oil purchased a 10.0%
Shell........................ 27.0 Shell ................ 30.0 interest in Corp. in 1967.
Union Oil of California. . . . 
Sun Oil ....................
MASSACHUSETTS PIPELINE COMPANY 
(Product only)
16.2
10.0
Pure.................. 20.0
Exxon........................
Shell........................
MIAMI VALLEY
66.7
33.3
Same None
Standard of Ohio ............ 50.0 Standard of Ohio. . . . 80.0 Change in ownership is the
Union Oil of California. . . .
OWENSBORO-ASHLAND CORPORATION 
(Crude gathering only)
50.0 Pure.................. 20.0 result of the merger of 
Union and Pure and also the 
purchase of 30% from 
Standard of Ohio.
Ashland Oil..................
PIPELINES OF PUERTO RICO 
(Product only)
100.0 Ashland Oil ..........
Standard Oil (Ohio) . .
50.0
50.0 In 1965 Ashland purchased 
Standard of Ohio's interest. 
In 1974 company began inter­
state operation.
Shell Co. (P.R.), Ltd........ 40.0 Same
(Continued)
None
oj
COUi
TABLE B8 (CONTINUED)
Joint Ventur Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
195 7 or entry date
Significant Changes 
1957-75
Pipelines of Puerto Rico Continued
Texaco.................   40.0
Commonwealth Oil and 
Refining....................... 20.0
PROMIX 
(product only)
Getty O i l ..............  33.3
Placid O i l ..................... 33.3
Wanda Petroleum................. 33.3
Same None
w
CO
SAN DIEGO PIPELINE COMPANY 
(Product only)
Pacific Petroleum Pipeline Co. 
(Subsidiary of Southern
Pacific)..................... 50.0
Chanslor-Western Oil and 
Development Co. (Subsidiary 
of Santa Fe)................... 50.0
SLEEPING TURTLE 
(Crude only)
Tenneco......................... 50.0
CATC Group..................... 50.0
RIVER PIPELINE COMPANY
American Petrofina ............  50.0
Cosden Pension Plan............. 50.0
Same None
Same
Same
None
None
(Continued)
TABLE B8 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and Percent 
Ownership, 1975
Participants and 
Percent Ownership, 
1957 or entry date
Significant Changes, 
1957-75
WASCANA PIPELINE COMPANY
Reserve Oil & Gas ........ . . 33.3 Same None
Gibson Petroleum ........ . . 33.3
Murphy .................... . . 33.3
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Association of Oil Pipe Lines;
Moody's Industrial Manual, selected annual issues; USA Oil Directory, 1973-1976; and The Oil and
Gas Journal, 1957-1976. ^
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TABLE B9
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES THAT TRANSPORTED BOTH CRUDE PETROLEUM
AND REFINED PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1957-1974
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company!
Reason Pipeline Company No Longer 
Reports to The Interstate Commerce 
Commission
ATLANTIC PIPELINE COMPANY 
Atlantic Refining Co.
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of New Jersey
MAGNOLIA PIPELINE COMPANY 
Socony Mobil Co.
NAVAJO REFINING COMPANY
OHIO OIL COMPANY (Pipeline 
Division) (Now Marathon Oil Co.)
SALT LAKE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of California
SERVICE PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of Indiana
SHOSHONE PIPELINE COMPANY LTD .
SINCLAIR PIPELINE COMPANY 
Sinclair Oil Co.
In 1966, Atlantic Refining and Rich­
field merged. Pipelines merged into 
ARCO Pipeline Co. in 1970.
Merged into Humble Pipeline Co. in
1960.
Socony Mobil's central pipeline 
division merged into Pipeline Co. in
1959. Name changed to Mobil Pipe­
line Co.
Acquired facilities from Continental 
Pipeline Co. which was under court 
order to sell facilities. Has not 
filed ICC report since 1971.
Division was merged into Marathon 
Pipeline Co. in 1961.
Merged into Chevron Pipeline Co. in 
1966.
Named changed to Amoco Pipeline Co.
Tariffs adopted and cancelled by 
Husky Oil Co. in 1967.
Purchased LTieat Belt Pipeline Co. in 
1961. Merged into ARCO Pipeline Co. 
in 1969.
SUN PIPELINE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS 
Sun Oil Co.
Sold to Sohio Pipeline Co. in 1964.
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statis­
tics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; The International 
Petroleum Register, 1966-67; and Moody's Industrial Manual, selected 
annual issues.
ItUnless noted, ownership is 100 percent.
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TABLE BIO
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES THAT TRANSPORTED
CRUDE OIL IN THE UNITED STATES^ 1957-74
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company!
Reason Pipeline Company No Longer 
Reports to The Interstate Commerce 
Commission
ARKANSAS PIPELINE CORPORATION 
Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. 
(Cities Service)
BELL CREEK PIPELINE COMPANY 
(a)
BIGHEART TRANSPORTATION COMPAITY 
(a)
B.P. EASTERN PIPELINE COMPANY 
British Petroleum Co.
CAL-KY PIPELINE COMPANY
Standard Oil of California
FAIRVIEW PIPELINE COMPANY 
(a)
GENERAL AMERICAN PIPELINE CO. 
General American Oil Co.
GREAT NORTHERN PIPELINE CO.
(a)
Company merged into Cities Service 
in 1963.
Merged with Fairview Pipeline Co. 
and name changed to Wesco Pipeline 
Co. in 1972.
Relieved of filing in 1972 by ICC.
Tariffs of B.P. were adopted by 
Sohio Pipeline Co., 1-1-71.
Merged into Chevron Pipeline Co. 
in 1969.
Merged with Bell Creek in 1969.
No longer engaged in interstate 
commerce.
Acquired by Portal Pipeline Co. 
in 1972.
ILLINOIS PIPELINE COMPANY OF TEXAS Merged into Marathon Pipeline Co, 
Ohio Oil Co. (Now Marathon Oil in 1960.
Co.)
NANTUCKET PIPELINE COMPANY 
Eastern States Petroleum 
Corp.
NEW YORK TRANSIT, INC. 
Buckeye Pipeline Co.
Nantucket Pipeline Co. facilities 
transferred to Acorn in 1971. Oxmed 
an undivided interest in the Rancho 
Pipeline System.
Merged into Buckeye in 1965. 
(Continued)
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TABLE BIO (CONTINUED)
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company^
Reason Pipeline Company No Longer 
Reports to The Interstate Commerce 
Commission
NORTHERN PIPELINE CO. Merged into Buckeye in 1965.
Buckeye Pipeline Co.
PANOTEX PIPELINE COMPANY Merged into WESCO Pipeline Co. in
Western Crude Oil 1974.
(Reserve Oil & Gas)
PLYMOUTH PIPELINE COMPANY Acquired by Ohio Oil Co. and name
Plymouth Oil Co. changed to Marathon Pipeline Co.
SOCONY MOBIL (CENTRAL Merged into Magnolia Pipeline Co.
PIPELINE DIVISION) (Now Mobil Pipeline Co.)
TIDAL PIPELINE COMPANY (b)
Tide water Oil Co.
(Controlled by Getty Oil Co.)
TORONTO PIPELINE CWO'ANY Purchased by Gulf in 1967
British-American Oil Co.
UTE PIPELINE COMPANY Taken over by Pure Transportation
Pure Oil Co. Co. (Now part of Union Oil of
California.)
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport 
Statistics in the United States, Part 6: Pipelines, 1957-1975; The 
International Petroleum Register, 1966-67; and Moody's Industrial 
Manual, selected annual issues.
^Ownership is unknown. 
^Reason is unknown.
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TABLE Bll
INTERSTATE CORPORATE JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES THAT 
TRANSPORTED CRUDE OIL IN THE UNITED STATES, 1957-74
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and 
Percent Ownership
Reason Pipeline Company 
No Longer Reports to 
Interstate Commerce Commission
BRADFORD TRANSIT COMPANY
South Penn Oil Co......... 50.0
Tidewater Oil Co.......... 50.0
GLACIER PIPELINE COMPANY
Texaco................... 50.0
Continental............... 50.0
MUSKEGON PIPELINE COMPANY
Standard of Indiana. . . . 50.0 
Ohio Oil Co............... 50.0
Merged into National Transit in
1961.
Continental purchased Texaco’s 
interest in 1964.
Ohio Oil (now Marathon) purchased 
Standard's interest in 1960.
'' SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport 
Statistics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; USA Oil 
Directory, 1973-1976; Directory of Pipe Line Companies and Pipeline 
Contractors, 1953-1976; The Oil and Gas Journal, 1957-1976. Data was 
cross checked against ownership data published in congressional hear­
ings and prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission; data prepared 
by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines; the International Petroleum 
Register, 1966-67, Moody’s Industrial Manual selected annual issues, 
Moody’s Transportation Manual, selected annual issues. Additional data 
came from a variety of sources, such as the Tulsa Daily World, Tulsa 
Tribune, and Prospectus and Annual Reports of Petroleum and Pipeline 
Companies.
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TABLE B12
INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES THAT TRANSPORTED
REFINED PRODUCTS IN THE UÎ^ITED STATES, 1957-74
Pipeline Company 
& Parent Company
Reason Pipeline Company No Longer 
Reports to The Interstate 
Commerce Commission
AMERICAN OIL PIPELINE COMPANY 
Standard Oil of Indiana
APCO PIPELINE COMPANY 
Anderson-Prichard Oil
Formerly Fairfax Pipeline Co.
Merged into Service Pipeline Co.
(now Amoco Pipeline Co.) in 1959. 
Owned an undivided interest in 
Bayou operated by Shell Pipeline Co.
Tariffs cancelled in April, 1958.
AUGUSTA PIPELINE COMPANY 
Publicly held
CENEX PIPELINE COMPANY 
Farmers Union Central 
Exchange, Inc.
CENTRAL FLORIDA PIPELINE CO. 
Independent
Acquired by Kaneb Pipeline Co. in
1960.
Relieved of filing in 1971 by ICC.
No longer reporting to ICC.
MID-CONTINENT PIPELINE CO. 
Sunray-Midcontinent
TIDE-WATER PIPELINE CO. LTD. 
Tidewater Oil Co.
TUSCARORA PIPELINE COMPANY 
(In 1957 outstanding shares 
were in names of individuals 
who held stock in the inter­
est of Esso Standard Oil 
Co.)
Unknown
Tidewater was controlled by Getty. 
Activities transferred to Getty in 
1969.
Purchased by Buckeye Pipeline 
Company in 1960.
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statis­
tics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; The Inter­
national Petroleum Register, 1966-67; and Moody's Industrial Manual, 
selected annual issues.
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TABLE B13
INTERSTATE CORPORATE JOINT VENTURE PIPELINE COMPANIES TUAT
TRANSPORTED REFINED PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1957-74
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and 
Percent Ownership
Reason Pipeline Company No Longer 
Reports to Interstate Commerce 
Commission
CHEROKEE PIPELINE COMPANY
(Both crude and product)
Continental .  ......... 50.0
Cities Service........... 50.0
DETROIT SOUTHERN PIPELINE CO.
Pure..................... 51.0
S u n ..................... 29.0
Gulf.................. .'.20.0
GREAT LAKES PIPELINE COMPANY
Continental............. 29.2
Sunray D X ............... 19.0
S k e l l y ................. 14.2
Texaco . . . . . . . . .  12.1
Union of California . . .  9.5
Sinclair.................. 5.9
Cities Service............ 5.1
Phillips................ 5.0
OKLAHOMA-MISSISSIPPI PRODUCT
PIPELINE COMPANY, INC.
Sunray Mid-Continent. . . 49.6 
All Others . . . . . . .50.4
PROJECT FIVE PIPELINE COMPANY
Gulf.................   . 69.0
Socony Mobil ..........  24.0
Lion Oil Co............... 5.0
Premier Oil Refining. . . 2.0
SOUTHEASTERN PIPELINE COMPANY
Gulf..................... 52.5
Pure..................... 47.5
Gulf purchased Cities Service's 
interest in 1966. In 1974 Conti­
nental purchased Gulf's interest in 
company. (Now operating as a 
system.)
Pure purchased remaining 49% in 
1965 and merged company. Now a 
part of the Union Oil of Califor­
nia's pipeline operations.
Company was purchased by Williams 
Brothers Pipeline Co. in 1966. 
Debentures of Williams were initially 
held in same percent as was ownership 
in the Great Lakes Pipeline.
Merged into Sun Oil in 1972.
Merged into Texas Eastern Trans­
mission Co. in 1959.
Common carrier status ended in 
1963.
(Continued)
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TABLE B13 (CONTINUED)
Joint Venture Company, 
Participants, and 
Percent Ownership
Reason Pipeline Company No Longer 
Reports to Interstate Commerce 
Commission
SOUTHERN PIPELINE COMPANY
Ashland................. 42.0
Unknown................. 58.0
TECHE PIPELINE COMPANY
P u r e ................... 68.0
Cities Service........... 32.0
WABASH PIPELINE COMPANY
Ohio Oil Co.............. 75.0
Continental............. 25.0
WYOMING-NEBRASKA PIPELINE CO. 
Frontier Refining . . . .  51.0 
O t h e r s ................. 49.0
No records after 1963.
Unknown
Merged into Marathon Oil (formerly 
the Ohio Oil Co.) in 1972.
Company purchased by Nielson 
Enterprise and name changed to the 
Cheyenne Pipeline Co. in 1965.
SOURCE: Data compiled from The Oil Record, 1956-1959; the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, Valuation Dockets, 1973 and Transport Statis­
tics in the United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1957-1975; USA Oil Direc­
tory, 1953-1976; The Oil and Gas Journal, 1957-1976. Data was cross 
checked by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines; the International 
Petroleum Register, 1966-67, Moody's Industrial Manual, selected annual 
issues, Moody's Transportation Manual, selected annual issues. Addi­
tional data came from a variety of sources, such as the Tulsa Daily 
World, Tulsa Tribune, and Prospectus and Annual Reports of Petroleum and 
Pipeline Companies.
APPENDIX C
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TABLE Cl
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL BY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS, 1957
III I 03
1. STANDARD 
OIL (NJ)
2. SOCONY 
MOBIL
3. GULF
4. TEXAS CO.
S. STANDARD
OIL (IN)
6 SHELL
7. STANDARD 
O tL(C A)
SINCLAIR
S PHILLIPS
10. CITIES 
SERVICE
11. SUN
12.C0NTINENTAL
13. TIDEWATER
14. ATLANTIC 
REFINING
15. PURE OIL
16. UNION OIL 
O F CALIFORNIA
17. STANDARD 
OIL (OHIO)
IB. SUNRAY 
MIO-CONTINENT
19. ASHLAND 
OIL
20. OHIO OIL
21. SKELLY O IL
22. RICHFIELD 
OIL
23. PLYMOUTH 
OIL
24. AMERADA 
PETROLEUM
25. KERR
MC GEE
A LL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO
NON
PETROLEUM
13GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C2
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL BY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS, 1975
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1. EXXON \ 1
2. TEXACO 1 \ 1
3. MOBIL \
4. STANDARD 
OIL(CA) 1 \ 1
5. GULF 3 2 6
£. STANDARD
OIL (IN) 2 1 1 2 1 i 1 1 ! 1 5
7. SHELL 3 1 I 2 4 2 \
11 i ! ! 12
8. ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD 1 1 2 2 1 1 ! i 7
9. CONTINENTAL 1 2 2 2 \ 7
10. PHILLIPS 1 1
11. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA 1 2 1 4 1 \. 9
12. SUN 1 1 1 \ 3
13. ASHLAND 1 1 2
14. CITIES 
SERVICE 2 1 1 1 1 1 \\ 7
15. AMERADA
HESS \
16. GETTY o i l' 1 2 1 1 1 6
17. MARATHON 
OIL 1 1 2 1 2 7
IB. STANDARD; 
OIL (OHIO) 1 1 2 1 2 1 \ 8
19. KERR 
M C  GEE 1 1 1 3
20. DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK \
21. PENNZOIL \
22. CHARTER \
23. AMERICAN 
PETROFINf 1 1 1 1 1 1 \ 6
24. MURPHYOIL 1 1 \ 2
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM \
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO 2 5 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 5 7 5 7 1 \ , 48
NON
PETROLEUM 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 \ 17
GRAND TOTAL 14 I 9 15 10|21 6 8 13 6 1 8 11 8 2 9 1 9 4 1 2 158
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C3
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL BY JOINT VENTURE SYSTEMS, 1957
§i ii5=J wO O S ztü
•ÔO
1. STANDARD 
OIL(NJ)
2. S O C O N Y  
MOBIL
3. GULF
4. TEXAS CO.
S. STANDARD 
OIL (IN)
5 SHELL
7 STANDARD 
OIL(CA)
I. SINCLAIR
S. PHILLIPS
10 CITIES 
SERVICE
11. SUN
12.C0NTINENTAI
13. TIDEWATER
14. ATLANTIC 
REFINING
15. PURE OIL
16. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
17. STANDARD 
OIL (OHIO)
18. SUNRAY 
MID CONTINENT
19. ASHLAND 
OIL
20. OHIO OIL
21. SKELLY OIL
22. RICHFIELD 
OIL
23. PLYMOUTH 
OIL
24. AMERADA 
PETROLEUM
25. KERR
M C  GEE
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO 13
N O N
PETROLEUM
47G R AND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B,
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TABLE C4
NLTMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL BY JOINT VENTURE SYSTEMS, 1975
go
S x
1. EXXON
2. TEXACO
3. MOBIL
4. STANDARD 
O IL(C A)
S. GULF
6. STANDARD 
OIL (IN)
7. SHELL
6. ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD
9. CONTINENTAL
10. PHILLIPS
11. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
12. SUN
13. ASHLAND
14. CITIES 
SERVICE
IS. AMERADA
HESS
16. GETTY o il ’
17. MARATHON 
OIL
19. KERR 
MC GEE
20. DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK
21. PENNZOIL
22. CHARTER
AMLHICAN-}
PETROFINA
24. MURPHYOIL
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO. 32
NON
PETROLEUM
15213 14GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C5
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEÎ-IENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF REFINED PRODUCTS BY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS, 1957
<3
ii ii
92
cs:
1. STANDARD 
OIL (NJ)
2. SOCONY 
M OBIL
3. GULF
4. TEXAS CO.
5. STANDARD 
OIL (IN)
6. SHELL
7 STANDARD 
O IL(C A )
8. SINCLAIR
9. PHILLIPS
10. CITIES 
SERVICE
11. SUN
12.C0NTINENTAL
13. TIDEWATER
14. ATLANTIC 
REFINING
15. PURE OIL
16. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
17. STANDARD 
OIL (OHIO)
18. SUNRAY 
MID-CONTINENT
19. ASHLAND 
O IL
20. OHIO OIL
21. SKELLY OIL
22. RICHFIELD 
OIL
23. PLYMOUTH 
OIL
24. AMERADA 
PETROLEUM
25. KERR
MC GEE
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO
NON
PETROLEUM
14 64GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C6
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF REFINED PRODUCTS BY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS, 1975
09
52
Z Xli I5
1. EXXON
2. TEXACO
3. MOBIL
4 STANDARD 
O ILIC A )
5. GULF
6. STANDARD
OIL (INI 12
7. SHELL
[. ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD
9. CONTINENTAL
10. PHILLIPS
11. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA 20
12. SUN
13. ASHLAND
14. CITIES 
SERVICE 39
15. AMERADA 
HESS
16. GETTY o il '
17. MARATHON 
OIL 20
18. STANDARD 
OIL (OHIO
19. KERR 
MCGEE
20. DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK
21. PENNZOIL
22. CHARTER
24. MURPHYOIL
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO. 35
NON
PETROLEUM 12
1224 20 101 919 23£23GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C7
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEAIENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF REFINED PRODUCTS BY JOINT VENTURE SYSTEMS, 1957
III I
Z _ l 03
| o u iO O S ztü
« ÔO
1. S T A N D A R D  
OIL(NJ)
2. S O C O N Y  
M O e i L
3. G U L F
4. T E X A S  CO.
5. S T A N D A R D  
O IL (IN)
6. SMELL
7. S T A N D A R D  
OIL (CA)
6. S I N C L A I R
S PHILLIPS
10. CITIES 
S E R V I C E
11. S U N
1 2 . C 0 N T I N E N T A I
13. T I D E W A T E R
14. A T L A N T I C  
R E F I N I N G
IS. P U R E  OIL
16. U N I O N  OIL 
O F  C A L I F O R N I A
17. S T A N D A R D  
O IL (OHIO)
IB. S U N R A Y  
M I D - C O N T I N E N T
19. A S H L A N D  
OIL
20. O H I O  OIL
21. S K E L L Y  O I L
22. R I C H F I E L D  
O IL
23. P L Y M O U T H  
OIL
24. A M E R A D A  
P E T R O L E U M
25. K E R R
M C  G E E
A L L  O T H E R  
P E T R O L E U M  C O
N O N
P E T R O L E U M
33G R A N D  T O T A L
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C8
NUI-IBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF REFINED PRODUCTS BY JOINT VENTURE SYSTEMS, 1975
z z
52
S x
Zjz _ j Z _ |
1. EXXON
2. TEXACO
3. MOBIL
4. STANDARD 
O IL(C A)
5. GULF
6. STANDARD 
OIL (IN)
SHELL
I. ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD
9. CONTINENTAL
10. PHILLIPS
11. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
12. SUN
13. ASHLAND
14. CITIES 
SERVICE
15. AMERADA
HESS
16. G ETTYO IL '
17. MARATHON 
OIL
19. KERR
MC GEE
20. DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK
21. PENNZOIL
22. CHARTER
24. MURPHYOIL
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM
A LL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO.
NON
PETROLEUM
40GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
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TABLE C9
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTRASTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE AND REFINED PRODUCTS BY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS, 1957
§1 ii OS
55
1. STANDARD 
O IL(N J)
2. SOCONY 
MOBIL
3. GULF
4. TEXAS CO.
5. s t a n d a r d  
OIL (IN)
6. SHELL
7. s t a n d a r d  
OIL (CA)
8 SINCLAIR
9. PHILLIPS
10. CITIES 
SERVICE
11. SUN
12 CONTINENTAL
13- TIDEWATER
14. ATLANTIC 
REFINING
15. PURE OIL
16. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
17. s t a n d a r d  
O lL lO H tO )
16. SUNRAY 
MID-CONTINENT
19. ASHLAND 
OIL
20. OHIO OIL
21. SKELLY OIL
22. RICHFIELD 
OIL
23. PLYMOUTH 
OIL
24. AMERADA 
PETROLEUM
25. KERR
MC GEE
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO
NON
PETROLEUM
13GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B,
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TABLE CIO
NUMBER OF JOINT INTERLOCKING OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTRASTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE AKD REFINED PRODUCTS BY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS, 1975
09 z z
Z _ l O S
1. EXXON
2. TEXACO
3. MOBIL
4. STANDARD 
O IL(C A)
5. GULF
6. STANDARD 
OIL (IN)
7. SHELL
8 ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD
9. CONTINENTAL
10. PHILLIPS
11. UNION OIL 
OF CALIFORNIA
12. SUN
13. ASHLAND
14. CITIES 
SERVICE
IS . AMERADA
HESS
16. GETTY o il '
17. MARATHON
OIL
18. STANDARD
19. KERR 
MC GEE
20. DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK
21. PENNZOIL
22. CHARTER
AMkHICANj
PETROFINÆ
24. MURPHYOIL
25. TESORO 
PETROLEUM
ALL OTHER 
PETROLEUM CO.
NON
PETROLEUM
46GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Appendix B.
APPENDIX D
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T A B L E  D 1
J O I N T  C O Y P A N I T ?
O P ‘=-'v a TING p i p e l i n e  VILEAGZ
•=A R
G P A' 0  
T O T A L
T P U N K
C R U D E
L I N E S
p R c r u c ^
G - T H E h I N  
L I N E S
C T H E R  
G T H A \
O w n e d
5 7 3 5 2 9 3 . 1 2 1 9 6 . 12757. 1 0 2 5 9 . P I .
5 5 3  6 8  8 2 . 1 2 9 4 3 . 1 3 3 7 1 . 1 0 4 3 7 . 8 1  .
5 9 3 7 6 6 3 . 1 2 9 2 4 , 1 4 2 1 9 . 1 0 4 4  1 . 8  0 .
6 0 3 7 8 4 3 . 1 3 0 5 9 , 1 4 1 6 0 . 1 0 5 4 1 . 8 3 .
61 3 9 3 4 8 . 1 3 2 7 1  . 1 4 6 2 2 . 1 1 3 7 2 . 8 3 .
6 2 & 0 7 4 9 . 1 3 7 2 0 . 1 5 9 7 6 , 1 1 9 7  1 . 3 3 .
6 3 4 2 9 8 0 . l 4 0 0 4 , 1 7 5 9 3 . 1 1 2 4 0 , S 3 ,
6 A 4 4  3 9 9 . 1 4 - 0 2 0 . 1 9 0 4 6 . 1 1 2 5 0 , 3 3 .
6 5 4 4 5 7 6 . 1 4 2 6 8 . 1 9 4 1 0 . 1 1 2 9 6 , 2 .
6 6 4 5 7 4 9 . 1 4 2 8 4 . 1 9 6 2 2 . 1 1 3 4 1 , 2 .
6 7 4  0 0 0 1 . 1 4 7 4 7 . 1 3 4 2 2 . 1 1 8 3 0 . 2 .
6 8 4 1 2 3 5 . l 5 6 1 3 . 1 3 9 6 0 . 1 1 6 6 0 , 2  .
6 9 4 1 4 9 4 . 1 5 9 1 5 . 1 4 2 1 0 , 1 1 3 6 9 . 0 .
7 0 4 1 6 5 9 . 1 5 9 4  0 » 1 4 4 5 6 . 1 1 2 5 3 . 3 .
7 1 4 J  8 3 8 . 1 5 7 8 3 . 1 5 3 3 1 . i 0 7 2 4 , 0 .
7 2 4 1 2 9  7  . 1 5 2 4 4 . 1 6 9 7 6 . 9 0 6 7 . 0 .
7 3 3 9 3 0 3 . 1 5 3 0 6 . 1 5 3 2 7 . 3 1 7 0 , 0 .
7^ 4 0 3 9 4 . 1 4 9 4 2 . 1 7 0 4 4 . 3 4 0 8 . 0 .
7 5 3 8 4  0 ? . 1 4  9 . 1 . 7 , 1 5 5 3 3 . 3 0 1 1 . 0 .
SGU p c e : I h i T E P S T A T P  c o m m e r c e . C O M M I S S I O N .  " T P  A N S
' C P T M î 3 N  S T A T J S ^ I C S • I N  T H E  U N I T E D  S T A T E S : P A R T  6 .
P I P E L I N E S . "  W A S H I N G T O N :  U . S ,
O F F I C E .  A N N U A L L Y »
G O V ' F M E N T  P R I N T I N G
408
TABLE D2
J O:  N T  V ~ r . ' TUF 5 r r v P A N i r ç
( S H A P E o r  T C î L  V A P K 5 ~ ( t o t a l  = 1 .  0 ) )
P F  = A T I N G P I P r L I M 5 V T L 5 A G 3
jr-u'-iK, L : N c 3 ■t t h f p
r, c - h. p — —------- ------------------ : - A T H E P  I N C Tr-! AN
Y F A P 0  T A t C P U D E p p c r u c T L  ! N 3 S r i ' . vNLD
5 7 0 . 2 4  f ; 0 . 2 1  0 0 .  4  2 3 0 . 2 0 0 C .  0 1  0
5 6 0 . 2 5  3 0 .  2 2 2 0 . 4 2 9 0 . 2 1 3 j .  o:  9
5 9 0  .  2 5 4 0 .  2 1  o 0 . 3 9 7 0 . 2 1 2 0 .  0 1  9
6 0 0 . 2 5 1 0 . 2 2 ? 0 . 3 7 0 0 . 2 1 5 0 .  0 1  9
61 0 , 2 5 8 0 . 2 ^ 4 0 , 3 6 3 0 . 2 3 2 0 . 0 1 9
6 2 0  « 2 6 6 0 . 2 3  5 0 . 3 7 6 0  .  i  .3 1 0  .  0 1  9
6 3 û .  2"? 7 0 . 2 4 0 0 . 3 6  ? 0 . 2 4 1 0,  01 7
0 . 2 3 1 0 . 2 3 3 0 . 4 0 3 0 . 2 4 3 0 . 0 1 8
6 5 0 .  2 8  1 0 . 2 3 5 0 .  3 9 ? 0 . 2 4 6 C .  0 0  0
6 6 0 . 2 "  2 0 . 2 4 0 0 . 3 4 9 0 . 1 5 4 0 .  0 0 0
6 7 0 . 2 4 4 0 .  2 4 ? 0 . 2 6 1 0 . 2 5  2 0 .  0 0 0
6 3 0 , 2 4 f 0 . 2 5  3 0 . 2 6  2 0 .  2 4 9 0 .  ) J 0
6 9 0 . 2 4  t 0 . 2 5 7 0 . 2 5 6 0 , 2 4 7 0 .  0
7 0 0 .  2 4  2 0 .  2 5 3 0 . 2 5 6 0 ,  2 4 1 0 .  0 0 1
7 1 0 . 2 * 6 0 .  2 5 ? 0.266 0 . 2 3 3 D,  1
7 2 Ü ,  24  4 0 . 2 5 5 0 . 2 7 6 0 .  2 1  1 ü .  ü
7 - 0 . 2 5  7 0 . 2 6  7 0 . " 5 6 Ü .  !  9 6 ü .  0
7 4 0 . 2 3  9 0 . 2 6  0 0 . 2 6  0 0 , 2 0 2 0 .  0
7 5 0 .  2 2  9 0 .  2 6 1 0 . 2 4 4 0 .  2 0 0 0 .  0
3 C U P C 5  : C AL C ü L A . T ' - Û F P r v  d a t a P U B L 1 S H Ü D 3  Y T H ?
I K T E P S T  AT 5 C L ' M V - 4 CS c o v v n s s i O N  i N " 9  A N S P O R T A T I D N
s t a t i s t i  : 5  I N T H h U N I T E D S T A T E S  : P A P T  6 ,  P I P ? L  I N 6 S  .  "
A N N J  A L L Y ,
TABLE D3
JOINT V^NTUPü COMPANIES
SELECTED PHYSICAL OPERATING DATA (IN lOOOS OF E!APPELSI
PERCENT PERCENT
TOTAL I NPUT ORIOINATFD ORIGINATED TOTAL 1OUTPUT TERMINATED TERM!RATED
rpA fl CRMDF p r o d u c t CRUDE PRDDUCT CRUDE PRODUCT CRUDE PRODUCT CRUDE PRODUCT 1CRUDE PRCDUC
57 8 1 J43H. 3 3168). 4)4891. 221133. 3.50 ). 67 a )89aa. 327053. ' 321733. 303474. 0.40 0.93
5.9 786096. 340297. 410053. 231707. 0.52 0.68 785244. 3404 55. 339505. 314255. 0.43 0. 9?
59 846492. 391533. 460129. 277912. 0. 54 0. 71 859336. 3891C7. 379443. 349513. 0.44 0.9 )
6Î 849612. 3 9062 9. 461696. 265093. 0.54 0. 6 3 858065. 390432. 380096. 347523. 0.44 0. 89
61 912585. 407081. 525990. 270505. 0. 50 0. 60 909309. 406033. 422597. 358422. 0. 46 0. 00
62 949276. 458994. 556144. 32547). ). 59 J. 71 939)38. 456236. 436898. 4)47)1, 0.47 0.89
69 1003814, 488694. 602486. 357104. 0.60 0.73 1004021. 477660. 477747. 427077. 0. 48 0. 90
64 1V 10282. 596367. 638810. 501360. 0.63 0. 84 1009163. 5883 83. 495226. 532959. 0.49 0.91
65 I 332819. 7573)7. 656786. 648161. 0.64 0. 66 1033024. 7566 36. 517816. 635037. 0.50 0.84
66 1094503. 739844. 711417. 647220. 0.65 0.07 1091596. 741859. 566429. 645436. 0.52 0. 07
67 1134457, 83)818. 742714. 7 2 )852. ). 65 ). 67 1131 )37. 8293 64. 613935. 713542. ).54 ). 06
68 1251 347. 952005. 832229. 8 1 325C. 0.67 0.85 1245798, 9 50.2 t 3. 6 796 97'. 010879. 0.55 0. 05
69 1369660. 9932^1. 878206. 853435. 0.64 0.06 1365078. 0 9 ÎI 7 9. 733616. 348149. 0.54 0.3 3
7) 1513192. 1 )37519. 97)948. 892928. ) . 6 4 0.8 6 ! 509809. 1 0 1662". 818368. 086012. 0.54 0.0 5
71 1565230. 1099586. 1000106. 94 0479. 0.64 0.86 1505 365. J 09.27< c. 849613. 055110. C.S4 C. 37
72 165906C. 1223907. 1076006. 1)3)710. ).65 ). 04 I 6693 35. 12197 39. 9 )1 938. 1 J54704. ).54 0. 06
73 1837301. 1336332. 1141754. 1125577. 0.62 0.8 4 1834411. 1335!54. 502450. 1136087. 0.4 9 C. 05
74 1752871. 1289803. 1056729. 1076192. 0.60 0.83 1749021. 1289761. 379642. 1077124. 0.50 C. 84
75 16827)1. 1264485. 1 )31995. 1 )79305. ).6l ). 85 1676749. 1265257. 359450. 1057737. 0.51 0.04
O
VO
s o u r c e : CALCULATED FRCM DATA PUBLISHED ÜY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE C O w M ISS ION IN « T R ANSPCRTAT!CN 
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES: PART ü . PIPELINES." ANNUALLY.
TABLE D4
J O I N T  V S N T U C ^  C C M P f N I F S  
( ‘> H A T F  C P  T O T  4 L  V A ^ K E T  ( T O T A L  =  1 . 0 )  )
S E L E C T E D  P H Y S I C A L  O P E P A T I ' . ' G  D A T A
t o t a l  i n p u t OR  I G I N A  T £ D T O T *  L C U T I  ' U r T  =  OM T N A T E C
Vf; A p c p u n c P R O D U C T C R U D E P R O D U C T C R U D E P R O D U C T C P U D E P R O D U C T
5 7 0 . 5 2 3 0 .  4 0 ? 0 .  l  5 6 0 .  3 3 7 0 . 2 2 3 0 . 3 9 9 0 . 1 4 7 0 . 4 4 2
5 ’ ' j ,  ? :• 3 3 . 3  6 6 ) .  2 3 4 ) ,  3 J 9 ) .  2 3 3 3 .  3 6 5 1 . 1 6 7 3 . 4 ) 9
5  A 0 .  2 3 5 . 0 . 3  7 3 0 . 2 1 3 0 . 3 3 1 0 . 2 3 9 Ü . 3 7 P 0 .  1 7 3 0 . 4 2 0
c o 0 , 2 3 4 0 .  3 5 i 0 .  2  0 7 0 .  2 9 3 0 . 2 3 5 0  . 3 5 1 0 . 1 6 9 0 .  3 9 6
6 1 0 .  2 4 5 T .  3 4  ) 0 . 2 2 6 0 .  2 9 0 0 . 2 4 5 0 . 3 2  4 0 .  1 8 2 0 . 3 8 0
6 ? 0 .  2 5 1 0 .  3  4 6 0 .  2 3 4 0 .  3 0 3 0  .  2 4  9 0 . 3 4 5 0 . 1 8 1 0 , 7 8 3
f  T û .  2 5 8 0 .  3 4 1 0 . 2 4 4 1 .  3  0 3 9 .  2 5 7 ) . 3  1T 1 .  1 8 9 3 . 3 7 6
6 A 0 . 2 5 4 0 .  3 7 4 0 .  2 4  9 0 .  3 5 4 0 . 2 5 4 0 . 3 7 0 0 . 1 9 1 0 . 4 1 2
6 5 0 .  2 5 8 0 .  4  0 ? 0 .  2 5 1 0 .  3 9 9 0 .  2 5 9 0 , 4 0 7 0 . 1 9 6 0 . 4 3 7
6 5 i .  2 6  ) J .  3 6 4 0 .  2 5 2 ) .  3 6 5 ) . 2 6 ) )  .  3 6  5 0 .  2 0 0 0 .  3 9 5
6 7 0 .  2 5 4 0 ,  3  5 P 0 •  ?. 4  6 0 .  3 5 5 0 . 2 5 2 0 .  ■ ' 56 0 .  2 0 0 0 . 3 9 ?
6 5 0 .  5 6 5 0 , 3 7 5 0 .  2 6  0 0 .  3 7 0 :j .  2 6  4 0 . 3 7  3 J .  2 1  3 1 . 4 ) 3
6 0 0 .  ? 7 ? 0 .  3 6 7 0 . 2 5 8 0 .  3 6  9 0  .  2 7  1 0 . 3 6 6 0 . 2 2 0 0 .  3 9 ?
7 0 0 .  2 8 6 0 . 3 6 3 0 .  2 7 2 0 .  3 6 5 0 ,  2 5  5 0 . 3 6  ? 0 . 2 3 3 0  .  3 8 5
7  * ) .  2 0 6 ) .  3 6 4 0 .  2 8 7 0 .  0 6  î 1 , 2 9 5 1 . 3 6 3 1 . 2 4 1 1 . 3 8 7
7.? 0 . 3  0 3 0 .  3 6 5 0 . 2 9  5 0 .  3 5 9 0 . 3 0  3 0  « 3 6  5 0 , 2 5 1 0 . 3 9 0
7 3 0 .  3 2 1 0 , 3 6 7 0 . 3 1 3 Û .  3 6 2 0 . 3 1 9 0 . 3 6  c 0 . 2 4 4 0 .  3 9 3
7 4 J . 3 J 5 ) ,  3 6 3 0. 2 P 7 0 .  3 5 4 J .  3 0  5 0  .  3  6 ? 0 . 2 3 9 0 .  3 T Ç
7 5 0 .  2 9 0 .  3 4 5 G.  2 9 6 0 . 3 4 5 1 .  2 9 7 0 , 3 4 9 0 . 2 4 3 0 .  T 6 4
S O U R C E  : C A L  C U L A T . E D F R C M  D A T A P U ü L I S H L û J Y  T H E I N T E R S  T A T E C O Y P E O C F
-i>
MO
C C ^ H I S S I O N  I M " T R A N S P O R T A T I O N  
P A P T  6 .  P I P E L I N E S . "  a n n u a l l y .
> T A T 1 s t I C S  I N  T H F  U N I T F ü  S T A T E S :
J O I N T  VZNTU^'^ C r r P A N I E F
TABLE D5
S L t r C T t l D  P H Y S I C A I .  AND F I N A N C I A L  C n F ^ A T l N O  F A T I H S
AVER A G F  M I L L ' S A VE RAGE  REV £ N U E A V E R A G E  R X P E f J G F GRD S S - I N C OME
B AF Rf 'L S H  I  P R f D p p n D A R R E L M I L E PER B A R R E L r-’ I !.. r. PER E A P P E L M I L E
YEAS C P U D E PR T Ouc  T t o t a l C R U D E P R O D U C T T O T A L C P UD E P R O R U C ^ t o t a l C RUDE P R O D U C T
57 3 6 6 , 6 4 i ? , T 0 ,  0 0 C 4 9 0 .  0 0 ,  0 Û» 0 0  0 2 2 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 . 0  0 C 2 8 0 . 0 0 , 0
5 S 2 A 4 „ 4 4 ) 9 , 7 ) ,  ) ] ) 5 2 )  ,  J 3 ,  3 3 , 3 3 3 2 2 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 9 0 , 0 0 , ( 3
5 9 2 9 R Ü 3 8 7 , 3 0 , 0 0 C 5 Î 0 . 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 2 0 . 0 0 ,  0 0 . 0 0 0 2 9 0 . 0 0 , 0
f  0 7 9 3 , 0 7 0 ? ,  9 0 ,  0  0  05. 1 0 , 0 Ü,  0 3 , 3 3 3 2 2 3 .  3 3 ,  3 3 . 3  3 3 2 9 3 . 3 3 ,  3
C l 3  8 7 . .  8 2 8 6 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 4 9 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 2 0 . 0 0  ,  0 0 , 0 0 0 2 7 0 . 0 0 , 0
6 2 3 8 1 , 1 0 7 2 . 8 0 , 0 0 0 5 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 7 0 . 0 0  .  0
6 3 2 0 3  , 7 3 ? T ,  9 0 ,  )  )  ) 4 9 ) ,  j 3 .  3 3 . 3 3 3 2  2 3 .  3 3 ,  3 3 .  3 3 3 2 7 3 . 0 0 . 0
6 4 3 8 6 »  1 4 4  7 , 5 0 , 0 0 0 4 5 0 . 0 0 0 3 8 0 , 0 0 0 5 7 0 , 0 0  0 2 5 0 . 0  0  01  9 0 , 0  0 0 3 3 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 9 0 , 0 0 0 2 4
6 5 3 9 4 , 1 5 6  4 ,  2 0 , 0  0  0 4 1 0 , 0 0 0  2 8 0 .  0 0 0 4  4 0 , 0 0 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 0 1  9 0 , 0 0  0 2 ? 0 .  3 3 3 2 1 3 ,  3 3 3 1  9 3 , 3  3 3 2 2
6 '"' 3 8 9 , 9 6  2 1 . 2 0 , 0 0 0 3 7 0 . 0 0  0  3 5 0 , 0 0  0  3 3 0 . 00  0 1 a 0 .  0 0 0 1  8 0 ,  0 0 0 1  8 0 ,  0 0 0 1  9 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 0 . 0 0 0 2 0
6 7 3  8 6 ,  0 It 6' 6  ,  0 0 . 0 0 0 2 4 0 ,  0 0 0 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 3 4 0 . 0 0  0 1  7 0 . 0 0 0 1  8 0 ,  0 0 01 4 0 , 0 0 0 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 1 6
6 9 3 8 1  . . T 6  6  2 , 7 J .  ) )  D 3 2 ) .  ) )  ] 34 3 ,  3 3 3 3 3 3, 3 3 3 1 7 3 .  3 3 31 ? 3 . 3 3 ) 1 6 3,33315 3 ,  3 3 31 5 3 . 3 3 3 1 4
6 9 2 6 ? , ? 6  6  0 ,  9 0 . 0 0 0 3 2 0 , 0 0 0 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 3 0 0 , 0 0  0 1  7 0 , 0 0 0 1  9 0 . 0 0 3 1 6 0 . 0  0 0 1  5 0 ,  0 0 0 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 1  4
7 0 3 7 4  , ? 6  3 9 , 6 0 , 0 0 0 3 3 0 .  0 0  0 3 4 0 ,  0 0 0 3 2 0 . 0 0 0 1  7 0 . 0 0 0 1  8 0 . 0 0 0 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 1 6 0 , 0 0  31 6 3 .  3 3 3 1 5
71 T O ] ,  8 4  1 4 . 4 ] .  ) ]  ) 3 4 3 .  0  0 0  3 4 0 . 0 0 0  3 5 0 , 0 0 0 1  e 0 .  0 Û 0 J e 0 ,  0 0 or 8 0 .  0  0 C l  6 0 , 0 0 0 1  6 0 , 0 0 0 1 7
7 2 3 8 5 , 2 6 1 1 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 4 0 , 0 0 0 2 3 0 , 0 0  0 3 4 0 , 0 0 0  1 9 0 , 0 0 0 1 6 0 , 0  0  Cl  9 0 . 0 0 0 1  5 0 , 0 0 0 1 5 0 , n c o  1 5
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TABLE El
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERSTATE PIPELINE NET INVESTMENTS 
IN PAD I, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1972 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Company
Market Value of Investments^
Percent of 
Grand TotalTotal Subsidiaries
Corporate 
Joint Ventures
Pennsylvania Co. 78.4 78.4 11.7
Gulf Oil 73.9 2.1 71.8 11.0
Exxon Corp. 64.0 4.3 59.7 9.5
Texaco, Inc. 60.6 3.3 57.3 9.0
Mobil Oil 52.9 21.1 31.8 7.9
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 40.8 — — 40.8 6.1
Cities Service Co. 38.5 — 38.5 5.7
Atlantic Richfield Co. 35.6 29.8 5.8 5.3
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 35.0 6.3 28.7 5.2
Shell Oil Co. 33.9 —— 33.9 5.0
Standard Oil Co. CA 27.8 27.8 4.1
Phillips Petroleum 22.0 - 22.0 3.3
Continental Oil Co. 20.9 - 20.9 3.1
Sun Oil Co. 19.1 19.1 — 2.8
Texas Eastern Trans. Co .18.6 18.6 - 2.8
Union Oil Co. of CA 10.7 —  — 10.7 1.6
Pennzoil 7.4 7.4 1.1
All Others 30.8 4.6%
Total Investments,
All Companies 670.9
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 41.2
Top 8 66.2
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SOURCE; Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport Statistics in the 
United States. Part 6: Pipelines, 1972. Pipeline investments were 
assigned to the above companies based on the ownership data in Appendix B. 
Joint venture investments were prorated to these companies based on the 
percent owned by the participants.
Market value of investments (net investment) is defined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for valuation purposes as the cost of 
reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
2
Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE E2
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERSTATE PIPELINE NET I^ŒSTMEILES
IN PAD II, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1972
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Company
Market Value of Investments^
Total Subsidiaries
Corporate 
Joint Ventures
Percent of 
Grand Total
Williams Companies 237.3 237.3 12.2
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 131.7 121.4 10.3 6.8
Atlantic Richfield Co. 110.0 83.2 26.8 5.7
Texaco, Inc. 96.0 36.1 59.9 4.9
Shell Oil Co. 93.2 45.0 48.2 4.8
Pennsylvania Co. 91.8 91.8 — — 4.7
Gulf Oil 90.2 6.8 83.4 4.6
Mapco, Inc. 90.0 90.0 - 4.6
Marathon Oil 80.2 66.0 14.2 4.1
Phillips Petroleum Co. 79.8 70.5 9.3 , 4.1
Exxon Corp. 69.1 0.5 68.6 3.6
Union Oil Co. of CA 65.7 18.2 47.5 3.4
Continental Oil 55.6 20.1 35.5 2.9
Sun Oil 53.5 23.6 29.9 2.8
Mobil Oil 52.5 41.0 11.5 2.7
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 48.5 30.3 18.2 2.5
Cities Service 48.3 4.9 43.4 2.5
Hydrocarbon 47.2 47.2 -- . 2.4
Texas East. Trans. Crp . 45.7 45.7 - 2.4
Ashland Oil Co. 38.6 31.8 6.8 2.0
Kaneb, Inc. 31.4 31.4 I ■! —* 1.6
Clark Oil & Refining 16.7 — 16.7 0.9
Getty Oil3 5.7 - 5.7 0.3
Diamond Shamrock 3.8 - 3.8 0.2
All Others 256.8 13.3
Total Investment,
All Companies 1939.5 100.0%
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 29.6
Top 8 48.3
Top 20 83.7
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SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport Statistics in the 
United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1972. Pipeline investments were 
assigned to the above companies based on the ownership data in Appendix 
B. Joint venture investments were prorated to these companies based on 
the percent owned by the participants.
^Market value of investments (net investment) is defined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for valuation purposes as the cost of 
reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
2Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
3
Includes Skelly Oil Company.
A?2
TABLE E3
DISTRIBUTION OE INTERSTATE PIPELINE NET INVESTÎ-IENTS
IN PAD III, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1972
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Company
Market Value of 
Total Subsidiaries
Investments^
Corporate 
Joint Venture
Percent of 
Grand Total
Exxon Corp. 310.8 245.8 65.0 16.2
Gulf Oil 220.1 143.3 76.8 11.5
Texaco, Inc. 195.1 129.9 65.2 10.2
Mobil Oil 181.7 158.7 23.0 9.5
Shell Oil 158.6 118.0 50.6 8.8
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 102.3 71.8 30.5 5.3
Atlantic Richfield 96.8 67.3 29.5 5.0
Standard Oil Co. CA 91.4 56.4 35.0 4.8
Cities Service Co. 66.5 22.5 44.0 3.5
Phillips Petroleum 66.1 46.1 20.0 3.4
Sun Oil Co. 61.3 32.7 28.6 3.2
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 56.1 18.7 37.4 2.9
Texas East. Trans. Corp., 48.1 48.1 ---- 2.5
Union Oil Co. of CA 44.4 23.8 20.6 2.3
Continental Oil Co. 31.1 8.4 22.7 1.6
Ashland Oil Co. 29.8 28.4 1.4 1.5
Mapco, Inc. 29.6 29.6 - 1.5
Diamond Shamrock 23.6 23.6 ---- 1.2
Amerada-Hess 19.8 19.8 ---- 1.0
Marathon Oil 14.7 — 14.7 0.8
Southern Pacific Co. 8.6 8.6 — 0.4
All Others 50.4 2.7
Total Investment,
All Companies 1916.9 100.0%
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 47.4
Top 8 71.3
Top 20 96.7
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SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport Statistics in the 
United States, Part &: Pipelines, 1972. Pipeline investments were assigned 
to the above companies based on the ownership data in Appendix B. Joint 
venture investments were prorated to these companies based on the percent 
owned by the participants.
Hlarket value of investments (net investment) is defined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for valuation purposes as the cost of 
reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
2
Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE E4
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERSTATE PIPELINE NET INVESTMENTS
IN PAD IV, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1972
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Company
Market Value of 
Total Subsidiaries
Investments^ 
Corporate 
Joint Ventures
Percent of 
Grand Total
Continental Oil 60.4 41.9 18.5 24.3
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 48.1 41.3 6.8 19.3
Standard Oil Co. CA 30.8 29.9 0.9 12.4
Phillips Petroleum Co. 13.3 13.3 — 5.3
Marathon Oil 12.3 7.4 4.9 4.9
Union Oil Co. of Ca. 11.7 1.6 10.1 4.7
Bell Fourche 10.7 10.7 - 4.3
Atlantic Richfield 9.8 - 9.8 3.9
Shell Oil Co. 9.6 0.3 9.3 3.9
Exxon Corp. 9.4 7.0 2.4 3.8
Texaco, Inc. 8.3 0.5 7.8 3.3
Diamond Shamrock 4.1 4.1 - 1.6
Mobil Oil 3.8 0.4 3.4 1.5
Gulf Oil 3.7 - 3.7 1.5
Getty Oil Co.3 1.7 1.5 0.2 0.7
All Others 11.0 4.4
Total Investment,
All Companies 248.7 100.0%
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 61.3
Top 8 79.1
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport Statistics in the 
United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1972. Pipeline investments were 
assigned to the above companies based on the ownership data in Appendix 
B. Joint venture investments were prorated to these companies based on 
the percent owned by the participants.
Market value of investments (net investment) is defined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for valuation purposes as the cost of 
reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
2
Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
^Includes Skelly Oil Co.
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TABLE E5
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERSTATE PIPELINE NET INVESTMENTS
IN PAD V, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1972
(MILLIONS OF DOLL.\RS)
Company
Market Value of 
Total Subsidiaries
Investments^ 
Corporate 
Joint Ventures
Percent of 
Grand Total
Southern Pacific Co. 107.2 107.2 __ 47.0
Shell Oil Co. 21.2 - 21.2 9.3
Standard Oil Co. CA 20.4 9.1 11.3 8.9
Mobil Oil 16.9 - 16.9 7.4
Atlantic Richfield 14.3 - 14.3 6.3
Union Oil Co. of CA 11.4 11.4 5.0
Marathon Oil 10.8 - 10.8 4.7
Texaco, Inc. 8.9 - 8.9 3.9
Gulf Oil 5.3 - 5.3 2.3
Continental Oil 3.9 - 3.9 1.7
Exxon Corp. 2.4 0.9 1.5 1.0
Standard Oil Co. Ind 0.3 - 0.3 0.1
All Others 4.9 2.1
Total Investments, 9
All Companies 227.9 100.0
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 72.6
Top 8 92.5
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Valuation Dockets, 1973, and Transport Statistics in the 
United States, Part 6 : Pipelines, 1972. Pipeline investments were 
assigned to the above companies based on the ownership data in Appendix 
B. Joint venture investments were prorated to these companies based 
on the percent owned by the participants.
^Market value of investments (net investment) is defined by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for valuation purposes as the cost of 
reproduction less depreciation (and excluding land).
2
Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
TABLE E6
DISTRIBUTION OE OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, BY COMPANY, 1973 
(CAPACITY IN THOUSANDS BARRELS PER DAY)
Grand Total United States Central & So. Amerlc;
Capacity
Percent 
Of Total Capacity
Percent 
Of Total Capacity
Percent 
Of Total
Exxon 2,555.0 13.7 1,242.0 8.7 1,313.0 29.4
Shell? 2,044.6 10.9 1,127.0 7.9 917.6 20.6
Texaco 1,510.1 8.1 1,058.0 7.4 452.1 10.1
Standard Oil (CA) 1,220.7 6.5 952.0 6.7 268.7 6.0
Standard Oil (IN) 1,072.3 5.7 1,065.0 7.5 7.3 0.2
Mobil 1,055.3 5.7 950.3 6.7 105.0 2.4
Gulf 998.3 5.3 860.6 6 .0 137.7 3.1
Atlantic Richfield 830.4 4.4 785.0 5.5 45.4 1.0
Amerada Hess 688.5 3.7 98.5 0.7 590.0 13.2
Sun 569.0 3.0 484.0 3.4 85.0 1.9
Union Oil of CA 487.0 2.6 487.0 3.4 .—  —. —  —
Phillips 408.7 2.2 403.7 2.8 5.0 0.1
Standard Oil (Ohio) 388.0 2.1 388.0 2.7 ---- —
Continental 364.0 1.9 364.0 2.6 —— —
Ashland 361.8 1.9 361.8 2.5 — ----
Marathon 318.0 1.7 318.0 2.2 —  — ----
New England Petrol 300.0 1.6 ----- - 300.0 6.7
Cities Service 268.0 1.4 268.0 1.9 — —
Getty 213.7 1.1 213.7 1.5 — —
American Petrofina 200.0 1.1 200.0 1.4 — — —
N
o\
CONTINUED
TABLE E6 CONTINUED
Grand Total United States Central & So. America
Capacity
Percent 
Of Total Capacity
Percent 
Of Total
Percent 
Capacity Of Total
All Others 
Total
2,830.0
18,683.4
15.1 
100.03
2,593.6
14,220.2
18.2 
100.03
236.4 5.3 
4,463.2 100.03
Concentration Ratio 
TOP 4 
TOP 8 
TOP 20
39.2
60.3 
84.6
30.4
56.4
81.5
66.1
72.8
SOURCE: Data for the United States and Puerto Rico from Bureau of Mines, Minerai Industry Survey, 
"Petroleum Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, January 1, 1974"; capacity data for other 
areas from the Petroleum Publishing Company, International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1974; and ownership 
data for refineries outside the United States from James Sturgeon, "Joint Ventures in the International 
Petroleum Industry: Exploration and Drilling" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 
1973).
^Includes only Central America, Caribbean, Venezuela and Puerto Rico; joint venture refineries 
are prorated to parent company based on percent participation; all known subsidiaries are included in 
parent totals; and excludes a 250,000 B/D refinery in El Salvador jointly owned by J. A. Clements and 
Associates/Toyo Menka Kaisha Ltd. which just came on stream and was not exporting products in 1973.
2
Royal Dutch/Shell Group.
3
Detail may not equal 100 due to rounding.
fo
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TABLE E7
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY
IN PAD I, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1973
Company
Operating Capacity 
(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Percent of 
Grand Total
Exxon Corp. 265.0 15.8
Atlantic Richfield Co. 185.0 11.0
Gulf Oil 168.5 10.1
Sun Oil Co. 165.0 9.9
Mobil Oil 148.3 8.9
Getty Oil Co. 140.0 8.4
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 100.0 6.0
Texaco, Inc. 88.0 5.3
Standard Oil Co. CA 88.0 5.3
-Stnnd.a^ Oil Co. Ind. 75.0 4.5
Ashland Oil Co. 70.8 4.2
Amerada Hess Corp. 70.0 4.2
Pennzoil Co. 16.3 1.0
All Others 93.6 5.6
Total Operating Capacity 1,673.5 100.0^
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 46.9
Top 8 75.5
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Sur\eys, "Petroleum 
Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, Jar . 1, 1974."
^Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE E8
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY
IN PAD II, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1973
Operating Capacity 
Company (Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Percent of 
Grand Total
Standard Oil Co. Ind 575.0 14.8
Ashland Oil Co. 291.0 7.5
Standard Oil Co. Ohio 288.0 7.4
Mobil Oil 272.0 7.0
Sun Oil Co. 262.0 6.7
Shell Oil Co. 260.0 6.7
Marathon Oil 257.0 6.6
Texaco, Inc. 206.0 5.3
Union Oil Co. of CA 152.0 3.9
Continental Oil 140.5 3.6
Atlantic Richfield Co. 126.0 3.2
Farmland Industries 121.1 3.1
Clark Oil and Refining Co. 108.0 2.8
Kock Industries 107.0 2.7
Gulf Oil 92.4 2.4
Phillips Petroleum 85.0 2.2
Getty Oil Co.2 73.7 1.9
Champlin Oil Co.^ 49.5 1.3
Murphy Oil Corp. 37.0 1.0
American Petrofina Co.^ 25.0 0.6
All Others 327.7 8.4
Total Operating Capacity 3889.4 100.0^
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 36.7
Top 8 62.0
Top 20 90.7
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SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Department 
of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Petroleum 
Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, Jan. 1, 1974."
1Includes CRA, Inc. and National Cooperative Refining Association. 
2
Includes Skelly Oil Co.
Includes American Petrofina of Texas.
^A wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Pacific Railroad
^Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE E9
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY IN
PAD III, BY MAJOR COMPANY, 1973
Operating Capacity Percent of
Company (Thousand Barrels Per Day) Grand Total
Exxon Corp. 845.0 14.2
Texaco, Inc. 630.0 10.6
Shell Oil Co. 586.0 9.9
Gulf Oil 521.2 8.8
Mobil Oil 335.0 5.6
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 333.0 5.6
Standard Oil Co. CA 311.0 5.2
Cities Service Co. 268.0 4.5
Atlantic Richfield Co. 213.0 3.6
Phillips Petroleum 180.0 3.0
American Petrofina Co.^ 175.0 2.9
Coastal States Petrochemical Co. 135.0 2.3
Union Oil Co. of CA 116.0 2.0
Southwestern Oil & Refining Co. 105.0 1.8
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 100.0 1.7
Continental Oil 98.0 1.7
Tenneco Oil Co. 97.5 1.6
Murphy Oil Corp. 92.5 1.6
Charter Companies^ 70.0 1.2
Champlin Oil Co.^ 62.2 1.0
All Others 659.5 11.1
Total Operating Capacity 5932.9 100.o4
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 43.5
Top 8 64.4
Top 20 88.8
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SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Department
of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Petroleum 
Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, Jan. 1, 1974."
^Includes American Petrofina of Texas and Cosden Oil and 
Chemical Co.
^Charter Oil Co.
A wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Pacific Railroad
^Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE ElO
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY IN
PAD IV, BY ELAJOR COMPANIES, 1973
Operating Capacity Percent of
Company (Thousand Barrels Per Day) Grand Total
Continental Oil 82.5 16.3
Standard Oil Co. Ind. 82.0 16.2
Husky Oil Co. 46.5 9.2
Exxon Corp. 45.0 8.9
Standard Oil Co. CA 45.0 8.9
Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. 41.6 8.2
Pasco, Inc. 40.0 7.9
Phillips Petroleum 28.7 5.7
Texaco, Inc. 21.0 4.1
The Refinery Corp. 17.5 3.5
Little America Refining Co. 16.8 3.3
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 10.5 2.1
All Others 28.6 5.6
Total Operating Capacity 505.7 100.oi
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 50.6
Top 8 81.3
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Department of
the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Petroleum
Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, Jan. 1, 1974."
^Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE Ell
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING REFINERY CAPACITY IN
PAD V, BY MAJOR COMPANIES, 1973
Operating Capacity 
Company (Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Percent of 
Grand Total
Standard Oil Co. CA 508.0 22.9
Shell Oil Co. 281.0 12.7
Atlantic Richfield Co. 261.0 11.8
Union Oil Co. CA 219.0 9.9
Mobil Oil 195.0 8.8
Texaco, Inc. 113.0 5.1
Phillips Petroleum 110.0 5.0
Exxon Corp. 87.0 3.9
Gulf Oil 78.5 3.5
Continental Oil 43.0 1.9
Edgington Oil Refineries, Inc. 33.0 1.5
Champlin Oil Co.^ 28.8 1.3
Powerine Oil Co. 28.5 1.3
San Joaquin Oil Co. 27.0 1.2
Toscopetro Corp. 26.6 1.2
All Others 179.3 8.1
Total Operating Capacity 2218.7 100.02
CONCENTRATION RATIO (PERCENT)
Top 4 57.3
Top 8 80.1
SOURCE: Calculated from data published by the U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Petroleum 
Refineries in the United States and Puerto Rico, January 1, 1974."
^A wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Pacific Railroad.
^Details may not equal 100 due to rounding.
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